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For my inspiring Mother; without her I would not be here.
Abstract  
 
This thesis aims to resolve the puzzling standing of democracy in international 
law. To date, international lawyers have been caught between the exceedingly 
careful approach, by either resisting to the notion of democracy as a legal 
concept tout court or acknowledging that only the electoral dimension of 
democracy, that is the right to free and fair elections, is a positive legal right, 
and the exceedingly maximalist approach, according to which democracy, 
equated with all sorts of social virtues of a liberal society, is a human right and 
a state obligation. Both accounts suffer from a lack of a clear methodological 
reflection and thus fail upon deeper theoretical scrutiny. This thesis sets out to 
respond to these shortcomings by developing a contextualised (context-aware) 
approach to democracy but within the proper confines of the de lege lata legal 
discourse. That said, global constitutionalism as a political theory and a legal 
approach providing the most adequate account of transformative nature and 
potential of international law serves as a theoretical framework for the present 
thesis. On this account, because (empirically validated) constitutionalisation of 
international law entails the law’s increasing autonomisation vis-à-vis states, 
non-consensual elements within international law, such as teleological and 
evolutive treaty interpretation, evolving nature of custom towards one 
accommodating interests of states as members of the international community, 
softening of international legal obligation, the ever-growing impact of 
equitable general principles and the reinvigorated role of legitimacy in the legal 
discourse, provide an important source of the democratic entitlement’s legal 
underpinnings. 
Beyond this complex theoretical construction, it is shown that not only is 
the right to democracy an abstract academic invention fostered by the 
constitutional rationale, but it is also actively defended both by the 
international community (external defence) and domestic actors (internal 
defence). Whereas the external mechanism of democracy promotion and 
defence is marked by the elevated willingness of the international community 
to intervene in response to democratic disruptions and backsliding, such as 
coups d’état, the internal mechanism is triggered by the bottom-up resistance 
by means of revolution as an ultima ratio tool to restore democracy and an 
ultimate remedy to effectuate the right to democratic governance. It is 
concluded that international law recognises the right to democratic governance 
and provides for the external and internal mechanisms of its defence and 
enforcement. Certainly, this does not signify an end to the contestation over 
the substantive scope of democracy and the concrete parameters of its legal 
status. However, this does suggest that the preceding black and white 
discussions on democracy are clearly insufficient for understanding the 
operation of this multifaceted concept and its impact on international relations. 
This work has taken a step forward to add shade and texture to the rigid and 
monochrome view on democracy of the previous years. 
Sammanfattning 
 
Den här avhandlingen strävar till att klargöra demokratins förbryllande 
ställning i folkrätten. Fram till nu har folkrättare ställts mellan en överdrivet 
försiktig inställning, där de antingen utan vidare förkastar demokratibegreppet 
som ett juridiskt koncept eller betraktar enbart valdimensionen, det vill säga 
rätten till fria och rättvisa val, som en positiv rättighet och en överdrivet 
maximalistisk inställning enligt vilken demokrati, som likställs med en mängd 
olika dygder i det liberala samhället, är en mänsklig rättighet och en statlig 
skyldighet. Båda förklaringarna lider av en brist på metodologisk reflektion 
och fallerar vid en närmare teoretisk granskning. Denna avhandling tar sig an 
att svara på dessa tillkortakommanden genom att utveckla en kontextuell 
(kontextmedveten) inställning till demokrati inom ramen för en juridisk 
diskussion de lege lata. Global konstitutionalism som politisk teori och rättligt 
synsätt tillhandahåller dock den mest adekvata förklaringen av folkrättens 
transformativa karaktär och potential och fungerar som teoretisk ram för den 
här avhandlingen. Av detta skäl, eftersom (empiriskt validerad) 
konstitutionalism i folkrätten innebär växande autonomi för lagen gentemot 
staterna, tillhandahåller de icke-konsensuella elementen i folkrätten, såsom 
teleologisk och dynamisk tolkning av fördrag, sedvanerättens tendens att 
utvecklas på ett sätt som tillgodoser staternas intressen som medlemmar i det 
internationella samfundet, uppluckring av internationella rättsliga 
förpliktelser, ett alltmer växande inflytande från rättvisa allmänna principer 
och en återupptagen roll för legitimitet i den rättsliga diskursen, en viktig källa 
till den rättsliga grunden för rätten till demokrati. 
Bortom denna komplexa teoretiska konstruktion visar avhandlingen att 
rätten till demokrati inte bara är en abstrakt akademisk konstruktion som 
grundas på ett konstitutionellt resonemang utan också att den aktivt försvaras 
både av det internationella samfundet (externt försvar) och nationella aktörer 
(internt försvar). Medan den externa mekanismen som främjar och försvarar 
demokrati markeras av det internationella samfundets ökande beredskap att 
intervenera när demokratin störs eller tar ett steg bakåt, såsom vid statskupper, 
initieras den interna mekanismen av motstånd på gräsrotsnivå i form av 
revolutioner som ett sista medel för att återställa demokrati och som ett slutligt 
rättsmedel för att genomföra rätten till demokrati. Slutsatsen är att folkrätten 
erkänner rätten till demokratiskt styre och tillhandahåller externa och interna 
mekanismer för att försvara och genomtvinga den. Detta innebär visserligen 
inte ett slut på ifrågasättandet av demokratins innehållsmässiga omfattning och 
de konkreta parametrarna för dess rättsliga status. Det tyder dock på att de 
tidigare nämna svartvita diskussionerna av demokrati är klart otillräckliga för 
att förstå hur detta mångfacetterade koncept fungerar och vilken inverkan det 
har på internationella relationer. Detta arbete utgör ett steg framåt i strävan att 
Sammanfattning 
 v 
ge nyanser och textur åt den stela och monokroma synen på demokrati under 
tidigare år.1 
 
                                               
1 I am greatly indebted to my colleague and friend Dr Lisa Grans for making a Swedish 
translation of the abstract. 
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1. Introduction: Setting the Scene 
 
Before the Cold War, references to the notion of democracy in the writings of 
international lawyers were meagre. The mainstream view succinctly expressed 
by the American Law Institute that ‘international law does not generally 
address domestic constitutional issues, such as how a national government is 
formed’1 was a generally accepted dogma. Regardless of the enshrinement of 
a bunch of civil and political rights and freedoms, including the right to 
political participation and the freedoms of assembly, opinion and expression, 
in legal instruments of global reach, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1966 Human Rights Covenants, the 
heterogeneity of member states’ political regimes had hindered the emergence 
of an unequivocal interpretation of the concept of democracy. Moreover, 
recognition practices of states and international organisations based on 
pragmatic considerations of ‘effective control’ would have been frustrated 
should democracy have asserted itself as a universal legal principle, not to say, 
a globally enforceable human right. 
Following the fall of communism, however, and the subsequent emergence 
of new states, the international community turned out to be more amenable to 
an idea that international law should take a more rigorous stance towards how 
states are internally constructed and what level of protection they give to their 
citizens.2 To illustrate, the proportion of (electoral) democracies has increased 
sharply, and as of the end of 2018, approximately 116 nations are legally 
committed to permit open, multiparty, secret-ballot elections with a universal 
franchise.3 Leading international and regional organisations have reaffirmed 
the right to political participation, including the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA), the ICCPR Human Rights Committee, regional judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the American 
Commission on Human Rights, and their umbrella organisations, namely the 
Council of Europe and the Organisation of American States respectively, not 
to mention the collective defence mechanisms within the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe and the African Union. Democracy and 
human rights are now requirements for admission of new member states into 
the European Union and a number of other regional organisations. The UN too 
is now explicitly pro-democratic and together with its regional counterparts is 
becoming actively involved in the crafting and monitoring of elections in 
                                               
1 Restatement, Third, of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute 
1987) para 203. 
2 See eg Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law (Hart Publishing 2013) 1. 
3 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2018’, Annual Report 
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores> accessed 28 
November 2018. 
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various countries across the globe.4 Other devices used by international fora to 
foster democratisation include the withholding of development assistance to 
states unwilling to pursue democratic reforms5 as well as the promotion of 
democratic practices through peace-building operations6 and, in extreme cases, 
through the use of force.7 The most recent cases of global promotion of 
democracy include international support of the grass-root revolutions against 
authoritarian regimes in the Arab world and Ukraine as ultimate means to 
uphold peoples’ democratic aspirations. On top of this, the internationalisation 
of democracy is reinforced by the recent proclamation by the UNGA of an 
International Day of Democracy on 15 September.8 All in all, democracy, as 
two prominent commentators in this area have concluded, ‘has become a 
central issue of international law, visualised by the continuous and continuing 
adoption of treaties, declarations, resolutions and other policy instruments’.9 
This post-Cold War international legal landscape induced many 
international legal scholars to characterise democracy as a legal principle, 
customary norm and even a human right. In this way, the mutual 
interdependence between democracy and human rights was recognised10 as 
well as the perennial antagonism between the ‘liberty of ancients’ (public 
rights, or positive liberty) and the ‘liberty of moderns’ (individual rights, or 
negative liberty) was reconciled.11 The debate about democracy has come to 
                                               
4 See generally Yves Biegbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites and National Elections 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994). 
5 See Stephen Haggard and Steven B Webb, Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political 
Liberalization and Economic Adjustment (OUP 1994); Barbara Brandtner and Allan Rosas, 
‘Human Rights and the External Relations of the European Community: An Analysis of 
Doctrine and Practice’ (1998) 9 EJIL 468, 473-77. 
6 Russell Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart Publishing 
2013) 154-59. 
7 See inter alia Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to 
Tyranny’ (1990) 84 AJIL 516; Michael W Reisman, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling 
Democracies’ (1995) 18 Fordham Int’l L J 794; Fernando R Teson, ‘Collective Humanitarian 
Intervention’ (1996) 17 Mich J Int’l L 323; Fernando R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Inquiry into Law and Morality (Transnational Publishers 1997); Michael W Reisman, 
‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law’ in Gregory H Fox and 
Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 239-58; 
Fernando R Teson, ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’ in JL Holzgrefe and 
Robert O Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (CUP 2003) 93-129. 
8 UNGA Res 62/7 (8 November 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/7, para 6. 
9 Frithjof Ehm and Christian Walter (eds), International Democracy Documents: A Compilation 
of Treaties and Other Instruments (Brill/Nijhoff 2015) 1. 
10 See eg David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Polity 1999). See also Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights (25 June 1993) para 
8 (‘Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of the 
people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full 
participation in all aspects of their lives’). 
11 See Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press 1995) 100-04 (The author 
employs the terms ‘public autonomy’ and ‘private autonomy’ and claims to resolve a 
contradiction between them). For the discussion on two liberties, see Wilfred Nippel, Ancient 
and Modern Democracy: Two Concepts of Liberty? (CUP 2016) 204-11, 348-50. 
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camouflage a debate about the constant progressing of the international 
community from the anarchical Westphalian society of self-interested 
Leviathans to a global community of peace-loving states respecting human 
rights of their citizens on the internal plane and living up to their international 
obligations on the external plane. Yet, the arguments set forth are incomplete 
and suffer from theoretical incongruences and real-world disconnect. The 
attempt by some scholars to foster a ‘novel right’ within the framework of 
traditional doctrine has almost always led to a conclusion that democracy is 
somewhat a right but yet not fully operational; by adjoining the qualifier 
‘emerging’ to democracy one would appear as progressive but without 
endangering one’s positivist identity. However, the status of the concept of 
‘emerging right’ in international legal doctrine is rather dubious and involves 
complex debates as to the theoretical soundness and legal implications of such 
construction. On top of this, the geopolitical developments of the last eight 
years including political violence and civil wars of the Arab Spring and the 
resultant establishment of ISIS (known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), a 
terrorist organisation exercising a de facto control over large portions of the 
land mass of Iraq and Syria, as well as Ukrainian political crisis of 2014 
culminating in the Russian annexation of Crimea and its support of the ongoing 
civil war in eastern Ukraine, not to mention the rise of political extremism in 
Europe, the recent wave of military coups in Egypt and Turkey and the crisis 
of democratic values caused by Brexit and American isolationist politics, put 
the idea of democracy as a global right under ever more strain. On the contrary, 
to give up the idea of democratic entitlement is to betray the very project of 
human rights, since respect for human rights implies the existence of 
democratic institutions. It follows that a new framework is needed to make 
sense of international law in the twenty-first century and to ensure its 
effectiveness vis-a-vis new demands of the globalised society, one of these 
being democracy. This work sets out to account for the above-mentioned 
shortcomings and concerns in the debate on democracy by fleshing out a fresh 
look on international law’s theoretical foundations. 
The objective of this thesis is thus to critically investigate an argument for 
the human right to democracy from the vantage point of global 
constitutionalism. Because the right to democracy is progressively gaining 
prominence in international legal debate by virtue of its universal endorsement 
in a variety of international instruments and enhanced interest within academic 
circles since the 1990s, it is undoubtedly a universal principle, ideal and ethical 
imperative.12 Yet, it is still ‘invisible’, or, to put more precisely, not worth of 
                                               
12 See eg UNGA, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (12 July 1993) UN Doc 
A/CONF.157/23 preamble (Referring to democracy as a principle of the UN Charter); Inter-
Parliamentary Union, Universal Declaration on Democracy (Cairo, 16 December 1997) para 3 
<http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/161-dem.htm> accessed 24 August 2016 (Defining democracy as an 
‘ideal’); UNGA, ‘Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule 
of Law at the National and International Levels’, UNGA Res A/RES/67/1 (30 November 2012) 
para 5 (‘We reaffirm that human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and 
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being paid attention to, from the standpoint of the value-neutral traditional 
legal doctrine, because no international legal treaty explicitly recognises the 
obligation to introduce and maintain democratic form of government, and state 
practice and opinio juris on the issue are too inconsistent and at times outright 
contradictory for a customary norm to be established. A new approach capable 
of remedying this positivistic straitjacket is thus needed. Global 
constitutionalism is a modern legal approach in international law seeking to 
map, identify and explain the ongoing developments within and of 
international law that deviate from the conventional Westphalian paradigm. At 
the core of the constitutional argument lies the idea that global values endorsed 
in the universally ratified instruments transcend the sum of individual state 
interests. These values include the rule of law, human rights and democracy. 
Certainly, such value-embeddedness of global constitutionalism raises 
concerns on many fronts since akin to other scholarly attempts to 
reconceptualise international law along neoliberal lines it propagates certain 
range of substantive values to the disadvantage of alternative discourses. 
Another concern is subjectivity of values and the concomitant risk of 
employing the language of values as an instrument of self-aggrandisement.13 
Yet, in contrast to other value-oriented conceptions of the international legal 
order, global constitutionalism is a legal approach based on considerations of 
legality, foreseeability and legal stability. Its positive nature is enhanced by the 
fact that, even though a normative agenda of a more just and efficient legal 
order constitutes one of its themes, global constitutionalism is an 
overwhelmingly descriptive approach as it captures and describes structural 
changes and developments in international law. 
Against this backdrop, it will be examined how this new framework of 
global constitutionalism modifies the very premises of international law within 
such foundational domains as the doctrine of sources, custom, soft law thesis 
and treaty interpretation and what place the right to democracy holds in 
international law based on neoliberal assumptions.14 The argument for the right 
to democracy will also be bolstered from the standpoint of external and internal 
mechanisms for democracy defence, including collective responses to military 
coups and other extra-constitutional changes of government and peoples’ 
ultimate right to revolution as a protection mechanism at the grass-root level. 
                                               
mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and 
principles of the United Nations’) (emphasis added). 
13 The most pronounced critique of the value-loaded conceptions of the international legal order 
is advanced by Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Renewal’ (2005) 16 EJIL 113, 122 (Arguing that all substantive universalism is imperialism). 
See also Emmannuelle Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
International Law?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 379, 382. 
14 It is of note here that neoliberalism, as the term is used in the present thesis, denotes a political 
development involving the global spread of democracy and respect for human rights. Therefore, 
neoliberalism as an economical project entailing the expansion of capitalism into the closed 
economies together with world-wide deregulation, liberalisation and privatisation does not 
constitute the focus of this work. 
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Put within the value-sensitive setting of global constitutionalism, these 
developments acquire a whole new dimension in international legal discourse. 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. With this chapter being 
introductory, chapter 2 sketches out the methodological framework of the 
thesis. It first traces the theoretical pedigree of global constitutionalism, which 
is eventually tested against other dominant approaches in international law. 
Firstly, it is established that global constitutionalism is a variation of new 
liberalism whose distinctive features are the promotion of a certain core of 
substantive values, including democracy, and intolerance towards states 
reneging upon these values. Because any value-based conception of 
international law involves a subjective judgment over the exact content and 
contours of ‘global’ values, it is easily susceptible to abuse and manipulation 
by individual (predominantly powerful) states following their egoistic short-
handed interests. Many fear that this is reminiscent of the nineteenth-century 
‘standard of civilisation’ under which states’ self-proclaimed altruistic motives 
to advance human rights and development served as a cloak for geostrategic 
power control. For others, any value-oriented interpretation of international 
law is intrinsically hegemonic because it is premised on the progressive 
reading of history: whenever certain values are claimed from the position of 
authenticity to stand over and above competing ideas, they reflect a progress 
narrative which by definition involves power relations and an ideological 
struggle during which some will gain and others will loose. In response to these 
major critiques of new liberalism in general and global constitutionalism in 
particular, it is asserted that the contemporary value talk is not imposed upon 
the international community, as is the case with the old standard. Rather it is 
spawned by the dynamic inherent in modern political, economic and social 
developments, commonly referred to as globalisation. It is further claimed that 
albeit global constitutionalism is a progress narrative, it is premised on 
assumptions that minimise exclusion. Moreover, by appealing to the stratum 
of norms locating between the binary concepts of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, global 
constitutionalism mitigates the rigidity and undisputed correctness of the 
progress narrative constructed by the mainstream legal scholarship. Secondly, 
the theoretical soundness of constitutionalist reading of international law is 
enhanced by responding to the criticisms of other major theoretical approaches 
in law, such as conventional legal positivism, naturalism and critical legal 
studies. It is concluded that global constitutionalism oscillates between 
positivist apologism and naturalist utopianism by combining the ‘culture of 
formalism’ with the ability to effectively respond to the extra-legal challenges 
of the twenty-first-century conditions of rapid change. In conclusion, it is 
argued that global constitutionalism as a legal approach falls under the ambit 
of the ‘law-in-context’ research. 
Chapter 3 aims to revisit the perennial debate on conceptual limits of 
democracy and attempts to develop a definition of democracy accommodating 
the perspectives of the global constitutionalism paradigm. The thesis contends 
that the dominant procedural understanding of democracy in the mainstream 
legal scholarship is inadequate as it compromises the normative value of 
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democracy as a tool of political empowerment and equality. Moreover, such 
minimalist conception of democracy renders the right toothless against abuse 
by anti-democratic actors. Instead, a novel substantive definition of democracy 
is suggested. Unlike the substantive definition of ‘anything goes’ of the 
previous years, the so-called ‘limited’ substantive conception is developed 
drawing on modern understandings of the doctrines of constitutionalism and 
liberalism. 
Chapter 4 examines the international legal foundations of democracy 
within the framework of global constitutionalism. It is suggested that 
international law exhibits strong empirical evidence of its constitutionalisation, 
which is characterised by major transformations in such foundational subject-
areas as treaty interpretation, the doctrine of customary law formation and the 
doctrine of sources. Because the principle of state consent as the criterion for 
the validity of legal norms is no longer the dominant one, non-consensual 
tendencies within international law-making, such as teleological interpretation 
of treaties, modern approaches to custom, softening of international law and 
ever-frequent recourse to general principles of international law, gain traction. 
Applied in tandem, they provide robust legal foundations for the democratic 
entitlement and make up an international law of democracy. 
Chapter 5 lays out external mechanisms of democracy defence, including 
collective responses to military coups and other democratic threats at the global 
level as well as in regions, such as Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. 
Even though the practical implementation of a right does not change its nature 
as a legal right, evidence of the international enforcement of the democratic 
norm inevitably strengthens the democratic entitlement thesis. It is further 
asserted that despite the differences in scope and robustness of the external 
system of democracy defence on the international and regional levels, the 
general tendency of increased institutionalisation of such mechanisms speaks 
eloquently in favour of the right to democracy as an internationally enforceable 
right. 
Chapter 6 investigates in turn how democracy is protected within a nation-
state, including by means of revolution as a last resort. Because the 
international enforcement of the right to democracy is patchwork and sensitive 
to the considerations of political expediency, the bottom-up resistance, 
including by violent means, is indispensable if the right to democracy is not to 
be dismissed as an empty rhetoric. The chapter seeks to delineate the 
conceptual contours of the notion of revolution as a bottom-up mechanism of 
democracy defence and traces its philosophical and legal underpinnings. It is 
established that revolution is an individual right sui generis under international 
law by virtue of its secondary (remedial) status with respect to other, more 
conventional, rights. Such extraordinary sui generis status of revolution is 
clarified by reference to the ‘illegal but justifiable’ formula, based on a 
consideration that in order to maintain law’s legitimacy, it is essential to 
recognise certain limited acts of violence in collective defence of human rights 
as illegal but legitimate. Because the recognition of ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution implies that non-state actors are sometimes allowed to use force 
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against sitting governments, the imperative of laying down an effective 
framework of differentiation between such morally justified violence and other 
less benevolent forms of non-state violence, as terrorism, has never been this 
acute. In other words, the effectiveness of the internal mechanism of 
democracy defence, not to mention the very normative sustainability of the 
democratic entitlement thesis, plainly depends on the existence of criteria to 
distinguish between the legitimate (remedial) violence, such as revolution, and 
illegitimate (offensive) violence, such as terrorism. To this end, a set of just 
war criteria, including legitimate cause, legitimate means, legitimate target and 
a set of legitimate conditions, is applied. It is concluded that whenever non-
state violence abides by the aforementioned strata of ethical norms, it is by 
definition legitimate. 
The so-called right-to-revolution thesis is subsequently tested against the 
backdrop of the Arab Spring revolutions and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution in 
terms of international responses. It is asserted that albeit the grass-root 
resistance against oppressive government has not yet been crystallised into a 
customary norm, international support of the people’s efforts to remove 
nondemocratic regimes, and violently if necessary, creates an important 
presumption in favour of permissibility of revolutionary violence provided that 
other conditions are met. It is further claimed that because opinio juris behind 
the practice of global support of revolutionary cause is rather pinned on the 
considerations of morality and political expediency rather than a sense of an 
obligation that such practice is legally required, the right to revolution can at 
best be designated as an emerging norm of customary international law. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in chapter 7.
2. Theoretical Framework: Constitutionalist 
Transformation of International Law 
 
2.1. Classical Liberalism v New Liberalism 
 
Theorising in international law has never been a normatively neutral exercise. 
All of us look at law and interpret legal texts from a certain standpoint based 
on what one’s underlying assumptions about law as a social phenomenon are. 
A certain coherent accumulation of assumptions makes up a theoretical 
paradigm, which frames the direction of research, informs what is to be 
regarded as legitimate knowledge and involves epistemological assumptions.1 
In legal science, such theoretical paradigm provides an abstract framework for 
understanding, systematising, explaining, conceptualising and objectivising 
international law as a science and as a discipline. It is a sort of ‘lens’ through 
which to view international law, which are always present irrespective of one’s 
awareness and/or explicitness. Not infrequently, one can consciously deploy a 
certain approach to, and/or perspective on, international law as a tactic of 
‘wordfare’ in an attempt to gain interpretative authority and persuasiveness in 
the interpretative community of international law.2 There is nothing obnoxious 
or unsettling in such use of semantic weaponry, because the term ‘law’ has no 
inherent claim to mean something well defined but is rather a matter of 
definition. Therefore, any theory of law is nothing but a claim, whose 
normative strength depends on the number of its supporters and not some 
objective normativity.3 Thus, if one accepts the hermeneutic premise that the 
objective meaning of a text, independent of the reader, does not exist, then 
reading international law through certain theoretical ‘spectacles’ is an ordinary 
hermeneutic exercise, a legitimate form of interpretation, not a distortion of 
norms which are ‘objectively’ something else.4 Since any research in social 
                                               
1 Bridget Hutter and Sally Lloyd-Bostock, ‘Law’s Relationship with Social Science: The 
Interdependence of Theory, Empirical Work and Social Relevance in Socio-Legal Studies’ in 
Keith Hawkins (ed), The Human Face of Law: Essays in Honour of Donald Harris (OUP 1997) 
25. 
2 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Wording in International Law’ (2012) 25 LJIL 575, 576. 
3 Ulrich Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ (1993) 4 EJIL 305, 331; Jean 
d’Aspremont, ‘Wording in International Law’ (2012) 25 LJIL 575, 582 (‘[P]roduction of 
knowledge boils down to a process of securing argumentative authority among one’s peers, 
which is parasitic on the process of communication between the actors of that community’). 
4 See Anne Peters and Klaus Armingeon, ‘Introduction — Global Constitutionalism from an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective’ (2009) 16 Ind J Global Legal Stud 385, 385. For a similar 
viewpoint, see Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Wording in International Law’ (2012) 25 LJIL 575, 577 
(Maintaining that ‘since the demise of philosophical foundationalism and that of the Aristotelian 
idea of an inner meaning of words, scholarship about international law is no longer perceived as 
a mining activity geared towards the extraction of pre-existing meaning. Rather, international 
legal scholarship is in a state of fierce competition for persuasiveness and semantic authority’). 
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sciences, including law, is conducted against the background of a certain 
theoretical frame of reference, either intuitively or in a reflective manner, 
making such frame of reference explicit aids in ensuring a transparency of 
argument5 and safeguards objectivity and neutrality of research results by 
maintaining a controlled distance between the researcher’s subjectivities and 
the object of research. Such methodological self-consciousness and ‘reasoned 
eclecticism’6 do not amount to a ‘shopping-mall approach to “method”,’7 but 
‘are a precondition of informed criticism, which is, in turn, the conditio sine 
qua non of scholarship and of a functioning civil society’.8 
That being said, theoretically and methodologically, this work is based on 
the neoliberal reading of international law.9 The thesis argues for the 
inadequacy of the traditional theory in depicting and explicating the 
functioning of the modern international legal system. By traditional theory 
of/about international law, it is meant a theory of law largely based on, if not 
fully coincident with, legal positivism.10 Legal positivism as the principal 
theoretical paradigm for mainstream legal scholarship associates law with the 
emanation of state will (voluntarism). Thus, law is essentially what states have 
consented to be bound by, simply and strictly so called. Another common 
understanding of positivism zeros in on the strict separation of law in force, as 
derived from formal legal sources, from non-legal considerations, such as 
natural reason, moral principles and political ideologies (formalism).11 On both 
accounts, law is viewed as an ‘objective’ reality, which needs to be 
distinguished from ‘law as it should be’. 
Apart from questioning the assumption that law is an objectively given fact 
having a certain inner, pre-existing meaning, there are several other reasons 
                                               
5 Anne Peters, ‘There is Nothing More Practical than a Good Theory: An Overview of 
Contemporary Approaches to International Law’ (2001) 44 German YBIL 25, 37 
(‘[M]ethodological explicitness is preferable because it contributes to a transparency of 
argument’). 
6 ibid. 
7 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’ (1999) 93 AJIL 351, 352. 
8 Anne Peters, ‘There is Nothing More Practical than a Good Theory: An Overview of 
Contemporary Approaches to International Law’ (2001) 44 German YBIL 25, 37. See also 
Steven R Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 AJIL 291, 291 (Contending that focus on theory is 
increasingly needed in a field of international law driven to great degrees of both specialisation 
and fragmentation). 
9 Whenever the adjective ‘neoliberal’ is used in this thesis, it refers to the the value-oriented 
nature of international law as opposed to the Westphalian state-centred paradigm. 
10 See eg Douglas Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 JLS 163, 188 
(‘[T]raditional doctrinal approach to legal questions is the touchstone of the disciplinary identity 
of legal academics’); Robert Cryer and others (eds), Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 39 (‘Positivism is the dominant approach amongst 
international lawyers […] It represents the default position of many international and EU 
lawyers’); Siegfried Wiessner (ed), General Theory of International Law (Nijhoff 2017) 15 
(Recognising legal positivism as a ‘traditional theory about international law’). 
11 Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus, ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights 
Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View’ (2009) 93 AJIL 291, 304; See also Jaye Ellis, 
‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22 EJIL 949, 953. 
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why the present research distances itself from this traditional framework. The 
first concern, which is widely shared within scholarly circles, is that while the 
value of the doctrinal research (based on legal positivism) is hard to 
overestimate, particularly for legal practitioners involved in the daily 
ascertainment of what rule is valid and where it is located, doctrinalism is often 
accused of being ‘arid, technical, atheoretical […] full of unstated or unproven 
assumptions, lacking empirical support’;12 ‘rigid, dogmatic, formalistic and 
close-minded’ encouraging ‘intellectual tunnel-vision’ through an unhealthy 
preoccupation with technicalities;13 placing ‘an intellectual strait-jacket on 
understandings of law and society’ and ‘of impoverish[ing] the questioning 
spirit’ of a researcher.14 Legal positivism, in particular, remains fixated on the 
past, ‘seemingly disinterested in the actual dynamics of political and social 
change’,15 and is unable to tackle the concerns of the modern globalising and 
increasingly interdependent society. Most significantly, it fails to provide a 
means for linking validity, or legality, with legitimacy, or morality, justice, 
political feasibility etc. Whereas in domestic legal orders, the adherence to the 
positivist conceptual apparatus is well justified considering the existence of 
secondary norms serving as a yardstick to determine the validity of primary 
norms (legal constitution), in international law it is much more difficult to 
determine the ‘positiveness’ of a norm because secondary norms are either 
utterly absent or are dispersed throughout different legal regimes. It means that 
in order to fully understand the operation of international law, other theoretical 
perspectives are necessary.16 
The exhaustion of positivist toolkit to effectively respond to the 
contemporary conditions of rapid change is visible in the ever-frequent resort 
to some ‘higher-legitimacy’ arguments, including moral arguments, what was 
dubbed by some scholars as a ‘turn to ethics in international law’.17 The most 
obvious example is the 1999’s Kosovo crisis, when the NATO’s military 
intervention was widely recognised as technically illegal but morally 
justified.18 Thus, legitimacy as an embodiment of higher moral values (as 
                                               
12 Grainne de Burca, ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ (2005) 12 JEPP 310, 314. 
13 Roger Cotterrell, ‘Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies’ 
(2002) 29 JLS 632, 633. 
14 Douglas Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 JLS 163, 181. 
15 Grainne de Burca, ‘Rethinking Law in Neofunctionalist Theory’ (2005) 12 JEPP 310, 314. 
16 In the same vein, see the remarks given by Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Reductionist Legal Positivism 
in International Law’ (2012) 106 ASIL Proc 368, 370. (Arguing that ‘international law is much 
more than a set of rules. Other theories are thus necessary to explain the whole phenomenon of 
international law […] A renewed ILP [international legal positivism] is only needed to assist us 
ascertain and identify rules of international law, not to explain the whole phenomenon of law’). 
17 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘“The Lady Doth Protest Too Much”: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law’ (2002) 65 MLR 159. 
18 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (OUP 2000) 4 (‘The Commission concludes that the 
NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive 
prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission considers 
that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and 
because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a 
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opposed to a less contested notion of procedural legitimacy)19 was invoked to 
dispense with ‘undesired’, ‘obsolete’ and ‘morally unacceptable’ legality. 
Whilst laudable on moral grounds, such legitimacy-talk stands at loggerheads 
with essential premises of legal science, such as legality, predictability, 
neutrality, procedural justice etc. Because it is normatively obscure and there 
is no undisputed authority to assess it, the legitimacy rhetoric seems to be easily 
susceptible to abuse by hegemonic powers following their strategic interests. 
To allow the (substantive) legitimacy rationale in international law is, in the 
opinion of many, to make a mockery of the foundational principle of state 
equality.20 
That said, the paucity and inadequacy of positivist assortiment of 
argumentative techniques and approaches in explicating, theorising and 
addressing contemporary global challenges leads to the legitimacy crisis of 
international law, which, in turn, is inextricably linked with the questions of 
the moral force of international law (legitimacy) or, simplifying somewhat, the 
duty to obey international law. If the principal legitimating factor of 
Westphalian international law was state consent, properly so called, what can 
be said of the post-Westphalian legal order assuming an increasingly 
autonomous role vis-a-vis individual states? Where does legitimacy reside 
within this new framework? What has left of state sovereignty in a system 
where ‘the procedure by which international law is generated increasingly 
attenuates the link between state consent and the existence of an obligation 
under international law’?21 How can this ‘new’ international law claim 
obedience? These questions, reflecting the geist of the twenty-first-century 
legal order, bring to the fore a plethora of theoretical and practical challenges 
which positivist orthodox schema cannot handle on its own. There is thus a 
need for a new theory (or at least a theoretical conception) of international law 
equipped with an adequate conceptual and argumentative apparatus to account 
                                               
long period of oppression under Serbian rule’). See also Antonio Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: 
Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures in the International Community?’ (1999) 10 EJIL 23, 30; Bruno Simma, 
‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 EJIL 1. For particularly useful 
discussions of the international lawyers’ reaction, cf Siegfried Schieder, ‘Pragmatism as a Path 
towards a Discursive and Open Theory of International Law’ (2000) 11 EJIL 663, 691-98 and 
Olivier Corten, ‘Les ambiguïtés de la référence au droit international comme facteur de 
légitimation portée et signification d'une deformalisation du discours légaliste’ in Olivier Corten 
and Barbara Delcourt (eds), Droit, légitimation et politique extérieure. L'Europe et la guerre du 
Kosovo (Bruylant 2000) 223-59. 
19 For a useful discussion on various conceptions of legitimacy, see Christopher A Thomas, 
‘Uses and Abuses of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2014) 34 OJLS 729, 749. 
20 To claim that the substantive legitimacy language is prone to misuse is not to advocate its 
unqualified rejection in legal doctrine. It is merely to emphasise that traditional legal doctrine 
lacks conceptual tools to accommodate the substantive legitimacy rationale. Global 
constitutionalism is a more suitable framework for advancing legitimacy claims. See section 
6.3.6. 
21 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’ (2004) 15 EJIL 907, 914. 
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for these changes and to resolve, or at least mitigate, the legitimacy crisis of 
international law. 
The present thesis seeks to address these challenges by revising the very 
theoretical platform on which international law is based. It is possible to argue 
that the above discussion of doctrinal research as underpinned by legal 
positivism is reflective of classical liberalism – a conventional paradigm of 
international law whose main distinctive features are tolerance, diversity and 
agnosticism about moral truth. In this configuration, a ‘liberal’ international 
system in the traditional sense does not have its own vision of The Good, but 
it was designed to enable every state to realise its own understanding of The 
Good, its own value system.22 Simpson designated this as ‘Charter liberalism’ 
because the underlying premises of this approach are explicitly enshrined in 
the UN Charter.23 Classical liberalism directly stems from domestic liberalism 
as a political theory and philosophy, which was developed at the Age of 
Enlightenment with the aim of securing negative liberty, that is liberty from 
arbitrary authority.24 On this view, state, similarly to the individual in a liberal 
society, enjoys a zone of private action embodied in the doctrine of domestic 
jurisdiction, which is protected by law. As Simpson put it, ‘where domestic 
liberal theory appeals to a conception of the individual as a bearer of rights and 
a democratic actor, classical liberalism substitutes the State for the individual 
and posits the nation-State as the free and equal object and subject of 
international law’.25 Ergo, such fundamental principles of international law as 
domestic jurisdiction, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention are 
classical liberal principles. Respect for these principles has become the 
touchstone of the classical international liberal theory.26  
Classical liberal theory of international law, which, as was earlier 
ascertained, lays down philosophical foundations for legal positivism, has been 
criticised on two principal grounds. First, by viewing states as autonomous 
subjects possessing an inherent right to sovereignty, the theory fails to take into 
                                               
22 Louis Henkin, ‘International Law: Politics and Values’ in Siegfried Wiessner (ed), General 
Theory of International Law (Nijhoff 2017) 286. 
23 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 541. See also Georg Sorensen, 
‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World Order in the 
New Millennium’ (2006) 20 Int’l Rel 251, 259 (Claiming that classical liberalism essentially 
embodies a ‘Liberalism of Restraint’ with its key emphasis on one’s own sphere of liberty, which 
can only be infringed by preventing harm to others). 
24 The foundational ideas of classical liberal thought are: 1) the central place of individual in 
society as a bearer of natural rights; 2) limited state; 3) representative government; and 4) free 
trade and protection of property rights. See Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Revisioning 
Democracy Promotion (Routledge 2013) 31-32. 
25 Gerry Simpson, ‘Imagined Consent: Democratic Liberalism in International Legal Theory’ 
(1994) 15 Aust YBIL 103, 113. 
26 See Michael W Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’ (1983) 12 Phil & Pub 
Aff 205, 213. See also Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Springer 1995) 
104, 106 (Opining that the international system is essentially a ‘liberal’ system allowing both 
secular and religious, authoritarian and democratic states to co-exist under the paradigmatic 
Charter norm of the prohibition of the use of force). See also Olena Sihvo, ‘Global 
Constitutionalism and the Idea of Progress’ (2018) 1 HLR 10, 17. 
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cognisance the need for cooperation to resolve both own and global 
environmental, ecological and security problems. Second, the ‘arbitrariness of 
value’ cherished by classical liberalism entails the denial of any binding 
principles existing above states, such as e.g. human rights. Because there is no 
agreement on precise definition of human rights, the argument that human 
rights impose restrictions on state power to protect individual liberty fails on 
the same ground as other natural law doctrines, against which classical 
liberalism legitimised itself.27 As Koskenniemi provocatively suggested 
 
[L]iberalism contains two separate strands which continuously threaten each 
other. The ascending strand legitimizes political order by reference to 
individual ends. The existence of natural values is denied. Individuals can be 
constrained only to prevent ‘harm to others’. But any constraint seems a 
violation of individual freedom as what counts as ‘harm’ can only be 
subjectively determined. The descending strand fares no better. It assumes 
that a set of fundamental rights or a natural distinction between private and 
public spheres exists to guarantee that liberty is not violated. But this blocks 
any collective action as the content of those freedoms (either as ‘rights’ or a 
‘private sphere’) can be justifiably established only be reference to 
individuals’ views thereof.28 
 
Thus, there is a constant tension between global concerns and individual rights 
that lies at the heart of liberalism: ‘[I]f liberalism preserves its radical 
scepticism about values, then it cannot ground a coherent problem-solving 
practice — if it makes reference to the objective nature of some values it will 
undermine liberty’.29 
It follows from the above-mentioned dilemma that there is also another 
understanding of what it means to be liberal. This is, according to Simpson, 
‘liberal anti-pluralism’,30 sometimes characterised as ‘liberal 
internationalism’,31 ‘new liberalism’, ‘neo-liberalism’, ‘liberal universalism’,32 
‘liberal millenarianism’,33 ‘new liberal cosmopolitanism’34 or ‘liberalism of 
                                               
27 See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument (CUP 2005) 84-85. 
28 ibid 87. 
29 ibid 89. 
30 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 537. 
31 Beate Jahn, Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
32 John Charvet and Elisa Kaczynska-Nay, The Liberal Project and Human Rights: The Theory 
and Practice of a New World Order (CUP 2008) 60. 
33 Susan Marks, ‘The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses’ (1997) 
3 EJIL 449. 
34 Peter Gowan, ‘The New Liberal Cosmopolitanism’ in Daniele Archibugi (ed), Debating 
Cosmopolitics (Verso 2003) 52 (Under new liberal cosmopolitanism ‘sovereignty is reconceived 
as a partial and conditional licence, granted by the “international community”, which can be 
withdrawn should any state fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the 
requirements of liberal governance’). 
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imposition’.35 This ‘new’ type of liberalism is endowed with a sort of 
moralistic fervour as it conceptualises equality as a condition of fulfilling 
certain ‘neo-liberal’ criteria and is intolerant of the illiberal.36 The central point 
of liberal anti-pluralism is to differentiate between states on the basis of their 
internal characteristics. International human rights law serves as an inspiration 
and a primary driving force for this strain of liberalism.37 Unlike classical 
liberalism that views states as sole subjects of international law, new liberalism 
gives ontological priority to individuals.38 It is a liberalism ‘ready to defend 
liberty where it was threatened’.39 The conceptual difference between the two 
species of liberalism is also neatly captured by Cryer et al who categorise 
classical liberalism as an Enlightenment philosophy under the rubric ‘modern 
and critical approaches’ to international law, whilst liberalism as an 
international relations theory (new liberalism) is included into the group ‘law 
and [international relations]’.40 
Notably, contrary to classical liberalism, new liberalism, as a theory, has a 
different pedigree: it was first developed by Moravcsik in the field of 
international relations as a principle alternative to realism. Although he 
acknowledged that conceptually this theory draws on domestic liberal political 
doctrine, he nonetheless claimed that a direct transfer of classical liberal 
assumptions to international law was problematic, and, hence, it made more 
sense to attempt to conceptualise this theory on its own terms as a self-
contained anti-realist thesis.41 Moravcsik’s central argument is that liberalism 
has made a transition from a normative (prescriptive) theory instructing states 
as to how they should conduct their foreign policies with other states to a 
positive (explanatory) theory that accounts for how states do interact with one 
another.42 On this account, states as members of international society are not 
                                               
35 Georg Sorensen, ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and 
World Order in the New Millennium’ (2006) 20 Int’l Rel 251, 259 (Liberalism of Imposition 
assumes active intervention by the state to ensure the proper conditions for real freedom). 
36 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 539; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers 
and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (CUP 2004) 78. See 
also Olena Sihvo, ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Idea of Progress’ (2018) 1 HLR 10, 17-18. 
37 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 541. 
38 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International 
Legal Order (CUP 2004) 81. 
39 Georg Sorensen, ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and 
World Order in the New Millennium’ (2006) 20 Int’l Rel 251, 261. 
40 See Robert Cryer and others (eds), Research Methodologies in EU and International Law 
(Hart Publishing 2011) ch 5. 
41 See Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Liberalism and International Relations Theory’ (1992) Center for 
International Affairs Working Paper No 92-6, Harvard University 
<https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf> accessed 23 August 
2016. 
42 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Politics’ (1997) 51 
Int’l Org 513, 514. A number of other political scientists too have showed an interest in 
developing core foundations of liberalism as a rival theory to realism. See Joseph S Nye, 
‘Neorealism and Neoliberalism’ (1988) 40 Wld Pol 235; Robert Powell, ‘Anarchy in 
International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate’ (1994) 48 Int’l Org 313; 
Mark W Zacher and Richard A Matthew, ‘Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, 
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equated to individuals in domestic settings. Rather they are aggregations of 
individuals and private groups advancing multifarious preferences. This new 
liberalism, or what he called liberal international relations (IR) theory, was 
later on transposed by Slaughter to international law.43 She suggested that 
Westphalian international law was based on classical liberal assumptions. It 
did not distinguish among sovereign states: ‘Democracies, theocracies and all 
manner of autocracies are deemed identical under the all-purpose label of 
sovereignty’.44 Any distinction on the basis of political regime was strictly 
forbidden. 
However, with the Cold War approaching its end, a number of political 
scientists, after undertaking thorough empirical analysis, pioneered the need to 
distinguish between liberal and illiberal states on the basis of their external 
behavioural patterns, which came to be known as a ‘democratic peace 
theory’.45 According to this theory, liberal states created a separate zone of 
peace and did not wage wars with one another. Illiberal states, conversely, 
remained in the ‘zone of politics’ virtually unrestrained in their actions in the 
global realm.46 
Slaughter’s liberal IR theory moved beyond this correlation between 
liberal democracy and peace and interrogated what other characteristics liberal 
states have that distinguish them from their illiberal counterparts. It is founded 
on three core assumptions. First, individuals and private groups are primary 
actors in domestic and international politics informing state’s preferences on 
the international scene. Second, state is not an autonomous and monolithic 
entity as propagated by realists, but a representative institution whose foreign 
policies are determined by preferences of individuals and groups enfranchised 
by domestic institutions and practices. Third, the accumulation of these 
individual and group preferences determines the outcome of state 
interactions.47 On this view, ‘states bear no resemblance to billiard balls but 
rather to atoms of varying composition, whose relations with one another, 
                                               
Divergent Strands’ in Charles W Kegley (ed), Controversies in International Politics: Realism 
and the Neoliberal Challenge (St Martin’s Press 1995). 
43 Anne-Marie Burley [now A-M Slaughter], ‘Toward an Age of Liberal Nations’ (1992) 33 
Harv Int’l LJ 393; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A Dual Agenda’ (1993) 87 AJIL 205. 
44 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of 
State Doctrine’ (1992) 92 Colum L Rev 1907, 1909. 
45 Philosophical roots of this theory go back to Kantian assumption that people are rational and 
prefer peace to war. Immanuel Kant, ‘Perpetual Peace’ (1795) in Ted Humphrey (ed), Perpetual 
Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals (Hackett Publishing Company 1983). 
The empirical foundation of ‘liberal peace’ is based on studies illustrating the absence of war 
between liberal democracies. See eg Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles 
for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton UP 1993); Michael Brown and others (eds), Debating the 
Democratic Peace (MIT Press 1996). For criticisms see eg Tony Smith, ‘Democratic Peace 
Theory: From Promising Theory to Dangerous Practice’ (2011) 25 Int’l Rel 154. 
46 Olena Sihvo, ‘Global Constitutionalism and the Idea of Progress’ (2018) 1 HLR 10, 16. 
47 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 EJIL 503, 
508. See also Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The New Liberalism’ in Robert E Goodin (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Science (OUP 2011) 714. 
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either cooperative or conflictual, depend on their internal structure’.48 The 
upshot of this argument is that states constituted along democratic lines behave 
differently at the international orbit than non-democratic (illiberal) states.49 
Subsequent works, including Simpson’s Two Liberalisms, draw heavily on 
Moravcsik and Slaughter’s theory but are more explicit in promoting 
neoliberal agenda.50 In fact, they defend a return to normative (or prescriptive) 
liberalism in the sense that they do not only explain why liberal states behave 
differently than illiberal ones but also seek to challenge the over-inclusive 
orientation of international legal order by substituting it with the one in which 
status of states is defined by their degree of acceptance of certain individual 
rights, including the so-called ‘right to democracy’. 
It is clear from the aforementioned that international law in the age of 
globalisation is inconceivable without a certain value core not only to act as a 
sort of glue keeping increasingly numerous and manifold legal regimes 
together but also to secure prompt response to legal and political challenges of 
the twenty-first-century international community whenever legal norms on the 
issue are either absent or too generic to serve as an effective guide for action. 
Neoliberal conception of international law provides a solid theoretical ground 
for approaching international law as a value-sensitive normative system. 
However, because any value-oriented conception of international law involves 
a subjective judgment of what those values are, it easily falls prey to political 
manipulation. Particularly small and weak states fear the fact that the colonial 
history of differentiation and subjugation concealed under the language of 
‘civilisation’ may be repeating itself. The next section addresses this issue in 
more detail. 
 
2.2. New Liberalism — a ‘New Standard of Civilisation’? 
 
The very idea of a distinction between liberal (democratic) and illiberal (non-
democratic) states may prove unwelcome to many. The main reason behind 
such aversion is its historical pedigree. Many scholars beware the fact that the 
nineteenth-century division between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarian’ is now cast in 
the language of democratic legitimacy.51 The division in question manifested 
                                               
48 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’ (2000) 94 ASIL Proc 240, 
241. 
49 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 EJIL 503, 
509. 
50 Gerry Simpson, ‘Two Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537; Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and 
Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (CUP 2004); Georg 
Sorensen, ‘Liberalism of Restraint and Liberalism of Imposition: Liberal Values and World 
Order in the New Millennium’ (2006) 20 Int’l Rel 251; Russell Buchan, ‘A Clash of 
Normativities: International Society and International Community’ (2008) 10 Int’l Cl Rev 3; 
Russell Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart Publishing 
2013). 
51 Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ (2008) 22 Glob Soc 75, 84. 
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itself under the banner of the ‘standard of civilisation’, which is, in Gong’s 
terms, ‘an expression of the assumptions, both tacit and explicit, used to 
distinguish those that belong to a particular society from those that do not’.52 
Whilst the origins of this standard go back to the medieval relations between 
Christians and infidels (9-13th centuries) and are well traceable in European 
encounters with the New World (15-16th centuries),53 the beginning of the 
classical standard of civilisation is largely associated with the mid-nineteenth 
century.54 The emergence of this classical standard was occasioned by the need 
to accommodate and ultimately homogenise cultural differences between 
Western and non-Western societies in order to facilitate trade and interaction. 
In legal terms, a state was recognised as ‘civilised’ and, thus, ‘entitled to full 
recognition as an international personality’ whenever ‘its government was 
sufficiently stable to undertake binding commitments under international law’ 
and whenever ‘it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty and 
property of foreigners’.55 While it is undeniable that the language of 
civilisation contained certain benevolent connotations, namely to ameliorate 
the dark condition of ignorance and barbarism and advance Western 
knowledge, science and culture, the means by which civilising missions, or 
missions civilisatrices, were conducted were often violent, destructive and 
ostracising,56 particularly in terms of their effects on indigenous populations.57 
Moreover, the politics of inclusion and exclusion wrapped in the language of 
civilisation, evidenced the ever-present interplay of power relations rather than 
altruistic motives to advance development. 
With the termination of the Cold War rivalries between East and West and 
the alleged triumph of liberal democracy, many scholars suggest there was a 
reinvigoration of the nineteenth-century standard of civilisation. It is now said 
to be visible in the politics of liberal anti-pluralism, where states failing to meet 
neoliberal criteria of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are excluded 
from the international community of liberal states as outlaws or pariahs.58 As 
                                               
52 Gerrit W Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society (OUP 1984) 3. 
53 See generally Brett Bowden, ‘The Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion 
and the Classical Standard of Civilization’ (2005) 7 J History Int’l L 1, 4-13. 
54 Wilhelm G Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (Michael Byers tr and rev, Walter de 
Gruyter 2000) 445-58; Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ (2008) 22 Glob Soc 
75, 80; Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (The 
University of Chicago Press 2009) ch 5. 
55 Georg Schwarzenegger, ‘The Standard of Civilization in International Law’ (1955) 8 CLP 
212, 220. For a more detailed account, see Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The 
Evolution of an Imperial Idea (The University of Chicago Press 2009) 16. 
56 Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (The University 
of Chicago Press 2009) 130. 
57 Paul Keal, European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (CUP 2003). 
58 See Benedict Kingsburry, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods 
(eds), Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (OUP 1999) 66, 90; Gerry Simpson, ‘Two 
Liberalisms’ (2001) 12 EJIL 537, 546; David P Fidler, ‘The Return of the Standard of 
Civilization’ (2001) 2 Chic J Int’l L 137, 146; Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ 
(2008) 22 Glob Soc 75, 84. See also James M Goldgeier and Michel McFaul, ‘A Tale of Two 
Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era’ (1992) 46 Int’l Org 467; Max Singer and 
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Hobson has astutely noted, ‘[o]nce again we find ourselves inhabiting a 
dualistic international order where toleration and coexistence are the norm 
within the liberal democratic zone of peace, while Realpolitik and 21st-century 
civilizing missions mark dealings with the non-democratic zone of war’.59 
Considering the fact that new liberalism is loaded with the conceptions of 
progress (it is based on a linear reading of human history), telos (the aim is to 
extrapolate liberal values to the international society at large) and action 
(undertaking active measures in order to create a liberal zone of peace), 
originally attributed to the concept of civilisation,60 it comes as no surprise that 
it is widely referred to as a ‘new standard of civilisation’. Just like its 
nineteenth-century counterpart, it ‘evaluates, judges, classifies, orders and 
excludes’61 by dividing the world into zones. ‘Whether this division is 
characterized as a dichotomy between the “well-ordered” and the “not well-
ordered”, the “civic” and the “predatory”, the “good” and the “evil” […] the 
“civilized” and the “savage”’ or the ‘liberal’ and the ‘illiberal’ ‘is a matter of 
semantics’.62 Moreover, while the classical standard of civilisation was rather 
limited and superficial as it only assumed the acceptance of Western socio-
political institutions leaving the questions of culture as such intact, the new 
standard is more far-reaching and intrusive: ‘It is being carried deeper into the 
hearts of non-Western cultures through international law’.63 It is in fact on the 
basis of this doctrinal distinction between the two standards that some 
commentators dubbed the nineteenth-century standard as the product of the 
Westphalian civilisation,64 or formal universalism,65 founded on the 
assumption of uniformity of states, similar enough to conduct political and 
economic relations with the acceptance of a certain minimum of legal 
commitments. The twenty-first-century standard is, on the other hand, claimed 
                                               
Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil (Chatham House 
1993); Deon Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2004); Jack 
Donnelly, ‘Sovereign Inequalities and Hierarchy in Anarchy: American Power and International 
Society’ (2006) 12 EJIR 139. 
59 Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ (2008) 22 Glob Soc 75, 90-91. 
60 Ifversen suggested four central attributes of the concept ‘civilisation’, namely ‘evolution, 
ideal, action and space’. He associates evolution with progress, ideal with the civilized society, 
action with the act of civilizing and space with a ‘cultural macro-entity’. Jan Ifversen, 
‘Civilization and Barbarism’ (2005) Discourse Politics Identity Working Paper No 1, 7-9; 
Hobson rephrased these characteristics in terms of progress, telos and action. Christopher 
Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ (2008) 22 Glob Soc 75, 79. See also Emmanuelle 
Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law?’ 
(2007) 18 EJIL 379, 390-91. 
61 Christopher Hobson, ‘Democracy as Civilization’ (2008) 22 Glob Soc 75, 95. 
62 Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Sovereignty and Inequality’ in Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods (eds), 
Inequality, Globalization and World Politics (OUP 1999) 90. For similar criticisms, see Brett 
Bowden The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea (The University of 
Chicago Press 2009) 188, 212. 
63 David P Fidler, ‘The Return of the Standard of Civilization’ (2001) 2 Chic J Int’l L 137, 147. 
64 ibid 144-45. 
65 Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of 
International Law?’ (2007) 18 EJIL 379, 386-88. 
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to represent a liberal, globalised civilisation, or substantive universalism,66 
with a more ambitious project to establish a universal community of states 
sharing common values such as respect for basic civil and political rights, 
commitment to democratic governance, rule of law, free market and scientific 
development.67 Because they do not automatically express anything universal, 
all substantive universalism, as was provocatively asserted by Koskenniemi, is 
imperialism.68 
In light of the above-said, it is difficult to deny commonalities existing 
between the classical standard and the so-called new standard. Both imply the 
existence of a hierarchy between nations based on a distinction between full-
right members of the international society and members that are stripped of 
this status. Be that as it may, to automatically blacklist the theory of new 
liberalism as ‘an exercise in creating the new realities of imperialism’69 due to 
the ‘fatal tainting’70 of the abuses committed in the name of civilisation in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is to drastically oversimplify the similarities 
between the two standards. Whereas the old standard of civilisation was 
particularistic in nature and resulted in exclusionary policies, the new standard 
strives for universality and inclusion.71 New liberalism as a political doctrine 
and legal approach is not imposed upon the international society. Rather it is 
spawned by the dynamic inherent in modern political, economic and social 
development, commonly referred to as globalisation, which is characterised by 
deepening interdependence between states, permeability of the domestic and 
the international, homogenisation of cultures and values and the like. 
Therefore, values underpinning the new standard are not forced into existence, 
as is the case with the classical standard, but are shaped by the international 
community as a whole in response to modern realities through the venues of 
international organisations, such as the UN, and reflected in multilateral 
treaties and non-binding commitments. As Mozaffari rightly observed, the new 
standard operates more through ‘attraction’ than ‘coercion’.72 Moreover, 
modern global challenges, such as climate change, international terrorism, 
transnational crime, nuclear threat, state failure, civil wars, to name but a few, 
necessitate the adoption of a certain modicum of common values serving as a 
sort of a cohesive glue or a normative path in an otherwise fragmented and 
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anarchical world. The words of Donnelly astutely reflect these concerns: ‘[A] 
standard of civilization is needed to save us from the barbarism of a pristine 
sovereignty that would consign countless millions of individuals and entire 
peoples to international neglect’.73 New liberalism is thus individual-centred 
since unlike the classical standard aiming to solely protect the rights of 
Western citizens abroad, the new ‘liberal’ standard imposes limits on how 
states treat their own citizens. This elevated moral legitimacy of the new 
standard renders the ‘moral evaluation of empire’ more complicated ‘when one 
of its benefits might be the freedom of the oppressed’.74 
It may also be argued that traditional international law still mirrors the 
classical standard of civilisation as it is a product of Westphalian order which, 
in its turn, was imposed by European powers upon other societies to ensure 
uniformity and homogeneity. Only states characterised by certain minimum 
degree of uniformity could effectively interact with one another. Primary 
sources of international law, such as treaties and custom, contain remnants of 
European hegemony in that they allegedly reflect interests of the most 
powerful.75 New liberalism, conversely, can be viewed as ameliorating this 
historical imbalance by installing universal, in contrast to uniform, standard of 
civilisation recognised by the international community at large. Universality 
of this new standard is visible in the increasingly inclusive participation of 
states and non-state entities in the processes of international lawmaking for 
regulating public goods and delineating common values, which is facilitated 
by the transformation of the core legal doctrines, including the doctrine of 
sources. For instance, the transformation of the doctrine of custom from its 
traditional conception to ‘modern custom’76 implies that more and more states 
are actively participating in the formation and crystallisation of international 
customary law as it is international consensus exemplified in the 
pronouncements of international organisations, such as e.g. the UN, rather than 
‘consistent’ practice of the most powerful and rich states, which is now 
regarded as formative of custom. The same can be said about the process of 
softening of international law. 
Another reason why new liberalism is so often regarded as illiberal and 
hence exclusionary (akin to the old standard of civilisation) is the failure to 
appreciate the fact that under classical liberal doctrine no one is required to 
tolerate illiberals who seek to inflict damage on them. The doctrine recognises 
the imposition of limits on one’s freedom of action to avoid anarchy in which 
everyone would claim unrestricted freedom to do whatever he or she pleases. 
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Coercion is justified only against someone who reneges upon those limits. 
Anything less coercive would lead to an anarchic state where the absence of 
legal constraints on freedom would, in effect, create a situation in which actual 
freedom would be severely circumscribed.77 Thus, considering the empirically 
established fact that illiberal states are more prone to violate international 
obligations by waging wars and otherwise infringing liberty of other states (by 
e.g. creating a state of uncertainty) than liberal nations, it should be no surprise 
that liberal states are entitled to use coercion against them to protect their 
interests. The coercion to secure one’s own sphere of liberty does not make 
one illiberal. 
Last but not least, presenting the Westphalian era as genuinely liberal due 
to the negation of thick ethical principles and assigning equal credence to all 
types of government regimes, and post-Westphalian order as an imposition of 
a particular (substantive) world vision and, thus, illiberal is a confusion since 
at no point of human history has the international system been wholly value-
free. As Gong notes, ‘the processes by which an international system 
establishes standards to define and codify its operating interests, rules, values, 
and institutions are continuing ones’.78 What is susceptible to change is not the 
standard itself but its nature and character. ‘It may be more or less exclusive, 
and more or less explicit, depending on a number of factors, the most notable 
being the “thickness” or “thinness” of the common values that exist between 
states in international society’.79 Thus, the standard of civilisation exists as 
long as the community of states interacts in one way or another. Consequently, 
the characterisation by some scholars of a Cold War period from 1945 to 1989 
as a rejection of any standards of civilisation80 and, thus in a way nostalgic, is 
misleading and fallacious as it largely refers to the juridical equality of states 
as enshrined in the UN Charter but fails to account for factual inequality 
manifesting itself in ‘hot wars’ in Korea and Indochina and the ostracism of 
Pinochet’s Chile and racist South Africa as pariahs.81 
Hence, such fundamental values as equality and autonomy transcend both 
classical and new liberalisms. The only difference is that liberal pluralism’s 
conception of these values is somewhat thinner than that of new liberalism but 
in no way is it more liberal. Quite on the contrary, the thinner values are the 
easier it is for states, especially powerful ones, to misinterpret and manipulate 
these and to effectuate thereby de facto illiberal outcome. New liberalism 
brings in more substance to these values. Thus, it is not only status quo (that 
needs to be preserved) that the new species of liberalism draws its justification 
from (as is the case with classical liberalism) but also certain progressive vision 
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as to how to build a more just international order. To sum up, to say that the 
standard of civilisation is inherently negative and should be abandoned is to 
misinterpret the very history of this concept. The challenge is hence not to 
make international law immune from any language of civilisation but to ensure 
that the new standard, by whatever name it is called, is as inclusive as possible 
to secure legitimacy and efficiency of the contemporary international legal 
order. 
 
2.3. Global Constitutionalism 
 
In international law it is today of both theoretical and practical importance to 
distinguish between the international law of ‘coexistence’, governing 
essentially diplomatic inter-state relations, and the international law of co-
operation, expressed in the growing structure of international organization 
and the pursuit of common human interests.82 
 
New liberalism, as a theoretical conceptualisation of the modern global order 
and the principal theoretical framework for this dissertation, encompasses a 
variety of forms and themes. To varying degrees, the New Haven School,83 the 
above-discussed liberal IR theory,84 neo-Kantianism,85 Fukuyama’s liberal 
triumphalism,86 Grotian tradition,87 democratic entitlement school88 and global 
constitutionalism89 are all variations of this new type of liberalism. Each of 
them acknowledges the importance of global values for effective functioning 
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of the international legal system, which has allegedly moved beyond the 
classical accounts of inter-state relations, and each is based on an idea that 
individual should take a more prominent role in international legal processes. 
It is the latter variation of new liberalism, namely global constitutionalism, that 
this thesis is concerned with. What distinguishes global constitutionalism from 
other species of new liberalism is its overwhelmingly descriptive (positive), as 
opposed to prescriptive (normative), character. Thus, whilst a normative 
agenda of a more efficient and just world order undeniably constitutes one of 
its themes, global constitutionalism is more concerned with the actual 
transformations occurring at the heart of international law: it analyses in a 
descriptive sense these transformations and conceptualises these in a way in 
which traditional doctrine cannot. 
As international legal order is clearly becoming more refined, complex and 
less dependent on individual state will, a new conceptual basis is needed to 
understand its operation. The ever-growing inter-connectedness of economies, 
societies and cultures renders traditional legal theory reflecting classical liberal 
ideas utterly inadequate. Earlier works focusing on the notion of jus cogens 
and erga omnes with an attempt to remedy the rigidity of the conventional 
normative framework ostensibly failed given the unmanageability of the 
process through which they come into existence.90 Moreover, in Slaughter’s 
terms, distinct behavioural patterns observable between liberal and illiberal 
states cannot be accommodated within classical international law. She called 
for a ‘new generation of interdisciplinary scholarship […] to reimagine 
international law based on an acceptance of this distinction and an 
extrapolation of its potential implications’.91 The author of the present thesis 
contends that global constitutionalism is a theoretical conception that captures, 
names and explicates the fundamental changes in the international legal order 
which we are witnessing but cannot adequately comprehend and express in the 
traditional language of international law. It remedies the main weaknesses of 
classical liberalism by inviting a richer and more substantive liberalism to the 
international realm, yet without falling into the trap of hegemonic politics. 
Global constitutionalism, henceforth, represents the most sophisticated tool for 
re-visioning international law along neoliberal lines.  
Global constitutionalism as a theoretical approach in international law 
should be distinguished from a more general understanding of 
constitutionalism in national contexts. Constitutionalism as a domestic 
doctrine of limited government refers to a set of political values and aspirations 
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whose overarching goal is to protect liberty through the establishment of 
internal and external checks on government power by means of a constitution. 
It is, thus, a species of political liberalism that emerged in the American and 
French revolutions in the late eighteenth century.92 Global constitutionalism, 
on the other hand, was borne by major transformations within and of the 
international legal system since the 1990s, such as globalisation and 
fragmentation of international law (increasing specialisation within separate 
legal regimes undermining the unity of international law),93 and geared 
towards the substantive unity of international law and the rule of law, albeit 
the idea that there is a constitution that stretches beyond the borders of a single 
political entity can be found in ancient, medieval and early modern political 
theories.94 While drawing heavily on the domestic doctrine of 
constitutionalism, global constitutionalism is concerned with the tasks peculiar 
to the international community, namely maintaining international peace, 
justice and smooth cooperation between independent political entities. 
Similarly to national constitutionalism, it seeks to constrain raw power through 
the imposition of legal limits, such as human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. Because there is no international constitution in a formal sense nor the 
holders of constituent power, some designate global constitutionalism as 
somewhat ‘lite’,95 ‘small-c’96 and/or ‘compensatory’97 in comparison to 
constitutionalism within states. Alternatively, one speaks of a mere 
constitutionalisation as long as international law is concerned, whereas 
constitutionalism proper only exists on the level of a nation-state,98 not to 
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mention those for whom the very project of supra-state constitutionalism is 
utterly ‘impossible’, ‘inconceivable’ and even ‘illegitimate’.99 Yet, a more 
correct approach is to view global constitutionalism as ‘simply different’ by 
virtue of specific tasks and responsibilities of the international community, 
which differ from tasks and responsibilities of national governments.100 
There is no single recognised understanding of global constitutionalism. 
Rather there are many overlapping conceptualisations relating to its 
objectives,101 nuances and constituting elements,102 what has been designated 
by one scholar as a ‘constitutional cacophony’.103 On a theoretical level, the 
debate on global constitutionalism may be situated, à la Kleinlein, within two 
generic groups: on the one hand, scholars may conceptualise developments in 
international law as an evidence of on-going constitutionalisation. On the other 
hand, they may transpose the themes of the domestic constitutionalism onto 
the international plane.104 On a more specific level, Schwöbel suggested four 
dimensions of constitutionalism in public international law: social 
constitutionalism (focusing on coexistence), institutional constitutionalism 
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(focusing on governance through institutions), normative constitutionalism 
(emphasising specific fundamental norms) and analogical constitutionalism 
(focusing on analogies to domestic and regional constitutionalisms).105 
Significantly, there are other approaches to classification of various academic 
traditions on global constitutionalism, whose detailed overview is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.106 
While Schwöbel’s four dimensions of global constitutionalism are 
overlapping in many respects and some of them fall into the both generic 
camps sketched by Kleinlein, it is nonetheless legitimate to suggest that the 
understanding of global constitutionalism, as it is conceptualised in the present 
thesis, mostly aligns with social constitutionalism, albeit not completely 
subsumed by it, especially considering the fact that it draws heavily on 
analogical constitutionalism. In a nutshell, ‘the international community 
school’,107 which Schwöbel recognises as one of the themes of social 
constitutionalism, centres on the idea that international legal system has 
undergone a transformation from a sovereignty-centred system to a value-
oriented or individual-oriented system.108 This transition is well-captured in 
the judgments of the World Court, which in its 1986 dictum reaffirmed the 
conventional position, namely that ‘[i]n international law there are no rules, 
other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or 
otherwise’,109 and in a ten-year time span subscribed to the constitutionalist 
vision by declaring that ‘[r]esolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of 
international law still current at the beginning of the [twentieth] century [had] 
been replaced by an objective conception of international law, a law more 
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readily seeking to reflect a collective conscience and respond to the social 
necessities of states organized as a community’.110 
The most comprehensive academic account of the international 
community school and its impact on the legal doctrine was given by Buchan 
in his outstanding International Law and the Construction of the Liberal 
Peace. His key point is that following the end of the Cold War, the world order 
comprises two forms of state association: international society based on 
unqualified membership criteria and ruled by the traditional Westphalian 
principles of state sovereignty and inviolability of domestic constitutional 
settings, and international community – an exclusive club of liberal 
constitutional democracies.111 Whilst this framework has been characterised 
by some as overly ‘bold’, ‘premature’ and ‘reductionist’,112 as there are many 
instances in the post-Cold War era where liberal states have failed to dismiss 
illiberal states as illegitimate and have even maintained close relationships 
with them, it neatly captures the central patterns of transformations (as 
opposed to every micro-aspect of international social reality) occurring in 
international relations since 1990.113 
That said, constitutionalisation of international law is ‘the continuing 
process of the emergence, creation and identification of constitution-like 
elements in the international legal order’.114 It is ‘a process where a legal 
system goes from an ad hoc, decentralised, and consent-based order to a 
system where the law regulates the exercise of power and governance’;115 it is 
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‘a process by which international law moves beyond its sovereign foundations 
as well as its vertical and Western bias, to a system of law founded on a process 
that is hierarchal, normative and structured’.116 It is hence a process where 
international organisations and international legal norms become increasingly 
salient in global politics. In more concrete terms, Westphalian, horizontal, 
consent-based model of international relations, pinned on an idea that states 
are sole subjects and makers of international law, is being incrementally 
supplanted by a new constitutional world order, resting on three fundamental 
pillars: limited government (democracy), human rights and the rule of law — 
what has been called as ‘the trinitarian mantra of the constitutionalist faith’.117 
The key rationale behind such a shift is that the international system can no 
longer be viewed as a mere coexistence of states governing their relations by a 
set of pre-agreed ‘coordination’ rules. Rather, it is increasingly complex and 
overarching system of rules and principles regulating various areas of life. On 
this account, international law, apart from being a compilation of rules 
explicitly sanctioned by states, includes values and principles, or ‘common 
interest’, which do not derive solely from individual state consent but also from 
overall consensus of the international community as a whole. In other words, 
this means an increasing autonomy of international law vis-à-vis individual 
states and consolidation of universal values, which no individual state will can 
override. As Bryde has aptly maintained, constitutionalist system of 
international law ‘recognises the source of legitimacy that is higher than 
individual states, a hierarchy of norms in which ordinary legal rules have to be 
reviewed against constitutional principles, and it employs constitutionalist 
methods of interpretation’.118 
Thus, international law as a unified system enjoys considerable political 
legitimacy because is it pinned on widely shared liberal values, such as the rule 
of law, human rights and democratic form of government. This necessarily 
implies that international law cares about domestic constitutional standards. 
Importantly, democracy has not historically been a sine qua non of 
constitutionalism, since history abounds with examples where states were 
constitutional without being fully democratic, such as the nineteenth-century 
UK with its restrictions on female political participation. However, as one 
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prominent scholar suggested, the absence of a fully operational democratic 
structure is ‘a historically primitive understanding of constitutionalism’.119 
Since 1990, no constitution has been enacted that does not pledge allegiance 
to democracy.120 Constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy go hand in hand, 
because the latter maintains the link between constituent and constituted power 
holders.121 While the notions of constituent and constituted powers are not 
bound to be easily transplanted to the realm of international relations, since the 
holders of constituent power are still to be identified, it is fair to suggest that 
individuals residing within states can be viewed as such. If states are 
domestically organised according to democratic principles, then they are more 
reflective of the will of their citizens on the international plane. Such 
understanding of international constituency as based upon domestic 
democratic participation may serve as an important legitimating base for the 
concept of the international community. 
As regards the analogical dimension of global constitutionalism, as 
developed in this thesis, it is suggested that the concept of global 
constitutionalism has its roots in the domestic doctrine of political 
constitutionalism which is, in turn, characterised by legislative supremacy and 
by an idea that the constitution is not a rigid framework of fundamental laws, 
as the advocates of legal constitutionalism maintain, but a political process 
which is mostly associated with lawmaking rather than judicial practice.122 
Applied to the international level, political constitutionalism implies holding 
those who exercise political power (e.g., states) to account, by and large, 
through political processes and institutions rather than through judicial review, 
as propagated by legal constitutionalism. Moreover, the vision of 
constitutionalism employed in this thesis does not presuppose the existence of 
international constitution embodied in, say, the UN Charter and other texts of 
‘constitutional’ significance, but it is rather pinned on the existence of global 
(constitutional) values, which are shaped and enforced by the world 
community through a variety of political processes, such as, inter alia, 
membership criteria in the international organisations, recognition practices, 
development policies and sanctions for non-compliance and interpretative 
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techniques, including, among others, evolutionary interpretation of treaties and 
the redefinition of the doctrine of custom. Hence, the main thrust of the idea of 
global constitutionalism as a derivative of political constitutionalism lies in the 
wide discretion of international actors as to how to go on political decisions 
but within ‘thin’ parameters set by global constitutional principles. In this 
sense, global constitutionalism exists independent of a constitution. Moreover, 
the normativity, and therefore naturalist fervour, of global constitutionalism as 
interpreted along political constitutionalism’s lines is minimal, and thus 
compatible with the principle of state sovereignty, as it does not prescribe more 
than that it is for states as representatives of the international community to 
decide on how to live up to these principles. However, to say that the 
normativity of global constitutionalism as a sub-species of political 
constitutionalism is minimal is not to say that it is utterly absent or should be 
absent. A certain core of normative principles is essential for global 
constitutionalism to retain its role as a check on states’ self-interested actions. 
It means that global constitutionalism draws heavily on a normative version of 
political constitutionalism, as developed by Tomkins and Bellamy, rather than 
a descriptive one which defines constitutionalism as a mere political process 
stripped of any prescriptive overtones.123 The idea that global constitutionalism 
resembles the domestic doctrine of political constitutionalism, particularly the 
British experience, is also shared by O’Donoghue who contends that the 
common feature of the two constitutionalisms is the fact that while the outer 
limits of constitutional project are blurred, the day-to-day process of its 
operation is clear.124 It should be kept in mind, however, that the above division 
between social and analogical constitutionalisms is by essence an artificial one 
since all visions of world constitutionalism are heavily influenced by the 
domestic constitutionalist theory. 
On a final note, it is of import to highlight that global constitutionalism, as 
the concept is treated in the present work, is a positive doctrine. It means that 
it captures, maps and conceptualises ongoing behavioural patters of states and 
other subjects of international law without seeking (or to be more precise, 
seeking to a very limited extent) to lay down normative requirements as to the 
desired course of development of the international legal system. In this sense, 
it stands for an analytical tool to describe structural changes and developments 
in international law and provides for a conceptual vocabulary to phenomena 
which the traditional doctrine is not capable to conceptually accommodate. The 
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positive nature of global constitutionalism is underscored, for instance, by 
Werner who contends that ‘[i]nternational constitutionalism seeks to explain 
certain developments in international law in terms that deviate from a purely 
consensualist understanding of the international legal order’.125 Similarly, 
Bhandari posits that ‘global constitutionalism operates at the positive rather 
than normative level, being distinguished by the formative features 
[legitimacy, authority and validity] and operational aspects [unity, harmony, 
legalisation, convergence and supremacy]’.126 Global constitutionalism is 
therefore a theoretical framework which sees constitutionalism as a description 
and explanation of how international legal and political order is changing. 
That global constitutionalisation is an empirical process rather than 
academic artefact is well illustrated by such fundamental changes within and 
of international law as, for example, relocation of authority to international and 
regional organisations, such as the UN and the EU, with increasingly 
majoritarian decision-making procedures; vertical differentiation (or 
hierarchisation) between different norms and principles of international law 
(emergence of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations); increasing legalisation 
and juridification of dispute settlement through the establishment of the 
international courts and tribunals; ever-frequent adoption of multilateral 
treaties (with third-party effects) delineating universal values, such as human 
rights protection, climate protection, sustainable development and free trade, 
whose non-ratification and/or non-observance entail high reputational costs; 
reduced threshold for the emergence of international custom in terms of state 
practice and/or opinio juris, particularly when fundamental values are 
concerned; changes in the concept of statehood entailing the shift from the 
principle of effectiveness to standards of legitimacy in the question of 
recognition of states and governments; and rebalancing of moral primacy 
between rights of states (e.g. sovereignty and non-intervention) and rights of 
individuals (human rights) in the debates on the external (e.g. humanitarian 
intervention) and internal use of force (e.g. revolution).127 
Notwithstanding the robust empirical evidence of global 
constitutionalisation and the fact that empirical findings made by virtue of 
global constitutionalism are barely disputed by most international lawyers, 
interpretation of international law through constitutionalist lens has been 
criticised as wishful thinking and a hybrid enterprise resting on diametrically 
opposing theoretical assumptions. It has been said that the coexistence of 
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normative and descriptive dimensions within global constitutionalism 
contributes to the hybridity of such an approach and makes it inevitably torn 
by dilemmas.128 Even if the conceptual soundness of global constitutionalism 
as a legal approach could be defended, the constitutionalist argument is 
premised on the progressive reading of history, arguably appropriated and 
controlled by hegemonic powers who possess military capacity and economic 
resources to impose their understanding of ‘progress’ upon the weak and 
thereby to marginalise and disqualify alternative narratives. In what follows, 
global constitutionalism’s paradoxical nature will be demystified (section 
2.3.1) and its progress agenda revisited (section 2.3.2). 
 
2.3.1. Squaring the Circle: Reconciling Apology and Utopia 
 
Global constitutionalism as a legal approach undoubtedly has a sort of 
naturalist savour as it propagates the existence of constitutional principles 
binding on states without or against their will. Indeed, the very fact that 
constitutionalism questions positive law underpinnings by invoking ‘natural’ 
principles of limited power, checks and balances and democracy (when they 
are not enshrined in positive law) warms up an idea that the whole tradition of 
constitutionalism is but naturalism in disguise. It is, in effect, the principal 
point of criticism that global constitutionalism attracts from its opponents. For 
instance, positivists insist that constitutionalism is an unworkable theory of 
international law as it is overly ambitious, even disingenuous, not backed up 
by state practice and might lead to normative over-extension because its formal 
categories are said to be derived from global values.129 On this view, global 
constitutionalism is equated to a set of normative standards which, albeit 
having its own beauty and value as a concept and academic theory, lacks 
legitimacy, authority and validity — the principal characteristics of positivity. 
Similar objection is raised by legal and political realists who maintain that 
constitutionalism naively purports to direct and control social reality 
independently from the interplay of power structures and is, thus, irrelevant to 
a proper understanding of international politics.130 
Yet, is often overlooked that global constitutionalism’s central objective 
is mapping and explicating a changing legal and political milieu without 
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blurring the distinction between law ‘as it is’ and law ‘as it ought to be’. 
Certainly, such mapping activity is adjoined by the desideratum to reform the 
political community into legal community from a clear normative preference: 
‘[T]he furtherance of legal unity, international integration and fundamental 
rights, and anti-nationalistic understanding of sovereignty, a relaxation of the 
requirement of state consent and the regulation of political power through legal 
institutions’.131 These principles are not, however, purely naturalist artefacts. 
They originate from state practice and opinio juris. The fact that they might be 
at times irreconcilable with state will does not mean that such norms are 
‘given’ or ‘imposed’ from outside the legal system. Once the principles 
emerge, they are constantly under state scrutiny as they are discussed and 
criticised by the international community in concrete cases.132 Moreover, 
international law is not amoral, as many scholars tend to suggest. It is not unfair 
to claim that international law has historically been sensitive to moral issues, 
such as slavery, genocide, humanitarian concerns and human rights, to name 
but a few. Thus, the sole fact that international law mirrors certain universal 
values, such as, in the present case, democracy and the rule of law, does not 
necessarily make it utopian and, therefore, political. These values, enshrined 
in some way or another into the corpus of positive law, constitute the common 
heritage of mankind.133 
It follows, therefore, that constitutionalism has much in common with 
positivist school of thought as well. Traditional international law derives its 
legitimacy and binding force from state consent: states can only be bound by 
norms they consented to, either explicitly or tacitly. Be that as it may, rigid 
voluntarism may be untenable in globalised and ever-interdependent 
international community. It allows states to reject the binding character of 
putative obligations that may be desirable; ‘it allows for “free riding”; it allows 
for “holding out” or “holding others hostage”, all to the detriment of the global 
order’.134 Hence, constitutionalism can be deemed to be firmly embedded in 
positivist thinking as consent is still considered to be a primary validating 
factor unless it frustrates the achievement of community interest.135 Likewise, 
Anne Peters postulates that albeit constitutionalism is a ‘value-loaded 
concept’, it does not cease to be a legal (positive) approach based on the 
consideration of predictability, legal stability and legality and, therefore, 
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geometrically opposed to ‘moralizing tout court’.136 In this sense, 
constitutionalism stands in stark contrast to bold naturalism, or what 
Koskenniemi called ‘turn to ethics’,137 as the way it incorporates global values 
in international system is compatible with the regime of traditional sources and 
with the formal rule of law.138 By the same token, d’Aspremont reiterates that 
constitutionalist theory remains consistent with the formalism advocated in 
mainstream legal scholarship. On this account, not only global 
constitutionalism abstains from questioning the formal law-ascertainment 
system as a foundation of international law identification, but it also reinforces 
the doctrine of sources by attempting to tame the perception of state centrism 
in international lawmaking.139 Further, universal principles on which the idea 
of constitutionalism is based, such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights, can be empirically validated by referring to 
various international instruments, either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’. Klabbers has 
succinctly observed in this respect: 
 
It is difficult to see how a constitutional order can be non-positive: appeals to 
faith, recta ratio, the actual compliance with norms or legitimacy are too 
open-ended to serve, and holding actors accountable ex post facto without 
there being clarity as to what is expected of them seems difficult to reconcile 
with the principle of legality, which must be considered one of the core 
notions of any constitutional order. Hence, constitutionalism and positivism 
need to go hand in hand.140 
 
As the foregoing makes clear, global constitutionalism lies at the intersection 
of positivist and naturalist dichotomy and is, indeed, often characterised by 
international constitutionalists as both normative (natural) and descriptive 
(positive).141 It is normative inasmuch as it was developed by scholarly 
community to further efficiency, coherency and legitimacy of international law 
by applying domestic constitutional theories to the international domain. It is 
positive to the extent that it serves as an analytical tool to describe ongoing 
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process of restructuring the international legal system and is grounded in 
constructions traditionally found in legal positivism. 
However, such reliance on both positive and normative nature of global 
constitutionalism — ‘rejecting the legitimacy of any change which has not 
been willed into existence, but recognizing that reliance on will undermines 
the substance of the developments under way’ — is bound to be controversial 
and fraught with theoretical ambiguities.142 On a more general level, the works 
of Koskenniemi well reflect the ongoing naturalist/positivist tension in legal 
theory. For him, if law is only what states say and do, it becomes an apology 
for the interests of the powerful and if, on the contrary, law sets normative 
standards to put limits on raw state power, it becomes utopian. On both 
accounts, law taps into politics for it cannot be concrete and normative at the 
same time.143 Constitutionalism, as he has pointed out, is but one of many 
strategies which modern international lawyers have taken to prove the 
relevance of international law in terms of its normativity (contra-facticity) and 
concreteness (congruence with state practice).144 However, he insists that 
international argument (or theory) cannot be both concrete (positive) and 
normative (natural) since ‘the closer to state practice an argument is, the less 
normative […] it seems’145 and vice versa. It basically means that Koskenniemi 
is sceptical about the feasibility of a legal theory to be responsive to both 
positivist and naturalist criticisms. 
Klabber’s response to this dilemma is simplex but prodigious. He 
submitted that the reconciliation between positivism and naturalism is not a 
‘mission impossible’. To this end, he proposed a presumptive approach, which 
represents a pragmatic rapprochement between natural and positive legal 
traditions, both of which serve as theoretical foundations for constitutionalist 
thought. It presupposes that whatever states purportedly do to regulate their 
relations must be presumed to be law unless it can be objectively 
counterclaimed. While the Lotus case146 embodies the system where 
international law was presumed to be non-existent, the presumptive approach 
merely reverses this presumption.147 The approach in question might seem 
overtly simplistic and lacking necessary nuances but it succinctly displays a 
need for an adequate doctrine incorporating traditional sources of legality and 
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pleas for the ‘culture of formalism’148 as well as concerns over law’s autonomy 
and normativity. 
To respond to Koskenniemi’s critique and to fine-tune Klabber’s 
presumptive approach, it may be argued that constitutionalism combines both 
utopian and apologist concerns without tapping into either thereof. It is not 
utopian to the extent that it is based on the consent of states, at least implicitly, 
to incorporate certain global concerns which individual states are not capable 
to address on their own into the fabric of international law. To illustrate, 
general principles of international law, serving as the main repositories of 
universals values, are codified in the ICJ Statute as one of the sources of 
international law, and thus binding on all states. It goes without saying that 
considering the solid legal foundation of these principles, one cannot possibly 
call them utopian, imagined, abstract or by any other naturalist qualifier. On 
the second account, constitutionalism is not apologetic either for whenever 
constitutionalist values are couched in legally binding form, they are not easy 
to change by whim and whimsy of individual states. This middle-ground 
quality of global constitutionalism, as the one ‘aim[ing] to bring about what it 
describes as existing’,149 has been designated by scholars as ‘hybrid’150 and 
even ‘paradoxical’.151 However, this depends on what approach one takes to 
the notion of ‘objective values’. If one holds global values to be metaphysically 
objective, agent-neutral things ‘out there’, then the paradox thesis is 
sustainable. Global constitutionalism, contrastively, reposes on a more agent-
relative understanding of values, namely values consented to by the 
community of states (as they are embedded in the architecture of the 
international legal order). That such consent may at times be implicit does not 
change the agent-relative nature of these values. Yet, such ‘minimalist’ values 
are to be distinguished from pure individual state interests for they ‘derive from 
deliberation based on idealised (counterfactual) circumstances of complete 
knowledge and rationality, rather than being merely based on deliberation in 
actual circumstances’.152 
Such a subtle approach to the notion of ‘objectivity’ as a central element 
of the law’s normativity seems to have also been embraced by post-modern 
positivists. Whilst militating against mechanical and unreflective rejection of 
(classical) legal positivism, the adherents of post-modern legal positivism, also 
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known as ‘enlightened positivism’,153 ‘progressive positivism154 and 
‘normative positivism’,155 celebrate the role of politics in international law and 
offer a more sophisticated vision of legal validity that can embrace non-
consensual and even constitutional norms, ‘whose validation hinges on the 
recipient epistemic community’.156 
In the upshot, today’s international law cannot effectively regulate 
manifold issues of globalised community unless it distances itself from 
positivistic straitjacket without falling into naturalist utopianism. Global 
constitutionalism has both naturalist and positivist roots: it is inspired by the 
former and cannot be effective without the latter. It means that it is neither a 
lofty discourse de lege ferenda nor an apologetic alignment with the actions of 
powerful states. It transcends this binary dilemma by being both and neither at 
the same time. It adds shade and texture to existing black and white approaches 
to law to secure their effectiveness and theoretical consistency. Global 
constitutionalism is thus a modern legal approach shaped by the needs of the 
globalised community ‘that maintains the distinctiveness of the legal order 
while managing to be responsive to the extralegal settings of politics, history 
and morality’.157 In this sense, descriptive and normative aspects of global 
constitutionalism are mutually reinforcing. 
 
2.3.2. Global Constitutionalism and the Idea of Progress 
 
The idea of international law marching towards a more constitutionalised 
framework inevitably implies a teleological and linear reading of the history 
of international law, global constitutionalism being at the apex thereof. By 
depicting the present state of international law as being in the ‘process of 
constitutionalisation’ — a process where a legal system goes from a 
decentralised and consent-predicated order to a system of an ‘enhanced 
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constitutional quality’158 — global constitutionalism automatically implies its 
progressive nature with respect to the ‘pre-constitutionalised’ order. In 
intellectual history, the term ‘progress’ signifies a constant improvement from 
a primitive, ‘barbarian’ past towards an enlightened future of rationality and 
peace.159 It consists of three elements: (1) comparative, which means that 
progress can only be identified by way of comparison with a more inferior 
state; (2) evaluative, in that it necessarily scrutinises the past on the presence 
of the signs of progress (or, more precisely, on the absence thereof); and (3) 
reformative, that is by equating itself to anything but goodness progress 
inevitably assumes a reformist ‘punch’.160 
Indeed, the promise of progress lies at the very centre of the 
constitutionalist epistemology. From the vantage point of global 
constitutionalism, the world has been growing irreversibly more 
interdependent and, as a result, the global order has evolved from the system 
of co-existence to the framework of cooperation to a comprehensive ‘blueprint 
for social life’ and ultimately to international law of the international 
community.161 However, the language of progress is not without dark sides. It 
may legitimise imperial politics and shift alternative narratives to the 
periphery. There is a danger of complacency with regard to the dominant idea 
and the attendant risk of this idea remaining unaltered irrespective of its 
efficiency and legitimacy. Another criticism centres on the progress narrative’s 
hopelessly idealistic depiction of the world, which obscures the fact that ‘never 
have violence, inequality, exclusion and famine, and thus economic oppression 
affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and humanity’.162 A 
further flaw of progressivism is its simplistic interpretation of historical 
change. It overstates the predictability of history and fails to appreciate the 
contingency of events.163 
Importantly, the idea of progress is not an exclusive feature of global 
constitutionalism. It also animates mainstream legal scholarship. Almost every 
book on general international law in its introductory chapters presents 
historical events that are situated at specific coordinates in space and in time 
as a coherent story of progress: ‘[F]rom Westphalia in 1648 through Bretton 
Woods and San Francisco conferences of 1944 and 1945 to the present day and 
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beyond to a more just world’.164 The idea that international law is constantly 
moving towards a more perfected state has ancient roots. In the Christian 
tradition, history was viewed as following a linear and directional path to some 
ideal future. Such progress narrative stood in stark contrast with pagan cyclical 
histories of natural birth, development, decline and regeneration.165 In the 
modern times marked by fast scientific, technological and social change, this 
teleological approach to history took on the secular form and became the 
dominant paradigm of the philosophical history of international law. It is 
clearly discernible in the works of one of the prominent Enlightenment 
scholars who contended that 
 
The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as a realization of 
a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally — and for this purpose 
also externally — perfect political constitution as the only possible state 
within which all natural capabilities of mankind can be developed 
completely.166 
 
The naturalist appeal to universal moral principles as a common strategy of 
many Enlightenment scholars to reform international law was subsequently 
attacked for its subjectivity and fuzziness and supplanted by an ostensibly 
objective discourse of the progressive development partially based on thin 
empirical evidence.167 Hudson’s work Progress in International Organization, 
which treats the growth of international organisations as an embodiment of 
progress, is one of the most cited in this respect.168 For him as well as for the 
succeeding generations of international lawyers, ‘the notion that international 
law serves as the ordained mechanism for the achievement of “progress” was 
an accepted tenet of the faith’.169  
Thus, modern progress narratives are constructed, à la Altwicker and 
Diggleman, by means of four ‘techniques’: (1) ascending periodisation, (2) 
proving increased value-orientation of international law, (3) detection of 
positive trends and (4) paradigm shift-talk.170 On this account, global 
constitutionalism is a second technique: by suggesting that international law is 
evolving from Westphalian, anarchic model of international relations pinned 
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on an idea of sovereignty to a new constitutional world order founded on 
common interest, it asserts the progress by pointing to the growing value-
orientation of international law. Traditional international law too may (and it 
actually does) employ this technique to convey the message of progress but in 
a less pronounced manner. In fact, the idea of progress is so imminent to 
international law’s self-perception as a discipline that it became a dominant 
narrative of the field.171 The difference that global constitutionalism has 
introduced is that it brought this discourse into light, made it explicit, whereas 
orthodox international theory attempts to contain the progress narrative 
underground, behind a veil of objective reasoning and impartial argumentative 
techniques. 
So, is the progress narrative inherently fallacious? Is it avoidable? Should 
it be avoided? Thinking in terms of progress is not intrinsically erroneous. It is 
when one constructs a progress narrative and uncritically assembles historical 
facts to match the plot in order to design a particular future that one enters 
dangerous waters of subjectivism, idealism and politics of alienation. As 
Skouteris observed, the language of progress is a language of authority which 
can legitimise but also de-legitimise.172 By designing an ostensibly true version 
of history, it proclaims in a celebratory tone an end to contestation and thus 
sets aside alternative narratives. Hence, progress discourse is not a descriptive 
exercise but a ‘powerful rhetorical strategy of legitimation’.173 
Be that as it may, a strong claim may be advanced that any theory of 
international law shall incorporate the idea of progress to be operative, that is 
to provide for practical solutions to every-day legal problems. In fact, this is 
the main reason why almost every modern theory of international law is built 
on the idea of progressive history. However, there is a strand of legal 
scholarship that emerged as a counter-narrative to the prevailing linear 
understanding of historical change.174 This counter-narrative, or what has 
become to be known as critical legal studies,175 rejects the idea of law as linear 
progressive development towards an ideal end and substitutes it with a circular 
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vision of international law constantly oscillating between opposing values.176 
On this view, international law is always indeterminate, which allows for the 
producing of an infinite number of arguments, which in turn make up the 
source of the continuous ‘renewal of the field’.177 Critical legal studies do not 
advance any grand theory of international law akin to positivism or naturalism. 
Instead, they invite legal scholars and practitioners to question their most 
entrenched convictions by acknowledging the political nature of international 
law and accepting its radial indeterminacy as an asset, as ‘an absolutely central 
aspect of international law’s acceptability’.178 But if the purpose of the counter-
narrative is not to provide for a workable theory of international law but rather 
to critically evaluate how the dominant narrative generates its structures and 
how these structures distort the reality, then it is not suitable for, and in fact 
not even capable of, proposing workable solutions.179 As Koskenniemi himself 
acknowledged: 
 
By reducing international law to self-contained formalistic argument around 
opposing concepts, the critical counter-narrative has not merely placed the 
content of solutions to legal problems outside international law but has 
actually made this content inaccessible to the international lawyer, who lacks 
the means and methods to reach out of law’s endless circularity to sociology, 
philosophy, or political science to identify workable solutions and to 
introduce them to the legal discourse.180 
 
It follows that international law as a normative tool of regulating social 
interactions is inconceivable beyond the narrative of progress, at least at this 
stage of legal scholarship. However, this does not have to be viewed in purely 
pessimistic tones. Progress is not an inherently bad thing. On the contrary, it is 
needed to raise a sense of responsibility for making one’s own history and to 
make continuous efforts to ameliorate conditions of human existence. As 
Collingwood noted: 
 
[M]ore dangerous […] is the defeatist spirit which fears that what we are 
aiming at is no more than a Utopian dream. And this fear becomes paralyzing 
when […] it calls in the help of philosophical ideas, and argues that the evils 
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admittedly belonging to our moral, social, and political life are essential 
elements in all human life, or in all civilizations, so that the special problems 
of the modern world are inherently insoluble.181 
 
Consequently, progress narratives can act as a call for action: ‘[B]y de-
mystifying progress narratives, new possibilities are opened for the intellectual 
imagination on which to act in the world’.182 Global constitutionalism is one 
such possibility. Not only does it not attempt to bury the progress tropes behind 
the seemingly objective legal semantics, but it also puts the idea of progress at 
the very centre of its epistemology. To reiterate, progress only becomes 
‘unsettling’ when it is couched in the seemingly objective language of 
international law. Such pretension for objectiveness and making progress 
‘speak itself’183 are the principal weaknesses of the traditional theory attacked 
by the new stream. Considering the fact that the underlying rationale behind 
the counter-narrative is to make explicit the political nature of international 
legal argument, global constitutionalism as an embodiment of substantive 
(value-laden) liberalism in a sense takes this criticism seriously and thus 
distances itself from the dominant narrative. Ultimately, global 
constitutionalism does not assert that constitutionalisation of international law 
is the only way to go. It merely makes a positive claim (instead of a normative 
one) that this is what is now happening without any attempt to project a 
desirable future.184 
The final question to consider here is, as was poignantly formulated by 
Skouteris, whether ‘progress [can] ever be universal or will it necessarily 
always involve power relations and an ideological struggle during which some 
will gain and others will lose’?185 As was previously mentioned, statements on 
progress are never neutral. They are always value-laden. But to aspire for a 
theory of international law that would completely do away with politics is to 
be utterly idealistic. The propensity to exclude and marginalise is as old as 
history of a man and international law is not an exception. Thus, the challenge 
is not to get rid of the idea of progress as such but of the hegemonic agenda 
behind it. As Galindo has rightly observed, it is not the progress itself that is a 
problem but an inevitable progress: the false perception that a certain 
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prevailing idea will remain immune from critique.186 Only when the language 
of progress is transparent and inclusive can it act as an engine for the universal 
development. 
It follows that global constitutionalism is a discourse of progress, but it is 
founded on assumptions that minimise exclusion. First, constitutionalisation of 
international law entails ‘softening’ of international law. As Shelton contented: 
 
Non-binding commitments may be entered into precisely to reflect the will of 
the international community to resolve a pressing global problem over the 
objections of the one or few states causing the problem, while avoiding the 
doctrinal barrier of their lack of consent to be bound by the norm.187 
 
Non-binding commitments permit, in principle, the inclusion of all interested 
parties in a process of international lawmaking.188 Because the traditional 
channels of norm-creation, such as treaties (especially law-making treaties) 
and custom, are more often than not orchestrated by leading states and yet 
establish obligations towards all the world rather than with respect to particular 
parties, recourse to soft instruments is equally available to developing states 
and can, thus, be viewed as a tool of empowerment rather than exclusion.189 
Second, constitutionalisation of international law presupposes the revision 
of the doctrine of custom. From this perspective, it is not the practice of 
individual states that counts most but rather the existence of universal opinio 
juris that a certain norm is desirable and/or needed. Thus, constitutionalising 
international law for the purposes of ascertainment of a customary norm 
discounts the requirement of general and consistent state practice and instead 
focuses primarily on statements.190 Unlike traditional doctrine of custom, 
where the formation of custom is effectuated by a handful of the most powerful 
and wealthy states, the process of the so-called ‘modern custom’ formation is 
a conscious, egalitarian and deliberate process. Because it gives an equal voice 
to all participating parties, it makes international law, in words of Charney, 
truly ‘universal’.191 
Another domain where constitutionalisation has transformed international 
law into more inclusive is the doctrine of sources itself. Global 
constitutionalism presupposes a shift of emphasis from individual state consent 
to universal consensus as the basis of an international legal obligation. In more 
concrete terms, it would mean that treaties as the main source of obligations in 
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Westphalian society give way to the sources more easily accommodating the 
common interest of the international community,192 such as custom in its 
above-mentioned conceptualisation and general principles. As regards the 
latter, it is now widely accepted that although article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice does not establish a hierarchy of sources, in 
actual fact general principles of law are almost never referred to, at least in 
explicit terms, in the international fora due to their non-consensual character. 
Constitutionalisation of international law envisages a more frequent recourse 
to this third source as an ultimate repository of universal values. Because 
general principles of international law derive from a large number and variety 
of domestic legal systems, obligations they impose are more universal than 
those established by (multilateral) treaty or custom.193 
In conclusion, narratives of progress are vital for international law’s 
identity and self-perception as well as its capability to shape future paths. 
Making these narratives explicit curtails abuse and serves as a platform for 
revising the ‘filter of right solutions’.194  Global constitutionalism is one of the 
most sophisticated modern approaches in international law. Not only is it 
explicit about its vision of international law as a sign and instrument of 
progress, but it also attempts to make this a virtue by universalising this process 
and minimising exclusion. On this view, international law is, at an increasing 
rate, a product of international consensus rather than consent of a dozen of the 
most powerful nations. It is clear that following the global decline of the rule 
of law and ongoing human rights violations around the globe caused by 
transnational terrorism threats, internal conflicts, state aggression and the rise 
of a new type of authoritarianism – ‘authoritarian in political form, capitalist 
in economics, and nationalist in ideology’195 – global constitutionalism is now 
in (temporal) retreat.196 Moreover, in many places and contexts political 
authority continues to be, at least to certain extent, justified with reference to 
more traditional legitimating factors, such as state sovereignty, national 
identity, local traditions or divine considerations. For instance, China’s recent 
appropriation of certain rocks and islands in the East and South China Sea with 
a view to extend its air defence zone in contravention to its obligations under 
the Law of the Sea Convention and refusing any legal proceedings is better 
understood through the frames of reference of realism rather than 
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constitutionalism.197 Similar concern relates to the USA’s exorbitant exercise 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters, on the one hand, 
and its simultaneous denial of jurisdiction over its activities with respect to 
‘enemy combatants’ as well as its efforts to prevent the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by other states, on the other.198 Likewise, Russian involvement in 
the breakaway of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 as well as its ongoing military 
presence in eastern Ukraine in blatant violation of the UN Charter is but 
another serious challenge to global constitutionalism. Additionally, the 
repeated ad nauseam invocation of cultural relativism in the debate on 
universality of human rights, including the right to democracy, assumes the 
particularistic and Western character of global constitutionalism.199 
However, one should not be confused by these separate trends. 
Constitutionalisation of international law is not necessarily a linear process and 
temporal setbacks as well as exceptionalist policies of individual states do not 
distort the general pattern of value-based transformation of international law. 
Notably, even those states that frequently act contrary to the constitutional 
ideals, nonetheless, seek international validation by ‘investing in 
constitutionalist gestures, thereby implicitly acknowledging the legitimating 
normative power of constitutionalism’.200 On the grass-root level, the same 
constitutionalist rhetoric of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is 
invoked by the oppressed, exploited and discriminated against seeking to 
articulate their grievances and improve their lives. Thus, constitutionalism is 
not confined to the West, it is global. It provides ‘a vocabulary that has a hold 
on the world — it is able to connect to the inside of institutions, procedures, 
practices and self-understandings that are central to the legal and political 
world we live in’.201 Moreover, legal and political practices of every polity are 
already, by and large, shaped by constitutional norms and are thus susceptible 
to be scrutinised and assessed from an external (international) standpoint. It 
follows that global constitutionalism as an approach and idea in international 
law is based on a shared endorsement of core constitutional principles of the 
rule of law, separation of powers and human rights within the wider context of 
global society and is nothing but universal. 
 
 
                                               
197 See Mattias Kumm and others, ‘How Large is the World of Global Constitutionalism?’ 
(2014) 3 Global Constitutionalism 1, 5. 
198 See generally Anne Peters, ‘The Growth of International Law between Globalisation and the 
Great Power’ (2003) 8 ARIEL 109. 
199 See eg Federico Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (OUP 2014) ch 1. 
200 Mattias Kumm and others, ‘How Large is the World of Global Constitutionalism?’ (2014) 3 
Global Constitutionalism 1, 5. 
201 ibid 6. 
Theoretical Framework: Constitutionalist Transformation of International Law 
 
 
46 
2.4. Global Constitutionalism as a ‘Law-in-Context’ 
Approach 
 
The present research falls into the category of socio-legal research. Albeit 
largely employing traditional ‘rules of the game’, it is not doctrinal research as 
the knowledge it produces is not intended for judges and other legal 
practitioners, nor is it a research in constitutional law. The central purpose of 
this project is to make sense of international law as well as to resolve particular 
legal issues from an external standpoint, rather than from a viewpoint of an 
internal participant. The importance of such undertaking lies in the novelty and 
distinctiveness of the final outcome as compared to the research result to be 
produced within the confines of the doctrinal tradition. As Douglas Vick 
succinctly observed, interdisciplinarity presupposes that researchers, in 
addition to ‘black-letter’ approach, resort to an amalgam of theories, methods 
and techniques borrowed from other social disciplines that are integrated and 
synthesised to produce a type of analysis that would not otherwise be possible 
should either discipline be utilised in isolation.202 The value of external 
perspective is hard to overestimate since international law is much more than 
a mere accumulation of legal rules waiting to be discovered and interpreted. 
Other perspectives are necessary to explain the whole phenomenon of 
international law. In addition, on the account of the utilised methodology and 
the level and extent of the interdisciplinary interplay, it is germane to designate 
this work as a socio-legal lite research (theoretical socio-legal research or ‘law-
in-context’ research).203 Because it is not socio-legal methods proper 
(quantitative or qualitative) that are used but a particular theory transplanted 
from the domain of political science to the domain of law to account for certain 
phenomena, not otherwise addressed by law, one cannot claim doing socio-
legal research par excellence but rather a light version of it, that is socio-legal 
lite research, in the sense that this research is context-aware but does not 
include hardcore socio-legal methods. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sketched out the theoretical basis of the present thesis. It is 
argued that such theoretical self-reflection does not amount to a ‘shopping-
mall approach’ to method, whereby one selects an approach which most 
adequately corresponds to one’s personal idiosyncrasies and academic 
objectives. Rather, such methodological openness is premised on an idea that 
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any type of legal research inevitably involves theoretical assumptions having 
bearing on the way how the research is conducted, what type of data is regarded 
as legitimate and who is the ultimate beneficiary of the research outcomes. 
Thus, the crucial task of any researcher is not to conceal her methodological 
predisposition as unnecessary, impractical and unscientific but, on the 
contrary, to demonstrate in explicit terms her theoretical awareness and self-
consciousness as preconditions of informed criticism and scientific soundness. 
This thesis is, thus, placed within confines of neoliberal reading of 
international law, which most adequately reflects the ongoing value-
orientation and humanisation of the international system. It is acknowledged 
that any value-based conception of international law involves subjective 
judgments on what those values are and how they are to be promoted and 
enforced, which is reminiscent of the nineteenth-century standard of 
civilisation. It is demonstrated, however, that the propensity to impose a 
particular substantive world vision is an inherent feature of human society, 
which cannot be eliminated but can be effectively controlled. Global 
constitutionalism is suggested to be a solution to the increasingly complex 
international political environment where the need to promote equality, non-
intervention and inclusiveness is as essential as to maintain a certain core of 
values as a sine qua non of unity, integrity and efficiency of the post-
Westphalian order. It is founded on three fundamental pillars: democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law — values recognised by the international 
community in variety of instruments. This necessarily implies that 
international law cares about domestic political systems, that is how national 
governments are formed. The legitimacy of the constitutional rationale is based 
on the fact that, unlike other value-based conceptions of international law, it is 
primarily descriptive and does not seek to force into existence normative ideas 
unsupported by state consent, even though the latter’s conceptualisation is 
somewhat modified because it is increasingly derived from, and is shaped by, 
international consensus. 
It is subsequently recognised that even though global constitutionalism is 
primarily concerned with capturing, mapping and explicating ongoing 
behavioural patters of states and other subjects of international law without 
advancing a desired course of action, it is based on progressive reading of 
history because its legitimacy base relies on the assumption that 
constitutionalising international law is more effective in responding to modern 
challenges than the Westphalian system of decentralised and consent-based 
interaction and is, thus, superior to the pre-constitutionalised order. However, 
the idea of progress is tainted by the risk of imperialism since it is allegedly a 
narrative constructed by hegemonic powers who possess military capacity and 
economic resources to impose their understanding of ‘global’ values upon the 
weak and thereby to shift alternative narratives to the periphery. 
In response to these criticisms, it is established that albeit global 
constitutionalism speaks the language of progress, it is based on assumptions 
that minimise abuse and exclusion. First, softening of international law as a 
layer of global constitutionalisation implies that more states than ever before 
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can now participate in the process of international law-making because it is 
easier and less costly. Second, the revision of the doctrine of custom implies 
that more credence is given to universal opinio juris that certain norm is 
desirable and/or needed, rather than to individual instances of state practice of 
the most powerful states who possess political authority and economic 
resources to make their actions count. Third, because constitutionalisation of 
international law implies a shift of emphasis from individual state consent to 
universal consensus as the basis of an international legal obligation, sources 
that more easily accommodate the common interest, such as general principles 
of law, assume prominence. Because such principles derive from a large 
number and variety of domestic legal systems, obligations they impose are 
more universal than those established by (multilateral) treaty or custom. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that global constitutionalism is a ‘law-in-
context’ approach by virtue of its pedigree (political science), methodology 
(theoretical rather than empirical), objectives (assumes a certain progressive 
stance vis-à-vis international order rather than simply preserves the state of 
affairs) and ultimate audience (broader academic community).
3. Defining Democracy 
 
With the apparent demise of Soviet Communism and the Marxist version of 
socialism, many claim that liberal-democracy, and perhaps capitalism, won 
the Cold War. But the crucial question is, about which liberalism, which 
democracy and which capitalism is this claim maid.1 
 
Irrespective of the widespread support for democracy in the years following 
the fall of communism, the definition of what is at stake is still a critical issue 
to be addressed. Quite surprisingly, the notion of democracy was employed to 
designate multifarious forms of government as well as political processes over 
wide periods of time.2 As Burchill pointedly observed, 
 
Democracy has been conceptualised as an entitlement all societies possess, as 
a human right individuals are able to exercise through accepted procedures, 
as a criterion for the recognition of legitimate governance, as a justification 
for intervention and the use of force, and as an overriding principle upon 
which the international system is ordered’.3 
 
What renders situation even more complicated is the internationally recorded 
references to democracy as both an ‘ideal’ and a ‘form of government’. For 
instance, the Inter-Parliamentary Union in its 1997 Universal Declaration on 
Democracy contemplates that ‘[d]emocracy is both an ideal to be pursued and 
a mode of government to be applied’.4 It states: 
 
As an ideal, democracy aims essentially to preserve and promote the dignity 
and fundamental rights of the individual, to achieve social justice, foster the 
economic and social development of the community, strengthen the cohesion 
of society and enhance national tranquillity, as well as to create a climate that 
is favourable for international peace. As a form of government, democracy is 
the best way of achieving these objectives.5  
 
A similar fuzziness in definition is observable in other international 
documents, such as, for instance, a UNGA Resolution, which provides that: 
 
                                               
1 Conrad Waligorski, Liberal Economics and Democracy: Keynes, Galbraith, Thurow, and 
Reich (UP of Kansas 1997) 1. 
2 The work of David Held, aimed to demonstrate a variety of practices and regimes falling under 
the notion ‘democracy’, is illustrative in this respect. David Held, Models of Democracy (3rd 
edn, Polity Press 2006). 
3 Richard Burchill, ‘The Developing International Law of Democracy’ (Review Article) (2001) 
64 MLR 123, 126. 
4 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Universal Declaration on Democracy (Cairo, 16 December 1997) 
para 2 <http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/161-dem.htm> accessed 24 August 2016. 
5 ibid para 3. 
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[T]he essential elements of democracy include respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful 
assembly and of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, to 
vote and to be elected at genuine periodic free elections by universal and 
equal suffrage and by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the 
independence of the judiciary, transparency and accountability in public 
administration, and free, independent and pluralistic media […].6 
Moreover, the consensus on the definition of democracy is precluded by 
disagreement on whether democracy is a question of kind or one of degree, 
that is whether democracy is a binary concept in the sense that state is either 
democratic or non-democratic or whether democracy is a question of degree in 
the sense that some states are more democratic than others.7 Ultimately, the 
key complexity lies in the ambiguity as to whether democracy should be 
referred to as a process of free and genuine elections or whether it is a 
substantive concept embracing the whole nitty-gritty of a liberal democratic 
society. The absence of agreement on the meaning of democracy has prevented 
consensus on the emergence of a human right to democratic governance. This 
thesis seeks to bring some clarity to the definition of democracy through the 
prism of the constitutionalist rationale. That said, the thesis will first trace the 
main contours of the debate on the definition of democracy, which primarily 
revolves around the discussions on theories and models of democracy. 
Hereafter, the international law’s conception of democracy will be revisited 
and the novel definition will be developed. 
 
3.1. Theories of Democracy 
 
The term ‘democracy’ derived from Greek demokratia which is a synthesis of 
demos (‘people’) and kratos (‘rule’). Literally, the term stands for ‘rule by 
people’ and was coined to describe the political system in some Greek city-
states, notably Athens.8 In classical antiquity and up to the seventeenth century, 
democracy was largely associated with the gathering of citizens in assemblies 
and other public places to decide on political issues of a polity. It was only by 
the early nineteenth century that the concept acquired its modern meaning, that 
is democracy as a right of citizens to participate in political life of their country 
                                               
6 UNGA Res 59/201 (20 December 2004) UN Doc A/Res/59/201, para 1. See also UNCHR Res 
32 (2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES 2005/32, para 1 (Repeating verbatim the 2004 resolution). 
7 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (CQ Press 1987) 184. See also Niels 
Petersen, ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law’ (2009) 34 Brook J Int’l 
L 33, 37. 
8 Robert A Dahl, ‘Democracy’, Encyclopedia Britannica (2010) 
<https://global.britannica.com/topic/democracy> accessed 24 August 2016. 
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through the medium of elected representatives.9 Within the broad discourse on 
the definition of democracy in political science, it is thus possible to 
distinguish three principal theories of democracy: classical theory of 
democracy (or government-centric theory of democracy), procedural theory of 
democracy (or competitive theory of democracy) and substantive theory of 
democracy. The former was adopted at the end of the eighteenth century and 
conceptualised democracy in terms of sources of authority for government 
(will of the people), purposes served by government (personal development 
and material goods) and procedures for forming government (political 
participation, such as e.g. participation in elections).10 The latter element was 
subject to restrictive criteria, such as wealth, sex, societal status, birth and 
education.11 Moreover, liberal political and economic rights formed the 
cornerstone of thought on democracy within the classical liberal democratic 
theory. The most prominent representatives of this strand of thought are John 
Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill.12 
This classical theory of democracy with its premium on government and 
individual rights was challenged by Joseph Schumpeter. For him, the theory 
did not provide for clear guidelines as to how to distinguish democratic 
regimes from non-democratic ones, and democracy from this theoretical 
perspective bounds, so the story goes, to be rather an ideal than a method.13 He 
wanted to approach democracy not as an ideal ‘utopian’ normative system but 
as a form of governance with narrow but clear procedural determinants. To 
assert that democracy entailed ‘the rule of people’ for ‘common good’ was, for 
Schumpeter, foolish, because people in democracies did not rule, they merely 
elected their rulers, and because the objective ascertainment of common good 
was practically impossible. To this end he proposed what he termed ‘another 
theory of democracy’, which is now commonly viewed as competitive theory. 
The ‘democratic method’, he suggested, ‘is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.14 The same position 
is maintained by another prominent scholar, Samuel Huntington, who argues 
that 
 
Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable 
sine qua non […] Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, 
corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and 
incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities 
                                               
9 Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship (Peter Kennealy tr, Polity Press 1989) 144. 
10 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 6. See also Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy (Harper 1947) 269. 
11 See David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Polity Press 1995) 9-12. 
12 For a more comprehensive account, see Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Revisioning 
Democracy Promotion (Routledge 2013) 32-39. 
13 Joseph A Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Harper 1947) 266, 269. 
14 ibid 269. 
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may make such governments undesirable but they do not make them 
undemocratic.15 
 
On this account, democracy has no inherent normative content and is largely 
about electoral process: people’s participation in political process is reduced 
to casting a vote once in a circumscribed timespan and resuming the role of 
passive observers between elections. It can be gauged on the basis of such 
(empirically verifiable) criteria as universal participation, that is everyone is 
entitled to participate in elections, both as a voter and as a candidate; majority 
rule, meaning that decisions are taken by majority; and formal equality (one 
man, one vote), implying that every vote counts equally. While this theoretical 
model does not literally refuse to look beyond the institution of elections and 
recognises the importance of other rights, it endorses these rights inasmuch as 
they support the right to political participation rather than on their own merit.16 
Importantly, the role of democracy is not even to represent the will of the 
people, as the theorists of the classical theory of democracy had opined. In 
Macpherson’s terms, for Schumpeter, ‘[t]he voters’ role is not to decide 
political issues and then choose representatives who will carry out those 
decisions: it is rather to choose the men who will do the deciding’.17 Notably, 
this thin procedural understanding of democracy has been supplemented by a 
thick procedural model, also labelled as an ‘expanded procedural minimum’ 
model,18 mostly associated with Dahl and his concept of polyarchy,19 which 
insists on constitutional guarantees and checks on the exercise of executive 
power as well as the government’s capability to rule effectively.20 
Thus, till the 1970s the debate was enduring between the adherents of the 
classical ‘value-based’ approach, equating democracy with source or purpose, 
and those subscribing to procedural understanding à la Schumpeter. That latter 
school eventually won the battle given the analytical precision and empirical 
                                               
15 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 9-10. See also Adam Przeworski and others, ‘What Makes 
Democracies Endure?’ (1997) 7 Journal of Democracy 39, 50-51. 
16 Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law (Hart Publishing 2013) 17. 
17 Crawford Brough Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (OUP 1977) 78. 
18 David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in 
Comparative Research’ (1997) 49 Wld Pol 430, 434. 
19 Dahl coined this term in 1953 to refer to a modern representative democracy with universal 
suffrage. Because a fully-fledged democracy is not practically possible in the modern world, 
where everyone would have a genuinely equal possibility to partake in political decisionmaking 
and where government would be fully responsive to the concerns of the whole citizenry, Dahl 
employed the term ‘polyarchy’ to designate the more limited form of democracy that is 
realistically feasible. Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (Yale UP 1971) 
90, 97. 
20 See eg David Collier and Steven Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research’ (1997) 49 Wld Pol 430, 434. Similar distinction was also 
developed by Riker who established a gradation between two procedural versions of democracy: 
populism (thin) and liberalism (thick). William H Riker, Liberalism against Populism (Freeman 
1982). The distinction drawn by Meny and Surel between popular democracy and constitutional 
democracy is also illustrative of this trend. Yves Meny and Yves Surel, Democracies and the 
Populist Challenge (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 7-11. 
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verifiability of the procedural model.21 Yet, Schumpeterian conception quickly 
attracted multifarious criticisms.22 Terry Karl called the model in question a 
‘fallacy of electoralism’ by pinpointing to the fallacious privileging of the 
electoral side of democracy over other vital dimensions, failure to account for 
the dangers of majoritarianism and the lack of the real control of citizenry over 
political decisions affecting their lives.23 Other scholars characterised 
minimalist democracy as an ‘apology for exclusionary government power’24 
and as an ‘euphemism for sophisticated modern forms of neo-
authoritarianism’,25 which are denominated by political scientists in a variety 
of ways, including such qualifiers as semi-democracy, formal democracy, 
electoral democracy, facade democracy, pseudo-democracy, hybrid 
democracy, illiberal democracy, virtual democracy, delegative democracy, 
competitive-authoritarian regime, soft authoritarianism and electoral 
authoritarian regime.26 As Susan Marks succinctly observed, ‘[i]mportant 
though the institutions and procedures of representative democracy clearly are, 
they cannot be allowed to exhaust the meaning of democracy. To permit this is 
to give up on the idea that democracy is about self-government, and not just 
                                               
21 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 6-7. 
22 See, inter alia, Terry Karl, ‘Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El 
Salvador’ in Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva (eds), Elections and Democratization in Latin 
America, 1980-1985 (Center for US/Mexican Studies 1986) 9-36; Susan Marks, ‘The “Emerging 
Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic Governance”’ (1997) 91 ASIL Proc 372, 373; Susan 
Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of 
Ideology (OUP 2000) 59-60; Brad R Roth, ‘Evaluating Democratic Progress’ in Gregory H Fox 
and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 495; 
Richard Burchill, ‘The Developing International Law of Democracy’ (Review Article) (2001) 
64 MLR 123, 125-26; Giovanni Sartori, ‘How Far Can Free Government Travel?’ in Larry 
Diamond and Marc F Plattner (eds), Democracy: A Reader (The Johns Hopkins UP 2009) 50. 
23 Terry Karl, ‘Imposing Consent? Electoralism versus Democratization in El Salvador’ in Paul 
Drake and Eduardo Silva (eds), Elections and Democratization in Latin America, 1980-1985 
(Center for US/Mexican Studies 1986) 9-36 
24 Richard Burchill, ‘The Promotion and Protection of Democracy by Regional Organizations in 
Europe: The Case of Austria’ (2001) 7 EPL 79, 81. 
25 Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson, ‘Low Intensity Democracy’ in Barry Gills, 
Joel Rocamora and Richard Wilson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New 
World Order (Pluto Press 1993) 21. 
26 For a detailed discussion on a variety of regimes that hold periodic elections but fall short of 
providing meaningful political participation and protection of human rights, see eg Fareed 
Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’ (1997) 76 Foreign Aff 22; David Collier and Steven 
Levitsky, ‘Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research’ 
(1997) 49 Wld Pol 430, 430-31; Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’ (2002) 13 
Journal of Democracy 21, 23; Thomas Carothers, ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’ (2002) 
13 Journal of Democracy 5, 9-10; Steven Levitsky and Lucian A Way, ‘The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism’ (2002) 13 Journal of Democracy 51; Andreas Schedler, ‘The Menu of 
Manipulation’ in Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner (eds), Democracy: A Reader (The Johns 
Hopkins UP 2009) 270 (Table 2). 
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about legitimating government by others’.27 Mere elections in slave-society 
would not amount to democracy. 
Substantive theory of democracy was invented to tackle the weaknesses of 
the procedural view and has been buttressed by an increased awareness of the 
problems that many states face despite the increase in ‘electoral democracy’. 
It is founded on democracy’s underlying principles, such as (substantive) 
equality and self-empowerment: democracy entails fostering of a fully 
developed individual capable of exercising meaningful free choice and to fully 
participate in public affairs. The most sophisticated account of this model was 
given by Beetham. According to him, 
 
The core idea of democracy is that of popular vote or popular control over 
collective decision-making. Its starting point is with the citizen rather than 
with the institutions of government. Its defining principles are that all citizens 
entitled to a say in public affairs, both through the associations of civil society 
and through participation in government, and that this entitlement should be 
available on terms of equality to all. Control by citizens over their collective 
affairs and equality between citizens in the exercise of that control are the 
basic democratic principles.28 
 
Similar view is aired by Held, who claimed that genuine democracy is based 
on participation of ‘free and equal’ individuals ‘in the processes of deliberation 
about the conditions of their own lives and in the determination of those 
conditions, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights 
of others’.29 Democracy is, thus, not an absolute and static notion but a 
continuous process of enhancing political equality and self-rule.30 It is to be 
understood in terms of a social contract aimed to protect citizen’s rights. In this 
view, elections are not an end in itself but a means of creating a society of equal 
citizens enjoying equal access to political institutions and processes and 
exercising meaningful influence on the decision-making of their leaders. 
Rather than being confined to procedural pillars of universal participation, 
electoral equality and majoritarianism, the substantive view evaluates 
democracy on the basis of substance of government polices. Most theorists 
claim that democratic government must guarantee civil and political rights and 
freedoms. Some go further by adding social and economic rights to the list of 
requirements that governments should be evaluated against. 
The substantive model of democracy has not escaped criticisms either. It 
is often claimed to be a philosophical ideal lacking precise conceptual frames 
to be workable. Huntington’s position well reflects these concerns: 
 
                                               
27 Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique 
of Ideology (OUP 2000) 2. 
28 David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Polity Press 1999) 90-91 (emphasis original). 
29 David Held, Models of Democracy (3rd edn, Polity Press 2006) 264. 
30 Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique 
of Ideology (OUP 2000) 73. 
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To some people democracy has or should have much more sweeping and 
idealistic connotations. To them, ‘true democracy’ means liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, effective citizenship control over policy, responsible government, 
honesty and openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal 
participation and power, and various other civic virtues. These are, for the 
most part, good things and people can, if they wish, define democracy in these 
terms. Doing so, however, raises the problems that come up with the 
definitions of democracy by source or by purpose. Fuzzy norms do not yield 
useful analysis.31 
 
Moreover, given the generic character of the substantive conception, it is 
viewed by some as a modern neocolonial strategy.32 Since such highly abstract 
concepts as the rule of law, accountability and respect for human rights are 
difficult to measure, states’ policies of substantive democracy promotion may 
serve as a guise for neocolonial interventionism. There are also scholars taking 
a middle-ground position on the issue in question. While claiming that respect 
for economic, social and cultural rights does not necessarily constitute an 
unalienable element of democratic regime, they do not deny completely the 
impact of this strand of rights on functioning of democracy.33 
Thus, it should be clear by this point that democratic political theory lacks 
a unitary understanding of democracy. The procedural model is attractive due 
to its practical measurability and comparability. However, with its unhealthy 
focus on elections it provides a distorted picture of political reality since it fails 
to distinguish between liberal democracies and a variety of electoral regimes 
paying scant or no regard to the protection of human rights. For the adherents 
of the substantive theory, democracy is more than a political system or an 
electoral method and comprises a set of practices and values founded on the 
respect for human dignity. Yet, the absence of precise theoretical ramifications 
of the concept makes it ineffective, useless and vulnerable to abuse. To address 
both types of criticisms, some quarters of scholarly community sought to 
underscore the ongoing nature of the concept of democracy. For them, 
‘[s]ubstantive democracy is a maximum goal, relevant to normative evaluation 
of all regimes but susceptible only of incomplete realization in even the most 
highly developed polity. Popular sovereignty is a minimum goal, requisite to 
the bare recognition of a government’s legitimacy against the claims of rival 
contestants’.34 However, such understanding does not solve the conceptual 
indeterminacy of the notion of democracy, it merely restates the incapability 
of the concept to reconcile the substantive virtue of genuine citizen 
empowerment with the procedural virtues of quantifiability and precision. 
                                               
31 Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 9. 
32 Mart Koskenniemi, ‘Whose Intolerance, Which Democracy’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R 
Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 439-40. 
33 Jean d’Aspremont, L’État non démocratique en droit international (Pedone 2008) 33. 
34 Brad Roth, ‘Evaluating Democratic Progress’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), 
Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 512. See also James Allan, 
‘Liberalism, Democracy and Hong Kong’ (1998) 28 HKLJ 156, 164-65. 
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Before attempting to ‘update’ the democratic theory, it is worth pausing to 
consider the existing classification of democracy into several types, or models. 
 
3.2. Models of Democracy 
 
Apart from the debate on the ‘right’ theory of democracy, the imprecise and 
contested nature of the concept of democracy is neatly captured in the idea of 
‘models of democracy’. In fact, there are two competing models, or 
conceptions, of democracy in political science — revolutionary (one-party) 
democracy and liberal (representative) democracy. Noteworthy, Held also 
added the concept of ‘direct democracy’ to this classification.35 However, this 
model is only useful in historical perspective as it was incepted in ancient 
Greek city-states and is not feasible in the modern nation-state. Consequently, 
the present thesis focuses on the two remaining conceptions. Before examining 
each model of democracy, it is imperative to briefly note that ‘model of 
democracy’ is a notion which refers ‘to a theoretical construction designed to 
reveal and explain the chief elements of a democratic form and its underlying 
structure of relations […] Models are […] complex “networks” of concepts 
and generalisations about aspects of the political realm and its key conditions 
of entrenchment, including economic and social conditions’.36 This implies 
that there is no single concept of democracy but various ways of understanding 
the meaning of democracy, which can acquire multiple specificities — 
‘assemblages of ideas, forms and values’.37 In this sense, democracy is 
understood as a social construction, which does not simply ‘exist out there’ but 
whose meaning and content are shaped through specific assumptions and ideas 
held about the concept and its relationship to other concepts. 
That said, one-party democracy, or what Talmon proposed to call 
‘totalitarian democracy’, is built on the principle of ‘government for the 
people’ and is commonly associated with fascist and communist regimes.38 It 
is characterised by the existence of broad public sphere and absence of genuine 
choice in political processes. Authority is legitimatised by the claim that the 
ruling elite is in a better position to decide what is in the best interests of the 
people. Liberal democracy, on the other hand, advocates the maintenance of a 
broad sphere of private liberty and is based on the principle of ‘government by 
the people’ as people are entrusted with the possibilities and means to decide 
themselves how to organise their polity.39 Its liberal character is marked by the 
presence of the network of internal and external checks on political power and 
                                               
35 David Held, Prospects for Democracy. North, South, East, West (Polity Press 1993) 15. 
36 David Held, Models of Democracy (3rd edn, Polity Press 2006) 6. 
37 Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Revisioning Democracy Promotion (Routledge 2013) 26. 
38 Talmon made a distinction between ‘totalitarianism of the Left’ and ‘totalitarianism of the 
Right’. See Jacob L Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (Secker & Warburg 1952) 
6-7. 
39 See Andrew Heywood, Politics (Macmillan Press 1997) 68-69. 
Defining Democracy 
 
 
57 
its democratic dimension is maintained by the system of free, fair and regular 
elections.40 
The tension between these two models of democracy lies in the claim that 
‘both, if carried to extremes, could undermine the practice of democracy: the 
measures aimed at developing the private sector by destroying the basis for 
satisfying collective needs and exercising legitimate authority; the measures 
aimed at developing the public sector by destroying the basis for satisfying 
individual preferences and controlling illegitimate government actions’.41 That 
said, for some commentators, both one-party democracy and liberal democracy 
are equally democratic but in different ways.42 For others, calling one-party 
regimes democratic is to distort the very idea of democracy as popular 
sovereignty, since it is only in liberal democracy that collective empowerment 
and human rights can co-exist.43 
Although this conundrum persists to the present day, it is fair to say that 
liberal democracy, apart from dominating democratic theory, economic theory 
and social life more widely, is now globally accepted as the only form of 
government compatible with international human rights standards. It’s 
defining features are constitutional government, bill of rights, division of 
powers, system of checks and balances, regular and competitive elections 
conducted on the basis of universal suffrage and political equality, political 
pluralism, autonomous civil society and market economy.44 
It is clear from the above that the notion of liberal democracy lies at the 
intersection of three broad conceptions: liberalism (individual rights and 
freedoms), constitutionalism (rule of law, division of powers and system of 
checks and balances) and democracy (elections and popular sovereignty). Any 
other model of democracy falling foul of any of these elements, including one-
party democracy, is a contradiction in terms. It remains, however, unclear how 
the term ‘liberal democracy’ came to embrace such a wide range of theoretical 
perspectives. For instance, one can argue that the relationship between 
liberalism and democracy is rather artificial and contingent than natural and 
inevitable. Liberalism is essentially about protecting individual liberties, while 
democracy functions on the basis of majority rule. Majority’s decisions can be 
unwelcome for minorities, even repressive, and, thus, illiberal. But can one 
possibly call those undemocratic? The answer partly depends on what theory 
of democracy one embraces: procedural or substantive. Hayek, for instance, 
                                               
40 Andrew Heywood, Politics (Macmillan Press 1997) 28; See also Andrew Heywood, Political 
Ideologies: An Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 40. 
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42 ibid. 
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subscribed to the latter as he suggested that equality requires that all 
individuals have the same share in lawmaking and this is the point where 
traditional liberalism and democracy meet.45 Likewise, Green and Axtmann 
observed that the notion of liberty is not restrained to negative liberty but also 
entails the positive capacity of self-empowerment to have a real say in political 
issues of one’s country.46 Similar understanding of liberalism as ‘welfare’ 
rather than ‘unfettered individual choice of action’ is also endorsed by a wide 
plurality of other scholars.47 It means that there is no contradiction between 
liberalism and democracy but, on the contrary, they must be reconciled to 
ensure the balance between public and private spheres, the ‘liberty of ancients’ 
and the ‘liberty of moderns’.48 Berlin, conversely, criticised such a far-reaching 
reading of liberty. For him, ‘liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice 
or culture, or human happiness or a quite conscience’.49 While Berlin’s 
argument is not framed in terms of the substantive/procedural definition divide, 
it is illustrative of difficulties arising from attempts to bridge democracy and 
classical liberalism without references to substantive values — notion hostile 
to the classical liberal movement. Be that as it may, the very democratic theory 
is premised on such liberal assumptions as the importance of consent by virtue 
of the moral primacy of the individual, the vital role of critical argument and 
ideological diversity as prerequisites for the discovery of truth. Moreover, 
equality before the law, a central pillar of liberal philosophy, demands that all 
citizens have the same share in making the law.50 Consequently, the philosophy 
of liberalism, ‘contains within itself the seeds of its own democratization’, as 
it is centred not only on the idea of individual rights and limited government 
but also on the idea of human equality: men can only be free when they are 
equal in their natural rights.51 Genuine democracy is, therefore, inconceivable 
without the ideals of liberal society where the protection of the rights of 
minorities is as essential as ‘government by the people’ adjoined in majority. 
Another point of friction between liberalism and democracy, closely linked 
to the previous one, is the question of the extent and form of democratisation. 
Indeed, classical liberal theory has been historically profoundly hostile to 
                                               
45 Friedrich A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960) 103. 
46 Thomas H Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract’ in Paul Harris and John 
Morrow (eds), Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings (CUP 
1986) 202; Ronald Axtmann, Democracy: Problems and Perspectives (Edinburgh UP 2007) 65. 
47 Thinkers that are associated with ‘reform’ liberalism include John Hobson, TH Green, LT 
Hobhouse, Louis Brandeis, John Dewey, John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith, Lester 
Thurow, Robert Reich and John Rawls. See Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Revisioning 
Democracy Promotion (Routledge 2013) 44-50. See also Conrad Waligorski, Liberal 
Economics and Democracy: Keynes, Galbraith, Thurow, and Reich (UP of Kansas 1997) 11-
17; Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (OUP 1998) 
447. 
48 Wilfred Nippel, Ancient and Modern Democracy: Two Concepts of Liberty? (CUP 2016) 204-
11, 348-50. 
49 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (OUP 1969) 124-31. 
50 Friedrich A Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge 1960) 103. 
51 Marc F Plattner, ‘From Liberalism to Liberal Democracy’ (1999) 10 Journal of Democracy 
121, 123. 
Defining Democracy 
 
 
59 
democracy. Consider, for example, undemocratic liberal states in European 
history, in which popular control of government did not include all the 
people.52 More recently, the rise of illiberal democracy53 in the twentieth 
century, where citizens are institutionally empowered to political participation 
but face de facto restrictions on their liberties, put the discussion about the 
‘natural’ link between liberalism and democracy under even more strain. 
However, it is fair to suggest that the modern notion of democracy is 
intrinsically linked to liberalism at least to the extent that free elections require 
individual freedoms of speech, assembly and association to be protected, not 
to mention the fact that the idea of representative government animates 
liberalism since its very emergence. If these liberties are infringed, then the 
democratic nature of the polity is to be reconsidered. Moreover, it is precisely 
the idea that liberty assumes equality which makes it virtually impossible for 
non-democratic liberalism to assert itself in the contemporary world.54 All in 
all, it is clear form the preceding analysis that the link between democracy and 
liberalism has evolved from a contested one to the one of compatibility and 
mutual dependence. 
A similar theoretical tension is observable between democracy and 
constitutionalism. It is commonly asserted that ‘[d]emocracy without 
constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous bringing with 
it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war’.55 
However, a closer examination of the two conceptions reveals their variant and 
even contradictory agendas. Constitutionalism as a doctrine implies the 
existence of a legally enshrined set of core rules and principles of high 
importance regulating the exercise of state power and unsusceptible to change 
by simple majority. Democracy, on the other hand, envisages mass political 
participation. It is, thus, people themselves, or pouvoir constituant, who vest 
political organisation of a state with legitimacy and authority. Therefore, it 
seems conceptually untenable to speak of constitutional democracy since 
constitutionalism with its idea of constitution as a higher law is a direct 
constraint on people’s will-formation, particularly considering the fact that 
constitutions of many democratic states have disenfranchised significant 
portions of populations and installed limits on the exercise of the popular will 
through, inter alia, establishment of the institution of indirect representation.56 
Moreover, would-be autocrats can employ the tools of constitutional change, 
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such as constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement,57 to disrupt 
democratic regime, the most obvious example being the Nazi overthrow of 
Weimar Germany. 
The majority of scholarship, however, tend to uphold the intrinsic 
compatibility between constitutionalism and democracy. Constitutionalism 
and democracy, as the argument runs, should go hand in hand for the former 
merely codifies the latter: ‘Not even a democratic government could abrogate 
or infringe such a constitution without abolishing or detracting from 
democracy itself’.58 To put it differently, ‘[d]emocracy is constituted by values, 
such as autonomy and equality, and rules, such as one person one vote, that it 
does not itself create. If so, then the belief that the constitutional rules defining 
democracy cannot be curtailed even by the demos itself still holds’.59 
Legitimacy of constitutionalism in fact relies on its democratic pedigree. Any 
change to the constitution, except for revolution, can only be effectuated 
through democratic process. It is democracy that bounds together the 
constituent and the constituted powers so that the latter exercises its mandate 
in a fair and transparent way and can be removed should it surpass its mandate 
or in any other way frustrate the expectations of the constituent power.60 
Ultimately, it is imperative to trace the nexus between liberalism and 
constitutionalism, since liberal constitutionalism is often treated as 
synonymous with constitutionalism itself and, pursuant to the dominant view 
in political science, constitutes an inalienable element in the modern definition 
of democracy. It is based on an idea that human beings have certain inalienable 
rights and that governments must enshrine those in a binding instrument that 
would restrict the power of the agency responsible for enforcement of these 
rights. However, the rise of a so-called ‘non-liberal constitutionalism’, also 
referred to as ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ and ‘abusive 
constitutionalism’,61 which describes the polity which has a constitution but 
does not practice constitutionalism (the rule of law, democratic elections and 
judicially enforceable rights), such as e.g. North Korea ad China,62 reverses 
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this taken-for-granted relationship by denying the intrinsic bond between 
liberalism and constitutionalism. In other words, whilst liberalism necessarily 
presupposes the existence of a constitution acting as a safeguard against 
government encroachment upon individual rights, constitutionalism can 
perfectly dispense with liberalism by failing to either codify liberal guarantees 
or to put them in practice. In this sense, constitutionalism, normally associated 
with the instalment and consolidation of liberal democracies, may in some 
cases reduce democracy to electoral authoritarian regime. This antinomy calls 
for more rigorous justification to place the two doctrines under the banner of 
democracy. Some scholars raised the question of legitimacy of a constitution, 
contending that legitimate constitutions share a number of universal common 
characteristics, such as procedural (against arbitral use of power) and 
substantive (restricting the scope of policy choices that governments can make) 
limitations.63 Be this as it may, these limitations can only be upheld in 
democratic process. Thus, it is the democratic setting where individual 
freedoms can be safeguarded by individuals themselves through institutions of 
self-government (such as voting and representation) that liberalism and 
constitutionalism can benefit from each other and thereby unleash their fullest 
potential. Henceforth, while the link between liberal and constitutional 
traditions is at times a fragile one, it is held together by the democratic thesis 
implying constitutional entrenchment of substantive liberties as well as 
procedural guarantees of a fair democratic process. 
Importantly, some scholars question the modern ‘unreflected’ confinement 
to the liberal democratic theory tradition64 by pinpointing to alternative 
models, such as, for example, participatory democracy,65 radical democracy,66 
deliberative democracy67 or cosmopolitan democracy,68 not to mention various 
arguments for feminist, green and even Islamist and Confucian models of 
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democracy.69 One of the earliest hints of this ‘pluralising’ debate can be found 
in the work of Schmitter and Karl, who argue that democracy can take various 
meanings and institutional forms and that different kinds of democracies are 
not more or less democratic with regard to each another but democratic in 
different ways.70 More recently, Kurki similarly suggested that the concept of 
democracy is ‘open-ended, dynamic, normative, and inherently critical of 
existing structures’ and that particular models of democracy arise in particular 
settings and in response to specific political struggles.71 Whilst the capability 
of democracy to absorb a plurality of meanings to fit national specificities is 
essential for its universality, one should not forget that ‘alternative’ models of 
democracy use liberal model as their starting point and build on its weaknesses. 
As Youngs acknowledged, ‘[i]f given a list of Western democracy’s basic 
elements, people in developing states will usually acknowledge that they want 
similar attributes, such as choosing their leaders, enjoying basic rights of free 
and fair expression, and benefiting from the rule of law’ but with local 
attachments.72 As a result, it is not clear whether any distinctive non-Western 
model of democracy exists. Any attempt to do completely away with the 
liberal-constitutional core results in such impoverishment of the concept of 
democracy that it does not any more represent an effective bulwark against 
authoritarianism. In other words, core attributes of democracy, such as 
liberalism and constitutionalism, are so essential to its distinctive normative 
authenticity that they cannot be totally dispensed with but rather carefully 
adjusted to respond to local political, social, cultural and economic realities. 
All in all, whereas broad liberal-constitutional parameters of the notion of 
democracy are now widely accepted, the understanding of the cluster concept 
‘liberal democracy’ is far from straightforward. This is due to the fact that 
democracy is a contested notion not only between advocates of different 
models of democracy, but also among protagonists of the liberal model. The 
subsequent sections will attempt to decipher this ambiguity. 
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3.3. Democracy in International Law: A Prevalent 
Procedural Conception 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that political science lacks a coherent 
understanding of democracy. Conversely, international law does not strive to 
propound one paradigmatic definition, or theory, of democracy. In words of 
the UN Secretary-General, ‘[d]emocracy is not a model to be copied but a goal 
to be attained. Furthermore, the pace at which democratization can proceed is 
dependent on a variety of political, economic, social and cultural factors proper 
to the circumstances of a particular culture and society’.73 To put it differently, 
international law does not outline specific modalities of being democratic, such 
as, for example, electoral system, form of government (monarchy or republic) 
and system of government (parlamentarism, presidentialism or mixed system) 
etc.74 Rather it gauges democratisation by reference to the principles of 
political equality and popular sovereignty. Thus, in international legal parlance 
state is democratic if it rules with the consent of the governed. Because it is 
close to impossible to empirically validate the implementation of these 
principles, one turned to the institution of elections as the main benchmark 
against which to measure the degree of democratisation. Wheatly’s definition 
of democracy is illustrative in this respect: ‘A democratic system of 
government is one in which the principles of popular sovereignty and political 
equality find expression in free and fair elections and popular participation in 
the political process’.75 This election-centred approach of international law to 
the issue of democracy mirrors the procedural understanding of democracy in 
political science. 
That said, the discussion of democracy in international law is often 
reduced, albeit unintentionally, to its liberal procedural understanding and 
revolves around the question of elections and their compatibility with 
international human rights standards. It is, thus, international human rights 
framework that serves as the most fertile ground for the debate on democracy 
in international law. There are several ways in which international legal 
scholars approached the question of democracy. First, democracy is derived 
from already established list of international human rights, such as a right to 
political participation, right to free and fair elections and a set of adjacent 
rights, such as rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, association, opinion and 
expression. Thomas Franck and Gregory Fox are commonly viewed as the 
founders of the idea of democracy as an emerging entitlement. In his path-
breaking article, Franck conceptualised the international legal definition of 
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democracy as ‘the kind of governance that is legitimated by the consent of the 
governed’.76 He identified the normative evolution of the universal democratic 
entitlement by pointing out to three sequential ‘generations’ of international 
rule-making and implementation: the right of self-determination (the period 
following the First World War); international legal recognition of human rights 
(since the Second World War); and the right to free and open elections (a post 
Cold-War period).77 According to him, the right to democratic governance 
derived from the right of self-determination, freedoms of expression, thought, 
assembly and association, and the right to political participation.78 Franck 
acknowledged the minimalist character of democracy conceived in this way 
and yet admitted that it is ‘the limit of what the still frail system of states can 
be expected to accept’.79 However, in order to avoid the complete conceptual 
merger of democracy with electoral method, Franck added qualifiers ‘free’ and 
‘fair’ to the notion of elections.80 
Fox, for his part, equated ‘democracy’ with a right to political participation 
through the institution of elections and claimed that this right is now firmly 
embedded in both treaty law and international practice.81 Hence, similarly to 
Franck, he subscribed to the procedural definition of democracy, where the 
right to political participation is adequately realised through elections. Other 
scholars followed suit and are now dubbed as adherents of the ‘democratic 
entitlement school’.82 This school of thought revolved around the idea that 
conceptualising democracy as a global entitlement represents ‘a revolutionary 
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transformation of a full array of international norms, from norms governing 
recognition of States and governments to those governing the use of force’.83 
While some of them go beyond thin procedural understanding of democracy 
by appealing to other strata of human rights as well as principles of political 
equality and genuine empowerment, they equally come to conclusion, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, that democracy as a form of government based on the 
consent of the governed is realised through electoral process. 
If low intensity democracy is the only credible solution in a heterogeneous 
world of the 190-plus states, what is then the value of democracy as a self-
standing right given its close alignment with the already extant human rights 
framework? It is, in fact, against this backdrop that substantive definition 
makes its purchase in international law. As d’Aspremont pointedly noted, the 
procedural definition of democracy is concerned exclusively with the origin of 
power and fails to take into account the way power is exercised.84 This makes 
democracy toothless against non-democratic actors seeking to manipulate 
democratic procedures and institutions to advance ideas hostile to democratic 
ideals, the most prominent examples being the rise of the German Nazi party 
in the early 1930s and the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the 1991 
Algerian elections.85 It follows that the legal definition of democracy, apart 
from being premised on the institution of elections, should also include certain 
substantive elements, namely respect for the basic political rights and freedoms 
and the rule of law. 
The substantive account of democracy can be found in the number of 
reports and declarations of the international bodies. For instance, the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action defined democracy as the one ‘based on 
the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own political, 
economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects 
of their lives’.86 The Vienna Declaration further stated that ‘democracy, 
development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing’.87 Another example is the Secretary-
General’s relaxed approach to the notion of democracy: ‘[I]t is through 
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democracy that individual and collective rights, the rights of persons and the 
rights of peoples, can be reconciled’.88 In this sense, democracy is understood 
as being based on tolerance and non-violence, including peaceful transfer of 
power.89 Moreover, the UN Secretary-General has explicitly asserted that 
‘[t]he UN has long advocated a concept of democracy that is holistic: 
encompassing the procedural and the substantive; formal institutions and 
informal processes; majorities and minorities […] the political and the 
economic […]’.90 Similarly, the UNGA contributed to the extension of the right 
to democracy beyond its minimalist understanding. It asserted that the ‘will of 
the people’ is the best assurance for the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms91 and that the protection of human rights and democratic governance 
are ‘interlinked’ and ‘mutually reinforcing’.92 It further identified such 
‘essential elements of democracy’ as respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the right to vote and freedoms of assembly, expression and 
opinion, as well as political pluralism, respect for the rule of law, the separation 
of powers, the independence of judiciary, transparency and accountability in 
public administration and free media.93 
The scholarly community too embraced the substantive conception of the 
democratic entitlement and apart from the notions of the rule of law, general 
respect for human rights and multi-party system, added the elements of human 
dignity and redistributive justice in the form of socio-economic rights to the 
substantive definition.94 Such initiatives are definitely laudable and afford a 
richer understanding of the notion of democracy and its elevated conceptual 
sustainability but they bear a risk of being over-inclusive. Equating democracy 
with all sorts of social virtues makes of democracy an abstract idea, a general 
principle, an overall ideal, if you wish, and hence an empty concept. Roth’s 
scepticism against a substantive view of democracy merits lengthy quotation: 
 
‘Democracy’ has in recent parlance been transmogrified into a repository of 
political virtues: rule ratified by a manifestation of majority will (popular 
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sovereignty); orderly mediation of political conflict through participatory 
mechanisms (polyarchic constitutionalism); individual freedom under the 
rule of law (liberalism); broad popular empowerment to affect the decisions 
that condition social life (democracy, properly so called); et cetera. No term 
can mean so many things and continue to mean anything, for political virtues 
do not come in neat packages.95 
 
For Roth, the pleas to coin a substantive definition of democracy, however 
well-minded, are ideological and should not be transferred to the realm of 
international law.96 
Another common way to tie democracy to the existing framework of 
international law is to posit that it flows from the principle of (internal) self-
determination.97 It has been argued that self-determination, through its 
incorporation into common article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), gained an internal dimension. The articles 
stipulate that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development’.98 There are two main approaches 
to derive democracy from the principle of (internal) self-determination. 
According to the contextual approach, article 1 ICCPR is to be interpreted in 
light of the Covenant’s other democratic provisions, such as, for instance, 
article 25. On this view, the right to political participation through the 
institution of elections shapes the modalities of the realisation of the principle 
of self-determination.99 The second approach attempts to find a logical nexus 
between self-determination and democracy. Accordingly, people as the only 
holders of the right to determine their political status (in the post-colonial 
setting) can solely realise this right by democratic means.100 This also suggests 
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that self-determination is not only about the capacity to choose certain political 
direction at any given moment but also about the capacity to choose on an 
ongoing basis, which inevitably privileges democratic forms of government. 
Additionally, people who are denied the right of equal access to governmental 
institutions and placed in a position of subordination in relation to the 
numerical majority of population are arguably entitled to the right of remedial 
secession. In this sense, the doctrine of remedial secession is but one of the 
logical links between self-determination and democracy: ‘The “democratic” 
aspect of self-determination is present in muted form, through the idea of 
representation’.101 
Third, some quarters of scholarly community suggest that states are now 
customarily obliged to be democratic without such an obligation taking the 
form of a human right or embodying the internal aspect of the principle of self-
determination. For instance, d’Aspremont, the most prominent representative 
of this view, stresses out that while it is clear that free and fair elections 
presuppose the minimum respect for civil and political rights, states are under 
a customary obligation to be democratic solely to the extent that their leaders 
are chosen by means of free and fair elections.102 To paraphrase what 
d’Aspremont postulated, states are rather internationally obliged to hold free 
and fair elections than to install a fully-fledged democratic regime. Finally, 
some hold a view that international law does not contain either a strict right to 
democracy or a customary obligation to conduct elections, but merely a 
principle of democratic teleology, or a right to the emergence of democratic 
government, according to which states are obliged to gradually develop 
towards democracy and counter democratic regressions.103 Simplifying 
somewhat, this can be regarded as an obligation of conduct rather than that of 
result. 
There is also a distinct group of scholars, particularly those outside the 
United States, resisting the international democratic parlance tout court. For 
them, the emergence of a new human right to democracy seems little more than 
a proxy for wishful thinking of a narrow circle of international scholarship than 
a legal reality.104 To illustrate, while acknowledging the link between human 
rights and democracy as one of ‘mutual dependence’, Susan Marks and 
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Andrew Clapham concluded that democracy cannot be proclaimed as a human 
right of itself. Rather, it can be viewed as ‘an argument, a critical tool, and a 
set of principles for political life in all its multifarious settings’.105 Likewise, 
Henry Steiner views the problem of a human right to democracy as one of 
incompatible categories, despite their parallel evolution and histories: on his 
account, human rights have a much richer texture and a consistent quality 
reflected in legal principles; while democracy lies at the intersection of law and 
politics.106 The paucity and inconsistency of state practice in supporting a ‘new 
right’ to democracy has also lead James Crawford to resist to the notion of 
democracy as a universal entitlement.107 In a similar vein, Steven Wheatley 
suggests that no democracy has emerged in international law and international 
instruments do not generally identify any such right.108 The view of Jean 
d’Aspremont is even more provocative: 
 
En effet, à l’exception des systèmes régionaux de protection des droits de la 
personne humaine, la pratique contemporaine démontre un affaiblissement 
graduel de l’exigence relative à l’origine démocratique des gouvernements, 
l’accent étant désormais mis sur les exigences de transparence, l’absence de 
corruption (bonne gouvernance), et le respect des droits de l’homme. Après 
presque deux décennies d’attention portée à l’origine démocratique des 
gouvernements, il semble que nous assistions aujourd’hui à un retour de 
politiques étrangères exclusivement centrées sur les vertus relatives à la 
manière dont les gouvernements exercent leur pouvoir et non plus l’origine 
démocratique de leur pouvoir.109 
 
For d’Aspremont, the international legal practice is now less concerned with 
how governments are installed and more how they exercise their power. It 
effectively means that the international community seems to have done away 
with democracy as a principle and replaced it with a more obscure and legally 
indeterminate euphemism ‘good governance’. 
On other fronts, there are  concerns that given the historical record of 
imperial ideas, there is a cause to beware that the so-called ‘right to democracy’ 
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would become an apology for intervention in internal affairs of the weak110 and 
would occasion disruption of the UN system based on the principles of state 
sovereignty, equality and non-interference.111 It has been said that a norm of 
democratic governance amounts to a ‘liberal-democratic jihad’,112 a ‘new 
ideology of imperialism’113 that is apt to serve simply as a ‘call for contextual 
management of far-away societies in reference to Western-liberal policies’.114 
Notably, Third World international lawyers have expressed a wariness about 
explicitly endorsing democracy as an international norm given the fact that 
colonial era distinction between civilised and barbarian states is now 
seemingly re-framed in terms of liberal democratic and illiberal undemocratic 
states.115 Carothers puts this point starkly: ‘Advocacy of a democratic norm 
actually highlights [the] West versus non-West division and the tension in 
international law concerning the fact that it is at root a Western system that 
Western countries are seeking to apply to the whole world’.116 
Moreover, designating democracy as the only rational model of 
governance, and, ultimately, universal human right, is premature and fails to 
accommodate different historical, social and economical backgrounds of a 
plurality of countries. Indeed, it is has been submitted that no one claimed the 
right to democracy in, say, 1980, albeit the foundations for such discussion had 
already been laid down in 1948 when the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights was adopted: ‘What has resulted is a retroactive emergence of a legal 
principle of democracy’.117 It is also pertinent to recall the alleged incapability 
of the modern representative democracy to advance genuine participation of 
citizens, which is all too often reduced to a mere vote casting once every four 
or five years for representatives that are too distant and ineffective to further 
their citizens’ interests.118 Finally, democratic regime can violate rights, 
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especially of minorities, and tolerate social disparities.119 While democracy 
presents itself as inclusive, empowering and dedicated to the promotion of 
equality, it may also be used by powerful groups to install their domination 
over larger society.120 
The above-listed criticisms of the democratic entitlement thesis largely 
relate to the lack of consensus on the definition of democracy. On the one hand, 
democracy is equated to the maintenance of free, fair and periodic elections 
based on universal suffrage and, therefore, its normative value as a means of 
empowerment and political equality is reduced to zero. Because it is simply 
concerned with the way the power is established and fails to account for the 
way the power is exercised, procedural understanding of democracy makes the 
right toothless against abuse and manipulation by anti-democratic actors. On 
the other hand, the concept of democracy is overtly ideological and, as result, 
suspect as a neocolonialist strategy. A distinctive strategy of some scholars to 
deny any legal standing to democracy in international law is both an outcome 
of such conceptual confusion as well as an attempt to avoid delving into the 
complex discussion of sensitive political issues animating the concept of 
democracy. A novel approach to the definition of democracy is thus due. 
 
3.4. Towards the Limited Substantive Conception 
 
In light of the above said it seems like any attempt to construct a definition of 
democracy in international law is hampered by an inherent paradox: 
democracy reduced to electoral process, however free and fair, does not bring 
anything new to the table as international and regional human rights 
instruments already contain a minimum set of civil and political rights and 
freedoms guaranteeing participation in elections, non-discrimination, free 
press, free speech etc. Democracy elevated to the rank of social virtue 
encompassing all achievements of liberalism and constitutionalism from the 
rule of law to good governance means too much and, thus, barely anything. 
Moreover, the liberal aspect of the term ‘liberal democracy’ and its relationship 
to the democratic aspect is still a matter of debate within international legal 
circles. Global constitutionalism as a legal approach does not provide for a 
grandiose solution to this conundrum. However, it entails a certain set of 
assumptions when it comes to the doctrines of liberalism and constitutionalism 
which, in turn, shape the definition of democracy. 
First, global constitutionalism as a subspecies of new liberalism does not 
accept just any type of liberalism. For democracy to be meaningful, it is not 
enough for state to guarantee negative liberty. To ensure genuine 
empowerment and equality — two core values of democracy — a different 
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strand of rights should be guaranteed in addition to traditional civil and 
political rights, namely socio-economic rights. It means that real democracies 
are social-welfare democracies, which apart from securing freedom from 
arbitrary authority (negative freedom) also ensure proper conditions for 
exercising negative rights (positive freedom).121 In fact, the adoption of the 
ICESCR along with the ICCPR as well as the rapid expansion of the 
development discourse in international legal debate clearly manifests the 
triumph of social-welfare liberalism, or ‘“liberal” liberalism’122 over classical 
liberalism, or laissez-faire liberalism, in international law. This implies that 
democracy stands for normative goals ‘that include social justice, development 
of individuality, and solving of public problems’.123 
Second, constitutionalism from the perspective of the global 
constitutionalism thesis does not refer merely to having a constitution, but to 
having a particular kind of constitution, that is legitimate constitution124 — a 
constitution embodying the principles of constitutionalism. On this account, 
constitutionalism is a political theory that captures more than the existence of, 
and adherence to, the written text; rather it is an understanding of the law ‘as a 
bulwark against the arbitrary exercise of power’.125 Thus, while traditional 
theory of constitutionalism is rather descriptive in that it depicts any structure 
of government as constitutional as long as it originates and maintains its power 
in accordance with constitution, ‘new constitutionalism’, which underpins the 
doctrine of global constitutionalism, presupposes the existence of certain 
procedural and substantive characteristics which are, in turn, ‘an articulation 
of a “higher law” of the community of nations, reflecting a global communal 
consensus evidenced in common practice or international agreements’.126 
Indeed, more and more scholars subscribe to this new value-loaded 
understanding of constitutionalism. For Cottier, ‘legitimate’ constitution has to 
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meet certain prerequisites, such as ‘setting up and limiting the power of the 
polity, defining the fundamental boundaries between the private and the public, 
the state and the individual and between the different branches of 
government’.127 Further, d’Aspremont’s emphasis on the legitimacy of 
exercise in contrast to the legitimacy of origin128 reflects, albeit implicitly, a 
need for a revision of the doctrine of constitutionalism from its classical variant 
as an irreversible one-time event where the legitimate establishment of 
constitution is not questioned to a new model subject to continuous evaluation 
of legitimacy of constitutional process by reference to constitutional values, 
such as the division of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law and human 
rights. 
That said, ‘liberal’ liberalism and new constitutionalism animate the new 
definition of democracy. On this view, democracy is a system of government 
established through the process of periodic, free, fair and genuine elections 
based on universal suffrage in multiparty setting guaranteeing continuous 
political participation (by means of vote and other democratic institutions, such 
as referendums and civil society organisations) on conditions of equality and 
non-discrimination as well as protection of a certain core of socio-economic 
rights and operating on the basis of a legitimate constitution founded on the 
principles of checks and balances, divisions of power and the rule of law.129 
Thus, rather than being purely confined to the procedural notions of the rights 
to vote and stand for elections, democracy is ‘a series of rights that are 
collectively reinforcing’.130 On this (substantive) account, democracy is more 
than a means to reach power. It is an end in itself because it ensures the 
realisation of the fundamental capabilities of all members of society.131 Simply 
put, democracy is a political regime that takes human rights seriously and 
tackles diversity by means of debate. Accordingly, democracy should be 
understood as a comprehensive legal model stretching beyond the minimalist 
aspects and encompassing a series of fundamental rights and freedoms that are 
reciprocally reinforcing.132 Such essential procedural pillars as the right to vote 
and the right to be elected in free and fair elections can only be fully guaranteed 
if accompanied by, among others, the right to education, since the voter’s 
knowledge of the structure of the state and how the political power is 
administered and distributed enhances his right to vote; the right to access 
media, providing voters with essential information platform on the basis of 
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which they could make their political choices; the right to fair trial and judicial 
remedy to ensure integrity and impartiality of the election administration and 
impede the violations of the right to vote and other rights. 
Importantly, the UN Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 
‘Promotion of the Right to Democracy’ came closest to the delineation of the 
right to democracy as an embodiment and mutual reinforcement of certain 
fundamental rights and freedoms, including the rights of opinion, thought, 
religion and peaceful assembly; the right to information; the rule of law and 
impartial and independent judiciary; the right to vote and stand for elections; 
transparent and accountable government institutions etc.133 Drawing on this 
resolution, one can distinguish five components of democracy: electoral, 
liberal-constitutional, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian.134 The 
electoral component of democracy entails the identification of collective will 
by means of electoral process. The liberal-constitutional component embodies 
the protection of individual rights against a potential ‘tyranny of majority’ by 
the constitutional entrenchment and the constitutional protection of the rule of 
law, checks and balances and judicial independence from the executive. The 
participatory component envisages active participation of citizens in political 
decision making by means of vote as well as non-electoral engagement in 
political processes through civil society organisations and mechanisms of 
direct democracy. The deliberative component presupposes the overriding 
importance of dialogue and deliberation in formation of political decisions 
over subjective appeals to solidarity, national sensibility and resort to coercion. 
Lastly, the egalitarian component entails the equal importance of socio-
economic rights (with respect to civil and political rights) in attainment of 
political equality.135 
This refined substantive definition is not a panacea and does not solve all 
theoretical and practical problems that animate the concept of democracy. 
However, it overcomes certain major criticisms within debates on theories and 
models of democracy. Thus, the new definition of democracy does not confine 
democracy to a mere process of electoral competition, neither does it fail to set 
conceptual limits on the notion of democracy to keep it operational. Unlike the 
original substantive conception of ‘everything goes’, the limited substantive 
conception of democracy is not concerned with abstract notions of social 
justice and human dignity. Rather, it provides for a normative evaluative 
framework bolstering the capacity of the existing network of human rights to 
serve their original goals, including liberty, equality and self-empowerment, 
by means of popular control over collective decision-making as a mutually 
reinforcing system. Moreover, the extent of protection of human rights and 
liberties as an evaluative criterion of democratic government is not taken in 
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abstract, meaning that every human right should be perfectly guaranteed for an 
entity to qualify as democratic. Rather, human rights and freedoms, including 
socio-economic rights, should be respected at least to the extent they ensure 
minimum space for genuine and continuous participation, equality (both 
during and between elections) and diversity. Such an approach solves the 
problem of both competitive authoritarianism and illiberal constitutionalism as 
the two concepts by virtue of effectively defeating the de facto impact of 
citizens’ choices on the political and institutional layout of their governments 
would not fall under the definition of democracy. 
On the other hand, for democracy to maintain its universal appeal, certain 
local democratic variations should be accepted. However, to ensure that these 
variations do not serve as a cover for soft forms of authoritarianism, the 
minimum liberal core of the concept of democracy, namely meaningful 
participation and effective contestation of the majoritarian politics, is to be 
preserved to the extent that the five aforementioned elements of democracy are 
effectively realised. This is based on a suggestion that the liberal aspect of 
liberal democracy is not to be sacrificed for the sake of the democratic aspect, 
albeit it may be adjusted to ensure broader participation. In this sense, liberty 
is a key democratic value, whereas broad political participation is a means to 
ensure liberty. Whenever the liberty of thought and conscience, autonomy and 
the right to political opposition are compromised in the name of majoritarian 
objectives, this is not democracy, however massively supported such 
objectives might be. Such conceptualisation may seem to be lacking analytical 
precision and even imperialistic, since the principles animating the above-
suggested definition of democracy are liberal principles originating in the 
seventeenth-century Europe and, thus, anything but universal. However, the 
particular historical and geographical pedigree of an idea does not per se 
preclude its universalist claims. To assert otherwise is to endorse the crude 
relativist view that a state’s political system is a matter of its own business and 
beyond criticisms. As the world goes increasingly interdependent, state’s 
internal affairs are a subject of general concern. This requires an adoption of a 
minimum code of moral and political principles of good governance, which 
are both universally valid and culturally sensitive. World governments are free 
to evolve their national politics in line with their cultural particularities but in 
a way compatible with these regulative principles.136 Whilst it goes beyond the 
scope of this argument to prove the cross-cultural consensus over these 
principles, it suffices to mention the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) laying down the general principles every government should 
satisfy. Because the declaration translates these principles into the language of 
rights and recognises that the will of the people constitutes the basis of the 
authority of government, it implies liberal democracy. Since the declaration 
was signed by a large number of governments representing different cultures, 
geographical areas and political systems, it commands considerable universal 
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support. Thus, the principles of liberal democracy, on which the UDHR is 
founded, are increasingly becoming ‘a common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and nations’.137  
Ultimately, the lack of deeper analytical precision of the present 
conceptualisation stems from the very essence of the liberal rationale, namely 
defence of values solely essential for maintaining individual liberty, short of 
imposing an overarching normative world vision. This suggest that 
governments are allowed a certain margin of discretion when it comes to 
combining democracy and liberalism depending on their history, traditions, 
values and needs. Some may opt for their equal relationship whereby each 
limits the excesses of the other. Other may decide to assign greater role to the 
democratic element by providing a greater network of channels for popular 
participation, whereas the liberal component ensures the protection of minority 
interests. The most obvious example is the Nordic model of social democracy, 
where the primacy is assigned not to liberal values, as the classic model of 
liberal democracy entails, but to democratic controls over injustices in 
society.138 Or the political system can be tailored in a manner to ensure a more 
balanced relationship between the individual and the community by providing 
for a fairer distribution of opportunities through the engagement in, inter alia, 
major economic reforms. This model has been dubbed by Parekh as 
‘democratically liberal’ rather than a liberal democracy.139 Ultimately, the 
liberal element may be the dominant partner by ensuring that the democratic 
process does not undermine individual autonomy and control over decision-
making process. To this end, Richard Youngs advocates a guiding principle of 
‘liberalism plus’ which suggests that ‘democratic variation should be pursued 
through innovations that add to the core template of liberal democracy rather 
than subtract from it’. It means giving ‘greater meaning to political liberalism’s 
core spirit of tolerance, pluralism, and popular accountability over the 
powerful’.140 In other words, one should return to the original procedural 
understanding of liberalism which emerged as a philosophy of toleration 
instead of fallaciously associating it with amorality, excessive individualism, 
attack on conservative tradition and community and intolerance for religion.141 
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3.5. Conclusion 
 
It is established that the definition of democracy is a critical issue to be 
addressed if one is to speak of democracy as a human right. Political science 
is demonstrated to lack a coherent definition of democracy. Within its broad 
discourse on the notion of democracy, one can distinguish three broad theories: 
classical, procedural and substantive, none of which stands scrutiny on its own. 
Whereas the classical theory of democracy is too broad, according to which 
democratic government is the one formed by the will of the people expressed 
through political participation and serves the people by means of promoting 
development and material goods, the procedural conception is too narrow and 
equates democracy to electoral method. Neither provides for the adequate 
account of democracy, because whilst the former conception does not indicate 
clear guidelines as to how to distinguish democratic regimes from non-
democratic ones, the latter claims that any regime originating in elections is 
democratic. The substantive conception was invented to tackle the problem of 
excessive reliance on elections in qualifying the political character of the 
regime by appealing to democracy’s underlying principles, such as equality 
and self-empowerment. Yet, because it does not set precise conceptual limits 
to the application of these principles, it has been widely disqualified as fuzzy 
and unworkable. 
The conceptual indeterminacy of the notion of democracy in political 
science is exacerbated by the fact that there are two competing models of 
democracy: revolutionary, characterised by broad public sphere and absence 
of genuine choice in political processes, and liberal, marked by the centrality 
of individual liberty in the political space, the presence of internal and external 
checks on political power and the system of free, fair and regular elections. 
The complexity lies in the fact that both models are commonly viewed as 
democratic but in different ways, and the both could undermine the practice of 
democracy if carried to extremes: the threat of excessive communitarianism in 
the case of revolutionary democracy and excessive individualism in the case 
of the liberal model. Even though it is established that liberal democracy is 
now widely recognised as the only model compatible with international human 
rights law, ambiguity as to the precise conceptual frames of its underlying 
components, such as liberal, constitutional and democratic, persists until today. 
The treatment of democracy in international law largely mirrors the 
uncertainties and challenges faced by political scientists, albeit the procedural 
liberal conception seems to considerably dominate international legal debate, 
largely due to its measurability. It revolves around the question of elections 
and their compatibility with international human rights law. Even though such 
procedural approach to the definition of democracy is criticised on many 
fronts, particularly because it conceals and neglects the normative essence of 
democracy as a framework of empowerment and equality and thereby renders 
democracy toothless against manipulation by antidemocratic actors, viewing 
democracy through the prism of elections seems safer and more practical than 
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delving into complex discussions of democracy’s normative elements, such as 
respect for human rights and the rule of law, whose empirical ascertainment 
and measurement are close to impossible. It is claimed that because the 
conventional election-centred conception of democracy is at loggerheads with 
the international law’s changing attitude toward the character of government 
regime and the role of individual in national and international systems and 
because the substantive definition is too generic to lay down precise limits for 
the concept of democracy, a novel approach is needed. 
The thesis consequently suggests a so-called ‘limited’ substantive 
conception of democracy based on modern interpretations of the doctrines of 
constitutionalism and liberalism. Against this backdrop, democracy is defined 
as a system of government established through the process of periodic, free, 
fair and genuine elections based on universal suffrage in multiparty setting 
guaranteeing continuous political participation (by means of vote and other 
democratic institutions, such as referendums and civil society organisations) 
on conditions of equality and non-discrimination as well as protection of a 
certain core of socio-economic rights and operating on the basis of a legitimate 
constitution founded on the principles of checks and balances, divisions of 
power and the rule of law. Democracy is, thus, viewed as a comprehensive 
legal model originating in elections but stretching beyond the electoral method 
and encompassing a series of fundamental rights and freedoms that are 
mutually reinforcing. It is based on five pillars: electoral, liberal-constitutional, 
participatory, deliberative and egalitarian. It is accepted that even though the 
novel conceptualisation of democracy does not solve all the challenges 
animating the debate on the legal definition of democracy, it tackles major 
weaknesses of the earlier conceptions and is flexible enough to accommodate 
local variations, what makes it universally applicable.
4. The Right to Democracy in the 
Constitutionalising International Law 
 
As has been previously illustrated, there is a variety of ways to inscribe the 
right to democracy into the existing fabric of international law. The adherents 
of the democratic entitlement school attempt to tie democracy to one or several 
internationally recognised human rights but are cautious to declare the legally 
enforceable right to democratic government on its own terms. This 
cautiousness is clearly visible in the way they apply the qualifier ‘emerging’ 
to the right to democracy. Thus, while they all share an opinion that something 
like an ‘emerging democratic entitlement’ has undoubtedly enriched the 
modern lexicon of international law, how far this notion stretches and what 
concrete obligations it imposes on states is still marked by obscurity. 
Somewhat more scepticism towards democracy, either as a right or obligation, 
is traceable in the works of scholars claiming that states are customarily 
obliged to solely ensure free and fair electoral process. Moreover, the scope of 
application of this customary norm is arguably weakened by numerous 
persistent objectors to it.1 On an even more sceptical note, democracy is 
reduced to a teleological principle, according to which states are obliged to 
merely develop towards democracy and counter democratic regressions. The 
least optimistic view denies any legal standing to democracy by arguing that 
the concept is too political to be transposed to the realm of law. The rationale 
behind such a wariness to recognise a fully-fledged human right to democracy 
bestowed with every individual lies in the lack of evidence of state consent 
traditionally expressed by means of treaties and custom. Be that as it may, the 
twenty-first-century international law exhibits strong empirical evidence of its 
constitutionalisation by recognising sources of legitimacy going beyond 
isolated instances of expression of state will. This ‘non-consensual’ sources of 
legitimacy are couched in language of global values shaped by international 
consensus, which is, in turn, reflected in, inter alia, pronouncements of 
international organisations and general principles. This chapter examines legal 
foundations of the right to democracy in light of the recent developments in 
international law within such foundational domains as treaty interpretation 
(section 4.1), customary international law (section 4.2), the soft law thesis 
(section 4.3) and general principles of law (section 4.4). 
 
                                               
1 China and several states in the Middle East can probably be considered persistent objectors to 
that rule. Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: 
A Reply to Susan Marks’ (2011) 22 EJIL 549, 557. 
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4.1. From Textual to Teleological and Evolutive 
Interpretations 
 
4.1.1. Textual Interpretation of Democratic Provisions in 
International Legal Instruments: Tour d’Horizon 
 
The substantive elements of the democratic entitlement are firmly enshrined in 
the body of public international law in general and international human rights 
law in particular. The Charter of the United Nations — often referred to as the 
constitution of the international society2 — does not explicitly mention 
democracy. However, many legal commentators suggest that with the opening 
words of the Charter, ‘We the peoples of the United Nations’, the drafters 
envisaged the fundamental principle of democracy by deriving the legitimacy 
of the organisation from the will of the peoples represented through their 
respective governments.3 Moreover, by committing itself to the reaffirmation 
of ‘faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’ 
and to ‘the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples’,4 
the Charter reflects such fundamental democratic principles as equality and 
self-determination. These twin democratic principles also animate articles 55 
and 56 of the Charter, which recognise the importance of political and socio-
economic rights for the realisation of these principles. Other scholars are rather 
cautious to adopt such an inclusive interpretation of the text of the Charter. 
They claim that the period when the Charter was adopted was marked by the 
existence of a variety of political regimes ranging from liberal democracies to 
outright autocracies. The idea of universality that transgresses the text of the 
Charter and particularly its article 2(7) (the principle of non-intervention) 
placed the question of domestic political regime outside the purview of the 
international society. For them, either ‘people’ is synonymous with ‘states’ or 
the term may have merely been used to designate the fact that not all states 
                                               
2 See eg Blaine Sloane, ‘The United Nations Charter as a Constitution’ (1989) 1 Pace YBIL 61; 
Marie Dupuy, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the United Nations Revisited’ (1997) 1 Max 
Planck YB UN L 1; Ronald MacDonald, ‘The Charter of the United Nations in Constitutional 
Perspective’ (1999) 20 Austr YBIL 205. 
3 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization (United Nations 1996) 12; UNGA 
‘Supplement to Reports on Democratization’ (1996) UN Doc A/51/761, para 1 (The UN 
Secretary-General maintained that the Charter ‘offers a vision of democratic states and 
democracy among them’). Similarly, the UNGA has repeatedly affirmed that democracy is one 
of the principles enshrined in the Charter. See eg UNGA Res 50/133 (16 February 1996) UN 
Doc A/RES/50/133, preamble. 
4 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, preamble. 
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were sovereign when the Charter was drafted or it may simply be dismissed as 
rhetoric.5 
The excessive brevity of the Charter human rights provisions has been 
remedied by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1966 
covenants on human rights and other UN instruments and resolutions. The 
UDHR recognises rights to freedom of political opinion and expression, 
peaceful assembly and association and, most importantly, the right to political 
participation, including the right to ‘periodic and genuine elections which shall 
be by universal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free 
voting procedures’.6 Article 2 of the Declaration subjects all other articles to a 
general prohibition of discrimination on such grounds as ‘race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property 
birth or other status’. Applied to article 21 (providing for the right to political 
participation), no one can be discriminated on the basis of political or other 
opinion when exercising his or her right to political participation. Last but not 
least, article 28 provides that ‘[e]veryone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized’.7 Taken together, articles 2, 21 and 28 lay a legal foundation for the 
right to democracy in international law. Albeit it is logical to assume that the 
Declaration’s definition of democracy excludes non-pluralist governments 
(particularly by virtue of the article 2 prohibition of discrimination on basis of, 
among others, political opinion), the understanding of democracy is still by 
and large election-centred. Another concern is the UDHR’s non-treaty status. 
Although it is, at an increasing rate, asserted that the provisions of the 
Declaration have come to reflect customary international law as well as general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations8 and can even be viewed as a 
specification and authoritative interpretation of the human rights provisions of 
the UN Charter, the language of the UDHR is too general and vague to derive 
concrete state obligations therefrom. 
Democratic provisions of the Declaration had eventually acquired treaty 
form by their inclusion into the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                               
5 See Steven Wheatly, ‘Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective’ (2002) 51 
ICLQ 225, 228; Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet and Mathias Forteau, La Charte des Nations Unies: 
Commentaire Article par Article (3rd edn, Economica 2005) 308; Christian Tomuschat, 
‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 483. 
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res 217(III)A (10 December 1948) arts 19-
21. 
7 ibid art 28. 
8 See eg Louis B Sohn, ‘The Human Rights Law of the Charter’ (1977) 12 Tex Int’l LJ 129, 133; 
Philip Alston, ‘The Universal Declaration at 35: Western and Passé or Alive and Universal’ 
(1982) 31 ICJ Rev 60, 69; Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as 
Customary Law (Clarendon Press 1989) 82; Lung-Chu Chen, ‘Restatement: Protection of 
Persons’ (1989) 14 Yale JIL (1989) 542, 546-47; Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights (Columbia 
UP 1990) 19; Richard B Lillich, ‘The Growing Importance of Customary International Human 
Rights Law’ (1995-96) 25 Ga J Int’l & Comp L 1, 1; Hurst Hanum, ‘The Status of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law’ (1996) 25 Ga J Int’l & Comp 
L 287. 
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Rights (ICCPR), which refers to ‘democratic society’ as a default political 
system of state parties.9 Together with the rights to freedom of expression, 
peaceful assembly and association,10 the ICCPR provides for a right of peoples 
to political self-determination.11 Similarly to the UDHR, the ICCPR avoids the 
word ‘democracy’, but is rather confined in terms of the right to political 
participation and political accountability through elections. Article 25 of the 
Covenant, which is now commonly accepted as a repository for democratic 
entitlement, states as follows: 
 
Every citizen shall have right […] (a) to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives [and] (b) to vote and 
to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; (c) to have access, on general terms of 
equality, to public service in his country.12 
 
Since the article does not explicitly refer to democracy, many international 
legal scholars claim that it does not impose an obligation to institute and upheld 
the democratic form of government, let alone envisages sanctions for the 
failure to tackle antidemocratic trends. Moreover, given the ostensible brevity 
of wording of the article, a lack of consensus persists regarding its substantive 
specifications, such as, for instance, the imminence of political pluralism in the 
definition of democracy. In more concrete terms, the ambiguity as to whether 
article 25 enshrines an obligation to install multiparty democracy is caused by 
two competing interpretations of democracy existing at the time of drafting of 
the Covenant. Western vision of democracy implied ‘liberal democracy’, 
which is only possible in multiparty setting, whilst the Eastern bloc, on the 
other hand, embraced the model of ‘people’s democracy’. Thus, the adoption 
of the ICCPR was conditioned by its responsiveness to the interests and 
concerns of both bipolar powers at that time, who were eager to make sure that 
their own system of politics was not in instant violation of the article.13 It 
stands, thus, to a reason that during the Cold War, one-party democracy was 
acceptable under the Covenant to the extent that the dominant party allowed 
for the realisation of multifarious political agendas. Because the latter is easy 
to fulfil, many modern authoritarian regimes that are based on the one-party 
system of government claim that they they live up to their obligations under 
the Covenant. Such elasticity ascribed to the concept of democracy ‘robb[s] it 
of all normative value in international law’: in the end of the day democracy 
that means everything in fact means nothing.14 It is also against the backdrop 
                                               
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) arts 14(1), 21 and 22(2). 
10 ibid arts 19, 21 and 22 respectively. 
11 ibid art 1(1). 
12 ibid art 25. 
13 Henry Steiner, ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harv Hum Rts YB 77, 93. 
14 Susan Marks, ‘International Law, Democracy and the End of History’ in Gregory Fox and 
Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (CUP 2000) 532. 
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of this political compromise that the mainstream scholarship insists that neither 
the UDHR nor the ICCPR guarantees the right to democracy since the 
obligation to ensure the right to political participation and the right to vote in 
free and fair elections is not fully concomitant with the obligation to introduce 
a democratic form of governance. This position is also implied in the 
Nicaragua case, in which the ICJ declared that ‘the Court cannot find an 
instrument with legal force, whether unilateral or synallagmatic, whereby 
Nicaragua [a party to the ICCPR] has committed itself in respect of the 
principle or methods of holding elections’.15 
However, it is logical to suggest that the very notion of free and fair 
elections implies a multi-party system, since only when the voter is offered a 
number of alternatives, can his voting be considered as free. This idea is 
seemingly supported by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which 
considered in its case law that ‘restrictions on political activity outside the only 
recognized political party amount to an unreasonable restriction of the right to 
participate in the conduct of public affairs’.16 Later on it issued its General 
Comment on article 25 where it held that ‘[a]rticle 25 lies at the core of 
democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity 
with the principles of the Covenant’.17 The Committee further argued that ‘[b]y 
virtue of the rights covered by article 1(1), peoples have the right to freely 
determine their political status and to enjoy the right to chose the form of their 
constitution or government’.18 Article 25 appears to be a logical addendum to 
article 1 as it specifies the means for the exercise of the right of self-
determination. Moreover, the Committee established that the right to political 
participation depends on some other rights: ‘Freedom of expression, assembly 
and association are essential conditions for the right to vote and must be fully 
protected’.19 The Committee, thus, affirmed that compliance with article 25 
implies the democratic form of government. However, its pronouncements 
have been rapidly discounted by traditional scholarship as falling into the realm 
of ‘soft law’ and of no binding effect on states. 
Legal provisions in support of democracy can also be found in other more 
subject-specific international human rights instruments, such as the 
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD),20 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)21 and the Convention on the Rights 
                                               
15 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 261. 
16 Bwalya v Zambia (1988) 5 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 23, 25, para 
6.6. 
17 UNHRC ‘General Comment No 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right 
to Vote)’ (1996) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para 1. 
18 ibid para 2. 
19 ibid para 12. 
20 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD). 
21 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW). 
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of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).22 Article 5 ICERD, which is of relevance 
to all kinds of minorities, provides: 
 
State Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all 
its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to the 
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably 
in the enjoyment of the following rights: […] 
(c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections — to vote 
and to stand for election — on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to 
take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any 
level and to have access to public service […].23 
 
Similarly, article 7 CEDAW states: 
 
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the political and public life of the country and, in particular, 
shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the right: 
(a) To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for election 
to all publicly elected bodies […].24 
 
Last but not least, article 29 CRPD stipulates: 
 
State Parties shall guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights and 
the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with others, and shall 
undertake to: 
a. Ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in 
political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons 
with disabilities to vote and be elected […].25 
 
Similar provisions are included in other important international documents, 
such as the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (article 2), the 1953 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women (articles I-IV) and the 1990 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families (articles 41, 42). Whilst the 
importance of these instruments for the democratic entitlement is hard to 
overestimate, the understanding of democracy they advance is clearly 
procedural, since the introduction and maintenance of the institution of 
                                               
22 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNGA Res 61/106 (13 December 
2006) (CRPD). 
23 International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD) art 5. 
24 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 
December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 (CEDAW) art 7. 
25 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, UNGA Res 61/106 (13 December 
2006) (CRPD) art 29. 
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elections is viewed as a sufficient evidence of compliance with the obligations 
laid down by the aforementioned provisions. 
The most elaborate treatment of democracy can be found at regional levels. 
In Europe, the preamble of the Statute of the Council of Europe (CoE) 
reaffirms the devotion of the member states ‘to the spiritual and moral values 
which are common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual 
freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis 
of all genuine democracy’.26 The European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), adopted by the CoE, puts democracy at the core of its human rights 
regime. It recognises an inherently close relationship between democracy and 
the protection of human rights: ‘[F]undamental freedoms […] are best 
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the 
other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon 
which they depend’.27 The concept of a democratic society is a unifying thread 
throughout the Convention, and in cases when limitations of the rights 
enshrined in the Convention are allowable this may only be done when 
‘necessary in democratic society’.28 
Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR specifies the elements of effective 
democracy which include ‘free elections at reasonable intervals by secret 
ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion 
of the people in the choice of the legislature’.29 While article 3 is substantially 
narrower in scope than article 25 ICCPR, the European Commission and Court 
of Human Rights (ECmHR and ECtHR) have interpreted this article to provide 
guarantees similar to those contained in the ICCPR. This have been done, by 
and large, through the backdoor of articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, 
protecting freedoms of expression and assembly respectively, as well as by 
interpreting provisions of the Protocol through the prism of the European 
common democratic heritage. For instance, in Zdanoka v Latvia, the Court 
declared that democracy constitutes a fundamental element of the ‘European 
public order’ and is the only political model compatible with the Convention.30 
More than that, the ECtHR in its case law developed an understanding of 
democracy going beyond electoral minimum espoused by the international 
human rights instruments by referring to such essential elements of democracy 
                                               
26 Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949) ETS 
No 001, preamble. 
27 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 005 (ECHR) 
preamble. 
28 ibid second paragraph of arts 8-11. 
29 Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted 20 March 1952, entered into force 18 May 1954) ETS 9 (ECHR-P1) Article 
3. 
30 Case of Zdanoka v Latvia App no 58278/00 (ECtHR (GC) 16 March 2006) para 98. See also 
United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey App no 19392/92 (ECtHR, 30 January 
1998) para 45 (‘[D]emocracy is without doubt a fundamental feature of the European public 
order’). 
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as pluralism,31 tolerance and broadmindedness.32 To this end, the Court 
frequently invoked arguments from democratic political theory and resorted to 
political analysis in its judgments.33 As Vidmar noted, whilst at the 
international level the question of multipartyism as an inalienable element of 
democracy is still unsettled, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR speaks for the 
multiparty democracy as the only form of governance compatible with the 
Convention.34 
In the Americas, a commitment to promote democracy is provided in the 
1948 Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which encourages 
its members to ‘promote and consolidate representative democracy’, albeit 
‘with due respect for the principle of non-intervention’.35 It further expresses 
the conviction that ‘representative democracy is an indispensable condition for 
the stability, peace and development of the region’.36 Furthermore, the 1992 
Protocol of Washington, which amended the OAS Charter by laying out clear 
and specific procedures for collective response to democratic overthrows,37 
‘finally transformed into reality what had been merely proclaimed in the 1948 
Charter, since it turned democracy into an obligation, and into a condition for 
continued membership in the Organization’.38 
The obscure terms of the OAS Charter have found precision in the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), which recognises 
democratic rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association and the 
right of every citizen ‘(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives; [and] (b) to vote and to be elected in 
genuine periodic elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and 
                                               
31 Handyside v the United Kingdom App no 5493/72 (ECtHR, 7 December 1976) para 49 
(‘Freedom of expression […] is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population’); Case of Socialist Party 
and Others v Turkey App no 20/1997/804/1007 (ECtHR, 25 May 1998) para 41 (‘There can be 
no democracy without pluralism’). 
32 See Case of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v The United Kingdom Apps no 31417/96 and 32377/96 
(ECtHR, 27 December 1999) para 80 (The Court held that the hallmarks of a ‘democratic 
society’ constitute pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness). 
33 See Rekvenyj v Hungary App no 25390/94 (ECtHR, 20 May 1999); Case of Refah Partisi 
(The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey Apps no 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 
(ECtHR (GC) 13 February 2003); Case of Zdanoka v Latvia App no 58278/00 (ECtHR (GC) 16 
March 2006). See also Jure Vidmar, ‘Multiparty Democracy: International and European Human 
Rights Law Perspectives’ (2010) 23 LJIL 209, 239. 
34 Jure Vidmar, ‘Multiparty Democracy: International and European Human Rights Law 
Perspectives’ (2010) 23 LJIL 209, 240. 
35 Charter of the Organization of American States (adopted 30 April 1948, entered into force 13 
December 1951) 119 UNTS 3 (OAS Charter) art 2(b). 
36 ibid preamble. 
37 OAS, Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States (A-56) 
‘Protocol of Washington’ (adopted 14 December 1992, entered into force 25 September 1997) 
OAS Treaty Series No A-56, art 9. 
38 Jean-Paul Hubert, ‘Follow-Up on the Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter’ 
(OAS/Ser. Q, CJI/doc.317/09 corr.1, Bogota, 19 March 2009) 9. 
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by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the will of the voters’.39 
Moreover, the role of the Inter-American Commission and the Court 
(IACmHR and IACtHR) in giving precision and putting into context various 
democratic provisions of the Convention is hard to overestimate.40 To 
illustrate, in the framework of article 27 ACHR, concerning the legality of 
derogation measures adopted during states of emergency, the IACmHR 
assumed the task of controlling the legality of the government itself which 
introduces the derogation measures. For instance, in Nicaragua, when the 
Somoza government was overthrown, the IACmHR referred the situation to 
the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which in turn 
questioned the legality of the government that had effected gross human rights 
violations and called for its immediate replacement by a democratic regime.41 
Further, in the cases of Velasquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz, the IACtHR 
emphasised the State’s duty to be functionally organised in such a way as to 
permit the realisation of human rights.42 
The turning point occurred with the adoption of the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter (IADC)43 on 11 September 2001. Irrespective of its status 
as an OAS General Assembly resolution, it can nevertheless be put on a par 
with a binding treaty by virtue of being an authoritative interpretation of the 
OAS Charter.44 Its article 1 unprecedentedly proclaims: ‘The peoples of the 
Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation 
                                               
39 American Convention on Human Rights (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 
July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (ACHR) arts 13, 15, 16 and 23(1) respectively. 
40 See The Word ‘Laws’ in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights (IACtHR, 
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, 9 May 1986) Series A 6, para 34 (‘The meaning of the word “laws” 
in Article 30 cannot be disassociated from the intention of all the American States, as expressed 
in the Preamble to the Convention, “to consolidate in the hemisphere within the framework of 
democratic institutions a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the 
essential rights of man”’); Yatama v Nicaragua (IACtHR, 23 June 2005) Series C 127, para 192 
(The Court, citing para 34 of The Word ‘Laws’ Advisory Opinion, declared that ‘[r]epresentative 
democracy is the determining factor throughout the system of which the Convention is a part’, 
and ‘a “principle” reaffirmed by the American States in the OAS Charter, the basic instrument 
of the inter-American system.’ The political rights protected in the American Convention, as 
well as in many international instruments, promote, as the Court prceeds, the strengthening of 
democracy and political pluralism); Claude-Reyes et al v Chile (IACtHR, 19 September 2006) 
Series C 151, para 84 (reiterated verbatim para 192 of the Yatama case); Kimel v Argentina 
(IACtHR, 2 May 2008) Series C 177, para 87 (Affirming that tolerance and transparency are 
‘the requirements of the pluralism inherent in a democratic society, which requires the greatest 
flow of information and opinions on issues of public interests’). 
41 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (23 June 1979) Res/2, Ser/FII.17, 
Doc.40/79 rev. 2. 
42 Velasquez Rodriguez Case (IACtHR, 29 July 1988) Series C 4; Godínez Cruz Case (IACtHR, 
20 January 1989) Series C 5. 
43 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, OEA/Ser.G/CP-1 (11 September 2001). 
44 The Inter-American Juridical Committee posited in its special report of August 2001 that 
‘[t]he provisions of resolutions of this nature generally have as their purpose the interpretation 
of treaty provisions; the provision of evidence of existence of customary norms […] The 
provision of some resolutions of an organ of an international organization may have an 
obligatory effect’. CJI/Res. 32 (LIX O/01) (24 August 2001) para 5. See also section 5.3 of this 
thesis. 
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to promote and defend it’. Crucially, the substantive purview of democracy 
exceeds the mere electoral straitjacket; the Charter sets benchmarks for 
representative democracy, which include 
 
[R]espect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and exercise 
of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and 
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression 
of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches 
of government.45 
 
The affirmation that democracy is now a human right was repeated in various 
subsequent declarations. For example, the 2003 Declaration on Security in the 
Americas declared: ‘We reaffirm that democracy is a right […]’.46 Similarly, 
in 2005, member states referred to article 1 IADC as explicitly establishing the 
right to democracy of American peoples and the respective duty of 
governments to protect it.47 Such unqualified language of democracy as both a 
right and duty was initially met by many with resistance. However, ‘when the 
dust has settled, it was found that […] Article 1 lifts the concept to a 
significantly advanced reciprocal contract of peoples with governments’.48 On 
top of that, democratic provisions of the Charter can now be regarded as 
customary law since ‘[w]hether an instrument that is a political declaration 
becomes part of the fabric of customary international law is a function of 
precedent. In the case of the Charter, as was the case with Resolution 1080, 
precedents are already providing validation’.49 This view is shared by many 
American scholars who claim that there is now a ‘right to democracy’ in 
American regional law.50 
At the African level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR or ‘Banjul Charter’) does not explicitly mention a right to elections. 
It does, however, guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, association 
and assembly, and the right of political participation ‘in the government of his 
country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives’.51 The 
absence of express democratic provisions in the Charter has been countered by 
the practice of the African Commission on Human Rights52 as well as by the 
                                               
45 OAS, Inter-American Democratic Charter, OEA/Ser.G/CP-1 (11 September 2001) art 3. 
46 OAS, Declaration on Security in Americas, Mexico City (28 October 2003) CES/DEC.1/03 
rev. 1, para 5. 
47 OAS, Declaration of Florida: Delivering the Benefits of Democracy (7 June 2005) AG/Dec.41 
(XXXV-O/05). 
48 John Graham, A Magna Carta for the Americas: The Inter-American Democratic Charter: 
Genesis, Challenges and Canadian Connections (Focal 2002) 7. 
49 ibid. 
50 See eg Heraldo Munoz, ‘The Right to Democracy in the Americas’ (1998) 40 J Interam Stud 
& Wld Aff 1, 2. 
51 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 
October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (ACHPR) arts 9, 10, 11 and 13(1) respectively. 
52 See eg Interights et al v Islamic Republic of Mauritania (2004) AHRLR 87 (ACHPR 2004) 
para 80; Article 19 v Eritrea (2007) AHRLR 73 (ACHPR 2007) para 106; Zimbabwe Lawyers 
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adoption of the subsequent instruments containing more explicit democratic 
language, namely the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African Union53 and 2007 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Good Governance.54 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance defines one 
of its objectives ‘adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and 
principles of democracy and respect for human rights’.55 According to article 
3, this Charter should be implemented in accordance with the following 
principles: respect for human rights and democratic principles; promotion of a 
representative system of government; and condemnation and total rejection of 
unconstitutional changes of government. Article 4 of the Charter provides that 
‘States Parties should commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle 
of the rule of law and human rights […] [and] recognize popular participation 
through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people’.56 
At first blush, one may get an impression that the right to democracy is 
firmly embedded in the existing treaty law. As d’Aspremont explains, even 
though ‘[c]es instruments n’évoquent toutefois jamais expressément 
l’establishment d’un régime démocratique […] [n]ul ne peut cependant 
sérieusement contester que le droit à des élections libres, honnêtes et 
périodiques se confond avec une obligation d’établir un régime démocratique 
qui ne dit pas son nom’.57 Indeed, if one subscribes to the institutional 
(procedural) vision of democracy then it is undeniably true that democracy, or 
more precisely the right to choose one’s leader in a free and fair electoral 
process, constitutes a binding (conventional) norm of international law. 
However, a more substantive understanding of democracy, that is a guarantee 
of genuine conditions for realisation of political equality and self-government, 
albeit partially featuring in European and American experiences, is hardly 
discernible at the international level, not to mention the Asian region where 
democratic commitments largely remain on the level of rhetoric. Moreover, 
certain conceptual modalities of democracy, that is, for instance, whether it 
encompasses political pluralism or can also describe one-party regimes, remain 
unresolved on the international plane. The question hence arises as to whether 
one shall assume a restrictive stance and interpret treaties in a stringent 
                                               
for Human Rights v Zimbabwe (2008) AHRLR 120 (ACHPR 2008) paras 92, 95; Lawyers for 
Human Rights v Swaziland (2005) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 2005). See Christian Tomuschat, 
‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 485. 
53 Constitutive Act of the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001) 
2158 UNTS 3, arts 3(g), 4(m). 
54 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (adopted 30 January 2007, entered 
into force 15 February 2012) AU Doc Assembly/AU/Dec.147(VIII). 
55 ibid art 2(1). 
56 ibid art 4. 
57 Jean d’Aspremont, L’État non démocratique en droit international (Pedone 2008) 35 (Even 
though these instruments never expressly refer to the establishment of a democratic regime, no 
one can seriously contest the fact that the right to free, fair and periodic elections conform with 
an obligation to establish a democratic regime that does not say its name) (author’s translation). 
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accordance with the will of states unambiguously defined or whether a more 
teleological approach is warranted. 
 
4.1.2. Teleological Interpretation 
 
Treaties are not just dry parchments. They are instruments for providing 
stability to their parties and to fulfill the purposes which they embody. They 
can therefore change over time, must adapt to new situations, evolve 
according to the social needs of the international community and can, 
sometimes, fall into obsolescence.58 
 
The preceding section laid bare the multifarious legal instruments containing 
democratic provisions. While the value of every single document is not to be 
downplayed, it is undeniably the ICCPR which is of an utmost importance for 
mapping the universal treaty basis of the right to democratic governance. As 
of late 2018, the Covenant has attracted 172 ratifications and six signatures. 
Only 17 states have not undertaken any action in regard to this instrument. 
The text of the ICCPR does not indicate how it is to be interpreted. 
Consequently, by virtue of being ‘an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law’,59 general 
rules of treaty interpretation, mainly located in articles 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), are applicable to it. Notably, due 
to the non-retroactive character of the Convention, these provisions do not 
apply to the ICCPR as a treaty law. However, the VCLT came to be viewed as 
virtually in toto reflecting norms of customary international law60 and hence 
                                               
58 ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 60th Session’ (5 May - 
6 June and 7 July - 8 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/10, Annex A, 383, para 1. 
59 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT) art 2(1)(a). 
60 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Merits) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, para 
48 (Stating that the pre-existing principles of treaty interpretation ‘are reflected in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which may in many respects be 
considered as a codification of existing customary international law on the point’); Case 
Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) (Merits) [1994] ICJ Rep 
6, para 41; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v Bahrain) 
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1995] ICJ Rep 6, para 33; Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 19; LaGrand 
Case (Germany v US) [2001] ICJ Rep 279, para 100; Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 
94; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 160; 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Merits) [2009] 
ICJ Rep 213, para 47; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) [2010] ICJ Rep 
14, para 65. This process of growing acceptance of the customary nature of the provisions in 
question is aptly described by Torres Bernardez, ‘Interpretation of Treaties by the International 
Court of Justice Following the Adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ 
in Gerhard Hafner and others (eds), Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenverldern: in 
Honor of His 80th Birthday (Kluwer Law International 1998) 721ff. 
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applicable to every international treaty irrespective of the date of its 
conclusion. Article 31 VCLT provides: 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(a) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties.61 
 
As the previous section revealed, the prevailing text-based (objective) 
approach to the interpretation of the ICCPR, that is ‘in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty’, lead many scholars to 
conclude that the right to democracy is not recognised in this treaty.62 
However, there is another major approach to treaty interpretation that is 
espoused by the VCLT on par with the textual approach, namely teleological 
interpretation, which assumes that treaties are to be interpreted ‘in the light of 
[…] [their] object and purpose’.63 The object-and-purpose approach to 
interpretation is particularly relevant in the human rights context, since human 
rights instruments, as law-making treaties, have different aspirations than 
contractual agreements between states in that the primary goal of interpretation 
                                               
61 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT) art 31. 
62 Anthony Langlois, ‘Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist 
Thesis’ (2003) 25 Hum Rts Q 990; Niels Petersen, ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology in 
International Law’ (2009) 34 Brook J Int’l L 33, 56; Jure Vidmar, ‘The Right of Self-
Determination and Multiparty Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2010) 10 HRL Rev 
239, 261; Jure Vidmar, ‘Multiparty Democracy: International and European Human Rights Law 
Perspectives’ (2010) 23 LJIL 209, 223. 
63 There is also a third major school of treaty interpretation — subjective school — according to 
which the main goal of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties. However, 
the term ‘intentions of the parties’ does not feature as an independent interpretative element in 
the VCLT but is rather viewed as being subsumed by textual approach inasmuch as text is 
presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties. See ILC, ‘Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of Its 18th Session’ (4 May — 19 July 1966) UN 
Doc A/6309/Rev.1, 220, para 11. See also Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester UP 1984) 131 (Stating that ‘there can be no common intentions 
of the parties aside or apart from the text they have agreed upon’). 
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of a human rights instrument is the promotion of its effective application (effect 
utile) rather than the ascertainment of the original intent of state parties. 
It has long been debated how these interpretative tools (text, context and 
object and purpose) shall be treated. Some commentators have suggested that 
literal reading of article 31 presupposes a hierarchy between the three 
elements, that is they should be employed in the order they stand in the text of 
the VCLT.64 To put slightly differently, the less textually clear a provision 
becomes, the more recourse to remaining elements is justified. Thus, if text is 
ambiguous, one could put more weight to context. If the latter does not bring 
clarity either, one should appeal to object and purpose as a last resort. 
However, there is now a growing consensus to view the three interpretative 
formulas as well as the guiding principle of good faith as equal and mutually 
supplementing tools of treaty interpretation. This came to be known as a 
holistic approach,65 or ‘crucible approach’,66 to article 31. This approach 
transcends the ECtHR’s argument in Golder: 
 
In the way in which it is presented in the ‘general rule’ in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, the process of interpretation of a treaty is a unity, a single 
combined operation; this rule, closely integrated, places on the same footing 
the various elements enumerated in the four paragraphs of the Article.67 
 
Teleological interpretation is a constitutional interpretation because it aids in 
revealing the common interest of the international community vested into the 
text of a treaty, instead of attempting to ascertain a fluctuating, inward-looking, 
synallagmatic, contextually and temporarily dependent will of an individual 
state, commonly referred to as ‘intention of state parties’, when it comes to 
treaty interpretation. Moreover, the generic and abstract nature of the object 
and purpose as a guiding formula in treaty interpretation ensures a needed 
flexibility and evolution of the treaty text (in line with global constitutional 
principles) without the need of an onerous process of amendment or adoption 
of a new treaty. This notwithstanding, the very notion of ‘object and purpose’ 
                                               
64 For a classical defence of this position, see Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon 
Press 1961) 364-83. See also Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd 
edn, Manchester UP 1984) 130-35; Robert Y Jennigs, ‘Treaties’ in Mohammed Bedjaoui (ed), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects, vol 1 (UNESCO 1991) 135-77. See also Case 
Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) (Merits) [1994] ICJ Rep 
6, para 41 (Pointing out that the interpretation must be based ‘above all upon the text of the 
treaty’). 
65 See Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 9-10; Isabelle Van Damme, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body’ (2010) 21 EJIL 605, 626. 
66 The term ‘crucible’ comes from the ILC Commentaries on the Draft VCLT, which 
characterizes treaty interpretation as a ‘single combined operation’ where text, context and 
object and purpose are ‘thrown into a crucible’. ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaty with 
Commentaries’ (1966) 2 YBILC 187, 219-20, para 8; See also Richard Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (OUP 2008) 9-10. 
67 Case of Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975) para 30. 
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is an ‘enigma’68 in the sense that there is no exact rule to determine concrete 
state obligations by reference to it. The most precise definition that scholarly 
community could agree upon is that it is a ‘unitary concept referring to the 
goals that the drafters of the treaty hoped to achieve’.69 Thus, the idea that a 
treaty is to be interpreted in light of its object and purpose suggests a holistic 
mode of interpretation which takes cognisance of the ‘normative logic’ 
underlying the treaty in its entirely.70 
Because the HRC in its case law does not usually indicate its method of 
the identification of the object and purpose of the ICCPR,71 recourse should be 
had to general international law. It is a common practice to look at the preamble 
of a treaty as an expression of its object and purpose.72 Albeit treated in article 
31 VCLT as part of treaty text and, thus, an obligatory element in text-and-
context analysis,73 preambles are more frequently referred to as sources or 
evidence of a treaty’s object and purpose. This approach is virtually universal 
and originates from historical practices and conventions of treaty drafting and 
interpretation.74 As Judge Weeramantry posited in relation to the ICJ and 
arbitral tribunals: 
 
An obvious internal source of reference is the preamble to the treaty. The 
preamble is a principal and natural source from which indications can be 
gathered of a treaty’s objects and purposes even though the preamble does not 
contain substantive provisions. Article 31(2) of the VCLT sets this out 
                                               
68 Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ 
(1998) 3 Austr Rev Int’l & Eur L 311, 343. 
69 David S Jonas and Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three 
Interpretative Methods’ (2010) 43 Vand J Transnat’l L 565, 578; Oliver Dörr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (Springer 2012) 
232. 
70 David S Jonas and Thomas N Saunders, ‘The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three 
Interpretative Methods’ (2010) 43 Vand J Transnat’l L 565, 579. 
71 See eg Johnson v Jamaica (1994) 6 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 126, 
para 8.2(c) (The Committee merely stated that one of the Covenant’s objects and purposes is ‘to 
promote reduction in the use of the death penalty’ without elaborating how it came to this 
conclusion); Choi and Yoon v Republic of Korea (2007) 9 Selected Decisions of the Human 
Rights Committee 218, para 8.2 (The Committee asserted that the right to conscientious 
objection against military service must be assessed solely ‘in the light of article 18 of the 
covenant, the understanding of which evolves as that of any other guarantee of the covenant 
over time in view of its text and purpose’. (Emphasis added). The Committee, thus, resorted to 
a combination of interpretative methods (evolutive, textual and teleological) to justify the right 
to conscientious objection under article 18 ICCPR without delving into any analysis on how the 
application and interplay of these interpretative approaches led to such conclusion). 
72 See eg Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An 
Enigma?’ (1998) 3 Austr Rev Int’l & Eur L 311, 332 (Suggesting that ‘the title and the preamble 
of a treaty, and occasionally a programmatic article, are the prime indicators of the purpose of a 
treaty’). 
73 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT) art 31(2) (Stipulating that ‘[t]he context for the purpose 
of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and 
annexes […]’) (emphasis added). 
74 Max H Hulme, ‘Preambles in Treaty Interpretation’ (2016) 164 U Pa L Rev 1281, 1300. 
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specifically when it states that context, for the purpose of the interpretation of 
a treaty, shall comprise in addition to the text, the preamble and certain other 
materials. The jurisprudence of this Court has made substantial use of it for 
interpretational purposes […]. Important international arbitrations have 
likewise resorted to the preamble to a treaty as guides to its interpretation.75 
 
However, given the usually vague, hazy and unrestrained language of 
preambles, caution is needed. Moreover, both article 31(2) VCLT as well as 
international practice make clear that one has to read the whole treaty to 
ascertain its object and purpose. In other words, in order to interpret the treaty 
in light of its object and purpose, one has to first elucidate the object and 
purpose by interpreting the whole treaty. To escape the vicious circle, a two-
step approach may be useful: firstly, a prima facie assumption of the object 
and purpose of a treaty must be established by having recourse to the preamble 
of the treaty; secondly, this assumption must eventually be tested against the 
text of the treaty and all other available material and, if necessary, adjusted 
according to this test.76 Importantly, whenever preamble is employed as an 
indicator of a treaty’s object and purpose, its role is to limit, or ‘impose 
interpretative commitments’,77 to use the wording of Gardiner, but not to 
radically alter the possible interpretations of a treaty term. In this way, the 
haziness of the preamble’s language is precluded from giving rise to 
interpretations utterly divergent with the term’s ordinary textual reading. 
However, this is not to say that preamble cannot amplify or somewhat expand 
the substantive reach of the treaty provisions, particularly considering the wide 
judicial practice supporting such transformative power of preambles.78 
Turning to the ICCPR, it refers in its preamble to ‘the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’, 
‘inherent dignity of the human person’, ‘the ideal of free human beings’ and 
the ‘creation of conditions whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political 
                                               
75 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Merits) [1991] ICJ Rep 53, 142 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry). The decisions that he cited, in which the ICJ has 
relied upon the preamble to a treaty for interpretative purposes, includes Rights of Nationals of 
the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America) (Merits) [1952] 
ICJ 176, 196; and Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru) (Merits) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, 282. 
76 Isabelle Buffard and Karl Zemanek, ‘The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’ 
(1998) 3 Austr Rev Int’l & Eur L 311, 333. 
77 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2008) 186. 
78 For detailed overview and analysis of the judicial practice according strong support to positive 
force of preambles in expanding treaty terms, see Max H Hulme, ‘Preambles in Treaty 
Interpretation’ (2016) 164 U Pa L Rev 1281, 1307-17, 1324-30 (Referring to United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (12 October 1988) WT/DS58/AB/R. 
1998, several recent decisions by international investment tribunals and decisions by the ICJ, 
including the 1952 Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, the 1991 Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia/Malaysia) (Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep 625 and Territorial and Maritime Dispute 
(Nicaragua v Colombia) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 624. 
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rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights’.79 It is, therefore, fair 
to suggest that the object and purpose of the Covenant is to promote human 
dignity, equality, self-realisation and political empowerment. It is against the 
backdrop of these objectives that every article of the Covenant is to be 
interpreted, including article 25 (right to elections) — the principal treaty 
source of the democratic entitlement. Strikingly, these objectives immediately 
recall the underlying principles of democracy, namely equality and self-
determination. 
Whilst it is clear that the aforementioned objectives are still too generic to 
serve as a helpful guide for the interpretation of other treaty provisions, they, 
nonetheless, have certain implications on the quality of democracy as 
envisaged in article 25 ICCPR. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how 
authoritarian governments, whether fully lacking any electoral basis for their 
formation or with electoral competition of some kind, that curtail the full 
enjoyment of civil and political rights of their subjects by, among others, 
manipulating the results of elections, if not completely banning those, 
restricting the participation of various political fractions, assuming unfettered 
control over decision-making between elections, eroding the system of checks 
and balances between various branches of government, disrespecting the rule 
of law and the like, are to be judged as adhering to the underlying objectives 
of human dignity, equality and self-empowerment proclaimed in the preamble 
to the ICCPR. In this sense, authoritarian and competitive authoritarian 
regimes fall foul of complying with article 25 of the Covenant. Thus, the 
Covenant’s object and purpose derived from its preamble restricts the range of 
choices governments can make with respect to their political system. 
It is also unconceivable how free and fair elections could be non-plural. 
While the expression ‘free and fair’ is not explicitly used in the Covenant, 
which instead refers to ‘genuine periodic elections […] by universal and equal 
suffrage […] and by secret ballot’, recent state practice supported by universal 
opinio juris evidences the general consensus that any democratic elections 
shall be organised according to the standards of ‘free and fair’ in order to meet 
the requirements of article 25 ICCPR and other relevant instruments.80 Thus, 
it is plausible that the obligation to ensure participation of citizens on the basis 
of free and fair elections is a customary law obligation existing beyond the 
treaty obligation under article 25 ICCPR. Such invocation of extraneous 
standards in ascertainment of the Covenant’s terms seems to be in line with 
article 31(3) VCLT, which stipulates that treaty interpretation can be affected 
by ‘[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
                                               
79 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) preamble. 
80 See eg Eric C Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building 
Democracy (John Hopkins UP 2004) ch 6; Guy S Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections (2nd 
edn, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2006) 134, 163. See also Centre for Human Rights, Human 
Rights and Elections — A Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of 
Elections (United Nations 1994). 
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the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’,81 as well as with the 
Covenant’s object and purpose. 
For an election process to be free, the legal barriers to entry into the 
political space should be minimal. It means an effective protection of the 
freedoms of assembly, association, movement and speech for all political 
stakeholders, including voters and candidates/parties. There should be no 
coercion or intimidation in relation to the exercise of electoral choices.82 
Elections are fair when they are administered impartially by competent 
authorities without fraud or manipulation ensuring a level playing field for all 
political stakeholders, when independent monitoring of electoral process is 
allowed, and when any election-related disputes and complaints are promptly 
resolved.83 These principles are formally endorsed in the 1990 Copenhagen 
Document of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE)84 and in the 1994 Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections 
of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).85 
It is also fair to suggest that the expression ‘genuine elections’ in ICCPR 
article 25 conceptually incorporates the standard of free and fair. On this view, 
the adjective ‘genuine’ serves as a nexus between article 25 and other adjacent 
rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression (article 19), assembly (article 
21), association (article 22) and movement (article 12) and freedom from 
discrimination (article 2). At the very least, it entails a real choice for voters 
between various electoral platforms, which undoubtedly presupposes 
multipartyism. General Comment 25 of the HRC86 as well as its 
jurisprudence87 affirm this interpretation. Likewise, UNGA resolutions reflect 
the importance of multiparty elections for the effective enjoyment of the right 
to political participation: ‘[D]etermining the will of the people requires an 
electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become 
candidates and put forward their political views, individually and in co-
operation with others’.88 It is also becoming a common ground within 
                                               
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT) art 31(3). 
82 See Larry Diamond, ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’ in Larry Diamond and Marc F Plattner 
(eds), Democracy: A Reader (The Johns Hopkins UP 2009) 236. 
83 Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, ‘What Makes Elections Free and Fair?’ (1997) 8 Journal of 
Democracy 32, 35. See also Eric C Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and 
Building Democracy (The John Hopkins UP 2004) 96-99. 
84 OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE (29 June 1990) para 6 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304> accessed 29 
August 2016. 
85 Inter-Parliamentary Council, Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections (26 March 
1994) <http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm> accessed 29 August 2016. 
86 UNHRC ‘General Comment No 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right 
to Vote)’ (1996) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, para 8 (‘Citizens also take part in the conduct 
of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their 
representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is supported 
by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association’). 
87 Bwalya v Zambia (1988) 5 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 23, para 6.6. 
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international legal circles that in order for a state to be considered as complying 
with its obligations under the Covenant, it should guarantee its citizens a 
‘meaningful choice’ between political parties and agendas.89 
One may doubt, however, whether for the determination of the treaty’s 
object and purpose one may look beyond the treaty itself. In other words, it is 
not clear whether the meaning of ICCPR article 25 may be determined by 
reference to such external sources as the ‘free and fair’ standard, not explicitly 
incorporated into the text of the Covenant, and instruments of international 
institutions, such the HRC and the UNGA. However, state practice as well as 
court’s jurisprudence display that a treaty’s object and purpose is not restricted 
to the treaty itself but can also be extrapolated from extraneous rules.90 Thus, 
apart from looking at the treaty’s preamble as a material embodiment of its 
object and purpose, it is also possible to conceive of object and purpose of a 
treaty as ‘a normative element [existing] beyond the rules laid down in a 
treaty’.91 On this understanding, object and purpose can be defeated 
independently from a violation of the treaty’s actual terms.92 The case of 
Namibia is a good illustration of the application of this observation in practice. 
The facts of the case reveal that when states questioned the status of South 
Africa as mandatory in relation to South West Africa (Namibia) they referred 
to its violation of other instruments, such as the UN Charter and the UDHR.93 
In the same vein, the ECtHR in the Golder case, while recognising the 
importance of the treaty’s preamble in ascertaining its object and purpose, also 
appealed to the Statute of the Council of Europe to determine the scope of 
article 1 ECHR.94 As the Court explained, for the determination of the object 
and purpose of the ECHR’s provisions, the account should be taken of ‘any 
relevant rules and principles of international law, applicable between the 
parties’.95 Albeit, in contrast to the ECtHR, the HRC has frequently interpreted 
the ICCPR’s provisions without the recourse to external instruments, 
preferring instead to draw support from its general comments or the 
                                               
89 Niels Petersen, ‘The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law’ (2009) 34 Brook 
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preparatory works of the Convention,96 more recent decisions appear to give 
bigger credence to the extraneous sources, such as international conventions, 
to illuminate the object and purpose of the ICCPR’s provisions.97 
Noteworthy, Klabbers warned that such an expanded understanding of 
teleological interpretation is not unproblematic as introducing new obligations 
through the backdoor of object and purpose undermines law’s clarity and 
predictability. As he pertinently observed, ‘[w]hile one of the possible 
attractions of international law is, generally speaking, its indeterminate (some 
would say flexible) nature, the turning point is reached where indeterminacy 
lapses into “anything goes”’.98 In the present case, however, applying the 
standards of free and fair elections that are developed through state practice 
and are universally endorsed is not equivalent to ‘anything goes’. The panoply 
of adjacent rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, 
association and movement and the freedom from discrimination as applied in 
conjunction with article 25 ICCPR, provide a skeleton for a more fine-grained 
standard of free and fair. That said, states falling short of ensuring free and fair 
elections renege on their obligations under the ICCPR. In other words, 
teleological interpretation of article 25 ICCPR restricts the liberty of individual 
states to choose their form of government. 
Some may object to this seemingly sweeping conclusion by arguing that 
such complex multilateral treaties as human rights treaties may have plurality 
of objects and purposes, sometimes contradictory ones. This means that the 
object and purpose of a human rights treaty cannot be ascertained by merely 
referring to the treaty’s preamble but has to be weighted against, and adjusted 
in accordance with, the objects and purposes of separate articles of the treaty. 
This observation can draw some support from the definition of object and 
purpose by the HRC, which contends that ‘[i]n an instrument which articulates 
very many civil and political rights, each of the many articles, and indeed their 
interplay, secures the objectives of the Covenant’.99 Similarly, Sinclair 
emphasised that ‘most treaties have no single, undiluted object and purpose 
but a variety of differing and possibly conflicting objects and purposes’.100 It 
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follows from the aforementioned that each article of the ICCPR may have a 
distinct object and purpose. 
The most widely defended incompatibility between such plurality of 
objects and purposes has been observed with respect to articles 1 (self-
determination) and 25 ICCPR. Article 1 vests in the people the right to 
determine their political, social and economic system. Because the primary 
concern of the article is the people’s control and autonomy over issues directly 
pertaining to them, it has been suggested that the people have the right to 
choose any political system, including outright dictatorship. To proclaim 
democracy the only form of realisation of self-determination is to restrict the 
range of choices to which peoples are legitimately entitled.101 This 
interpretation finds at least a partial support in the pronouncement of the HRC 
contending that 
 
The rights under article 25 are related to, but distinct from, the right of peoples 
to self-determination. By virtue of the rights covered by article 1(1), peoples 
have the right to freely determine their political status and to enjoy the right 
to choose the form of their constitution or government. Article 25 deals with 
the right of individuals to participate in those processes which constitute the 
conduct of public affairs.102 
 
Following this line of reasoning, one may conclude that articles 1 and 25 
ICCPR pursue different and at times diametrically opposed goals. Whereas 
article 25 is concerned with citizens’ participation in political decision-making 
on a continuous basis, article 1, on the contrary, envisages people’s right to 
determine their political destiny as a one-time event — what has been termed 
as ‘one man, one vote, one time’103 — including the possibility to abolish such 
participation in the future. In other words, article 25 of the Covenant cannot be 
interpreted as restricting the liberty of states to choose their political system, 
as such interpretation is at loggerheads with article 1. 
Notwithstanding the seemingly solid legal reasoning animating such 
conclusion, it is imperative to note that the contemporary understanding of 
self-determination has evolved from the one confined to colonial context to the 
doctrine concerned with internal structure of states and democratic 
legitimacy.104 On this view, the right to elections informs how the right to 
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determine political status is to be exercised. Because peoples, and not their 
governments, are the repository of the right to choose a political system, this 
decision can only be effectuated through democratic mechanisms, as non-
democratic means are not attributable to the people. The right of the people of 
one historical moment to deprive future generations from the power to decide 
in the same manner is hard to justify.105 This would effectively mean that a 
people passed their power to determine the content of self-determination to 
their government, which would lead to a paradoxical situation where the 
principle of self-determination and the principle of state sovereignty would 
coincide and, thus, the former would loose any independent value.106 It follows 
that the modern conception of self-determination is inconceivable without a 
democratic system of government. Consequently, objects and purposes 
underlining the two articles, namely government representativeness and 
accountability, popular sovereignty and political equality, are not only 
incompatible but increasingly synonymous and mutually reinforcing, which 
has even led one prominent scholar to conclude that ‘[t]he right of peoples to 
self-determination, taken with the rights of citizens to political participation, 
creates an obligation for the 150-plus States parties to the [ICCPR] to both 
introduce and maintain democratic forms of government’.107 
Other articles of the ICCPR too may have distinctive objectives specific to 
the nature of the rights and freedoms they enshrine. Consider, for example, 
article 27 ICCPR, providing for the right of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities to enjoy their own culture. Albeit akin to articles 1 and 25 ICCPR 
(and in fact the Covenant as a whole), the objectives of article 27 are political 
empowerment, popular sovereignty and equality, these objectives are solely 
relevant for minorities with respect to the majority of population. The tension, 
hence, exists between political autonomy of separate ethno-cultural groups 
envisaged by article 27 and general objectives of political equality in decision-
making animating articles 1 and 25. It is commonly asserted that the electoral 
process as articulated in article 25 ICCPR can lead to a ‘tyranny of majority’.108 
Although it is theoretically accepted that in democracy the entire population is 
entitled to participate in the elections of representatives, who in their turn 
partake in the political decision-making on behalf of the population, this does 
not necessarily lead to the equal enjoyment of rights by everyone. In the 
extreme case, the electorally-formed power of majority may lead to violation, 
not fulfilment, of rights of numerically inferior groups. 
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However, such election-centred understanding of democracy is not 
supported by state practice. As has been previously indicated, the HRC 
recognised the importance of other ‘essential conditions’ for the effective 
exercise of the right to vote, such as freedoms of expression, assembly and 
association, which, in their turn, mitigate the distortive results of elections. 
Moreover, states are required to undertake positive measures to ensure that the 
right to elections is meaningful, including the availability of election materials 
in minority languages.109 In the general comment specifically relating to article 
27 ICCPR, the HRC reiterated the importance of positive measures both 
against the acts of the state party itself and the acts of other persons within the 
state ‘aimed at correcting conditions which prevent or impair the enjoyment of 
the rights guaranteed under article 27’. For the Committee, such measures 
amount to legitimate differentiation under the Covenant and, thus, do not 
undermine the prohibition of discrimination laid down in articles 2(1) and 26 
ICCPR.110 Moreover, it should not be forgotten that one of the distinct values 
of democracy is that it provides a possibility for everyone to actively partake 
in decisions that affect one’s fulfilment of basic human rights: ‘Inasmuch as 
people are social beings […] engaging in common or joint activities with 
others can be seen as itself one of the prime conditions for their freedom’, as 
itself a human right.111 In this sense, the right to democracy is indispensable 
means, if not the most effective way, to ensure the widest adherence to all 
human rights, including the rights of minorities. It follows that objectives of 
articles 27 and 25 are not mutually exclusive but conceptually interdependent, 
in that genuine democracy is inconceivable without the protection of minority 
rights, just like the full realisation of minority rights is only possible in 
democratic society. By the same token, any other right recognised in the 
Covenant by virtue of its civil and political nature, because it restricts 
unwarranted encroachments by governments upon individual rights (hence, the 
title of the Covenant), relies on the democratic framework for its realisation. It 
follows that interpreting article 25 ICCPR in light of the Covenant’s object(s) 
and purpose(s) implies the right to democratic governance vested in the people 
and a corresponding duty upon states to introduce and maintain democracy as 
the only form of government compatible with the Covenant. 
The expression ‘object and purpose’ also features in article 18 VCLT 
which states that: 
 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when: 
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(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty […]. 
 
Thus, the article, which came to be known as ‘interim obligation’, forbids 
signatory states from committing any acts that would undermine the object and 
purpose of a treaty between signature and its entry into force. Hence, the 
signature is neither purely ceremonial nor does it fully bind a state in respect 
of a treaty. Rather it produces a commitment to a threshold level of cooperation 
that is relied upon by other states in their relationship with a signatory.112 As 
was mentioned earlier, the ICCPR, apart from being ratified by 172 states, has 
attracted six signatures, including that of the People’s Republic of China113 – 
one of the world’s super-power notorious for its non-democratic, one-party 
regime, which in the words of one scholar ‘makes an ongoing mockery of the 
right of China’s 1,3 billion citizens to any genuine form of democracy or self-
determination’.114 Is it acting in violation of the ICCPR? 
Some commentators contend, that article 18 VCLT is of little use when it 
comes to law-making treaties since its original purpose was to serve in the 
restricted confines of contractual situations.115 However, the plain language of 
article 18 does not reveal any distinction between various types of treaties 
intended to be governed by the article. Moreover, the fact that human rights 
treaties are not strictly contractual in nature but seek to engender norms of 
general application, that is law-making treaties, which encapsulate values of 
international community at large and not merely reciprocal state undertakings, 
it is counterintuitive to claim that states can act as they please ‘simply because 
the calendar has not yet reached a certain date’.116 To clarify the issue, Klabbers 
proposed a ‘manifest intent test’ under which ‘where behaviour pending entry 
into force of an agreement is generally held to be morally obnoxious in light 
of what the agreement itself represents, then it violates the interim 
obligation’.117 However, the manifest intent test is arguably highly subjective 
and fails to provide a clear-cut standard for proving manifestation of lofty 
motivations. A new test — the so-called ‘status quo test’ — has been advanced 
in order to overcome these uncertainties. In short, this test concentrates on 
preserving the status quo at the time of signature. States do not assume any 
new obligations upon signing a treaty but are only restricted to follow their 
ordinary patterns of behaviour and should refrain from committing new 
‘transgressions’. Thus, ‘a state’s presumptively voluntary pattern of conduct 
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becomes obligatory’.118 It follows that under the manifest intent test China can 
be viewed as violating article 25 ICCPR, while under the status quo test no 
such violation occurs. Thus, which test is to be preferred? 
It is widely acknowledged that the interim obligation of article 18 is in 
essence an obligation of good faith: states concerned are not duty-bound to 
comply with the treaty in toto but nor can they frustrate its very essence, thus, 
rendering its entry into force de facto meaningless.119 Moreover, the content of 
the interim obligation is shaped by the object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole as well as the object and purpose of individual treaty provisions. In 
certain circumstances, the protection of the treaty’s object and purpose requires 
some active conduct to prevent the treaty from becoming meaningless. In one 
isolated case, the ECtHR incidentally raised the question of the application of 
article 18 VCLT in the context of human rights treaties. In Öcalan v Turkey, 
the Court held that the imposition of the death penalty by a Turkish court 
amounted to a violation of article 2 ECHR. To justify this conclusion, it noted 
that 
 
It must also be borne in mind in this context that Turkey has now signed 
Protocol No. 6 […] and that the non-implementation of the capital sentence 
is in keeping with Turkey’s obligations as a signatory State to this Protocol, 
in accordance with Article 18 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on 
the Law of Treaties, to ‘refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose’ of the Protocol’.120 
 
Thus, in the Court’s view, the mere signature of Protocol 6 to the ECHR 
(ECHR-P6), whose main object and purpose is the abolishment of the death 
penalty, gave rise to an obligation on the signing state to refrain from acts of 
capital punishment. It is, hence, clear that the Court opted for a manifest intent 
test. Applied to the issue in question, this would mean that states-signatories to 
the ICCPR which maintain non-democratic form of government are in 
violation of the Covenant’s object and purpose. Yet, one should be careful in 
reaching such a conclusion. Unlike narrow treaties whose object and purpose 
are relatively easy to determine, like ECHR-P6, the ICCPR is a substantively 
broad treaty including multiple objects and purposes, of which political 
participation is but one, albeit essential, objective. Moreover, one has to 
acknowledge the almost complete lack of practice relating to claims of 
responsibility for breaches of article 18 VCLT. Such unwillingness by states to 
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take action to engage responsibility in case of a breach of this article can be 
explicated by the fact that the wrongdoing state, after having signed the treaty, 
has a possibility to refrain from ratifying it by making its intention clear not to 
become a party to the treaty. Since in respect to human rights treaties the 
attainment of broad ratification is essential for its effectiveness, the invocation 
of article 18 is less than appealing.121 It follows that the object-and-purpose 
approach to interpretation cannot be stretched as far as to hold China and other 
non-democratic countries which have merely signed the ICCPR responsible 
for violating article 25 of the Covenant. 
 
4.1.3. Evolutive Interpretation and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration 
 
The consideration of object and purpose of a treaty on the same footing as text 
opened the door to an evolutive (or dynamic) approach to interpretation, since 
object and purpose may require that a term is interpreted evolutively. In this 
sense, teleological and evolutionary approaches go hand in hand. In short, 
evolutive interpretation means that a meaning given to a text changes over 
time. As the ICJ declared: 
 
The Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in 
the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected 
by the subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United 
Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international instrument 
has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.122 
 
It follows that treaty provisions are to be interpreted in the context of modern 
developments and against the background of general international law of the 
day. While it is clear that the ICJ has resorted to this approach on several 
occasions, the roots of the evolutive approach lie in the interpretative practice 
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of international human rights bodies characterised by an array of such 
interpretative techniques as principles of ‘autonomous concepts’, ‘living 
instrument’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘practicality’ developed by the ECtHR;123 the 
‘responsiveness to African circumstances’ in the context the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights;124 the consideration of the ‘real 
situation’ propagated by the IACtHR;125 and the ‘dynamic instrument doctrine’ 
in the case of the Committee against All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women.126 These techniques embody general understanding of how the 
general rule of interpretation under the VCLT can be applied to further treaty’s 
object and purpose. 
Evolutive interpretation has been as much criticised as it was defended. 
While, for some, it could generate meanings that are a far cry from what states 
originally intended,127 for others, it is in a strict accordance with article 31 
VCLT and particularly relevant in the context of human rights obligations.128 
This thesis argues that inasmuch as international law stands as a guardian of 
the common interest, it is to be interpreted teleologically, dynamically and 
evolutively. This is clearly discernible in the practice of the ICJ, which, whilst 
following the static approach as a basic rule, increasingly invokes dynamic 
interpretation to terms whose content the parties expected would change 
through time.129 
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In the context of the ICCPR, the question hence arises as to what 
interpretation one should give priority to: the one that implies interpretation of 
treaties in the context of rules of international law in force at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty (contemporaneous) or the one taking into account 
subsequent changes in law (evolutive). The interpretative practice of the HRC 
does not evidence any clear evolutionary approach. Respect for state 
sovereignty and consensual basis of international law seem to animate its 
jurisprudence. However, its recent case law evidences a more frequent recourse 
to evolutive interpretation by, for example, acknowledging the special nature 
of the ICCPR as a living instrument130 and making references to external 
sources in broadening the scope of the Covenant’s provisions,131 albeit in a 
rather restrictive manner. 
On a more theoretical level, there are several justifications for the special 
weight given to evolutive interpretation of the ICCPR. First of all, the ICCPR, 
by virtue of being a human rights treaty reflecting interests of the international 
community as a whole and concluded for an indefinite duration, implies a 
dynamic approach to interpretation as a means to ensure that human rights 
enshrined therein are protected effectively. Since the Covenant was adopted 
some half century ago, it is inconceivable that its provisions are static and not 
shaped by recent developments animating the fields of international law in 
general and human rights in particular. It should be an instrument of 
development and improvement rather than an ‘end-game treaty’,132 which 
froze the state of affairs that existed 50 years ago. Moreover, the generality and 
breadth of the Covenant’s terms as well as their non-reciprocal nature (in that 
they reflect obligations vis-à-vis individuals, not states inter partes) 
presupposes their interpretation in light of the present-day international 
consensus on their meaning and scope. The constitutional rationale bolsters 
these considerations. As has been previously posited, global constitutionalism 
is a species of new liberalism. Unlike classical international law being 
essentially reactive in nature and reflecting no common interest beyond the 
sum of interests of individual states, constitutionalisation of international law 
assumes the existence of common values embodied in the constitutional 
principles of the rule of law, human rights and democracy, which provide for a 
                                               
[1978] ICJ Rep 3, para 77 (Evolutive interpretation was again applied to the formula ‘territorial 
status’); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Merits) 
[2009] ICJ Rep 213, para 66 (‘[W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties 
necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and 
where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is “of continuing duration”, the 
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving 
meaning’). 
130 Judge v Canada (1988) 8 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 85, para 10.3 
131 Sarma v Sri Lanka (2003) 8 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 210, para 
9.3; Sharma v Nepal Comm no 1469/2006 (6 November 2008) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006, para 7.4; Maodoui v Algeria Comm no 1495/2006 (1 December 
2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1495/2006, para 7.2. 
132 Jared Wessel, ‘Relational Contract Theory and Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v 
Dynamic Interpretation’ (2004) 60 Ann Surv Am L 149, 149. 
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new source of legitimacy of international law (with the old ones being 
voluntarism and formalism). Such value-embeddedness of international law 
allows questioning existing legal norms that do not seem to fit into the value 
system any longer.133 In this sense, the value approach presupposes 
interpretation of established rules in light of the aforementioned global 
constitutional principles, which states themselves recognised in a wide 
plurality of modern-day instruments, hard and soft. Such widely endorsed 
array of principles forms the basis for international consensus on issues that 
the international community finds essential for its existence and proper 
functioning. It is, thus, tempting to suggest that the principle of evolutive 
interpretation is a constitutional principle to the extent that it accounts for 
developments animating the formation of international consensus, 
independently of the intentions of individual states. Another constitutional 
feature of the evolutionary approach to interpretation is its unifying role: it 
unites various bodies of international law into coherent paradigm. And unity 
constitutes one of modi operandi of global constitutionalism.134 Because 
regional human rights systems exemplify strong evolutionary trends in their 
interpretative techniques, it seems fair to suggest that interpretation of the 
ICCPR should accommodate those techniques to secure a unified approach to 
treaty interpretation in the field of human rights. The term ‘should’ in this 
connection does not indicate any de lege ferenda nature of the argument. It 
merely describes the unfortunate fact that the HRC and other subjects of 
interpretative community fail to fully employ the array of interpretative 
possibilities envisaged in the VCLT. This merits a closer inspection. 
Evolutive interpretation envisages that terms of a treaty evolve by virtue 
of a changing context in which they operate, by virtue of treaty’s object and 
purpose and other developments, such as subsequent agreements, practice and 
overall legal framework. As to the latter, article 31(3)(c) (interpretation of 
treaties against the backdrop of general international law) is of a particular 
importance. It provides that ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties’ shall be taken into account in the 
interpretation of a treaty. That said, the central objective of the article is to 
ensure that a treaty is not interpreted in a vacuum but is considered as a part of 
a wider legal system. In other words, a treaty must be interpreted and applied 
in view of its relationship with its normative environment. 
In fact, evolutive approach to interpretation serves as a nexus between 
article 31(3)(c) and article 31(1) VCLT (general rule of interpretation). Until 
very recently, article 31(3)(c) fell into such a disdain that, as Sands put it, it has 
‘been expressly relied upon only very occasionally in judicial practice’, and 
had ‘attracted little academic comment’.135 However, a renewed interest in this 
                                               
133 Thomas Kleinlein, ‘Between Myths and Norms: Constructivist Constitutionalism and the 
Potential of Constitutional Principles in International Law’ (2012) 81 Nord J Int’l L 79, 89. 
134 Surenda Bhandari, Global Constitutionalism and the Path of International Law (Brill Nijhoff 
2016) 24. 
135 Philippe Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’ (1998) 1 
Yale HR & Dev LJ 85, 95. Likewise, French noted that ‘as a feature of treaty interpretation it 
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article spearheaded by the ICJ in Oil Platforms136 and followed by other 
international tribunals as well as legal commentators137 and ultimately by the 
ILC itself138 succinctly illustrates the transformation of international law from 
a horizontal, sovereignty-based system to a ‘comprehensive blueprint for 
social life’.139 As some scholars contend, the very fact that ‘[t]his is the first 
time that the Court [in Oil Platforms] has expressly used this rule of 
interpretation’, indicates that it ‘must be assessed as an action in favour of the 
unity of the international legal system’140 and, hence, speaks for the 
constitutionalisation of international law. It is thus possible to assume that 
article 31(3)(c) expresses a fundamental constitutional principle of treaty 
interpretation, namely that of systemic integration,141 which can be said to 
constitute a subspecies of the principle of teleological interpretation in general 
and the principle of evolutive interpretation in particular. The ILC defined the 
principle of systemic integration as ‘a guideline according to which treaties 
should be interpreted against the background of all the rules and principles of 
international law – in other words, international law understood as a system’.142 
                                               
has long since been marginalized and ignored’. Duncan French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the 
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 281, 300. 
136 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) 
(Merits) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, para 41 (‘[U]nder the general rules of treaty interpretation, as 
reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, interpretation must take into 
account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” 
(Art. 31, para. 3 (c))’). 
137 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279; Anja Lindroos and Michael Mehling, ‘Dispelling the 
Chimera of “Self-Contained Regimes”: International Law and the WTO’ (2005) 16 EJIL 857; 
Alan Boyle, ‘Further Development of the Law of the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change’ 
(2005) 54 ICLQ 563; WTO, European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products – Reports of the Panel (29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R; Ben McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law or 
“Systemic Integration” of Treaty Regimes: EC-Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation 
of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (2008) 42 JWT 589; 
Philippe Sands and Jeffery Commission, ‘Treaty, Custom and Time: 
Interpretation/Application?’ in Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), 
Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2010) 41ff; Panos Merkorious, Article 31(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration (Queen Mary Studies in International Law) (Brill/Nijhoff 2015). 
138 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May 
- 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 2006) UN Doc A/61/10, 413-16; ILC, ‘Report of the Study 
Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law’ (29 July 2005) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.676. 
139 Christian Tomuschat, ‘International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a 
New Century’ (1999) 281 RCADI 21, 63. 
140 Natalia Ochoa-Ruiz and Esther Salamanca-Aguado, ‘Exploring the Limits of International 
Law Relating to the Use of Force in Self-Defence’ (2005) 16 EJIL 499, 509. 
141 See Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279, 280. 
142 ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising 
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (29 July 2005) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/L.676, 27 (original emphasis). 
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Similarly, the ECtHR summarised the theory of systemic integration as 
follows: 
 
[T]he Convention has to be interpreted in the light of the rules set out in the 
Vienna Convention […] and […] Article 31 § 3 (c) […] indicates that account 
is to be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. The Convention […] cannot be interpreted in 
a vacuum. The Court must be mindful of the Convention’s special character 
as a human rights treaty, and it must also take the relevant rules of 
international law into account […] The Convention should so far as possible 
be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part […]. 143 
 
The question that comes next is what exactly is meant by ‘rules of international 
law’ and whether the other applicable international law is that in force at the 
time the treaty was framed or at the time when the treaty is applied. With regard 
to the latter, since the textual analysis of article 31(3)(c) reveals that the sub-
paragraph in question does not contain temporal provision, it is possible to 
argue that any rule of international law is potentially applicable irrespective of 
the time of its conclusion.144 This is indeed what the ILC called ‘inter-
temporality’: meaning of a treaty provision may be affected by subsequent 
developments in, inter alia, customary law and general principles of law.145 
Moreover, article 31(3)(c) is located in the same subparagraph as articles 
31(3)(a) and 31(3)(b), both being of evolutionary character by virtue of their 
qualifier ‘subsequent’. Ultimately, the general requirement to interpret treaty 
in good faith may require evolutionary approach. It can thus be logically 
coherent to suggest that also any subsequent rule of international law is 
potentially applicable.146 
Turning back to the first question, namely what are the rules of 
international law for the purposes of article 31(3)(c) VCLT, McLachlan 
observes that the formulation ‘rules of international law’ may refer to all the 
sources of international law, including other treaties, custom and general 
                                               
143 Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom (GC) ECHR 2001-XI 761, para 55. See also Fogarty v the 
United Kingdom ECHR 2001-XI 762, para 35; McElhinney v Ireland ECHR 2001-XI 763, para 
36. 
144 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279, 291. This position is now dominant in contemporary 
literature. See eg Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties (Springer 2010) 178. 
145 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May 
- 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 2006) UN Doc A/61/10, para 22. See also Erik Bjorge, The 
Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (OUP 2014) ch 4. 
146 Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘Evolutive Interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’ 
(2013) 6 Eur J Leg Stud 127, 147. But see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human 
Rights Treaties’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights 
Law (OUP 2013) 765 (Claiming that article 31(3)(c) ‘allows reference only to provisions which 
are binding on the parties to a particular dispute […] On this basis, reference to […] the 
provisions of treaties that are not yet in force, would be deemed to fall outside the provisions of 
Article 31(3)(c)’). 
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principles.147 Illustratively, in as early as 1975, the ECtHR identified ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ as relevant to the 
interpretation of the term ‘civil rights’ in article 6 ECHR: 
 
Article 31 para. 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention indicates that account is to be 
taken, together with the context, of ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’. Among those rules are general 
principles of law and especially ‘general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations’ (Article 38 para. 1(c) of the Statue of the International Court 
of Justice) […] 
The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a 
judge ranks as one of the universally ‘recognized’ fundamental principles of 
law; the same is true of the principle of international law which forbids the 
denial of justice. Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) must be read in the light of these 
principles.148 
 
McLachlan notes, however, that the reference must be to rules of law, to the 
exclusion of broader principles or considerations.149 It follows that soft law 
seems to automatically fall out of the definition. Be that as it may, since the 
doctrine of evolutive interpretation is conceptually independent from article 
31(3)(c), ‘the range of relevant arguments to determine the evolution of an 
evolving term will often be much broader than just the “rules of international 
law” that article 31(3)(c) mentions’.150 It means that rules that are not formally 
binding can also affect dynamics of the interpretation. This is evidenced by the 
practice of the ECtHR, which has referred to non-binding instruments of the 
CoE,151 UNGA resolutions,152 UNSC resolutions,153 guidelines and 
conclusions published by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees154 and the 
                                               
147 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279, 290; ILC, ‘Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its 58th Session’ (1 May - 9 June and 3 July - 11 August 2006) UN 
Doc A/61/10, para 18 (‘Article 31(3)(c) deals with the case where material sources external to 
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of Treaties (Springer 2010) 177-78. 
148 Older v the United Kingdom (1975) Series A no 18, para 35. See also Vassilis P Tzevelekos, 
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149 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the 
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Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 765. 
150 Sondre Torp Helmersen, ‘Evolutive Interpretation: Legality, Semantics and Distinctions’ 
(2013) 6 Eur J Leg Stud 127, 147. 
151 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (2008) 48 EHRR 1345, paras 74-75. 
152 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (GC) ECHR 2001-XI 761, para 60. 
153 Loizidou v Turkey ECHR 1996-VI 2231, para 44. 
154 Saadi v United Kingdom App no 13229/03 (ECtHR (GC) 29 January 2008) para 65. 
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(then) non-binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights155 for the purpose of 
interpreting the ECHR. As the Court explained, ‘it is not necessary for the 
respondent State to have ratified the entire collection of instruments that are 
applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case concerned.’ It 
further maintained that ‘[i]t will be sufficient for the Court that the relevant 
international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms and 
principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority 
of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that 
there is common ground in modern societies’.156 Similarly, the ECJ invoked 
the ILC Articles on State Responsibility to facilitate the interpretation of the 
Montreal Convention.157 In the same vein, the IACtHR cited several reports, 
recommendations and other soft law instruments to prove that there was an 
‘international tendency’ to avoid the recruitment of child soldiers.158 On the 
other hand, soft law can be considered ‘practice’ in terms of article 31(3)(b) 
VCLT, particularly in light of changes within the doctrine of customary 
international law whereby verbal state practice can in itself form custom.159 In 
conclusion, evolutive interpretation of treaties implies that apart from the treaty 
text to be interpreted against the backdrop of the treaty’s object and purpose 
and overall context, a recourse is to be made to general international law 
ranging from hard rules to softer commitments existing at the moment of the 
treaty application. 
That said, article 31(3)(c) provides a solid legal ground for cross-
fertilisation between various human rights systems and regimes. In other 
words, regional interpretative practices can, and in fact should, be utilised to 
ensure that the rights enlisted in the ICCPR are guaranteed the most effective 
protection. The ECtHR has developed the most sophisticated conceptual tools 
and techniques to ensure that human rights provided in the ECHR are ‘practical 
and effective, not ‘theoretical and illusory’. These include, inter alia, the status 
as ‘living instrument’ of the human rights conventions generally and the ECHR 
in particular and the principle of ‘common values’ or ‘commonly accepted 
standards’. In Tyrer v United Kingdom, the Court submitted that because the 
ECHR is a living instrument and must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions, ‘the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments and 
commonly accepted standards […]’.160 Likewise, in Scoppola v Italy, the Court 
affirmed that ‘[s]ince the Convention is first and foremost a system for the 
protection of human rights, the Court must […] have regard to the changing 
conditions […] and […] to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be 
                                               
155 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (GC) ECHR 2002-VI, para 100; Sorensen and 
Rasmussen v Denmark (GC) ECHR 2006-I, para 72; Eskelinen et al v Finland App no 63235/00 
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achieved’.161 It further stated that ‘[i]t is of crucial importance that the 
Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights 
practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to 
maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering it a bar to 
reform or improvement’.162 There is now a rich case law in which the ECtHR 
makes use of these techniques.163 
The jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court evidences a similar 
approach, or what the Court designates ‘pro homine’ approach — a technique 
that calls for reading guarantees and limitations in favour of the individual.164 
In its advisory opinion on Interpretation of the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of Article 64 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the IACtHR asserted that human rights law 
cannot be rendered static through reliance on the original intent of the 
drafters.165 In the Mapiripan Massacre case, the Court explicitly referred to the 
case law of the ECtHR and held that ‘human rights treaties are live instruments, 
whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and current 
living conditions’.166 The Court submitted that such interpretation is consistent 
with the VCLT.167 
Whilst the concept of dynamic interpretation of treaties does not feature in 
the case law of the UN human rights bodies as distinctively as in regional 
human rights systems, there is, nonetheless, a trend to rely on the concepts of 
‘living instrument’ and an emerging consensus of an ‘increasing number of 
states’ to interpret human rights provisions according to contemporary 
standards.168 Illustratively, in Judge v Canada, the HRC submitted that the 
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ICCPR ‘should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected 
under it should be applied in context and in the light of present-day 
conditions’.169 In Choi and Yoon v Republic of Korea, the Committee, in order 
to justify the right to conscientious objection under article 18 ICCPR, relied on 
‘relevant’ and ‘common’ practice of ‘an increasing number of states’ that have 
introduced alternative service.170 Moreover, the Committee has been eager to 
refer to other international instruments, such as the UDHR, the CEDAW, the 
CERD, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons against Enforced 
Disappearances, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the 
standards set by the ILO, to interpret a particular ICCPR right.171 This 
notwithstanding, it has generally refrained from quoting either the ECtHR or 
other regional human rights tribunals. 
Noteworthy, some scholars have asserted that human rights adjudicative 
bodies do not follow the interpretative rules of the VCLT and should, thus, be 
dismissed as illegitimate. However, a consensus is emerging that these 
expansive interpretative approaches do in fact follow the rules of interpretation 
prescribed by the VCLT.172 In effect, they can be viewed as a sophisticated 
version of the general international law’s principle of systemic integration 
specifically designed for the human rights context. Moreover, human rights 
adjudicative bodies are moving towards a largely similar methodology in 
interpreting human rights treaties, in particular through their references to 
various widely-endorsed international documents containing human rights 
                                               
7.3. See also CEDAW ‘General Recommendation No 25: Temporary Special Measures’ (2004) 
UN Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.7, 282, para 3. 
169 Judge v Canada (1988) 8 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 85, para 10.3. 
170 Choi and Yoon v Republic of Korea (2007) 9 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 218, para 8.4. See also Jung et al v Republic of Korea Comm nos 1593-1603/2007 
(23 March 2010) UN Docs CCPR/C/98/D/1593–1603/2007, para 7.2. 
171 SWM Brooks v The Netherlands Comm no 172/1984 (9 April 1987) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, para 12.3; Danning v the Netherlands Comm no 180/1984 (9 April 
1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2, para 12.3; Zwaan-De-Vries v The Netherlands (1984) 2 Selected 
Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 209, para 12.1; Love et al v Australia (2001) 8 
Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 232, para 8.2; Sarma v Sri Lanka (2003) 8 
Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 210, para 9.3; Boucherf v Algeria Comm 
no 1196/2003 (30 March 2006) UN Doc CCPR/C/86/D/1196/2003, para 9.2; Sharma v Nepal 
Comm no 1469/2006 (6 November 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1469/2006, para 7.4; Maodoui 
v Algeria Comm no 1495/2006 (1 December 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1495/2006, para 7.2. 
172 See eg Daniel Rietiker, ‘The Principle of “Effectiveness” in the Recent Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights: Its Different Dimensions and Its Consistency with Public 
International Law — No Need for the Concept of Treaty Sui Generis’ (2010) 79 Nord J Int’l L 
245, 276; Lucas Lixinski, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of International Law’ (2010) 21 EJIL 585, 603-04; 
George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretative Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 
21 EJIL 509, 532; Birgit Schlutter, ‘Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the UN Treaty 
Bodies’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and 
Legitimacy (CUP 2012) 317; Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’ 
in Dinah Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 
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provisions, such as the UN Charter and the UDHR173 as well as international 
conventions that have not yet become accepted by all states of the international 
community. It follows that reliance by the HRC on the interpretative 
techniques developed by regional human rights tribunals is not only fully in 
obedience to the VCLT and in line with general international practice but is 
also an essential condition of its authority and legitimacy. 
It is not an easy task to determine, with even a partial degree of certainty, 
how evolutive interpretation of article 25 ICCPR would look like. Although 
the HRC recognised the pertinence of the concept of ‘living instrument’ to the 
Covenant’s provisions, it considered that evolutionary interpretation is 
applicable in exceptional circumstances involving the most fundamental 
rights, such as the right to life, and ‘in particular if there have been notable 
factual and legal developments and changes in international opinion in respect 
of the issue raised [death penalty in the present case]’.174 Whether the right to 
democracy inscribed in article 25 ICCPR is of such a fundamental nature is 
open to discussion. Moreover, the limits of evolutive interpretation have also 
been underscored by the ECtHR, who made clear that albeit the ECHR must 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions, ‘the Court cannot, by 
means of an evolutive interpretation, derive from these instruments a right that 
was not included therein at the outset. This is particularly so here, where the 
omission was deliberate’.175 Because the ICCPR was adopted during the Cold 
War, when the exact content of the notion of democracy was highly contested 
by bipolar powers, it is possible to claim that the term ‘democracy’ was 
deliberately omitted from article 25 to make sure that both one-party regimes 
and representative democracies were regarded as compatible with the 
Covenant. To claim that present-day conditions require the article to be 
interpreted as solely permitting liberal democracies is to bring to naught the 
original intent of the drafters. 
Wrongly or rightly, reading the article in the light of modern ‘commonly 
accepted standards’, when such central concepts as ‘genuine elections’ and 
‘free expression of the will of the electors’ have evolved to include, among 
others, genuine choice, level playing field, independent monitoring of the 
electoral process, full realisation of the freedom of speech, assembly and 
association, independent judicial review and political pluralism in general,176 
                                               
173 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’ in Dinah Shelton (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 769-70. See also Simon 
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is inconceivable with the parallel assertion of the compatibility of one-party 
politics with the Covenant, since to claim otherwise is to rob article 25 of its 
meaning. It follows that whilst the right to democracy is not explicitly 
mentioned in the ICCPR, including its article 25, it is implied therein, or should 
be implied, to assure that article 25 serves its purpose. Such line of reasoning 
is discernible in the practice of the ECtHR, which in the Golder case read into 
the Convention the right of access to court, right not expressly envisaged 
therein, in order to ensure that the expressly-guaranteed rights (particularly the 
right to a fair trial) are effective.177 Similarly, the principle of effectiveness has 
been used as a foundation for the development of other positive obligations 
under the ECHR to ensure the effectiveness of, inter alia, access to judicial 
remedies,178 the right to legal assistances in criminal proceedings,179 protection 
from disruptions caused by demonstrations and threats,180 and securing proper 
investigation of crimes.181 
By the same token, the African Commission in SERAC v Nigeria stated 
that, although the African Charter does not expressly guarantee the right to 
housing or the right to food, the combination of articles 14, 16 and 18(1) 
providing for the right to property, the right to health and the right to family 
protection respectively, forbids the wanton destruction of shelter or food 
supplies. Thus, the combined effect of the aforementioned articles ‘reads into 
the Charter a right to shelter or housing […]’.182 Remarkably, the 
unenumerated-right approach (reading into the convention a right not expressly 
envisaged therein to secure effectiveness of an enumerated right) has been also 
endorsed by the HRC, who in its General Comment 22 observed that even 
though ‘[t]he Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscientious 
objection [the right to refuse to perform military service] [...] the Committee 
believes that such a right can be derived from article 18, inasmuch as the 
obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the freedom of 
conscience and the right to manifest one’s religion or belief’.183 Owing to this 
                                               
and Fair Elections (26 March 1994) <http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm> accessed 29 
August 2016. 
177 Case of Golder v United Kingdom App no 4451/70 (ECtHR, 21 February 1975) para 36. 
178 Airey v Ireland (1979) Series A no 32. 
179 Artico v Italy (1980) Series A no 37. 
180 Ozgur Gundem v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 1082. 
181 McCann and others v United Kingdom (1996) Series A no 324. 
182 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 
2001) para 60. 
183 UNHRC ‘General Comment No 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or 
Religion)’ (1993) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 11. See also Westerman v The 
Netherlands Comm no 682/1996 (3 November 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/67/D/682/1996, para 
9.3 (‘[T]he Committee in its General Comment has expressed the view that the right to 
conscientious objection to military service can be derived from article 18’); Choi and Yoon v 
Republic of Korea (2007) 9 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 218, para 8.3 
(‘[W]hile the right to manifest one’s protected form of manifestation of religious beliefs does 
not as such imply the right to refuse all obligations imposed by law, it provides certain 
protection, consistent with article 18, paragraph 3 against being forced to act against genuinely-
held religious belief’). 
The Right to Democracy in the Constitutionalising International Law 
 
 
116 
logic, it is clear that evolutive approach renders interpretation pursuant to the 
travaux preparatoires under article 32 VCLT less important if such 
interpretation obliterates the effective protection of the right in question. 
International consensus, either ‘emerging’ or already existing, plays a 
prominent role in assessing and reinforcing such expansive interpretation. 
Ultimately, one of the fundamental conditions of the principle of 
effectiveness is coherence.184 This means that the ICCPR must be interpreted 
in such a way as to promote both internal consistency between its various 
provisions as well as external consistency with general international law. This 
is reflected in the VCLT which states that ‘the context for the purpose of 
interpretation of a treaty’ comprises text, preamble and annexes (principle of 
‘internal coherence’)185 as well as posits that together with the context, the 
recourse is to be made to ‘any relevant rules of international law’ (principle of 
systemic integration).186 The principle of internal coherence animates the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence as the Court frequently refers to other Convention 
rights and freedoms as an inspiration for interpreting provisions lacking clarity. 
One of the most obvious examples is article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (P1-
3) providing for the right to free elections. Since the textual formulation of the 
right is rather plain and unassertive, the Court in its jurisprudence made 
reference to other rights and freedoms under the ECHR to give the provision 
effect utile. As a result, the generic wording of P1-3 is now to be interpreted as 
recognising individual rights to vote and stand for election.187 Moreover, the 
Court asserted that P1-3 taken in conjunction with other relevant provisions of 
the Convention, such as, for example, article 10 (freedom of expression) and 
11 (freedom of association), implies democratic institutions.188 In the context 
of the ICCPR, this would mean that article 25 should be interpreted in liaison 
with other ICCPR articles to maintain coherence and harmony of the 
Covenant’s text. This was also recognised by the ILC (albeit in the context of 
the compatibility of reservations with treaty’s object and purpose), which 
opined that ‘account shall be taken of the indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness of the rights set out in the treaty […]’.189 Because the utmost 
protection of such fundamental rights and freedoms as the freedom of 
expression, assembly and association, prohibition of discrimination and the 
right to self-determination is only conceivable in plural and tolerant society, 
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which came to be synonymous with ‘democratic society’, reading article 25 
against the backdrop of the Covenant’s overall text assumes democratic form 
of government. 
Turning to the principle of systemic integration, or what Rietiker called 
‘the principle of “external coherence”’,190 since the principle has been 
thoroughly examined above, it suffices to note here that taking into account the 
surrounding legal framework is not only an option that Court may or may not 
avail itself of, but a legal obligation, whose violation may contribute to the 
fragmentation of international law and, thus, constitute an ultra vires act. Judge 
Ziemele made this point starkly in her dissenting opinion in Andrejeva v 
Latvia: 
 
[T]he Court cannot always avoid taking a position on complex matters and 
instead deal with issues in a narrow and isolated manner. The Court must not 
go against the general rule of interpretation as set forth in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and thus act ultra vires. In international 
law this raises a somewhat new challenge as concerns the value of such 
judicial decisions. The Court should not contribute to the fragmentation of 
international law in the name of alleged human rights, nor should it readily 
take decisions that may undermine State-building since the enforcement of 
human rights still requires strong and democratic State institutions […].191 
 
The obligatory consulting of other relevant rules of international law has been 
also recognised by the ECtHR in Demir and Baykara v Turkey, in which the 
Court clearly stated that article 31(3)(c) VCLT constitutes a legally binding 
obligation: ‘The Court […] can and must take into account elements of 
international law other than the Convention’.192 Since it has been established 
that ‘relevant rules of international law’ encompass all sources of international 
law, such as treaties, custom and general principles as well as soft instruments 
existing at the time of treaty application, these must be taken into account in 
the interpretation of treaty provisions, including article 25 ICCPR. Whilst the 
above-examined interpretative techniques by regional human rights tribunals 
have significantly assisted in delineating the scope and limits of the 
evolutionary interpretation of article 25 ICCPR, drawing support from other 
rules of international law in outlining and reinforcing legal underpinnings of 
the right to democracy is essential for the latter’s normative sustainability and 
legitimacy. In what follows, it will be examined whether international law 
contains any customary rule or general principle weighing in favour of 
democratic entitlement. Further, the legal significance of soft law instruments 
shall be revisited, if not on their own, then as supplementary indicators of 
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states’ evolving understanding with respect to the provisions of the Covenant. 
Shall the inquiry result in affirmative, one may confidently claim that the 
prevailing interpretation of article 25 as a right to a mere genuine electoral 
process, without repercussions for the form of government at large, is in 
violation of article 31(3)(c) VCLT given its failure to take cognisance of an 
overall legal framework. 
 
4.2. Democracy in Customary International Law 
 
4.2.1. Traditional Custom 
 
More and more states in the international community are democratic and 
establish appropriate monitoring mechanisms to ensure that norms on free and 
periodic elections as well as the right to effectively participate in the political 
life of one’s country are complied with. Against this backdrop, it is relevant to 
speculate whether oral commitments to establish and maintain democratic 
form of government and relevant state practice can be viewed as creating a 
customary norm of international law imposing obligation on states to commit 
themselves to introducing and protecting democracy. 
Classical legal doctrine defines customary international law as a consistent 
practice among states that endures over a certain period of time and is viewed 
by states as legally mandated (a belief of being legally bound is commonly 
referred to as opinio juris, a shortened expression for opinio juris sive 
necessitates).193 The North Sea Continental Shelf case serves as a locus 
classicus of this approach to custom: 
 
[N]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis.194 
 
A newly established customary norm is binding for all unless state opts out as 
a ‘persistent objector’. In other words, a state that persistently objects to a 
newly emerging norm of customary international law during the formation of 
that norm is exempt from the norm once it crystallises into law. Needles to 
mention, this orthodox scheme succinctly reflects the consensual nature of the 
Westphalian state-centred order because any norm of international law can 
only bind a state that has consented to be bound by it. Since it is more difficult 
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to establish the existence of opinio juris, it comes with no surprise that 
traditional doctrine attaches greater weight to state practice, which is now 
understood to consist of physical acts of individual states as well as statements 
and inaction.195 These acts can acquire a variety of forms, including 
 
[D]iplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the opinions 
of government legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions (eg manuals 
of military law), executive decisions and practices, orders to military forces 
(eg rules of engagement), comments by governments on ILC drafts and 
corresponding commentaries, legislation, international and national judicial 
decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments (especially 
when in ‘all States’ form), an extensive pattern of treaties in the same terms, 
the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal 
questions in UN organs, notably the General Assembly.196 
 
Nowadays, the predominant part of inter-state cooperation occurs through 
international organisations, including in the area of democracy promotion. The 
UN engagement in the election (including plebiscites and referenda) 
monitoring missions since the 1950s is a good example of this form of state 
practice. Albeit its first missions were largely about the realisation of the right 
to self-determination of the inhabitants of trust and non-self-governing 
territories (the first one taking place in 1956 in British Togoland, the last one 
— in 1992 in Palau), they gradually evolved into large-scale election 
monitoring missions in sovereign countries in transition to democracy. The 
most prominent examples of such ‘second-generation’ operations include 
Namibia (previously South West Africa), Nicaragua (ONUVEN), Haiti 
(ONUVEH), Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique. The main 
objective of these missions was to ensure the transition to democracy from one 
or another form of authoritarian rule.197 In 1990, the UNGA established the 
Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) in order to assist states in 
maintaining and strengthening their political institutions and democratic 
processes. The UPD holds observer missions and provides technical assistance 
to legislatures and electoral institutions. In 1992, the Electoral Assistance 
Division was created with the aim to serve as the focal point for electoral 
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matters.198 The main objectives of the electoral assistance are to ensure that 
elections are organised according to internationally recognised criteria 
established in international and regional human rights instruments and to assist 
states in building their institutional capacity in order to effectuate subsequent 
free and fair electoral campaign. 
The monitoring of elections has also been taken up by regional 
organisations, including the OAS, the Commonwealth and the CoE as well as 
NGOs, such as the US National Endowment for Democracy, the Council of 
Freely Elected Heads of Government, the International Human Rights Law 
Group, the International Federation of Human Rights, Freedom House, the 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems and many others.199 Whereas 
the OAS has been especially active in monitoring elections in fragile 
democracies of Latin America, such as, e.g., Surinam, El Salvador, Paraguay, 
Panama and Peru, the Commonwealth has committed itself to supporting 
former British colonies in their transition to democracy and has been 
particularly active in Africa, Asia, British Guiana and Gibraltar. In Europe, the 
leading role of democracy promotion has been taken by the CoE, which since 
its creation in 1949 has assumed both advisory and operational roles in the field 
of democracy-building and monitoring by, among others, aiding in defeating 
fascist-nazi and Marxism-Leninism ideologies and subsequently by observing 
national elections in Central and Eastern Europe.200 Ultimately, NGOs have 
monitored elections in dozens of countries. Their independent status has 
allowed them to intervene more rapidly, to be more outspoken and, if needed, 
more critical than inter-governmental organisations and government 
representatives.201 It is essential to note that host states turned out to be very 
cooperative throughout observer missions and the number of requests for 
election monitoring has steadily increased. Furthermore, because the election 
standards mirror the text of human rights instruments and pronouncements of 
the Human Rights Committee and other human rights bodies, the standards can 
be regarded as evidence of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the treaty terms 
concerning democratic participation.202 It may also be argued that election 
monitoring missions constitute ‘subsequent practice’ for the purposes of 
interpretation of human rights treaties, including article 25 ICCPR.203 
Moreover, there seem to be no persistent objections to such objective criteria 
of evaluation of compliance with human rights provisions, as the occasional 
resistance to monitoring missions does not emanate from ideological 
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opposition to the validity of criteria used, but rather from the fear of being 
constrained in the attempts to rig the election results. 
Whether holding of, and participation in, election monitoring missions 
qualifies as state practice occasioning the emergence of a customary norm to 
install and maintain democratic form of government is still unclear. First, this 
practice solely displays the commitment to secure the right to free and fair 
elections, with the right to democracy assuming much broader dimensions. 
Second, election monitoring is only widespread in the Western hemisphere to 
the exclusion of the big parts of Asia. Third, it is too premature to claim that 
states view these observer practices as legally mandatory. The practice of 
election monitoring is perceived more as an exception designed to end civil 
war or regional conflict and/or to increase political legitimacy following 
turbulent domestic political climate and less as a manifestation of an adherence 
to the universal right to democracy. Forth, the relationship between monitoring 
practice and human rights instruments is rather theoretical than formal since 
article 25-based participatory rights have not explicitly formed the basis for 
any monitoring mission and the mission reports do not directly cite human 
rights instruments. On top of that, no regional or global human rights treaty 
provides for election monitoring as an enforcement mechanism.204  
Another example of state practice relevant for the ascertainment of the 
existence of a customary norm obligating states to be democratic is 
membership conditionality in the statutes of a number of regional 
organisations, including the European Union (EU), OAS, African Union (AU), 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO), CoE, OSCE and others, which commit themselves, at 
least formally, to the principle of democracy. The cases of rejection of 
membership rights to undemocratic states or their restriction serves as a vital 
constituent part of the pro-democratic argument.205 To illustrate, membership 
in NATO is preconditioned by the commitment to democracy. Whilst the text 
of the North Atlantic Treaty does not include democracy as a membership 
requirement,206 the material conditions of membership were elaborated in the 
Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995, which holds that in order to become a 
member of the Organisation, willing states must demonstrate that they have ‘a 
functioning democratic political system based on a market economy’.207 
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One can also mention democratic conditionality in development policies 
as well as state creation and recognition practices as relevant instances of state 
material practice for the purposes of ascertainment of the objective element of 
the customary democratic norm. As to the former, in the course of the last 
decades, most major donors practiced democratic conditionality in the delivery 
of development assistance programs, with the case of the EU being of 
particular interest given its rigorous approach and the language of legal 
obligations.208 In short, the EU adopted a policy of including human rights and 
democracy clauses into its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements with 
third countries. More recent documents reveal that serious and persistent 
breaches of human rights as well as democratic interruptions are regarded as 
material breaches, as the term is understood in article 60 VCLT, which, in turn, 
enable the EU to suspend compliance with its treaty obligations.209 On a global 
scale, the practice of international financial organisations is worth a mention. 
Since the 1990s, the countries can only obtain financial support from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank provided that they 
‘govern well’. Traditionally, ‘good governance’ was defined by reference to 
sound macro-economic performance. However, it became soon clear that 
economic development and the rule of law go hand in hand. As a result, both 
the IMF and the World Bank supplemented their lending requirements with 
political conditions, such as respect for human rights and democratic 
governance.210 
The practice of creation of new states has also been marked by the 
‘democratic bias’. Entities that attained statehood in the last decades with the 
support or the involvement of the international community have been impelled 
to introduce democratic institutions. Similarly, most cases of the international 
administrations of territory culminated in the creation of democratic states, the 
most prominent examples being East Timor (UNTAET) and Kosovo 
(UNMIK), albeit the latter’s status as state is not yet finally resolved.211 Other 
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examples where the UN invoked its Chapter VII powers to reconstruct post-
conflict societies along democratic lines include, among others, the UN 
Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed in Namibia and UN’s 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).212 Further, democratisation has 
not left the practices of recognition of new states and governments untouched 
either. The case of the Yugoslav crisis is the most cited example. To make a 
long story short, following the Yugoslav war, the EC Member States 
established the Arbitration Commission (or the Banditer Commission) and 
passed two documents outlining recognition policy in relation to the new states 
that emerged in the territory of the SFRY (and the Soviet Union): the EC 
Guidelines213 and the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia.214 Pursuant to the EC 
Guidelines, states must ‘have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, 
have accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed 
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations’.215 Whilst 
the document does not spell out in any more detail what is meant by 
‘democratic’, it contains a direct reference to the Charter of Paris, which 
stipulates that ‘[d]emocratic government is based on the will of the people, 
expressed regularly through free and fair elections’. It further states that 
‘[d]emocracy has as its foundation respect for the human person and the rule 
of law. Democracy is the best safeguard of freedom of expression of all groups 
of society, and equality of opportunity for each person’.216 The EC Declaration 
supplemented the EC Guidelines with requirements specifically addressed to 
the Yugoslav situation. 
Last but not least, the recent SC-endorsed practice of the enforcement 
action against ‘rogue’ and ‘failed’ states aimed at forcible imposition of 
democratic institutions too speaks in favour of maturing of a democratic 
customary norm.217 The most cited cases of forcible democracy defence and 
democracy-building under the aegis of the SC include Haiti (1994), Sierra 
Leone (1997), Kosovo (1999) and Libya (2011). As one prominent scholar 
pointedly observed ‘[l]es États non démocratique ne semblent plus pouvoir se 
“réfugier” derrière la règle de non-intervention dans les affaires intérieures 
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quand l’objet de l’intervention est […] la démocratisation de leur régime’.218 
While the practice of adopting forcible measures against non-democracies is 
far from consistent and is at loggerheads with the principles of sovereignty and 
non-intervention, it can find psychological support in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, which is now 
commonly recognised as customary international law. The Declaration 
explicitly makes the territorial integrity of a state contingent on its possession 
of a representative government: 
 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.219 
 
Thus, whilst the preceding analysis makes clear that the democracy promotion 
agenda is certainly discernible in the practice of states, either on their own or 
through the venues of international organisations, there is no consensus yet 
within international scholarly circles whether this practice is consistent and 
durable enough to result in the establishment of a customary norm of 
democracy. There are several points to consider. First, it is not clear whether 
state actions in support of democracy have been accompanied by a belief that 
they were following a legal norm (opinio juris). Second, if the right to 
democracy crystallised into the norm of customary international law, then the 
violation of the norm in question (non-application of democratic governance 
or democratic disruption) would be seen as a violation of international law and 
engage state responsibility. This is certainly not the case.220 The reality is that 
very often there appears to be a consistent state practice of violating the 
democratic entitlement. This is mostly visible in the rise of the modern semi-
authoritarian regimes, rhetorically committed to democracy and in reality 
exempting their citizens from a real access to the political processes of 
decision-making, not to mention the hard-core authoritarian states as China 
and North Korea. Third, powerful states demonstrating no commitment to 
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democracy whatsoever face no serious objection on the part of the international 
community.221 Forth, the doctrine of pro-democratic intervention is not 
supported by consistent state practice and remains a controversial issue in 
international law.222 Finally, the scope of the democratic norm, that is whether 
democracy is synonymous with elections or whether it includes certain 
substantive virtues, is not evident from state practice. It follows that under the 
traditional approach to custom, democracy does not seem to reach the level of 
a customary norm. 
 
4.2.2. Modern Custom 
 
As constitutionalisation of international law envisages a shift of focus from 
individual state will to global consensus, it comes as no surprise that the 
traditional definition of custom comes under ever more strain. More pointedly 
put, state will still remains an important formative and validating element of 
international lawmaking. However, the process of identification of such will 
increasingly relies on the latter’s accordance with international consensus 
embodied in a set of fundamental constitutional principles, to which the state 
in question has previously consented, either explicitly or implicitly. A novel 
definition of customary international law advocated by Lepard incorporates 
this post-Westphalian imperative. He submits that 
 
A customary international norm arises when states generally believe that it is 
desirable now or in the near future to have an authoritative legal principle or 
rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain conduct. This belief 
constitutes opinio juris, and it is sufficient to create a customary law norm. It 
is not necessary in every case to satisfy a separate ‘consistent state practice’ 
requirement. Rather, state practice can serve as one source of evidence that 
states believe that a particular legal principle or rule is desirable now or in the 
future.223 
 
There are two points to be stressed. First, Legard asserts that for a customary 
norm to arise, it is enough for opinio juris to reflect a belief by states that a 
practice should be required instead of a traditional doctrinal view that it is 
already required. In this way, global constitutional principles more easily find 
their way to the subjective element of custom, because all that is necessary is 
that the majority of states solely believe in the importance of these principles. 
Second, state practice is relevant merely to the extent it proves the evidence of 
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such a belief. Moreover, Lepard insists that in ascertaining state beliefs it is 
imperative to take cognisance of certain ‘fundamental ethical principles’ (in 
other words, constitutional principles) recognised in extant international 
law.224 These include principles of human dignity and human rights, state 
accountability, limited state sovereignty, democracy etc. Similarly, Bradley 
asserted that the traditional approach to custom’s subjective element should be 
modified along these lines: a new customary norm ‘can be recognised when it 
is evident — from state practices, statements, and other evidence — that the 
rule is something that the relevant community of states wishes to have as a 
binding norm going forward and that it is socially and morally desirable’.225 
The constitutional transformation of the doctrine of custom is also neatly 
captured by Klabbers who notes that ‘[c]ustom is no longer what states actually 
do, but partly based on what they say to do, even if they act differently’.226 This 
is what Roberts called ‘modern custom’ (also known as ‘instant custom’227 or 
coutume sage228) – an approach to customary international law that 
significantly discounts the requirement of general and consistent state practice 
and instead focuses primarily on opinio juris, which is usually determined from 
verbal statements.229 By the same token, Kirgis suggested to put customary law 
on a ‘sliding scale’ by placing less emphasis on what states actually do, the 
more generally accepted a norm appears to be: ‘The more destabilizing or 
morally distasteful the activity — for example […] the deprivation of 
fundamental human rights — the more readily international decisions makers 
will substitute one element for the other, provided that the asserted restrictive 
rule seems reasonable’.230 More recently, Waters and Ryngaert asserted that 
‘the more important the common interests of states or humanity are, the greater 
the weight that may be attached to opinio juris as opposed to state practice’.231 
Thus, in situations where global community interests are at stake, inconsistent 
state practice may be overlooked and greater premium may be placed on states’ 
statements and pronouncements, as an expression of belief in the importance 
of a certain norm to have binding legal effect. 
In this connection, it is noteworthy to mention the ICJ’s dictum in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities. The Court paid lip service to the traditional 
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approach to custom but identified the customary rule of non-use of force and 
non-intervention in UN General Assembly resolutions ⁠, stating that 
 
[O]pinio juris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, 
the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of States towards certain General 
Assembly resolutions […] The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions 
[…] may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of 
rules declared by themselves.232 
 
The Court further asserted that the practice of states in the application of rules 
should not have been perfect but it was sufficient for the conduct of states to 
be consistent with such rules, and ‘that the instances of State conduct 
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches 
of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule’.233 The Court, 
thus, gave more credit to the law-making qualities of UNGA resolutions and 
downgraded the importance of material practice as one of the two key elements 
constituting custom. The evidence of opinio juris and/or practice was identified 
in such resolutions and in their verbal acceptance by states: ‘General Assembly 
resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. 
They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for 
establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris’.234 The 
method the Court applied was later on dubbed as ‘modern positivist 
method’.235 This novel approach of the ICJ to the ascertainment of customary 
norms is a logical attribute of its general tendency to lessen the investigation 
of the existence of the two elements forming customary law and to consider 
instead other evidence to determine the existence or content of a customary 
rule applicable to the case at hand, which is not, formally, the source of law.236 
The trend to focus on opinio juris to the expense of longstanding and 
consistent state practice is also visible in the judicial practice of some 
international criminal tribunals. For instance, in the Kupreskic case, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found that 
there was a customary law prohibition of reprisals against civilians, despite a 
scarcity of state practice.237 Earlier, in its 1995 dictum in Tadic, the ICTY had 
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similarly broadened the scope of customary IHL of non-international armed 
conflicts based primarily on opinio juris.238 The same tendency to pay far more 
attention to opinio juris than to state practice has also been (empirically) 
documented with respect to other international and national courts239 as well 
as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).240 Thus, the modern 
approach to custom does not dispense wholesale with the traditional ‘state 
practice plus opinio juris’ approach. It rather represents a refinement of the 
conventional view shaped by judicial and practical experience. 
There is now a rich collection of doctrinal claims and counterclaims on 
how to make custom a more workable concept applicable to the increasingly 
globalised and interconnected society of more than 190 states and even bigger 
number of non-state entities.241 Critical voices warn against modern approach 
to customary international law as it arguably lacks legitimacy of state consent 
and is deficient on formalistic grounds.242 The new theories, it is said, make it 
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more difficult to distinguish legal norms (lex lata) from moral norms (lex 
ferenda) and thus allow ‘the law’ to mask moral or political agendas on the 
part of their protagonists. They result in what one prominent scholar called 
‘fake custom’ — new norms are recognised as customary even though they 
constitute nothing more than wishful thinking.243 Other commentators have 
labelled these developments as ‘identity crisis’ of customary law since by de-
emphasising the importance of state practice as one of the constituting 
elements of custom, one ends up by substituting it with opinio juris, with the 
latter being thereby counted twice.244 For other scholars, it is not that 
customary international is now in crisis but that some international lawyers, 
boldly relying on article 38 of the ICJ Statute, overstretch this concept so much 
that it is not custom at all. According to this view, one should, instead of 
thinking of international law within the framework of article 38, rely on other 
sources of international law, such as for instance UNGA resolutions, as 
autonomous categories245 that constitute a new form of lawmaking.246 The 
taproot of these observations is that the modern theories arguably stretch the 
concept of custom to a breaking point and thereby lead to uncertainty about the 
existence and content of particular norms of customary international law. 
It may be argued that the aforementioned identical crisis of customary 
international law, or however it is called, is caused by the inadequacy of the 
traditional positivist framework to tackle current developments in the 
international legal system based, by and large, on common interest. With that 
in mind, it is difficult to imagine how the pursuance of common interest can 
be frustrated by the actions of a state, previously claiming adherence to global 
values and yet acting in different manner for the reasons of, say, changes in 
domestic political climate or some extraneous political considerations. In fact, 
many nondemocratic states do not openly deny the existence of democratic 
principles in international law and even claim that they are themselves in the 
process of transition to a fully-fledged democratic regime,247 even if their 
practice happens to be diametrically opposite. The post-Westphalia emergence 
of a sense of a belonging to the global international community and the 
attendant fear of political and moral fall-out incite even the most outright 
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transgressors to make clear in their verbal statements adherence to community 
values. In other words, states whose physical practice is in contradiction with 
the universally recognised standards and who deny such practice on factual 
grounds, do implicitly accept the standard involved. Ignoring such a powerful 
evidence of opinio juris simply because state practice is inconsistent, short or 
non-existent is erroneous, short-sighted and anachronistic. Moreover, if one 
accepts the view that the traditional element of consistent physical practice has 
no value of its own but is rather used as a proof of opinio juris, then to require 
existence of such practice even when opinio juris is reasonably clear is to show 
a poor analysis. One should also acknowledge the fact that with the increase of 
the number of states to nearly 200 nations it becomes virtually impossible to 
examine the vast array of evidence of state practice for each sovereign state. 
Hence, viewing state verbal practice as both evidence of opinio juris and actual 
practice may kill two birds with one stone. 
In complement, considering the fact that only a handful of the most 
economically advanced and militarily powerful states can make their practice 
visible on the international plane, traditional doctrine of custom not only fails 
to secure legal equality between states and, thus, legitimacy of the international 
lawmaking process, but exacerbates even more the factual power and wealth 
variations between states.248 The process of the modern custom formation, on 
the other hand, resembles that of treaty-making as it is a conscious, egalitarian 
and deliberate process. Because it gives an equal voice to all participating 
parties, it makes international law, in words of Charney, truly ‘universal’.249 
Indeed, as Alvarez submitted, both traditional custom and modern custom 
involve shortcuts, albeit of a different kind. While for traditional custom it is 
mostly ratione personae shortcut (the most interested and powerful states), 
modern custom is premised on ratione materiae shortcut (verbal practice).250 
To say that the one is more legitimate than the other is to misunderstand the 
very process of customary law formation. In crude words, ‘[i]n taking 
individual instances of what is pathological behaviour among states — as a 
guide for the general conduct of states, opponents are guilty of the same 
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evidentiary sin of which they accuse proponents’.251 Ultimately, because 
international law lacks a global legislative body, ‘enlightened’ community of 
states may search for other avenues for bringing international values into 
international law to further the legitimacy and effectiveness of the international 
public order. By doing so, they do not challenge the established lawmaking 
process as such but rather place changing degrees of importance on its 
constitutive elements, including the twin elements of custom. 
It follows form the above-mentioned that in establishing the existence of a 
customary norm of the democratic entitlement one must look for the evidence 
of opinio juris rather than state practice and not only that of states but also non-
state entities. Such an approach falls squarely within the confines of positivist 
orthodoxy as it is based on a universal consent and is responsive to the 
exigencies of modern realities without tapping into extra-legal penumbra. As 
regards universality, Wouters and Ryngaert submitted that modern custom is 
in a way even more positive than traditional custom, however counter-intuitive 
it may sound, as it pays even bigger credit to the notion of consent as is 
expressed in declarations and treaties with nearly universal participation, 
whereas traditional custom is mostly derived from the practice of a small 
number of prominent and privileged states.252 
UNGA resolutions, inasmuch as they deal with the issues of general law 
and mirror the consensus of a large majority of states, are the first place to look 
at. As Cassese argues, the ‘unique opportunity afforded by the UN for 
practically all members of the world to get together and exchange their views 
cannot fail to have had a strong impact on the emergence or reshaping of 
customary rules’.253 Since 1988, the UNGA annually placed the issue of 
democracy on its agenda. Up to 1994, it issued a set of resolutions entitled 
‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine 
elections’.254 Thereafter the title was changed to ‘Strengthening the role of the 
United Nations in enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and 
genuine elections and the promotion of democratization’.255 One of the 
resolutions (adopted without a vote) states: 
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[P]eriodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element 
of sustained efforts to protect the rights and interests of the governed and that, 
as a matter of practical experience, the right of everyone to take part in the 
government of his or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment 
by all of a wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms.256 
 
It is clear from the text of the resolution that effective enjoyment of human 
rights is dependent on democratic institutions. It further posits that 
‘determining of the will of the people requires an electoral process which 
accommodates distinct alternatives’ and that ‘this process should provide an 
equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their 
political views, individually and in cooperation with others’.257 Thus, political 
pluralism is explicitly recognised as an essential element of ‘genuineness’ of 
the electoral process. Whilst in a parallel set of resolutions, the General 
Assembly emphasised the importance of the principles of national sovereignty 
and non-interference in states’ internal affairs,258 one may notice a gradual 
change of language in the title of these resolutions, from the strict and 
unqualified one to more attenuated. What is more, from 2005 the sovereignty 
concern was no more on the agenda of the General Assembly. In one of its 
most recent resolutions, the UNGA reaffirmed that ‘democracy is a universal 
value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their own 
political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in 
all aspects of their lives’.259 It also reaffirmed that freely expressed will of the 
people is preconditioned on free participation of the political opposition by 
calling upon states to ensure ‘through legislation, institutions and mechanisms, 
the freedom to form democratic political parties that can participate in elections 
[…]’.260 
Even more striking evidence of opinio juris in favour of the right to 
democracy was conveyed by then-Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his 
Agenda for Democratisation.261 In this avant-garde document, he spoke for the 
right to democracy and its inviolability irrespective of the principle of non-
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intervention envisaged by article 2(7) of the UN Charter.262 Other prominent 
texts elucidating the global belief in the importance of democracy in 
international order are the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of the 
1993 World Conference on Human Rights,263 the Millennium Declaration of 8 
September 2000264 and the World Summit Outcome of 16 September 2005.265 
There is now a wide array of scholarly opinions arguing for the increasing 
role of UNGA resolutions as treasure house of opinio juris. To illustrate, 
Thirway contemplated that in view of the changing nature of the international 
society one can assert that the scope of custom has enlarged to encompass 
UNGA resolutions.266 Some adopted even a more cutting-edge standpoint by 
perceiving General Assembly resolutions not only as expressions of opinio 
juris but also as instances of state practice par excellence.267 Yet, others 
pinpoint to the anachronistic nature of the doctrine of sources incapable to 
address the significance of the international organisations’ resolutions in the 
development of customary international law.268 Noteworthy, the World Court 
in some of its judgments gave a due regard to the role of UNGA resolutions in 
displaying opinio juris.269 The view of Judge Hersh Lauterpacht as expressed 
in his separate opinion to the 1955 South-West Africa Voting Procedure 
Advisory Opinion pointedly reflects the role of UNGA resolutions in 
international law founded on constitutional principles and merits separate 
quotation. He contended that UNGA recommendation is: 
 
[A] legal act of the principal organ of the United Nations which Members of 
the United Nations are under a duty to treat with a degree of respect 
appropriate to a Resolution of the General Assembly […]. Although there is 
no automatic obligation to accept fully a particular recommendation or series 
of recommendations, there is a legal obligation to act in good faith in 
accordance with the principles of the Charter.270 
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To put it differently, failure to act in accordance with General Assembly 
resolutions can be equivalent to ‘disloyalty to the Principles and Purposes of 
the Charter’.271 In addition to UNGA resolutions, there is a variety of other 
international documents containing provisions of constitutional significance 
and backed up by a near-universal acceptance. While a comprehensive account 
of all these instruments would need a separate book, it suffices to mention the 
UN Commission on Human Rights/Human Rights Council and the ICCPR 
Human Rights Committee. 
The former Commission on Human Rights passed several landmark 
resolutions regarding democracy. In 1999, it adopted resolution ‘Promotion of 
the Right to Democracy’,272 which explicitly referred to the right to democratic 
governance, which, in its turn, included a range of traditional civil and political 
rights and freedoms, such as freedom of expression, thought and association, 
the right to free and fair elections, the right to political participation, as well as 
the novel ‘right of citizens to choose their governmental system through 
constitutional or other democratic means’.273 While the title of the resolution 
was an object of fierce debates, it did not attract any negative vote. Later 
resolutions omitted the express reference to democratic entitlement but 
specified some essential elements of democracy, such as, for instance, respect 
for freedoms of association, expression and opinion, the rule of law and 
separation of powers, independent judiciary, political pluralism, transparency 
and accountability of public officials and institutions and pluralistic media, 
which signifies a huge step forward when it comes to the definition of 
democracy.274 In one of its latest resolutions, the Commission defined plural 
political system as the one in which ‘persons entitled to vote must be free to 
vote for any candidate for election and free to support or to oppose 
Government, without undue influence or coercion of any kind that may distort 
or inhibit the free expression of the elector’s will’.275 This list of essential 
elements of democracy outlines the basic prerequisites for the effective 
functioning of democracy in terms of its origin and exercise that go well 
beyond the electoral conception.  
The Human Rights Council, which replaced the Commission in 2006, has 
also demonstrated its commitment to democracy.276 Its resolution 19/36 is 
instructive in this respect. It enlists such vital elements of democratic 
entitlement as freedom of association, assembly, expression, conscience and 
opinion, the right to political participation, the right to free and fair elections, 
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respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the independence of the 
judiciary and mutlipartyism.277 It also stresses that effective and legitimate 
government is the one formed in democratic process and respectful of human 
rights278 and based on ‘full participation of all parties and ethnic groups’.279 
Similarly to the Commission, the Council’s understanding of democracy 
entails more than the holding of elections at regular intervals. 
The Human Rights Committee as the primary monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism of the ICCPR, in the meantime, adopts general comments, views 
on individual communications and concluding observations. General 
comments are ‘today one of the potentially most significant and influential 
tools available to each of the six United Nations human rights treaty bodies in 
their endeavours to deepen the understanding and strengthen the influence of 
international human rights norms’.280 By essence, their value and goal lie in 
interpreting in authoritative manner treaty terms. Despite their non-binding 
character, they are not insignificant, and there should at least be a rebuttable 
presumption that they reflect universal opinio juris.281 Moreover, state parties 
have a duty of good faith to cooperate with a treaty body as envisaged by 
general principles of treaty law.282 HRC’s General Comment 25 is one of the 
most significant documents produced by the Committee to elaborate and 
interpret the vague provisions of article 25 ICCPR. Not only did the Committee 
recognise that article 25 can only be realised in the democratic system based 
on free and fair electoral process, but it also stressed the direct link between 
democracy and multipartyism: ‘The right of persons to stand for election 
should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of 
parties or of specific parties’.283 It further asserted that ‘[p]arty membership 
should not be a condition of eligibility to vote, nor a ground of 
disqualification’.284 The HRC reiterated its stance to the issue of the one-party 
system in Bwalya v Zambia, where it affirmed the incompatibility of 
restrictions on political activity outside the only recognised political party with 
article 25 of the Covenant.285 
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Other non-treaty instruments reflecting global consensus on the existence 
of democratic entitlement are examined in section 4.3.2. For the purpose of the 
present discussion it suffices to stress that there is a striking degree of 
convergence between the fundamental elements of democracy defined by the 
UN organs and the democracy-related criteria elaborated by other inter-
governmental institutions. Taken together, they provide a broad international 
consensus on the central procedural, institutional and substantive building 
blocks of democracy. This was confirmed by the UN Secretary-General who 
asserted that the organisation’s position on democracy is based on ‘universal 
principles, norms and standards, emphasising the internationally agreed 
normative content’, which stem from preamble and article 1 of the UN Charter, 
referring to such essential democratic underpinnings as ‘life in larger freedom’, 
‘self-determination’, ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’, as well as 
political rights recognised in the UDHR and subsequent human rights treaties 
and instruments.286 
Outside the discussion on legitimacy of modern theories of custom, the 
resort to non-binding instruments as proof of state practice and/or opinio juris 
has been criticised in many respects.287 One of the most important criticisms is 
the alleged incapability of a non-binding instrument to serve as an evidence of 
opinio juris. For example, it has been suggested that the voting in the adoption 
of a UNGA resolution is not necessarily reflective of states’ legal 
consciousness. The voting is a political act and not legal one. It is that states 
know that the resolution or declaration in question has only a hortatory effect 
that they vote in affirmative.288 However, it is fair to say that the reference to 
state practice is fraught with the same, if not even worse, difficulties. How 
indeed the nature of an act as is expressed in the voting in the international 
organisation is qualitatively different form the act of the same state elsewhere? 
If one argues that a certain state act can be characterised as an instance of state 
practice because it is constrained by (domestic) law and is, henceforth, 
juridical, the same can be claimed with regard to the act of voting. State 
officials do not vote irrespective of what provisions of their domestic 
normative systems stipulate and are therefore as juridical as any other acts. It 
is judges and other representatives of legal profession that identify through the 
act of interpretation whether the act concerned contains enough legal elements 
to be regarded as juridical. No act is inherently political or inherently 
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juridical.289 Once the commonality between various states’ acts is 
acknowledged, the reference to UNGA resolutions and non-treaty documents 
of other international organisations as expressions of opinio juris needed for 
the formation of a new customary norm is not that ‘weird’ any more. There is, 
however, an important caveat here to keep in mind. Not all the resolutions of 
the UNGA can be regarded as embodying opinio juris but solely those touching 
upon the most fundamental issues and enshrining global values as well as 
attracting acceptance by all or most members. 
Can one thus claim that states are now customarily obliged to introduce 
and maintain democratic form of governance? If so, what understanding of 
democracy does such obligation entail? According to one authoritative view, 
democracy did acquire a status of customary norm but with ratione personae 
and ratione materiae limitations. On the one hand, it is not applicable to states 
that are persistent objectors. On the other hand, it does not extend beyond 
holding free and fair elections and a minimum respect for some basic human 
rights.290 It is, hence, a regional customary norm, covering such regions as 
Europe and America, to set up and protect procedural democracy. However, 
the argument about the alleged material and personal limitations of the scope 
of the right to democracy does not stand closer scrutiny. Firstly, the above 
findings illustrate that the right to democracy does entail other (substantive) 
elements apart from electoral method. The requirement of free and fair 
elections coupled with the obligation to respect the freedoms of opinion, 
assembly and association, the rule of law and separation of powers, political 
pluralism and judicial independence, indicated in the globally endorsed 
instruments and applied in the area of post-conflict reconstruction, state-
building, recognition and development policies, indicate that democracy is not 
confined to electoral competition (important as it is, no doubt, for any 
democratic system) but represents a normative framework of equality and 
political empowerment by means of participation in decision-making 
processes both during elections as well as between electoral campaigns. This 
effectively means that the international community is no longer willing to 
accept a state’s claim of being democratic if it substantiates this claim by a 
mere reference to the existence of the institution of elections whereas other 
‘essential elements of democracy’ are persistently ignored.291 
Secondly, the view that the right to democracy cannot claim universality 
due to the existence of persistent objectors is not fully correct either. First, the 
doctrine of the persistent objector is relatively new and emerged as a result of 
particular political circumstances of the 1960s and early 1970s, namely 
Western states’ efforts to free themselves from the will of the international 
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community legalised in customary rules developed in the context of 
multilateral fora, in which the newly independent nations constituted a 
majority.292 Second, while the theoretical significance of the concept of the 
persistent objector is undeniable, its practical application is close to non-
existent, as ‘no tribunal has ever ruled that the status of persistent objector can 
effectively prevent the application of a norm of customary law to the objecting 
State’.293 Moreover, states are hesitant to call themselves persistent objectors 
in their foreign relations as this would isolate them from the rest of the 
international community. Rather, they claim that the norm in question has not 
yet crystallised into a customary norm.294 In case states do avail themselves of 
the objector status, the latter is not recognised by other states, which rather 
view them as law-breakers.295 
Third, the theory of persistent objector is fraught with logical 
inconsistencies. It is claimed to be based on political convenience rather than 
legal reasoning; and it is not applicable to new states and jus cogens norms.296 
Ultimately, universalist assumptions of international human rights law are 
compromised by the effects of the persistent objector thesis. By allowing 
individual states to opt out of their human rights obligations, whether on 
grounds of principle or expediency, undermines the very theoretical 
foundations of the human rights regime.297 All these considerations negate the 
existence of a persistent objector status in international law in general and 
human rights law in particular. Moreover, constitutionalisation of international 
law entails the diminishing role of the concept of persistent objector because it 
‘promotes disharmony and discord’ in the system.298 Thus, the international 
community continuously inflicts political pressure on the objector states to 
conform to the new standards accepted by the majority of states. Because the 
political stakes of non-adherence are high, dissenting states will eventually 
adopt the majority position. It is hence legitimate to suggest that the nature of 
the concept of persistent objector is provisional: states can only employ it for 
a limited period of time as a political tool to gain time and lobby other states 
to prevent the rule from acquiring customary status. Should the rule develop 
into customary law, it is binding on all, including the initial objector. 
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As of 2018, 116 out of 195 nations are regarded as (electoral) 
democracies.299 Albeit not all of them can be characterised as liberal 
democracies, they nonetheless provide a strong evidence of international 
opinion about the practice. It is also of note here that only four states explicitly 
claim being non-democracies, namely Vatican City (monarchy), Saudi Arabia 
(Islamic monarchy), Burma (military dictatorship) and Brunei (Islamic 
monarchy).300 The remaining states assert the special character of their 
democracies by appealing to cultural differences, traditional modes of 
government and special circumstances. Such a strategic shift from the 
proclamations of the universal superiority of one’s form of government to 
defensive claims of exceptionalism is an evidence of universal opinio juris that 
democracy is the only form of government compatible with international law, 
whilst the practice might be different. According to the traditional view, for a 
state to qualify as a persistent objector, it must have raised its objection at the 
sufficiently early stage and in a clear and consistent manner. It is, thus, fair to 
suggest that on the orthodox account only four mentioned states qualify as 
persistent objectors to the democratic rule. Other states that do not practice 
democracy and yet claim democratic credentials fail to evidence their objection 
in a clear and consistent manner and, thus, cannot be qualified as persistent 
objectors. However, as has been outlined above, several prominent scholars 
opined that the status and effect of the persistent objector rule is slightly 
different in international human rights law than in general international law. 
They invoked universalist foundations of the international human rights 
regime301 and the nature of the norm in question (how important is the norm).302 
Thus, considering the fact that human rights are universal and states agreed to 
honour them by participation in the UN human rights regime (original 
consent), states are estopped from raising objections. On this account, state 
consent is properly presumed because the state in question has already 
consented to the universality of human rights.303 Additionally, since the 
democratic principle has been repeated on numerous occasions in the 
international and regional fora and found way to international and regional 
human rights conventions as well as numerous non-treaty instruments 
attracting no explicit objection, it is plausible to suggest that the world 
considers the norm valid, which weakens the objector’s position. Henceforth, 
states manifesting persistent refusal to introduce and maintain democracy may 
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be today regarded as in violation of the global norm.304 All in all, it is fair to 
conclude that the right to democracy reflects customary international law. 
 
4.3. Softening of International Law 
 
4.3.1. The Doctrine of Sources: A Reconsideration 
 
Discussion of soft law usually takes place in the context of discourse about 
sources. The prevailing orthodox reading of international law conceives of ICJ 
Statute article 38(1) as an authoritative and exhaustive enlistment of the 
sources of international law, which include ‘international conventions’, 
‘international custom’ and ‘the general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations’.305 It means that a norm must fall within one of these 
categories in order to be a binding legal norm. Article 38, which was firstly 
adopted in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
in the early 1920s and eventually inherited by the ICJ, was heralded as a 
milestone in the international legal doctrine, as it was perceived as a long-
desired solution to the problem of indeterminacy having been plaguing 
international law over most of its history. A ‘closed’ and universal one-size-
fits-all list of sources was regarded as a better paradigm than a fragmented and 
ad hoc system of the pre-war international law where everything goes.306 State 
consent and vocabulary of formalisation (refusal to look for materials not 
formally recognised as law) became the hallmarks of legitimacy for this project 
of reconstruction of public international law. However, the reassuring 
impression of brevity, order, predictability and systemic unity that one initially 
obtains when first confronting the doctrine are eventually replaced by feelings 
of unease and disharmony on a closer read. Instead of providing for a workable 
framework for law-ascertainment, the doctrine of sources is the more 
impenetrable the more one attempts to make sense of it: it ‘is fraught with 
terminological discrepancy, scholarly disagreement, logical and 
epistemological incoherence, inability to capture the diversity of modern law-
making practices, inability to stand the test of “high theory”, and so on’.307 
First of all, the initial task of article 38 was to serve as a sort of a guide to 
instruct the World Court on materials it could avail itself of in adjudicating 
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international disputes, which is abundantly clear from the article’s chapeau: 
‘The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law 
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: […]’.308 It was never meant to 
be an exhaustive codification of international legal sources. Moreover, the 
article is poorly drafted, leaves the question of hierarchy of norms unresolved 
and confuses formal and material sources,309 not to mention the fact that a 
provision as old as article 38, which was adopted some century ago, cannot 
accurately reflect all the materials and forms of state practice that constitute 
today’s avenues of law-creation and law-ascertainment. 
On a deep theoretical level, a blind reliance on state consent makes the 
conventional sources thesis, in the words of Koskenniemi, apologist: ‘If there 
is no distance between “will” and “law”, then there is no justification to impose 
a standard on a non-consenting State’.310 Indeed, if consent is the sole 
prerequisite of law, why would one then draw a line between, say, treaties and 
other juridical acts, such as unilateral statements, or why would there be a 
requirement of state practice for a custom to emerge? Moreover, because there 
is no clear and objective process for ascertaining state will, ‘voluntarism is just 
as abstract, subjective and subject to manipulation as naturalism’.311 Another 
theoretical problem with the doctrine of sources of article 38 is that the 
exclusive reliance on norms that can be potentially applied by the Court is 
reminiscent of the ‘domestic model approach’. In this sense, the doctrine of 
sources plays a sort of a quasi-constitutional function akin to constitutions in 
domestic legal systems, which stipulate processes by which legal norms come 
into existence. However, a sophisticated legalistic culture of domestic societies 
as well as their highly developed judicial mechanisms are a far cry from the 
international law system which relies to a minimum extent on formal 
mechanisms for the resolution of legal disputes. Hence, a distinction between 
the norms of behaviour and the norms of adjudication is warranted.312 
Apart from incongruences on the level of theory, the changes in the 
international legal system triggered by the proliferation of multilateral regimes 
with ‘third-party effects’, such as, for instance, international human rights law, 
and the rise of international organisations as a forum for embracing, 
universalising and promoting global values put the doctrine under a 
considerable strain. Cohen identifies at least three challenges to the mainstream 
(consent-based) approach to international law. Firstly, after the Second World 
War, the inequality between states reached such unprecedented a scale that it 
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becomes increasingly difficult to prove state consent. Secondly, the rapid 
increase in the number of states lead to the adoption of ‘thinner agreements’ in 
terms of their meaning, nature and content. Finally, the emergence of the new 
type of sources expressing the needs of the ever-interdependent society 
assumes an uneasy relationship with the rigid framework established by the 
current source thesis.313 It follows that the traditional doctrine of sources, 
instead of fulfilling a promise of order, foreseeability, integrity and objectivity, 
is in the end a barrier in the fulfilment of systemic goals that the international 
community strives to achieve by means of international law. Ergo, revision is 
imperative. The framework of global constitutionalism provides for necessary 
theoretical foundation and empirical justification for such revision. 
International law in the process of constitutionalisation presupposes a rather 
attenuated model of the doctrine. State consent retains its leading position but 
it is rather a soft version of consent: it is increasingly tacit, presumed and non-
withdrawable. The fact that in certain cases states cannot object to something 
that they have once consented to resolves the problem of apologism as the 
‘controlled’ distance is maintained between state will and the source of legal 
obligation. Yet, because it is only norms that states at certain point happened 
to will, whether explicitly or tacitly, the danger of naturalist utopianism — 
where the law’s binding character is sought from somewhere beyond the state 
— is averted too. 
That said, international law does not have a single document specifying 
how it is made. However, because there is no other authoritative instrument 
instructing how legal norms are to be discovered, article 38 of the ICJ Statute 
is undeniably at the epicentre of law-ascertainment. This notwithstanding, the 
list of sources it dictates should not be perceived as exhaustive, but rather as a 
useful starting point for locating legal norms. The ICJ itself confirmed this 
view by acknowledging that states’ unilateral acts can represent sources of 
international law not mentioned in article 38.314 This is but one evidence of a 
general trend to identify norms of behaviour outside the ambit of conventional 
lawmaking mechanisms. From a theoretical perspective, such novel 
‘manifestations of normativity’ include, according to d’Aspremont, 
substantive validity – a conception of law-ascertainment based on substantive 
values rather than the source thesis; effect- or impact-based conceptions of 
international law-ascertainment whereby norms come to be regarded as legal 
whenever they effectively regulate relations between the subjects; process-
based conceptions of international law-ascertainment, most commonly 
associated with the New Haven School, where legal norms emerge as a result 
of authoritative and controlled decision-making; and other manifestations of 
the deformalisation of international law-identification mostly visible in the 
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theory of softness of international law.315 Notably, to d’Aspremont, it is only a 
substance-based conception of law-ascertainment that can be conceptualised 
as neoliberal or anti-pluralist, as the term is treated in this work. This thesis, 
by contrast, adopts a broader understanding of new liberalism, which embraces 
all the afore-enlisted manifestations of deformalisation of law-identification 
inasmuch as they represent a value-based disconnect between state consent and 
a valid legal rule. In what follows, I shall attempt to examine one of the forms 
of deformalisation of the source thesis propelled by the advance of global 
constitutionalism, namely the soft law doctrine, and what effect it has on the 
right to democracy. 
 
4.3.2. Non-binding Instruments as a Source of the Right to 
Democracy 
 
The process of softening of international law, that is an increasing resort to 
non-treaty instruments in the regulation of international relations, signifies 
constitutionalisation of international law for: 
 
Non-binding commitments may be entered into precisely to reflect the will of 
the international community to resolve a pressing global problem over the 
objections of the one or few states causing the problem, while avoiding the 
doctrinal barrier of their lack of consent to be bound by the norm.316 
 
The term ‘soft law’ is generally used to designate international instruments that 
are purposely excluded from the definition of treaty and aim to promulgate 
principles and rules of universal application without an intention to enter into 
binding commitments.317 It is commonplace to define these instruments in 
negative terms, as lacking one or several characteristics normally ascribed to 
international law, such as, e.g., justiciability, precise normative content, 
enforceability and formal legal status.318 Their relevance to international law 
is often underscored, inter alia, by their close resemblance to law, the extent 
to which they shape legal discourse, the extent of consensus around them, their 
impact on the behaviour of international actors and outcomes in international 
society.319 Yet, the most coherent approach to soft law from the standpoint of 
the doctrine of sources is to conceive of it in terms of the degree of hardening 
of a norm into a rule of international law. Notably, not every normative 
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commitment or statement can qualify as soft law but only such which ‘acquires 
a degree of traction [acceptance by states]’ and is ‘in the process of incubation’ 
which makes it a viable candidate for crystallising into hard law, though it may 
ultimately fail to become a binding rule of international law.320 Thus, the 
category of soft law can be understood as the one referring to ‘rules […] that 
are in the process of becoming, though may not ultimately become, binding 
rules of international law in the form of any of the established sources of 
international law — customary law, general principles of law, or as a binding 
interpretation of a rule of a treaty law’.321 Because constitutionalisation of 
international law is driven by international consensus over a set of principles 
crucial for the existence and proper functioning of the international 
community, softening of international law, whereby global values find their 
most frequent and elaborate endorsement in non-binding instruments, is 
manifestation of global constitutionalisation. 
Importantly, the ever-frequent invocation of non-binding instruments does 
not obliterate the positivist premises of the international legal doctrine, such as 
foreseeability and validity, since it is fair to say that the VCLT does not deny 
the status of law to them. As Hillenberg observed, the Vienna Convention 
applies to ‘international agreements concluded between States and governed 
by international law’.322 To automatically exclude soft law instruments form 
the definition is too simplistic an approach as the drafting history of the 
Convention reveals that the qualification ‘governed by international law’ 
pertains to the distinction between agreements under international law and 
those under domestic law, not between treaties proper and soft law.323 
Moreover, since state will is so commonly viewed as the lynchpin of 
international law, there is no reason to deny states the possibility to subscribe 
to international commitments in a less formal manner.324 Strikingly, the case 
law of the ICJ325 illustrates that while such soft law instruments as 
recommendations of international organisations are not binding as a matter of 
definition, they are nonetheless not without legal effect. Apart from being 
considered as evidence of existing law, or formative of state practice or opinio 
juris, or as aiders in the interpretation of treaty law, they increasingly assume 
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a more autonomous role in the ascertainment of legal rules. On this reading, 
they certainly constitute a part of international law.326 
From the vantage point of global constitutionalism, more frequent 
invocation of soft-law instruments allows to fill gaps in international law and 
thereby aids in constructing international law as a unified normative system 
where global values, as commonly found in the text of non-binding 
commitments, act as a sort of glue holding autonomous legal regimes together. 
This effectively means that not only is softening of international law a reaction 
to, and a bulwark against, fragmentation within and of international law but 
also an engine of unity between legal systems and regimes. Moreover, the 
specificities of international human rights law, such as, for example, the 
historical lack of enforcement mechanisms in the human rights field, facilitate 
a more privileged position of soft law in resolving interpretative 
indeterminacies. In this context, soft law instruments assume norm-filling 
(e.g., commentaries of the human rights bodies interpreting treaty provisions) 
and norm-creating functions (non-binding norms harden into a binding law 
when they reflect state consensus on certain issues).327 As regards the right to 
democracy, non-binding instruments provide for the most sophisticated 
account of democracy as a human right and a global value. Apart from 
international non-treaty agreements such as UNGA resolutions, resolutions of 
the Human Rights Council and its predecessor, the Commission on Human 
Rights, as well as general comments of the Human Rights Committee, 
discussed in the context of modern custom,328 there is a plethora of regional 
soft law documents endorsing democracy. 
In Europe, the OSCE, previously the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), undertook a missionary role in the promotion 
of the democratic entitlement. Due to space limitations, the focus is placed on 
three principal documents employing human rights language in their references 
to democracy. The first document adopted by the CSCE, ‘Charter of Paris for 
a New Europe’ of 1990, committed member states ‘to build, consolidate and 
strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations’.329 It 
further articulated that ‘[d]emocratic government is based on the will of the 
people, expressed regularly through free and fair elections’.330 The Charter also 
included essential elements of democratic entitlement, such as the respect for 
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human rights and the rule of law, representativeness, legal pluralism, 
accountability to the electorate and impartial system of justice.331 Needless to 
say, according to conventional view, the role of this instrument is minor, if not 
wholly futile, in serving as a norm of conduct for states in their relations with 
one another. And yet, given its deliberately norm creating language332 
enshrining values common to all European states, it is a perfect tool to interpret 
existing obligations of the Council of Europe and its member states. 
The second document with even more detailed democratic provisions is 
the 1990 ‘Copenhagen Document’. It states that: 
 
[P]luralistic democracy and the rule of law are essential for ensuring respect 
for all human rights and fundamental freedoms, the development of human 
contacts and the resolution of other issues of a related humanitarian character. 
They therefore welcome the commitment expressed by all participating States 
to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their common 
determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the 
rule of law.333 
 
It also affirmed such inherent elements of the right to democracy as the rule of 
law, free and fair elections, representative character of governmental structures 
and political pluralism.334 
Last but not least, the 1991 ‘Moscow Document’ urges the revision of the 
traditional concept of sovereignty: ‘[T]he commitment undertaken in the field 
of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate 
concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal 
affairs of the State concerned’.335 The document also condemns an 
unconstitutional overthrow of a legitimately elected government and speaks 
for the inadequacy of the effective control test as a condition for international 
recognition.336 
In African region, apart from important treaty standards touching upon the 
issues of democracy, such as the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(AUCA), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, there is a dense variety of 
soft instruments containing more elaborate terms with respect to state 
obligations to install and maintain a democratic form of government.337 One of 
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the most eminent examples is the 2000 ‘Declaration on the Framework for an 
OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government’.338 Drawing on 
articles 4 and 30 AUCA providing for the condemnation of the unconstitutional 
changes of government and suspension of state’s membership rights whose 
government came to power through unconstitutional means respectively, the 
Declaration envisages in more elaborate terms the operation of this sanction 
mechanism.339 Similar mechanisms of response to coups d’état have been 
established by other regional organisations in Africa. These include the 1991 
Declaration of the ECOWAS, the essence of which was eventually 
incorporated into the 1993 Treaty of ECOWAS;340 the 2001 Protocol on 
Democracy and Good Governance expressly recognising the obligation to hold 
free, fair and transparent elections;341 and the SADC Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections.342 
Turning finally to Americas, the Inter-American Democratic Charter in its 
remarkable article 1 provides for a right of the peoples of the Americas to 
democracy and obliges their governments to promote and defend it.343 
Similarly to its regional counterparts, the Charter recognises democracy as 
‘essential for the social, political and economic development’, whose 
constitutive elements include, among others: 
 
[R]espect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and exercise 
of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and 
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression 
of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and 
organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches 
of government.344 
 
Prior to this, the OAS took three steps to promote and consolidate democracy 
in American continent: the 1991 Santiago Commitment, the 1991 Resolution 
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1080 and the 1992 Protocol of Washington, commonly referred to as ‘Santiago 
Commitment’ or ‘Santiago Doctrine’.345 Whilst the essential part of the 
Santiago Doctrine is non-binding in principle, it has been repeatedly invoked 
in response to democratic threats in the American hemisphere.346 
Before moving to criticisms voiced against the soft law doctrine, it is vital 
to remind the reader that Asia in view of its cultural, social and economic 
diversity lacks a coherent human rights framework, whether hard or soft, to 
draw on when arguing for the existence of the regional norm of democratic 
governance. In fact, many scholars claim that Asia is the only part of the world 
that remained to a large degree immune from global democratic 
developments.347 And yet, there is some rudimentary progress in terms of 
recognising democracy as the only ‘human-rights-friendly’ form of 
government. South East Asia and West Asia (or Middle East) are regions where 
the progress is the most substantial. As to the former, while there is no regional 
legally binding human rights convention codifying the right to democratic 
governance, apart from brief reference to democracy as one of the purposes of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 2007 ASEAN 
Charter,348 one can nonetheless observe a sea change in the political climate of 
the region marked by a rising interest in human rights, including the right to 
democracy, discernible in the recent ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.349 Its 
article 25 (the right to participate in the government of one’s country and the 
right to free and fair elections) basically reaffirms the provisions of article 21 
UDHR and article 25 ICCPR. Another important document is the SAARC 
Charter of Democracy of 2011.350 The Charter sets a clear commitment to 
strengthening democratic institutions and reinforcement of democratic 
practices, including through the effective maintenance of checks and balances 
among the branches of government, guaranteeing the independence of the 
judiciary and respect for the rule of law and the unequivocal renouncement of 
any unconstitutional change of an elected government. Although the document 
is technically biding, its provisions are formulated in generic language, which 
hinders the derivation of concrete obligations therefrom. 
In the Arab World, the revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted in 
2004 under the auspices of the League of Arab States, entered into force in 
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2008.351 Albeit couched in treaty language, it is essentially soft in terms of its 
negotium352 given its weak implementation mechanism.353 Moreover, it does 
not include democratic provisions akin to other regional human rights treaties, 
except for vague references to the right to occupy public office in one’s country 
and the freedoms of thought, conscience, opinion, assembly and association.354 
In the same vein, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted 
under the aegis of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), endorses the 
right to express one’s opinion freely as well as the right of everyone ‘to 
participate, directly or indirectly in the administration of his country’s public 
affairs’ and ‘the right to assume public office’.355 Whether the expression 
‘indirectly’ refers to representative democracy is open to debate. However, 
interpretation of any of the above-mentioned instruments should be done 
through the prism of the principles of the UDHR and the two twin covenants. 
For states that are not parties to the covenants, the UDHR, whose provisions 
are widely recognised as reflecting customary international law, imposes a 
direct obligation to ensure that their regional practices are not in contradiction 
to its provisions. It should also be noted that nearly a third of the Arab countries 
are members of the African Union, to whom its more elaborate standards on 
democracy are directly applicable. 
Whether softening of international law is a layer of global 
constitutionalism or something else, criticisms abound. Mainstream scholars 
contend that legal effects that these instruments produce are not sufficient to 
transpose them into the realm of law. Unlike legal acts, soft law represents 
merely legal facts (incapable of generating binding obligations) and 
irrespective of the will of their authors cannot qualify as law.356 Further, the 
same strand of scholars argue for a redundancy of non-treaty commitments 
since when applied to a particular case, they are either employed to bolster the 
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application of hard law or are completely disregarded as non-law.357 In this 
sense, the concept of legality is binary: something is either binding (law) or 
nonbinding (non-law). To put something in between is to introduce gradation 
disfavoured by the mainstream: ‘[L]aw does not have a sliding scale of 
bindingness nor does desired law become law by stating its desirability, even 
repeatedly’.358 Ultimately, some legal commentators voiced concerns as to the 
destabilising and even destructive role of this category for the whole 
international normative system because of the dangers of relativism, 
politicisation and instrumentalisation of international law.359 The concept 
should, so the argument runs, be dismissed as useless and even pathological.360 
Interestingly, d’Aspremont explained this wide interest in deformalisation of 
conventional law-ascertainment procedures through the employment of the 
category of soft law by pinpointing to the idiosyncrasies of academic 
profession: 
 
[L]egal scholars strive to provide themselves with extra raw material to work 
with. Such self-serving attempt to stretch the boundaries of our discipline 
boils down to an instinctive quest for ‘survival’ for many legal scholars, as 
they feel constricted in a science which has proven too narrow to 
accommodate all of us and are enticed to look beyond the classical limits of 
the international legal order.361 
 
To cut a long story short, for some the category creates too much unmanageable 
subtlety and gradation,362 for others it undermines the international system so 
that the latter can no longer serve its purpose.363 
In a short response to the main criticisms, it is important to note that it is 
often overlooked that binding international law not infrequently faces similar 
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challenges in terms of precision, normativity (justiciability) and enforceability. 
A significant number of binding provisions fail to impose concrete obligations 
upon state parties, such as, for example, a duty to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions or to improve literacy rates among girls.364 Moreover, it is often 
claimed that many economic, social and cultural rights are not susceptible to 
judicial review because they involve complex political choices. Yet, they are 
undoubtedly legal rights imposing legal obligations upon states.365 The 
positivist binary approach to soft law fails to consider various roles assumed 
by soft law in contemporary international relations, which sometimes is more 
effective in terms of compliance than hard law: soft law instruments are often 
drafted like binding international law providing basis for legal reasoning and 
disputes and have a significant bearing on the issue area concerned; they are 
frequently used by international organisations to regulate their internal issues 
and are increasingly recognised as binding on them.366 On top of that, states 
often prefer soft law when they are uncertain about the desirability of their 
present undertakings in the future and when in order to solve the 
straightforward coordination games, the existence of a focal point is enough to 
ensure compliance.367 These considerations provide a firm justification for the 
sustainability and coherence of soft law as a distinct analytic category and legal 
concept. 
It is worth noting that softening of international law is a process that has 
already taken roots and will continue to affect international legal milieu at even 
more profound rate as the world is increasingly running ‘post-modern’. 
Illustratively, Jan Klabbers, one of the principle opponents of the soft law 
thesis, in his recent work claims that the source thesis is in the process of being 
replaced by the notion of accountability. This process is triggered by softening 
of international law since it becomes increasingly difficult, and therefore not 
that relevant anymore, to ascertain a precise legal obligation in international 
law containing ‘varying shades of grey, from the very soft to the extremely 
hard’. Instead, there is a discernible tendency to focus on accountability 
whereby those exercising public power improperly are to be held accountable. 
To this effect, accountability is to be distinguished from responsibility as it is, 
for the most part, cast in ‘soft’ language.368 In oversimplified terms, one may 
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discern the struggle positivist scholars encounter in the face of changing legal 
environment by desperately employing traditional linguistic categories to 
account for facts and events not fitting neatly into the orthodox reasoning. On 
this view, soft law is still not considered as international law proper, but it is 
increasingly accepted as a reality and an instrument of modern politics and 
governance that cannot be wished away. 
From the viewpoint of global constitutionalism, such changing legal 
environment marked by ‘various shades of grey’ can be characterised as the 
maturing of the international system since the very recourse to, and shaping of 
one’s behaviour in conformity with, non-treaty norms entails a certain degree 
of trust between the participating states that a particular undertaking will be 
implemented in good faith regardless its generic wording and lack of treaty 
form. Moreover, non-binding commitments permit, in principle, the inclusion 
of all interested parties in the process of international lawmaking.369 Enlarging 
the legitimacy base of international law by allowing more voices to be heard 
inevitably leads to the lessening of the role of individual states in the processes 
of decision-making and law-creation, which, in their turn, become softer. In 
this sense, softening of international law aids in strengthening international 
law’s representativeness and thus legitimacy. These vital considerations 
notwithstanding, to say that the right to (pluralist) democracy is a norm binding 
on every state, including in the Arab region, simply because the commitment 
to install certain representative government features in a plurality of non-
binding instruments around the globe is to stretch the normative capacity of 
soft law to the breaking point. On the other hand, to entirely dismiss the 
existence of democratic commitment merely because it lacks certain formal 
requirements is to encourage norm fetishism, which overlooks the 
contingencies and subtleties inherent in the application and interpretation of 
law. Because soft law instruments are not the only means how global values 
find their way into international law, it is imperative to examine other 
mechanisms of law creation reflecting international consensus on vital issues 
of global concern, including the right to democracy. The recourse is had to 
general principles of law. 
 
4.4. The Right to Democracy and General Principles of 
Law: An Equitable Framework for the Right to 
Democracy? 
 
It is imperative to reiterate that constitutionalisation of international law entails 
the diminishing role of treaties and traditional custom in ordering and 
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orchestrating international relations. Westphalian international legal system, 
being essentially concerned with the formal regulation of diplomatic relations 
between states, was primitive enough to rely mostly on bilateral agreements 
and custom derived from physical state practice as principal formal sources. 
However, considering the dense variety of social, economic, political and 
cultural settings making up the contemporary international legal order, it is 
increasingly difficult to conclude treaties furthering common interests and at 
the same time imposing concrete obligations, and/or to allow sufficient time 
for a custom to develop. The previously examined modern approach to custom 
as well as the phenomenon of softening of an international legal obligation 
represent important tools of legal evolution and development in line with 
globally endorsed principles but still struggle to firmly assert themselves in 
legal theory. Consequently, the ultimate mechanism of law creation capable of 
easily accommodating universal values and at the same time retaining solid 
legal base is still lacking, or so might one mistakenly think. 
General principles of law — a commonly neglected third formal legal 
source — are perfect tools to transmit into the legal system value 
considerations by virtue of their flexibility, inclusiveness and abstractedness. 
Given their inherent logic, generality, elasticity, richness of the normative 
content and adaptability to a variety of circumstances they are ‘doors of entry 
of the extra-legal, of the axio-logic, of the social needs’.370 As Kolb concluded, 
‘[t]he law of general principles is constitutional law in the fullest sense of the 
word’.371 The unfortunate minuscule interest in them in positivist tradition is 
countered by the constitutional argument, which, in turn, recognises them as 
an epicentre of international lawmaking. Because the purpose of the third 
source is to allow reference to rules not directly deriving from state will but 
mirroring common interest of the international community as a whole, general 
principles assume an important role in constitutionalising international law. 
Their central function is to adapt existing rules to constitutional necessities in 
order to ensure integrity of the rules vis-à-vis the general international legal 
system and their dynamic interpretation. At this juncture, the constitutional 
role of general principles is apparent from their character as ‘norm-sources,’ 
rather than simple norms, in that they constitute a middle-ground between the 
concreteness of a simple rule and abstractedness of a legal idea.372 Thus, it is 
largely due to general principles that international law can be designated as a 
system. 
Because general principles represent formal legal source to be used as a 
basis for resolving international disputes, it is inconceivable why they cannot 
form legal foundation for the right to democracy. The following sections will 
revise the place of general principles of law in the international legal system 
and chart how equity, as a sub-category of general principles of law recognised 
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by civilised nations, may impact upon the legal standing of the democratic 
entitlement. 
 
4.4.1. The Status of General Principles in International Law 
 
In addition to the two principle sources of international law, article 38(1)(c) 
ICJ Statute refers to ‘the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations’.373 Because the text of the article in question does not indicate any 
hierarchy, general principles formally rest on the same footing as treaty and 
custom. As Lord Phillimore observed during the travaux préparatoires of the 
PCIJ Statute, the predecessor of the ICJ Statute, ‘the order mentioned simply 
represented the logical order in which these sources would occur to the mind 
of the judge’.374 Further, the principles are ‘recognised’ by civilised nations, 
not enacted or consented by them. They are recognised by the virtue of their 
acceptance in major domestic legal systems, with state direct consent being 
immaterial. Moreover, the recognition is effected by ‘nations’, not by states, 
which means that the principles emerge through people’s practice within 
national borders. While the Statute does not give any definition of general 
principles and the ICJ’s pronouncements on the issue are rather tautological,375 
scholars agree that these principles constitute the very fundament of the 
international legal order and reflect legal conscience of the international 
community. To illustrate, Lauterpacht defines ‘General Principles’ as: 
 
[T]hose principles of law, private and public, which contemplation of the 
legal experience of civilized nations leads one to regard as obvious maxims 
of jurisprudence of a general and fundamental character […] a comparison, 
generalization and synthesis of rules of law in its various branches — private 
and public, constitutional, administrative, and procedural — common to 
various systems of national law.376 
      
According to Bin Chen, one of the most recognised scholars on the subject, 
general principles are ‘cardinal principles of the legal system, in the light of 
which international […] law is to be interpreted and applied’.377 For 
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Schlesinger, general principles are ‘a core of legal ideas which are common to 
all civilized legal systems’.378 In words of Verzijl, general principles are 
‘principles which are so fundamental to every well-ordered society that no 
reasonable form of co-existence is possible without their being generally 
recognized as valid’.379 For Sorensen, general principles are ‘le ciment qui 
assure le cohésion du droit international avec les ordres juridiques nationaux 
et qui permet de concevoir tous les phénomènes juridiques de l’humanité sous 
un aspect d’unité’.380 In the vein similar to other scholars, Lammers views 
general principles as ‘norms underlying national legal orders’ and as ‘the 
manifestation of the universal legal conscience’.381 Likewise, Kolb describes 
general principles as ‘a sort of fire brigade uti universi, able to reinforce weak 
points of the law or to bridge gaps in any field and in any part of its body’.382 
Finally, Jalet designates general principles as ‘principles that constitute that 
unformulated reservoir of basic legal concepts universal in application, which 
exist independently of the institutions of any particular country and form the 
irreducible essence of all legal systems’.383 
It is widely accepted that general principles of international law derive 
from broad plurality of developed domestic legal systems as well as 
international law in general. Concerning normative content, the concept of 
general principles encompasses: (a) fundamental principles of the international 
legal system (pacta sunt servanda, non-intervention, territorial integrity, self-
defence and the legal equality of states); (b) legal principles discoverable by 
means of legal logic (the lex specialis derogat legi generali rule, the lex 
posterior derogat priori rule and the principle of res judicata); and (c) some 
‘natural law’ principles (equity).384 
Despite broad scholarly support and unequivocal legal foundations, 
general principles played minor role in international dispute settlements by the 
World Court and other international tribunals as well as were stripped of any 
autonomous significance in legal scholarship. They were used either as a 
subsidiary source to ascertain the meaning of a treaty and identify the existence 
of a customary norm, or they served as a general background against which 
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‘primary’ sources were to be interpreted and understood.385 Such reluctance on 
the part of the World Court to avail itself of the third source can be explained 
by their vagueness and the fact that the Court would inevitably be obliged to 
use a large amount of discretion to derive concrete rights and obligations from 
them. This in turn can undermine the Court’s authority in the eyes of states, 
who established the Court to apply the existing rules of international law, not 
to create new ones. However, to distinguish principles from treaty or custom 
on the basis that they are more general and less precise and, most importantly, 
non-consensual is erroneous and even absurd. As the ILC noted, ‘the fact that 
article 31(3)(c) was rarely expressly cited should not obscure its importance as 
a rule of treaty interpretation’.386 Indeed, general principles are frequently 
invoked by individual judges of the Court as well as attract broad scholarly 
support. As to the non-consensual nature of general principles, it has been 
written that 
 
Recourse to principles of domestic law, even if they have not yet become 
‘internationalized’ by custom or treaty, does not derogate from the principle 
of consent. It is a source available only as necessary for interstitial use, to fill 
out what international law requires but has not recognized as customary law 
because it has not yet been invoked often and widely enough, and it is too 
cumbersome for the system to negotiate by multilateral treaty. General 
consent is properly assumed.387 
 
The consensual nature of general principles is also acknowledged by Alston 
and Simma: 
 
In contrast to […] natural law views, the recourse to general principles […] 
remains grounded in a consensualist conception of international law. 
Consequently, what is required for the establishment of human rights 
obligations qua general principles is essentially the same kind of convincing 
evidence of general acceptance and recognition […] in order to arrive at 
customary law. However, this material is not equated with state practice but 
is rather seen as a variety of ways in which moral and humanitarian 
considerations find a more direct and spontaneous ‘expression in legal 
form’.388 
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Judge Fernandes in his dissenting opinion similarly underlined the importance 
of the recognition of the positive underpinnings of general principles of 
international law: 
 
Whatever view may be held in regard to these principles, whether they are 
considered to be emanations of natural law or to be rules of custom, or 
constitutional principles of the international legal community, or principles 
directly deduced from the concept of law, or principles agreed to by States 
because they are members of a legal family, whatever, I say, may be the 
attitude of each towards the origin and basis of these principles, all agreed in 
accepting their existence and their application as a source of positive law.389 
 
Ellis has astutely concluded that general principles of law recognised by 
civilised nations are, akin to treaty and custom, positivist both on formalist and 
voluntarist grounds. They are formalist, that is formal sources of law for the 
purposes of adjudication at the ICJ, by virtue of being enshrined in the ICJ 
Statute, and for states by virtue of international customary law permitting 
reception into international law of principles widely recognised in municipal 
laws.390 As Fitzmaurice opined, state parties to the Statute have ‘duly 
consented to the application of those principles by the Court’.391 They are 
voluntarist ‘provided that the rule in question is anchored in a sufficiently large 
number of domestic legal systems as to be essentially universal […] which 
serves as a proxy for state consent’.392 Moreover, general principles may be 
unearthed not only from municipal legal systems but also from the 
international context that entails state conduct, treaties, collective declarations, 
policies and pronouncements at the international level, scholarly writings, 
international case law and international custom.393 Needless to say, in this case 
evidence of state consent is even more robust. To neglect such an important 
source of law is to fail to decide ‘in accordance with international law’. One 
should also bear in mind the fact that the binding force of ‘real’ sources, such 
as treaty and custom, is based on the fundamental principles of pacta sunt 
servanda, good faith, estoppel and other principles. Remarkably, for 
Lauterpacht, the resort to general principles of law has evolved into the 
international customary norm: 
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[T]here is a customary rule of international law to the effect that the actual 
will of States as evidenced by custom and treaty may, when necessary, be 
supplemented by such rules and principles as correspond to the nature of the 
legal relations between them, to rule of justice, and to the general principles 
of law […].394 
 
Furthermore, the way principles differ form more concrete legal rules is not 
that of substance but the one of degree: when states cannot reach a consensus 
upon definite and rigid standards of behaviour because of the complexity of 
the issue or high political stakes but need, nonetheless, some basic framework 
to navigate in otherwise anarchical ‘waters’ of international politics, they may 
be prone to agree on principles or accept them by means of acquiescence. On 
this account, principles are a typical tool for the ever-complex and globalised 
society, whereas in the Westphalian world precise contract-like obligations 
prevailed. This is not to say that general principles did not feature in the ‘pre-
constitutionalised’ order but that the international legal system in the process 
of constitutionalisation provides for the necessary prerequisites for their full 
application and legal impact.  
Another reason why general principles have not fared well as an 
autonomous source of international law is related to uncertainties as to their 
identification. All too often it is difficult to ascertain whether a general 
principle exists, particularly considering a great variety of approaches applied 
in municipal legal systems with regard to specific legal issues. Many legal 
commentators have attempted to fill this scholarly void. Bassiouni has, for 
instance, suggested a ‘functional approach’ to identify general principles of 
law flowing from various national legal systems that assumes the employment 
of empirical methodology, which is substantially similar to the one used to 
ascertain the existence of a customary rule of international law.395 Burke, 
instead, came up with a three-tools strategy to ascertain general principles of 
law beyond what the World Court has dealt with.396 First, he proposed to follow 
the logic of the World Court (the PCIJ and ICJ), since the logic used in the 
discovery of one principle is presumed sufficient to unearth another one. 
Secondly, instead of looking into all national systems of the world to find a 
principle common to all nations it is enough to look into the national 
jurisdiction of ‘States with developed legal systems’ referred to as ‘civilised 
nations’ in article 38(1)(c). Finally, so runs the argument, one has to focus on 
principles that transcend all or nearly all developed systems of law: ‘[T]he 
correct test would seem to be that an international judge before taking over a 
principle from private law must satisfy himself that it is recognized in 
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substance by all the main systems of law, and that in applying it he will not be 
doing violence to the fundamental concepts of any of those systems’.397 
The study of a more recent literature thus reveals the rising interest in 
general principles as a self-standing legal source.398 As was succinctly 
observed by Burke, general principles have become the ‘“elephant in the 
room” of international law, something which is undoubtedly important, but 
which most scholars choose to ignore because to deal with it would be too 
difficult, too controversial, or too taboo’.399 While he ostensibly followed a 
traditional positivist trajectory in chartering the equitable foundations for 
humanitarian intervention, it is possible to discern constitutionalist overtones 
throughout his work. In what follows, I shall attempt to chart several equitable 
principles having bearing on the right to democracy by drawing on the work 
of Burke. 
 
4.4.2. Equity 
 
Before moving to the examination of equitable principles that constitute a legal 
foundation for the right to democracy, it is of avail to ascertain first what equity 
means and what place it holds in international law. Equity, or equitable 
principles, constitutes a sub-set of general principles of law, whose particular 
relevance for the present undertaking is justified by its overwhelming 
acceptance in domestic legal systems and its universal existence in some form 
or another amongst various national orders, what has been even labelled as ‘a 
hallmark of “civilised” legal systems’.400 In the context of the sources of 
international law, the word ‘equity’ takes on different meanings. It can (a) aim 
at correcting extant legal rules and thus be perceived as an antithesis to law in 
the sense of ‘ex aequo et bono’, commonly defined as ‘according to what is 
equitable and good’,401 as provided in article 38(2) ICJ Statute (equity contra 
legem); or (b) fill the lacunae of international law to avoid the situations of a 
                                               
397 Harold C Gutteridge, Comparative Law (2nd edn, CUP 2015) 65. 
398 See eg Benedict Kingsbury and others, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’ 
(2005) 68 NYU JL & Contemp Prob 15; Nicholas Tsagourias, ‘The Constitutional Role of 
General Principles of Law in International and European Jurisprudence’ in Nicholas Tsagourias 
(ed), Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (CUP 2007) 
76; Armin von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: Sketching a 
Research Field’ (2008) 9 Germ LJ 1909; Fabian O Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the 
Decisions of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff 2008); Jaye Ellis, 
‘General Principles and Comparative Law’ (2011) 22 EJIL 949, 954; Ciaran Burke, An 
Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 2013); Beatrice I Bonafe 
and Paolo Palchetti, ‘Relying on General Principles in International Law’ in Catherine Brölmann 
and Yannick Radi (eds), Research Handbook on the Theory and Practice of International 
Lawmaking (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016). 
399 Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 
2013) 287. 
400 ibid 200. 
401 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (7th edn, West Group 1999) 581. 
The Right to Democracy in the Constitutionalising International Law 
 
 
160 
non-liquet (equity praeter legem); or (c) be perceived as an inherent attribute 
of legal rules (equity infra legem); or (d) make up the very content of legal 
rules (equity intra legem).402 Importantly, some scholars distinguish between 
equity contra legem as a legal principle and the situations ex aequo at bono, 
where the Court may be given a discretionary power by the parties to the 
dispute to go beyond what law says in a particular legal situation to avoid 
unjust result.403 Yet, for others, equity manifests itself in both cases: in the 
former case it is part and parcel of any modern system of administration of 
justice, while in the latter case it is equivalent to ‘fairness’, ‘morality’ and 
‘justice’ as the concept is applied in English legal system.404 The present work 
maintains this distinction. 
Some authors claim that even though equity plays a certain role in the 
reasoning of the World Court, it is not a legal (formal) source per se. It 
transcends legal rules, shapes their ramifications, widens their scope and 
sometimes directly impacts the rule’s content but without being a formal 
source of itself.405 Others insist that by virtue of its flexibility, its underlying 
role in softening the rigour of strict rules and its strive towards fairness, it is 
fair to maintain that equity makes up the corpus of general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations, that is the third source of law.406 To illustrate, 
in Diversion of Water from the Meuse, the case dubbed by Jenks as 
international equity’s ‘locus classicus’,407 Judge Hudson in his individual 
opinion upheld that ‘[w]hat are widely known as principles of equity have long 
been considered to constitute a part of international law, and as such they have 
often been applied by international tribunals’. He also added that ‘[a] sharp 
division between law and equity, such as prevails in the administration of 
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justice in some States, should find no place in international jurisprudence’.408 
While it is a separate opinion and thus not constituting a part of the Court’s 
judgment, it is nonetheless important for understanding underlying logic lying 
behind the Court’s relatively hazy exposition of arguments. Moreover, the fact 
that the Judge Hudson’s position has been challenged neither by his fellow 
judges nor in the subsequent decisions of the World Court implies the general 
acceptance of equitable principles as forming corpus of general international 
law on par with other legal sources.409 In fact, the ICJ not only refrains from 
questioning the legal normativity of equity, but also explicitly endorses it: 
 
Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by 
definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable. Nevertheless, when 
mention is made of a court dispensing justice or declaring the law, what is 
meant is that the decision finds its objective justification in considerations 
lying not outside but within the rules, and in this field it is precisely a rule of 
law that calls for the application of equitable principles.410 
 
On another occasion, the Court similarly held that 
 
Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court 
whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it. In the 
course of the history of legal systems the term ‘equity’ has been used to define 
various legal concepts. It was often contrasted with the rigid rules of positive 
law, the severity of which had to be mitigated in order to do justice. In general, 
this contrast has no parallel in the development of international law; the legal 
concept of equity is a general principle directly applicable as law.411 
 
Yet, other quarters of the scholarly community take a middle-ground position 
by claiming that given its inherent vagueness, it is not equity as such that is a 
general principle but rather certain equitable principles that are widely 
recognised across various foro domestico and can qualify as general principles 
of law recognised by civilised nations for the purposes of article 38.412 This 
last position finds partial explanation in the widely recognised trend among 
international judges to invoke a certain principle without much elaboration as 
to its origin. The author of the present work aligns with this last position as it 
allows to preserve the nature of international law as both normative 
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(constraining state actions) and concrete (the constraining power of 
international law flows from state consent). On this view, equity presents itself 
as a ‘material’ source of international law, that is a source from which equity 
derives its matter, not validity, whilst certain equitable principles which are 
accepted in majority of national legal systems are formal sources of 
international law. By virtue of their explicit enshrinement in article 38(1)(c) 
ICJ Statute, they are binding on all subjects of international law irrespective of 
treaties and custom. 
Given the increasing inter-dependence between states and consequently 
increasing assimilation of various legal systems, it comes as no surprise that 
national jurisdictions have developed analogous principles throughout the 
world. As Burke astutely noted, ‘[i]f a legal system of a civilized nation resists 
equity’s influence, respect for the legal system will, in the long term, diminish 
and collapse, and it will cease to be a legal system, or the citizens will revolt 
against it’.413 It means that legitimacy of every legal system depends on its 
acceptance of equity in one form or another in order to obviate injustice and 
abuse of law. Which are then these equitable principles? Albeit it is clear that 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations encompass a wide 
range of principles accepted by the majority of national jurisdictions, the 
objective test for finding these principles is yet to be invented. Ergo, in order 
to avoid inherently subjective picking up of principles ‘out of thin air’,414 the 
recourse will be made solely to principles that manifested themselves in the 
jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ. 
 
4.4.2.1. Good Faith 
 
There scarcely are scholars who would not regard good faith as the most 
fundamental principle of international law.415 Apart from being present in all 
developed national jurisdictions as well as endorsed by states in a variety of 
international instruments, the most obvious of which is the VCLT, the principle 
of good faith makes its influence felt in all areas of international law. In the 
‘Century of the Treaty’, where the amount of treaties skyrocketed to the 
number of over 200,000 documents published in over 2,800 volumes of the 
UN Treaty Series,416 with the number of non-treaty commitments being at the 
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very least double, the principle of good faith in the form of the doctrine of 
pacta sunt servanda is of such a paramount importance that without this 
principle ‘international law […] would be a mere mockery’.417 Cheng also 
notes that ‘by infusing such qualities as honesty, sincerity, reasonableness and 
moderation into the exercise of rights, [the principle of good faith] promotes 
the smooth and proper functioning of the legal system’.418 Good faith is, thus, 
a constitutional principle, a ‘Verfassungsgrundsatz der 
Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft’ in the words of Dahm,419 as it aims at mitigating 
destructive consequences of state sovereignty and its attendant principles, such 
as non-interference into the domestic affairs of states and inalienability of state 
consent, in the international community in an ever-growing need of 
cooperation. A number of eminent national and international judgments have 
upheld the principle.420 Moreover, the principle of bona fides has never been 
challenged by any party to the dispute before the World Court. 
In treaty interpretation, the importance of good faith is difficult to 
overstate. Even though the general rule of interpretation enshrined in article 31 
VCLT is too simplistic and too complex at the same time given its 
susceptibility to quite contradictory interpretations, one essential rule of 
interpretation is ever present, namely the rule of interpretation in good faith.421 
It is in following considerations of good faith that one accords priority to a 
certain interpretative element: ordinary meaning, context or object and 
purpose.422 That said, there is a strong link between the principle of good faith 
and the right to democratic governance. As was set out previously, states 
committed themselves to uphold democracy in a variety of binding 
instruments, the most prominent of which is article 25 ICCPR. Not only does 
the article encompass a bundle of procedural democratic elements, such as the 
right to vote, to stand for election and to occupy public office, but 
considerations of good faith require one to read into the article more 
substantive elements, such as political pluralism, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. It means that states failing to hold elections in line 
with these standards and otherwise undermining the establishment and/or 
consolidation of democratic form of government are acting mala fides. Bad 
faith exercised by the recalcitrant state is a breach of a general principle of law. 
In other words, when states violate the right of their citizens to, say, vote in 
free, fair and multiparty elections, not only does this amount to violation of the 
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norms of treaty law or customary law, but this also involves a breach of the 
general principle of good faith. This also holds true the other way around: the 
violation of the principle of good faith is tantamount to a breach stricto sensu 
of said agreement. As Cheng opines, ‘[i]n short, good faith requires that one 
party should be able to place confidence in the words of the other’.423 Every 
right stands for the protection of a legal interest. Any exercise of such right 
‘not in furtherance of such interest, but with the malicious purpose of injuring 
others can no longer claim the protection of the law. Malitiis non est 
indulgendum [indulgence is not to be shown to the malicious desires of 
men]’.424 Thus, any state who joined the ICCPR’s system to elevate their 
political image without a genuine commitment to act accordingly is acting 
mala fides vis-à-vis the Covenant, which is tantamount to an effective and 
material breach of the Covenant. 
On the other side of the coin, when a state undertakes binding obligations 
by subscribing to international treaty, such as, for instance, the ICCPR, to 
reassert its political standing without any actual intention to follow the treaty 
provisions, its action can be characterised as abus de droit, which forms part 
of the broader conception of good faith.425 This follows from the principle of 
sic uteri tuo ut alienum non laedas, meaning that one should so use one’s own 
property as not to injure other people. Thus, whenever a state becomes a party 
to a treaty, its people as well as the international community at large put trust 
into the fact that the state concerned will adhere to the said treaty. In failing to 
meet such expectations, the state in question commits a breach of faith 
concerning the assurances previously offered, including the obligation to 
democratise. 
Moreover, having established that soft law instruments, as a reflection of 
opinio juris for the purposes of establishing the existence of customary law and 
as a self-standing source of law, lay out more elaborate guidance on how states 
are expected to go about their democratic policies, including the prohibition of 
democratic interruptions through military coups and other extra-constitutional 
encroachments, it is fair to contend that by reneging on their ‘soft’ undertakings 
states also act in bad faith. The Nuclear Tests Case is but one example where 
the Court, faced with the necessity to inscribe concrete legal obligations into a 
soft instrument (unilateral declaration), found support in the principle of 
legitimate expectations, one of the aspects of good faith: 
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One of the basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal 
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and 
confidence are inherent in international cooperation, in particular in an age 
when this co-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential. Just 
as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based on good 
faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed 
by unilateral declaration. Thus interested States may take cognizance of 
unilateral declarations and place confidence in them, and are entitled to 
require that the obligation thus created be respected.426 
 
As Boyle pointedly insisted, while the majority of scholarly community is still 
sceptical as to their legal validity, non-treaty instruments are often carefully 
negotiated and intended to have some normative significance: ‘There is at least 
an element of good faith commitment, evidencing in some cases a desire to 
influence state practice or expressing some measure of law-making intention 
and progressive development’.427 It may be consequently submitted that the 
failure to live up to ‘soft law’ commitments may also entail the breach of the 
principle of good faith. 
 
4.4.2.2. Estoppel 
 
Another general principle of law relevant for the democratic entitlement is 
estoppel, also known as non concedit venire contra factum proprium (no one 
may set himself in contradiction to his own previous conduct). In a nutshell, it 
can be reduced to an idea that actors are to be held accountable for the promises 
they make. In words of Cheng, it is pursuant to a principle of good faith that ‘a 
man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold — to affirm at one time and 
deny at another […]. Such a principle has its basis in common sense and 
common justice, and whether it is called “estoppel”, or by any other name, it 
is one which courts of law have in modern times most usefully adopted’.428 
At its simplest, the major rationale behind the principle of estoppel is to 
ensure consistency in what states say and do and to guarantee thereby a 
measure of stability in their legal relations. Thus, the tripartite test for estoppel 
is based on: (1) an assurance provided by one party; (2) reliance on that 
assurance by another party; and (3) detriment occurred to another party on foot 
of this reliance.429 The principle originated in the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition 
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and was only partially integrated into international law. However, because it is 
present in all systems of private law, it is logical to extrapolate it into the 
domain of inter-state relations.430 In the words of Kolb, ‘[c]e principe qu’il est 
possible de décrire sommairement comme celui d’une non-contradiction 
qualifiée, est à proprement parler universel car il correspond à une conception 
fondamentale du droit’.431 MacGibbon suggests that the underlying rationale 
of the doctrine of estoppel lies ‘in the continuing need for at least a modicum 
of stability and for some measure of predictability in the pattern of State 
conduct’.432 He also characterised it as a natural and inherent complement to 
pacta sunt servanda, which on his view constitutes the cornerstone of the 
international legal system.433 For Burke, the doctrine of estoppel is ‘the 
epitome of equitable doctrines crafted to secure adherence to the idea of good 
faith and honorable conduct inter partes’.434 The World Court had an 
opportunity to pronounce on this principle in some of its judgments.435 In the 
Chorzow Factory case, the PCIJ ruled that: 
 
[I]t is […] a principle generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international 
arbitration […] that one party cannot avail itself of the fact that the other has 
not fulfilled some obligation, or has not had recourse to some means of 
redress, if the former party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from 
fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal 
which would have been open to him.436 
 
In Temple of Preah Vihear,437 commonly cited as the most important modern 
case of application of the doctrine of estoppel on the international plane, the 
Court applied the principles of acquiescence and estoppel to protect the 
boundary between Thailand and Cambodia, which albeit had been drawn by 
error, was not challenged by Siam authorities for a long period of time. As a 
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result, the Court held that Thailand acquiesced to the boundary and was 
estopped from altering it. It follows that estoppel is closely linked to the idea 
of acquiescence for it can also arise by the virtue of a state’s implicit acceptance 
(estoppel by silence) in addition to a specific assurance.438 
There is, thus, ample evidence that the principle of estoppel is deeply 
ingrained into the architecture of international law. Since the principle is an 
adjunct to good faith, and particularly to its pacta sunt servanda component, it 
comes as no surprise that it bears on the present discussion. It is fair to suggest 
that whenever state consents to be bound by a treaty or accepts, whether 
explicitly or tacitly, a norm of customary law as binding, or continuously 
expresses its conviction about the importance of a particular issue by means of 
soft law instruments, it creates legitimate expectations that its conduct will be 
in line with the rule in question. If the state concerned for some reason 
repudiates its commitment it inflicts detriment on other states as well as its own 
citizens. For instance, it is a common practice within the confines of the UN 
and other regional organisations to monitor election practices in states willing 
to embark upon democratic path. Whenever the international organisation 
upon the request of the incumbent government monitors the latter’s elections 
and subsequently recognises the result of elections as fair and in accordance to 
international standards, the government in questions creates expectations that 
all relevant stakeholders including itself will abide by the election outcome. 
Should this expectation be frustrated, the international community may 
undertake an action, as it did in Haiti, to restore the legitimate government 
whose election it was monitoring. In such way, the transgressor state is legally 
precluded, or estopped, from denying the original assurance given. It is here 
that another equitable principle comes into play, namely ubi ius, ubi remedium, 
meaning that for every wrong committed there must be an adequate remedy. 
Whenever it is established that a state is reneging on its human rights 
obligations, or assurances, and where the compliance cannot be vindicated 
through diplomatic channels, failure to ensure remedy will strip the doctrine of 
estoppel of any meaningful use. Burke mapped the principle so well that there 
is no need to reiterate his findings here.439 It suffices to mention that in case 
when democratic government is toppled by military coup or by the 
employment of other anti-constitutional means, that is when a state is reneging 
upon its assurances to ensure every citizen the right to political participation, 
it is held to be estopped from denying its assurances, and the citizens of the 
state in question shall have recourse to remedy. Since the state in issue is 
incapable of providing remedy given the absence of legitimate government, it 
is the international community as a whole that has to react to effectuate the 
international estoppel, whether by means of diplomatic, economic and political 
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sanctions, or, in the most extreme case, by means of military force. Another 
possibility would be the grass-root forcible action against the incumbent 
government by means of revolution.440 
 
4.4.2.3. Acquiescence 
 
One would barely object that negative duties, that is duties to refrain from 
committing certain acts, are more prominent in any legal system, including 
international law, than positive duties, that is duties requiring certain 
affirmative action to be regarded as fulfilled. Hence, the duty to protest or to 
undertake another positive measure to ensure ones established rights is not to 
be regarded as a prima facie condition for maintaining these rights. Yet, a 
certain type of situations may warrant an effective action to affirm the validity 
of one’s established rights and the failure to act, or acquiescence, may 
compromise one’s rights if the other party has been misled by that party’s 
silence.441 In fact, international law as a system lacking a compulsory 
mechanism of authoritative judicial ascertainment of the legality of new 
practices and forms of conduct is a fertile ground for the incorporation of 
acquiescence in the form of silence or the failure to protest as its underlying 
principle. Whilst acquiescence emerged in the Anglo-American legal tradition, 
it was transposed onto the international realm through a number of judicial and 
arbitral decisions442 as well as scholarly writings and, as a result, it acquired its 
autonomous meaning that goes well beyond its domestic precursor’s 
ramifications. 
Acquiescence, expressed by the maxim qui tacet consentire videtur si 
loqui debuisset ac potuisset (he who keeps silent is held to consent if he must 
and can speak), is an equitable principle in which, akin to other above-
mentioned principles, considerations of good faith and equity are central. Its 
main goal is to mitigate injustices flowing from the rigid application of positive 
law as well as to temper the stagnation effect of positivism, since a blind 
reliance on state consent for a new norm to arise might prove to be a significant 
impediment to the development of international law. Acquiescence may also 
facilitate the development of customary international law since ‘general 
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toleration by the international community may lend support to an emerging 
customary rule’.443 Acquiescence has equally closely-knit relations with 
estoppel: ‘Acquiescence produces an estoppel in circumstances when good 
faith would require that the State concerned should take active steps of some 
kind in order to preserve its rights of freedom of action’.444 In this sense, 
acquiescence can be viewed as a particular form of estoppel, that is ‘estoppel 
by silence’, ‘by inaction’ or ‘by abstention’. In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries 
case, in which Britain objected against the Norwegian expansion of its 
territorial sea, the Court laid emphasis on the absence of protests against the 
Norwegian claims: ‘The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the 
international community, Great Britain’s position in the North Sea, her own 
interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case 
warrant Norway’s enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom’.445 
In other words, the Court raised the acquiescence of Great Britain as an 
estoppel against her. Similar reasoning is visible in the Temple of Preah Vihear 
case, in which the Court relied on Thailand’s silence as a preclusion to deny 
the validity of the border settlement with Cambodia.446 However, one should 
not confuse the two principles. Whilst acquiescence must be manifested by the 
community at large, estoppel is applicable inter partes.447 Secondly, estoppel 
presupposes the existence of a dommage, whereas acquiescence lacks this 
requirement. Thirdly, acquiescence is only manifested through passive 
behaviour, whereas estoppel can include both passive and active elements. 
Fourthly, the requirement of a lapse of time is more acute for acquiescence than 
for estoppel.448 Lastly, acquiescence signals an expression of consent, whereas 
there is not such a requisite for estoppel to arise.449 Only in a limited type of 
circumstances, such as, e.g., boundary disputes as the above-mentioned cases 
demonstrate, is the difference between the two negligible. For acquiescence to 
arise, two conditions shall be met: (1) the acquiescing state should be aware of 
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the situation it acquiesces to and (2) certain lapse of time is required before 
acquiescence can emerge.450 
Inasmuch as acquiescence facilitates the emergence of new legal norms 
without directly invoking individual state consent, it can be regarded as an 
effective means of constitutionalisation of international law. The community 
values that are reflected in human rights, which are enshrined in international 
human rights treaties, enjoy strong international support and states are 
unwilling to compromise their political standing by persistently objecting to 
these norms. If they do not object they can be considered bound by these norms 
by virtue of acquiescence. Whilst it is not universally accepted that democracy 
is now a universal human right, it is neither explicitly objected thereto. Indeed, 
no modern authoritarian regime is capable of universal ideological assault on 
liberal democracy. Their stance in international community is defensive.451 
Whenever these regimes face a need to legitimise their power they claim 
representing a particular type of democracy, such as, e.g., a communist 
regime’s claim to be a proletarian democracy, an Africa one-party state’s claim 
to be an ‘African democracy’ and Asian states’ claim to be democracy carved 
by ‘Asian values’. Because the consolidation of a norm occurs whenever 
violators attempt to justify their actions within the framework of the norm or 
object ever violating it,452 it is fair to suggest that the commitment to 
democracy is now a legal norm. 
The above-mentioned calls for non-Western varieties of democracy are 
nevertheless regraded by some commentators as a manifestation of the 
legitimacy crisis of Western liberal democracy.453 They appeal to poor 
performance of modern democracies characterised by their inabilities to 
address popular interests, to defeat corruption and to provide for a workable 
political framework for fragile states.454 Yet, the author of this work contends 
that even if the Western liberal democracy as an institutional project might be 
in crisis, the idea of democracy as a right to equality and empowerment in 
domestic political process is ever universally shared. Moreover, to turn the 
argument upside down, the very fact that new models of democracy are being 
shaped to suit local particularities strengthens the democratic thesis because 
not only is there no objection to democracy as a right (calls for non-Western 
types of democracy are not a cloak for authoritarianism but are aimed to 
achieve a more genuine and effective democracy) but democracy is now 
universally accepted as the only form of government compatible with 
international law. It is only the democratic institutional layout that is yet to be 
locally designed. To put it slightly differently, democracy is universally 
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accepted precisely because it can have a variety of forms none of which is 
universal. This thesis finds support in the pronouncements of the UNGA which 
declared that while ‘democracies share common features [such as 
empowerment and equality]’, there is no ‘single model of democracy’.455 
Similar viewpoints were expressed by some high-standing international 
politicians, which claimed that ‘each society will work to realize its own 
democratic values and build its own democratic institutions in its own way, 
because we also recognize the uniqueness of culture and history and 
experience’456 and ‘[w]hile democracy is the cornerstone of the European 
Union, it is clear there is no single model for democratic government’.457 
Hence, it is fair to suggest that given the absence of protest on the part of the 
majority of states with regard to democracy as the only legitimate form of 
government irrespective of the diversity of visions concerning the right 
democratic institutional design, it is plausible to claim that states consented, or 
acquiesced, to the democratic rule as a legal norm and are, thus, bound by it. 
 
4.4.2.4. Substance over Form 
 
The last principle exerting impact on democratic entitlement is the principle of 
the prioritisation of substance over form (also commonly referred to as ex re 
sed non ex nomine). This is not to say that there are no other principles shaping 
the modalities of this discussion. Rather, their in-depth examination merits a 
separate book and is not possible in a work of this scale. By essence, the 
principle of substance over form, which gained a near-universal acceptance in 
various national systems,458 presupposes that one ‘looks to the substance rather 
than form of a transaction and does not require “unnecessary formalities” to be 
observed’.459 Similarly to estoppel and acquiescence, the doctrine stems from 
the principles of good faith and abus de droit.460 The demands of good faith 
are, thus, inconsonant with formalism which is marked by the prevalence of 
                                               
455 UNGA Res 62/7 (8 November 2007) UN Doc A/RES/62/7. 
456 Hillary Clinton, ‘Remarks at the Launch of Strategic Dialogue with Civil Society’, US 
Department of State (Washington DC, 16 February 2011) 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/02/156681.htm> accessed 31 
August 2016. 
457 EU, ‘Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Occasion of the 
International Day of Democracy’, A359/11 (Brussels, 15 September 2011) 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/124598.pdf> 
accessed 31 August 2016. For a more detailed exposition of the arguments for non-Western 
democracy, see Richard Youngs, The Puzzle of Non-Western Democracy (Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 2015) 15-19. 
458 Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 
2013) 317. 
459 Hilary Delany, Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland (3rd edn, Thomson Roundhall 2003) 
34. 
460 Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 
2013) 318. 
The Right to Democracy in the Constitutionalising International Law 
 
 
172 
form over substance.461 The Court had on several occasions to employ the 
principle.462 In Barcelona Traction, the ICJ extended the right of diplomatic 
protection to legal entities through the usage of two equitable doctrines, such 
as ubi ius, ubi remedium and ‘substance over form’. It justified its decision by 
stating that ‘it is necessary that the law be applied reasonably’.463 In the 
Nicaragua case, the Court despite Nicaragua’s failure to formally complete the 
process of ratification of its acceptance of the PCIJ jurisdiction, recognised 
Nicaragua as having met the requirements of compulsory jurisdiction.464 The 
rationale behind such a decision can be found in the equitable principle of ex 
re sed non ex nomine, that is equity will give credence to the substance of a 
transaction rather than its form. It does not mean, however, that substance will 
always prevail. Rather, ‘unnecessary formalities’ shall be dispensed with. 
Moreover, in certain domestic legal systems the invocation of formal 
deficiency to support one’s claim is viewed as abus de droit.465 
Turning to the right to democracy, it is important to remind the reader that 
there are two competing conceptions of democracy in political theory that were 
eventually transplanted to the field of international law: procedural (narrow) 
and substantive (broad). The former views democracy as a process in which 
new government comes into power through elections and is well-captured in 
the writings of Schumpeter: ‘The democratic method is that of institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’.466 
Substantive conception, on the contrary, is based on democracy’s underlying 
principles, such as political equality and popular sovereignty, rather than 
merely elections. As Beetham has amply contended, ‘[i]ts [democracy] 
defining principles are that all citizens entitled to a say in public affairs, both 
through the associations of civil society and through participation in 
government, and that this entitlement should be available on terms of equality 
to all’.467 The predominance of the procedural understanding of democracy in 
international legal scholarship leads to a quite unfair result, whereby states that 
                                               
461 See generally Olivier Corten, L’utilisation du ‘raisonnable’ par le juge international 
(Bruylant 1997). 
462 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Merits) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392. 
463 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Merits) [1970] 
ICJ Rep 3, 48. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf in Whaling in the Antarctic 
(Australia v Japan: New Zealand intervening) (Merits) [2014] ICJ Rep 226, para 15. 
464 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, paras 109-10. 
465 Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Hart Publishing 
2013) 222. 
466 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (6th edn, Routledge 1994) 269. 
Other scholars reducing democracy to elections are Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of Oklahoma Press 1991) 7-9; Adam 
Przeworski and others, ‘What Makes Democracies Endure?’ (1996) 7 Journal of Democracy 39, 
50-51. 
467 David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Polity Press 1999) 90-91. 
The Right to Democracy in the Constitutionalising International Law 
 
 
173 
organise elections to further their political image and legitimacy on the 
international scene but are unwilling to undertake any substantial effort to 
ensure meaningful participation of their citizens in political process (facade 
democracies) are treated on a par with liberal democracies. Moreover, states 
may use the institution of elections to shield themselves from international 
scrutiny of their human rights records. Considering the fact that many electoral 
democracies may be repressive towards their citizens and actively violate their 
human rights,468 as the cases of Russia, Belarus and other post-communist 
countries illustrate, the purely procedural reading of international legal texts, 
such as, for instance, article 25 ICCPR, may lead to controversial results 
unresponsive to the interests of justice. The application of the principle of 
prioritisation of substance over form may mitigate this inequity by reading into 
the democratic provisions of international and regional instruments the 
substantive principles of political equality and popular sovereignty. For 
example, by interpreting ICCPR article 25 through the prism of substance over 
form maxim would leave no room for states to argue that the article does not 
prohibit one-party regimes. Moreover, ex re sed non ex nomine renders it 
possible to look not only at the substance of the ICCPR, but also to consider 
substance of other international and regional texts as well as customary rules 
covering the same issue. 
The application of all the aforementioned principles in tandem provides 
for an equitable framework for the democratic entitlement. In other words, the 
combined weight of the applied principles inevitably suggests that the right to 
democracy forms an integral part of international human rights law. This is not 
only because international human rights law is essentially grounded on the 
considerations of human dignity and justice and whose intellectual base is 
dependent on the congruence with equitable principles but also because such 
deep interaction between written rules and principles is envisaged in general 
international law. As has been previously ascertained, article 31(3)(c) VCLT 
requires treaties to be interpreted against the backdrop of general international 
law, of which general principles constitute an essential part. This effectively 
means that general principles should be taken into consideration in 
interpretation of human rights treaties, including the ICCPR. In other words, 
whilst one cannot derive the right to democracy exclusively from equitable 
principles, one can definitely do such derivation from international human 
rights standards interpreted against the background of such principles as 
‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’.469 At this junction, the primary role of general principles is to ensure 
that the already existing but conceptually ambiguous norm — a characteristic 
animating the democratic entitlement norm — is effective and serves its 
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purpose. The author of this thesis is aware of the possible shaky ground on 
which the present argument lies given the absence of more concrete legal rules 
on the subject and the paucity of pronouncements of the World Court to draw 
on. However, as Burke noted on several occasions, general principles exist 
autonomously, irrespective of whether the Court had an opportunity to 
elucidate them in its jurisprudence or not.470 In addition, the authoritativeness 
of the present equitable framework is strengthened by the fact that only 
principles that have manifested themselves in the judgements and opinions of 
the PCIJ /ICJ have been employed. This is pinned on a consideration that the 
practice of the World Court in terms of dealing with general principles in the 
context of inter-state disputes appears the safest base upon which to ground the 
equitable theory of the democratic entitlement thesis. 
 
4.5. Taking Stock: Is Democracy a Human Right? 
 
The preceding chapter has shown that democracy has passed the stage when it 
was regarded as an exclusively domestic matter. With the advent of 
international human rights law, it evolved from being a purely political goal to 
a human right. Moreover, the ongoing globalisation and transformation of 
national political space and the attendant constitutionalisation of international 
law have affected the normative scope of the democratic entitlement to the 
extent that it now stretches itself well beyond the electoral method. Thus, legal 
foundations of the right to democracy lie in international human rights treaties, 
customary international law, various non-treaty instruments as well as general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. Taken in tandem, they 
constitute an international law of democracy. They interact and reinforce each 
other. Global constitutionalism is both an outcome and an engine of this 
process of convergence. 
That said, it has been firstly established that the principle international 
treaty source of the right to democracy is article 25 ICCPR. By virtue of being 
a human rights treaty, the Covenant urges teleological interpretation of its 
provisions, including the aforementioned article. After the critical examination 
of the Covenant’s preambular text, provisions of its article 25 and other 
relevant material, including external sources, as an expression of its object(s) 
and purpose(s), it was concluded that the ICCPR’s object-and-purpose test 
restricts the range of choices governments can make with respect to their 
political system. Such conclusion was reinforced by an assertion that the 
teleological method inevitably implies evolutive interpretation, pinned on an 
idea that international law is to be viewed as a system. Against this backdrop, 
it has been asserted that interpretative techniques developed by regional human 
rights tribunals are directly applicable to the ICCPR article 25’s interpretation 
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— an idea that has also found support in the recent jurisprudence of the HRC. 
Thus, reading the Covenant, including its article 25, as a ‘living instrument’ 
and in the light of modern ‘commonly accepted standards’ inevitably implies 
liberal democratic form of government. In other words, the widely-shared 
assertion that the ICCPR does not presuppose any particular political system 
but merely codifies the right to elections can no longer hold. As Cerna 
pointedly concluded, ‘by becoming a party to a human rights instrument, a 
state agrees to organize itself along democratic lines’.471 
Secondly, it has been ascertained that democracy has evolved into a 
customary norm given the ample evidence of opinio juris as expressed in both 
UN fora and other regional arrangements. Such conclusion has been reached 
by positing that constitutionalisation of international law has affected the way 
custom is formed. For a customary norm to arise, verbal statements by states, 
either directly or through the venues of international organisations, as a 
reflection of opinio juris that certain norm is desirable now or in the future as 
an authoritative legal norm are viewed as sufficient, whereas the traditional 
requirement of general and consistent state practice is considered less 
important. Thirdly, the role of soft law in international law in general and its 
impact on the democratic entitlement in particular has been revisited. It was 
concluded that even though the plurality of existing non-binding commitments 
to install and protect democracy is not per se sufficient to claim a full-fledged 
right to democracy, they undeniably exert a strong impact on the conceptual 
and legal ramifications of the right concerned and constitute an essential phase 
in the process of hardening of the ‘emerging’ democratic norm. 
Finally, it has been established that the commonly neglected third source 
— general principles of law recognised by civilised nations — plays an 
important role in sharpening the normative scope and effectiveness of existing 
legal norms, including the right to democracy. Thus, a set of equitable 
principles, including good faith, estoppel, acquiesce and substance over form, 
constituting a sub-category of general principles of law most commonly 
invoked in the jurisprudence of the World Court, has been examined in order 
to strengthen the democratic entitlement thesis and clarify its legal scope. 
Because the primary purpose of equitable principles is to ensure that the law is 
applied justly, to deny democratic entitlement by defending the election-
centred approach to democracy is to neglect this important source of law. This 
position taken in conjunction with the aforementioned considerations leads to 
a conclusion that international law in principle encompasses a right to (liberal) 
democracy. 
Be this as it may, it is commonly asserted that because the global index of 
the implementation of democratic norm is still quite low and there even 
appears to be a consistent state practice of violating the norm, democracy has 
not yet crystallised into a legal right/obligation. However, the weakness of 
national and international enforcement of democracy as a legal norm does not 
                                               
471 Christine Cerna, ‘Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or a Pipe Dream of the 
West’ (1995) 27 NYUJ Int’l L & Pol 290, 295. 
The Right to Democracy in the Constitutionalising International Law 
 
 
176 
repudiate the validity of the democratic entitlement. Human rights do not cease 
to be rights simply because they are honoured more in breach than in 
observance. As Henkin observed 
 
In principle, whether the human rights agreements are being honored, 
whether the individuals are in fact enjoying the human rights promised, is not 
immediately relevant legally (or philosophically) […] failure of one or more 
states to carry out their international human rights undertakings does not 
vitiate the character of the undertakings as legal obligations, or the rights and 
duties they create.472 
 
However, he added one caveat: non-observance of human rights does not affect 
their character as rights if it is for the short term. Should such non-confirming 
behaviour endure over an extended period of time ‘one would have to consider 
whether there are legal obligations and consequent rights and duties’.473 
Despite the ostensibly hard logic behind this claim, which is certainly relevant 
for state obligations vis-à-vis each other, it is doubtful whether it accounts for 
the special nature of human rights obligations, which are owed not to states 
inter partes but to individuals. States do not create human rights but recognise 
them through codification and enforcement. That states fail to implement 
human rights may weaken their enjoyment but do not strip them of their quality 
as rights. Moreover, there is a permanent tension between states’ self-interests 
and human rights — that is, it is often the case that guaranteeing human rights 
to their subjects may be in contradiction to states’ immediate goals and even 
represent a significant burden on states’ freedom of action as well as economic 
resources — a tension which is less salient with respect to more ‘practical’ 
coordination norms. Such tension inevitably leads to the widespread human 
rights violations, including the right to democracy, without affecting their 
status as rights. 
Finally, one may question the authentic value of the democratic entitlement 
with respect to the already extant internationally recognised rights to freedom 
of election, assembly, speech, association, movement and prohibition of 
discrimination, to name but a few. Would not their combined realisation 
automatically lead to democracy? As Alston suggested, in order for a claim to 
qualify as a human right, it must, among others, ‘be consistent with, but not 
merely repetitive of, the existing body of international human rights law’.474 It 
is often said that democracy is an ‘aggregate right’, as it draws its substance 
from other internationally recognised civil and political rights. However, it is 
frequently overlooked that the principal value of democracy as a self-standing 
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‘monolithic’ right is the fact that it brings certain normative idea, certain 
ideological element that is otherwise missing in the traditional ‘right-to-
vote/right-to-stand-for-election’ debate. This ‘novel’ right buttresses the 
effectiveness of other human rights by imputing greater determinacy in their 
otherwise open-ended texture and lessens the room for their abuse. For 
instance, the right to democracy as a self-standing right is justified by urgent 
moral goods, such as equality. As Christiano put it, ‘[t]he human right to 
democracy […] asserts that there is a strong moral justification for states to 
adopt or maintain the institutions of minimally egalitarian democracy and it is 
morally justified for the international community to respect, protect and 
promote the right of each person to participate in minimally egalitarian 
democratic decision-making concerning their society’.475 Another essential 
normative idea born by democracy as a right in and of itself is the notion of 
citizen empowerment, that is everyone is entitled to actively partake in the 
decisions that affect one’s fulfilment of basic human rights: ‘Inasmuch as 
people are social beings […] engaging in common or joint activities with 
others can be seen as itself one of the prime conditions for their freedom’, as 
itself a human right.476 
Henceforth, having ascertained that democracy is now a human right, the 
question of military coups and other anti-constitutional changes of government 
as well as revolutions acquire a completely new magnitude in international 
legal debate. If democracy is a human right then all sorts of democratic 
disruptions are to be regarded as violations of this right and, thus, illegal under 
international law justifying international responses, including by military 
means. Moreover, if a human right is violated there should be a remedy. Hence, 
one can argue that the right of revolution is one of such remedies, so to say the 
ultimate one, when democratic government is toppled or when democratisation 
is resisted by the leader of the day. The next two chapters will take a closer 
look at these issues.
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5. External Defence of Democracy 
 
The previous chapter has shown that international law envisages the right to 
democratic governance. Albeit it was concluded that the weak enforcement of 
the right in question does not deny its character as a right, the existing gap 
between the language of democracy and the actual practice undoubtedly 
undermines the progress of democratisation and its legitimacy. Moreover, such 
deficiency at the level of implementation has been invoked as the most 
powerful counter-argument against the democratic entitlement thesis.1 To 
provide for a stronger case for the right to democracy, one has to show that not 
only does it exist as an abstract concept impenetrable for orthodox techniques 
of legal interpretation and analysis but it is also actively defended both by the 
international community (external defence) and domestic actors (internal 
defence). That said, defence of democracy denotes measures aimed to prevent 
democratic backsliding as well as reactions to democratic backsliding and, in 
the most extreme case, forceful responses to democratic breakdown.2 Such 
measures may include the international condemnation of an illegitimate act, 
the threat to suspend a government’s membership or to cut economic benefits 
and the employment of increasingly robust measures, such as visa restrictions 
on copy plotters, arms embargoes, freezing of assets and, in exceptional cases, 
the use of military force. Together, they evidence the emergence of a new 
international norm: once put in place, the people’s right to live in a 
democratically constituted state shall not be abridged and attempts to do so 
justify international counter-actions. 
External defence of democracy has developed through state practice and 
has been formalised through the adoption of international instruments, hard 
and soft, containing so-called ‘democracy clauses’ — ‘multilateral 
mechanisms for protecting democracy when it is constitutionally interrupted 
or threatened by autocratic rulers’.3 Their most prominent feature is the 
collective response to unconstitutional changes of governments, such as 
military coups and executive coups, commonly designated as coups d’état 
(French for ‘stroke of the state’). Military coup is an illegal change of 
government in which military elite ousted the incumbent regime and installed 
some form of military dictatorship. It ‘consists of the infiltration of a small but 
critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the 
government from its control of the remainder’.4 Military coups are typically 
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executed by means of force. But force is not their defining feature. Other extra-
legal tactics are also possible. This has become to be known as executive coup 
(also called self-coup or autogolpe) — an extraconstitutional event in which 
democratically chosen executives effectively ended democracy by 
concentrating power in their hands by, inter alia, closing congress, purging 
courts, suspending the constitution, prolonging the term of tenure, declaring a 
state of emergency or martial law.5 Some authors also distinguish so-called 
‘impeachment coups’ — ‘illegal — and often violent — acts by a disloyal 
opposition that unseat elected presidents and effect a quasi-legal transfer of 
power to a constitutionally designated successor’.6 To put it bluntly, whereas 
executive coups involve an attack on a democratically-elected legislature by 
the executive branch, impeachment coups refer to a quasi-constitutional action 
by a legislature to remove a democratically-elected president. The seizure of 
power by military junta or a civilian actor is historically the oldest way of 
establishing a modern form of authoritarianism dating back to Napoleon 
1799’s coup, not to mention the days of the Roman empire when Julius Caesar 
ascended to power through a coup in 49 BCE. Nowadays, it is allegedly the 
most important factor leading to the breakdown of a democratic rule. 
According to the statistical data, three out of every four successful ousters of 
democratic regime are conducted by means of a coup d’état.7 
There are also a range of events that do not attain the level of a coup but 
which, nonetheless, lead to the erosion of the democratic order in a more 
gradual and sustained manner. These include, among others, the use of public 
office to harass opposition and institutionalise a single party policy, the 
restriction of human rights, the illegal and arbitrary appointment and dismissal 
of elected authorities or representatives of the judiciary as well as the failure 
to hold periodic and genuine elections and accept electoral outcomes.8 There 
is not always a clear fine line between these cases of democratic deterioration 
and coups d’état proper. All too often the same situation may tend to be 
characterised in the three above-mentioned ways. The analysis of the 
mechanisms at the hands of the international community to respond to both 
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coups d’état and other threats against democracy is crucial for ascertaining the 
(external) enforcement dimension of the right to democracy and strengthening 
thereby legitimacy of the democratic entitlement doctrine. In what follows, it 
will be elucidated how the international community acts in defence of 
democracy. 
 
5.1. Global System of the External Defence of Democracy 
 
Since Thomas Franck’s seminal article of 1992 on democratic entitlement, in 
which the author asserted that undemocratic regimes should be denied the 
benefits of collective security arrangements, such as those under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter,9 international legal scholars, especially the ones falling 
under the label of ‘democratic entitlement school’, have advanced an idea that 
post-Cold War international law assumed a defensive stance vis-à-vis 
democratic disruptions. Military coups, it has been said, ‘constitute terrible 
violations of the political rights of the collectivity, and they invariably bring in 
their wake serious violations of all other human rights’.10 Consequently, 
governments that came to power through undemocratic means should be 
denied recognition in the international fora.11 In more robust terms, it has been 
suggested that ‘coups against elected governments are now, per se, violations 
of international law’, and that ‘regional organizations are now licensed to use 
force to reverse such coups’.12 Whilst such progressive claims are largely 
limited to the North American continent and are treated with suspicion by other 
corners of scholarly community,13 they echo modern developments at the core 
of international legal regimes governing state recognition and the use of force. 
That being said, the first place to look for international legal norms 
prohibiting usurpation of constitutional processes is article 30 UDHR, which 
reads: ‘Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act 
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aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein’.14 
Absent direct references to anticonstitutional usurpations of power, one can, 
nonetheless, claim that the article prohibits ideologies standing in contrast with 
the rights enshrined in the Declaration. Indeed, how can any political ideology 
or form of government, except for democracy, be in compliance with, say, 
article 21 of the Declaration providing for a right to participation in elections? 
Importantly, contemporary hybrid regimes managing to ensure a certain 
modicum of political participation, normally limited to elections, and yet 
failing on other democratic indicators (real political freedom, accountability, 
transparency, independent judiciary, free opposition etc.) can ostensibly meet 
the requirements of article 21 and yet remain undemocratic. However, such an 
election-centred reading of the article is anachronistic and does not account for 
modern transformations within the doctrine of treaty interpretation.15 Albeit 
not an international treaty, the UDHR is widely perceived as an authoritative 
interpretation of the provisions of the UN Charter and should, henceforth, be 
interpreted in line with the modern developments animating the field of treaty 
interpretation. This assertion can be supported by the fact that most provisions 
of the Declaration found their way into the two Covenants and must be 
interpreted in accordance thereto. To claim otherwise, is to undermine 
uniformity in international human rights law. Against this backdrop, it is fair 
to posit that article 30 UDHR taken in conjunction with article 21 and other 
articles of the Declaration protecting democratic rights effectively disclaims 
the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes. 
Article 30 UDHR is almost verbatim reiterated in article 5 ICCPR.16 In MA 
v Italy, the Committee held that individuals must not abuse their rights to 
promote fascist policies which call for the destruction of the rights of others. 
Such acts are removed from the protection of the Covenant by article 5.17 
However, the Committee seemingly displayed more sympathy to left-wing 
antidemocratic views. In Sohn v Republic of Korea, the Committee found in 
favour of the applicant who was arrested for his support of the labour 
movement spreading the ideas of proletarian revolution by stating that ‘the 
State party has failed to specify the precise nature of the threat which it 
contends that the author’s exercise of freedom of expression posed and finds 
that none of the arguments advanced by the State party suffice to render the 
restriction of the author’s right to freedom of expression compatible with 
paragraph 3 of article 19’.18 Further, the Committee held that undemocratic 
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force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 5 (‘Nothing in the present Covenant may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or 
at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant’). 
17 MA v Italy (1981) 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 31, para 13(3). 
18 Jong-Kyo Sohn v Republic of Korea (1992) 5 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights 
Committee 163, para 10(4). See also Keun-Tae Kim v Republic of Korea (1994) 6 Selected 
Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 110, para 12(5) (‘The Committee considers therefore 
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institutions should not have significant political power. For instance, in its 
Concluding Observations on Chile it observed: ‘The Committee is deeply 
concerned by the enclaves of power retained by members of the former military 
regime. The powers accorded to the Senate to block initiatives adopted by the 
Congress and powers exercised by the National Security Council, which exists 
alongside the Government, are incompatible with article 25 of the Covenant’.19 
One should also be reminded of a more recent instrument elaborating the 
right of peoples to defend their fundamental rights and, if necessary, by using 
force. Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (also 
known as the Algiers Declaration) provides that ‘[a]ny people whose 
fundamental rights are seriously disregarded has the right to enforce them, 
specially by political or trade union struggle and even, in the last resort by the 
use the force’.20 While it is a soft instrument and lacks enforcement capacity, 
it remains to be a living document applicable to people in their struggle against 
oppression. 
Yet, the most important instrument regulating relations between states and 
their collective response to recalcitrant behaviour is the Charter of the United 
Nations.21 To say that the UN Charter contains a ‘democracy clause’ is to 
immediately effect an earthquake within the international legal circles. The 
paradigmatic principles of non-use of force (article 2.4) and non-intervention 
(article 2.7) are the central pillars of the Charter’s regime. Moreover, the 
membership of the Organisation is open to all peace-loving states that are 
capable to assume international obligations irrespective of their internal 
organisation.22 It means that peace was to be achieved through universality 
rather than democracy. This was affirmed in the advisory opinion on Western 
Sahara, where the ICJ has noted that ‘[n]o rule of international law, in the view 
of the Court, requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern, 
as is evident from the diversity of the forms of State found in the world 
today’.23 The same observation featured in the Nicaragua case, in which the 
Court stressed that: 
 
A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in 
which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide 
freely. One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural 
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.24 […] A State’s domestic 
                                               
that the restriction of the author’s right to freedom of expression [distribution of material 
soliciting the policy of the North Korea] was not compatible with the requirements of article 19, 
paragraph 3, of the Covenant’). 
19 UNHRC ‘Concluding Observations on Chile’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.104, para 8. 
20 Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (4 July 1976) art 28 <http://www.algerie-
tpp.org/tpp/en/declaration_algiers.htm> accessed 17 August 2016. 
21 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI. 
22 ibid art 4(1). 
23 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, para 94. 
24 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 205. 
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policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, provided of course that it does 
not violate any obligation of international law.25  […] [A]dherence by a State 
to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary 
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental 
principle of State sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests, 
and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and cultural 
system of a State.26 
 
Yet, the post-Cold War practice of the international community has manifested 
a change of paradigm with respect to national regimes. The UN Security 
Council (SC) has been increasingly willing to intervene in ‘rogue’ and ‘failed’ 
states in the name of democratisation. Its authorisation to use force to reinstall 
democratic government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti27 and ex post facto 
approval of the ECOWAS military campaign in Sierra Leone in response to 
anti-democratic reversal28 as well as its post-war policy of democracy-building 
in Somalia,29 Liberia,30 Bosnia-Herzegovina,31 Kosovo32 and East Timor33 
have been interpreted by various commentators as an evidence of the 
institutionalisation of the democratic entitlement norm in international law. 
However, the SC has never referred to democratic disruptions as a principle 
ground for action. Instead, it availed itself of the traditional formula of a ‘threat 
to international peace and security’ to justify its action under the Charter’s 
collective security regime. Determination by the SC of an event as a threat to 
the peace under Chapter VII constitutes an exception to the principle of non-
interference of the Charter34 and the issue in question is immediately removed 
from the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the sovereign state. Because no 
action of the SC has ever been triggered solely by the need to protect domestic 
democracy from authoritarian attacks but has rather been grounded on its 
                                               
25 ibid para 258. 
26 ibid para 263. 
27 UNSC Res 940 (31 July 1994) UN Doc S/RES/940, para 4 (The SC, ‘[a]cting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorize[d] Member States to form a multinational 
force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to 
facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors 
Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of 
the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti’). 
28 UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1132, para 1 (The SC, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, demanded that ‘the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish 
power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected 
government and a return to constitutional order’). 
29 UNSC Res 814 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/RES/814. 
30 UNSC Res 1116 (27 June 1997) UN Doc S/RES/1116; UNSC Res 1497 (1 August 2003) UN 
Doc S/RES/1497; UNSC Res 1509 (19 September 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1509; UNSC Res 1521 
(22 December 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1521. 
31 UNSC Res 1031 (15 December 1995) UN Doc S/RES/1031. 
32 UNSC Res 1244 (10 June 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1244. 
33 UNSC Res 1272 (25 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1272. 
34 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, art 2(7) (‘[T]his principle [of non-intervention] shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII’). 
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mandate to maintain international peace and security, one cannot claim in 
principle that the UN Charter’s system of collective security now includes a 
mechanism for defence of democracy. Neither can one deny the fact that 
because in certain cases coups d’état, by virtue of affecting the stability of the 
region, may per se constitute a threat to international peace and security, the 
Charter indirectly incorporates a mechanism of response to extra-legal changes 
of government in member states. However, such defensive mechanism is 
limited to the most extreme cases of democratic interruptions, namely those 
having bearing on international peace and security. 
Be that as it may, it is still far from clear how a non-democratic regime, 
even the one installed by means of a violent coup, could in itself amount to a 
threat to international peace and security within the meaning of Chapter VII of 
the Charter. Byers and Chesterman proposed three possible scenarios. First, 
coup d’état itself may threaten international peace and security. The SC’s anti-
apartheid and anti-fascist policy of the 1960s and the 1970s are viewed by 
some as early precedents for the SC action in support of democracy.35 Second, 
given the central claim of the democratic peace thesis that democracies do not 
wage wars on each other, the absence of democracy as such may be viewed as 
endangering international peace and security.36 Albeit this theory may fall 
squarely within the US unilateral policy of military interventions in Grenada, 
Panama and Iraq to defend democracy, it has no basis in international law 
neither is it supported by wider state practice. In fact, apart from Haiti and 
Sierra Leone, the SC has largely remained inert to antidemocratic politics 
within states. The third scenario concerns the SC’s allegedly unfettered 
discretion in what may amount to a threat to international peace and security.37 
Although in practice the actions of the SC are not subject to any judicial review, 
this position is not sustainable in principle. According to article 24 of the UN 
Charter, in discharging its ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security […] the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’. This was 
affirmed in the Admissions case, in which the Court pronounced that ‘the 
political character of an organ cannot release it from observance of the treaty 
provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limits on its 
                                               
35 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘“You, the People”: Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and 
International Law (CUP 2000) 281-82. 
36 ibid 282-83. See also Russell Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal 
Peace (Hart Publishing 2013) 106-07 (‘In essence, the SC has adopted a theory that international 
peace and security can only be maintained in a world of liberal states’). 
37 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘“You, the People”: Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and 
International Law (CUP 2000) 283. The main proponent of this view was Kelsen who observed: 
‘It is completely within the discretion of the Security Council as to what constitutes a threat to 
the peace’. Hans Kelsen, Law of the United Nations (Steven 1951) 727. See also Gabriel 
Oosthuizen, ‘Playing the Devil’s Advocate: The United Nations Security Council is Unbound 
by Law’ (1999) 12 LJIL 549, 562. 
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powers’38 and the Namibia advisory opinion, where the Court stated that 
‘[m]embers of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council 
powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and 
security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes 
found in Chapter I of the Charter’.39 
The most credible explanation for the SC’s treatment of certain cases of 
democratic disruption as threats to international peace and security is the SC’s 
evolutionary interpretation of a ‘threat’. When the Charter was concluded, ‘a 
threat to international peace and security’ was intended to mean almost 
exclusively the violation of state sovereignty, that is when one state abridged 
the principle of territorial integrity of another state. Constitutionalisation of 
international law, occasioned by the growing rate of global interdependence 
and vulnerability of states vis-à-vis international and domestic policies of one 
another, has necessitated the revision of the basic principles of international 
law, including those of the UN Charter. In this framework, ‘a threat to 
international peace and security’ has evolved to encompass, apart from 
conventional attacks against territorial integrity of a state, new types of threats, 
such as civil wars, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, humanitarian crises 
generating large exoduses of refugee flows and lack of democracy. Such 
practice of the SC is perfectly in line with a teleological interpretation of the 
Charter, whose purpose is, among others, to promote and encourage ‘respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’.40 What is more, because 
evolutive interpretation of treaties assumes that treaty shall be interpreted not 
only in line with its object and purpose but also ‘within the framework of the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’,41 it is fair to 
suggest that global transformations within the international legal order effected 
by the pioneering march of international human rights law as well as an 
attenuated understanding of international security occasioned by the 
emergence of new, non-state-versus-state threats, demands the rapid 
                                               
38 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of Charter) 
(Advisory Opinion) [1948] ICJ Rep 57, 64. See also The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (Jurisdiction) 
ICTY-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) para 28 (‘[N]either the text nor the spirit of the Charter 
conceives of the Security Council as legibus solutus’); August Reinisch, ‘The Obligation of the 
Security Council to Respect Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Adopting Economic 
Sanctions’ (2001) 95 AJIL 853, 856. 
39 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) 
[1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 110. 
40 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI, art 1(3). 
41 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) 
[1971] ICJ Rep 16, para 53. The Court also adopted the evolutive approach to treaty 
interpretation in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey) (Merits) [1978] ICJ Rep 
3, para 77; Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Merits) 
[1997] ICJ Rep 7, para 112; Iron Rhine Case (Belgium v Netherlands) (2005) 27 RIAA 35, 37; 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Merits) [2009] 
ICJ Rep 213, para 63. 
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adaptability and flexibility of the Charter concluded more than half a century 
ago. Such developments lend immediate repercussions for the right to 
democracy since certain cases of democratic reversals that attain the level of a 
threat to the peace can now trigger the collective security mechanism of 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The most recent case of the SC’s authorisation to use ‘all necessary means’ 
— an euphemism for the use of force — in response to an unconventional 
threat is Libya 2011, when the Gaddafi government violently suppressed the 
pro-democratic protests. In resolution 1973, the SC recognised ‘the legitimate 
demands of the Libyan people’ and determined that gross and systematic 
violations of human rights as well as widespread attacks on civilian population 
constituted a threat to international peace and security.42 Whilst the response 
of the international community characterised by a range of non-forcible and 
forcible measures, including the military intervention, has been heavily 
criticised by many as a regime change, the 2011 Libyan case is widely cited as 
a possible precedent in favour of the pro-democratic intervention thesis.43  
What can then be said about disruptions of democracy that do not reach 
the threshold of a ‘threat to international peace and security’? If grounds 
triggering the application of the Chapter VII measures are absent, then the 
UNSC is constrained by the domestic jurisdiction provision of article 2(7). 
This seemingly axiomatic reading of the Charter has been questioned by some 
pro-democracy scholars. For instance, Reisman and Farer insisted that under 
modern international law state sovereignty as a supreme, absolute and 
boundless jurisdictional authority has been replaced by a sovereignty bounded 
by international law and subject to the will of people, or popular sovereignty.44 
Likewise, D’Amato and Peters underscored that international law is about 
people and not about states.45 This implies that the test for sovereignty is the 
democratic organisation of a state and only states representing their people can 
be deemed sovereign. If so, the collective action to defend democracy cannot 
be regarded as directed against the ‘territorial integrity’ of another state within 
the meaning of article 2(4) of the Charter because its goal is not territorial 
aggrandisement. On the contrary, by supporting a government accountable to 
people, such action could be viewed as contributing to the realisation of 
                                               
42 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973. 
43 Simon Chesterman, ‘“Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama 
Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention after Libya’ (2011) 24 Ethics & Int’l Aff 279; Christian 
Pippan, ‘The 2011 Libyan Uprising, Foreign Military Intervention, and International Law’ 
(2011) 2 Zeitschrift für Recht und Gesellschaft 159; Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘The United Nations, 
Military Intervention, and Regime Change in Libya’ (2012) 52 Va J Int’l L 355. 
44 See Michael W Reisman, ‘Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2 
(4)’ (1984) AJIL 642, 643-44; Michael W Reisman, ‘Sovereignty and Human Rights in 
Contemporary International Law’ (1990) 84 AJIL 866, 868; Tom J Farer, ‘Collectively 
Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States: The Western Hemisphere’s Prospect’ 
(1993) 15 Hum Rts Q 716, 721. 
45 Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny’ (1990) 84 
AJIL 516, 523; Anne Peters, ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513. 
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‘political independence’ of that state.46 Other attempts to bypass the article 2(7) 
unequivocal prohibition of intervention in the domestic affairs of states in cases 
falling short of ‘threats to the peace’, ‘breaches of the peace’ and ‘acts of 
aggression’ include assertions by some scholars that democracy is a jus cogens 
norm by virtue of constituting an internal aspect of the principle of self-
determination. The latter is, according to many scholars, a peremptory norm of 
international law, whose abrogation is not allowed.47 On this view, the 
principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention, 
themselves being peremptory norms, cannot trump the democratic norm. Such 
view is also based on a negative reading of the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations — which is widely accepted 
as customary international law — which provides that states failing to conduct 
themselves in compliance with the principle of self-determination do not enjoy 
protection of their territorial integrity and political unity.48 
Whilst the aforementioned interpretations of the UN Charter and other 
relevant documents are laudable at the level of legal argumentation and even 
morally justifiable, they fail to gather broader scholarly support since they 
arguably ‘turn […] wishes into reality and conflate legal and moral 
considerations’.49 It is true that states, by entering into international 
obligations, including human rights obligations, by means of treaty or custom 
gave up a portion of their sovereignty to international scrutiny. However, it is 
too strong a claim to assert that the international community can now resort to 
military action to enforce these duties. It follows that at the global level, the 
collective action to defend democracy is limited to cases when attacks against 
democracy are defined by the SC as threats to international peace and security. 
Because there are no clear legal criteria for identifying ‘a threat’, particularly 
given the fact that the decision-making processes within the SC take place all 
too often in the realm of politics rather than law, the effectiveness of the global 
mechanism of the collective defence of democracy is at this stage rather 
meagre. Apart from the watershed cases of Haiti, Sierra Leone and Libya, the 
SC either stopped short of applying non-coercive measures or failed to act at 
all. However, the effectiveness of the collective security mechanism shall not 
be evaluated by a sheer number of applied sanctions or authorised military 
interventions. Sometimes responses in the form of condemnations (by means 
of, say, presidential statements or press releases) are equally efficient and/or 
equally important for breeding the culture of intolerance to undemocratic 
                                               
46 Anthony D’Amato, ‘The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny’ (1990) 84 
AJIL 516, 520; See also Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: Inquiry into Law and 
Morality (Transnational Publishers 1997) 151. 
47 See eg Reginald Ezetah, ‘The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry’ (1997) 22 Brook J 
Int’l L 495, 509. 
48 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA Res 2625 
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49 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, ‘“You, the People”: Pro-Democratic Intervention in 
International Law’ in Gregory H Fox and Brad R Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and 
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politics and aid in the creation of opinio juris within the broader process of 
customary law formation. As has been rightly asserted, ‘advancement of 
democracy [came to be] one of the most powerful international policy 
dynamics in the post-Cold War Era, it is […] now a broad-ranging, relatively 
well-funded and firmly institutionalised policy field’.50 
Yet, the most sophisticated mechanisms of external defence of democracy 
have been developed at the regional levels. 
 
5.2. Defending Democracy in Europe: A Tripartite 
System 
 
At the European level, the system of external defence of democracy has been 
developed within the framework of three regional organisations: the Council 
of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and the European Union (EU). The world’s oldest democracy clause 
can be found in the CoE — an international organisation established in 1949 
with the goal to promote democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights on the European continent. Article 3 of the Statute of the CoE enlists in 
a generic manner criteria for membership in the Organisation, which include 
acceptation of the principles of the rule of law and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.51 Whilst democracy does not explicitly feature in 
this article, it is mentioned in the preamble as the basis for these principles and 
should, hence, be read into article 3. In 1993, the Heads of State or Government 
at Vienna expanded article 3 by explicitly including democracy into the 
membership criteria.52 Article 8 of the Statute envisages a sanction mechanism 
for violating the article 3 requirements: ‘Any member of the Council of Europe 
which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of 
representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw […]’. 
In case of non-compliance it may cease to be a member of the Council.53 It is 
clear form the above provisions that the definition of threats to democracy is 
quite broad and may encompass both clear-cut cases of coups d’état as well as 
smaller blows against democratic principles and institutions. 
This mechanism was put in action in 1969 against Greece in response to a 
coup d’état. When it was determined that the Greek military clique had 
violated numerous provisions of the ECHR, the Council was considering 
suspension of Greece from membership. Without awaiting for the Committee 
                                               
50 Milja Kurki, Democratic Futures: Revisioning Democracy Promotion (Routledge 2013) 1. 
51 Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949) ETS 
No 001, art 3. 
52 Council of Europe, ‘Vienna Declaration of the Council of Europe’ (Vienna, 9 October 1993) 
<https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/archives/other_texts/2-
vienna/declaration/declaration_vienna_summit_EN.asp> accessed 16 September 2016. 
53 Statute of the Council of Europe (adopted 5 May 1949, entered into force 3 August 1949) ETS 
No 001, art 8. 
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of Minister’s decision, Greece withdrew from the organisation. It was 
readmitted to the Council upon the restoration of democracy.54 The democratic 
clause was also applied to Portugal and Spain, which were only allowed to join 
the organisation when democracy was re-established in 1976 and 1977 
respectively. It was again invoked in 1980 in response to the coup in Turkey, 
which was barred from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council and 
threatened with expulsion until it eventually reinstated elected government in 
1983.55 
The major step taken by the CoE in the sphere of human rights protection 
and democracy promotion was the adoption of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 195056 with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as its supervisory and enforcement mechanism.57 It became the first 
human rights treaty to give individual standing to lodge cases directly with the 
appropriate tribunal. Article 17 of the Convention, akin to article 30 UDHR, 
provides for the mechanism of preventive defence of democracy: ‘Nothing in 
this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person 
any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in the Convention’.58 Additionally, second 
paragraphs of articles 8 (right to private life), 9 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion), 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of 
assembly and association) include restrictions on the exercise of these rights 
as are, inter alia, necessary in ‘a democratic society’. The latter entails 
considering the proportionality of the measures taken to the aim pursued and 
whether there was ‘pressing social need’ for the restriction. These articles 
became the foundation for the Court’s espousal of the doctrine of ‘militant 
democracy’.59 The doctrine assumes a belligerent attitude towards actors 
seeking to undermine democracy’s existence by abusing its structures and 
institutions, which may take form of hate-speech legislation; banning political 
                                               
54 See Alison Duxbury, The Participation of States in International Organizations: The Role of 
Human Rights and Democracy (CUP 2011) 141. 
55 ibid. 
56 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 005 (ECHR). 
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parties, denying them registration or public funding; criminalisation of certain 
political organisations; preventing individuals from standing in elections, 
spreading pamphlets, convene rallies and so on — initiatives that typically 
interfere with democratic rights. It is a response to what Popper designated the 
‘paradox of tolerance’: sometimes too much tolerance can lead to the 
disappearance of tolerance.60 
In its early jurisprudence, the Court (as well as the European Commission) 
applied the doctrine of militant democracy to traditional opponents, such as 
Fascist and Communist actors. In German Communist Party (KPD) v 
Germany, concerning the challenge to the ban on the German Communist 
Party, the ECmHR declared that the political aims contemplated by communist 
ideology, namely establishment of a social-communist system by means of a 
proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, whether by 
peaceful means or by violent overthrow of the government, were incompatible 
with the Convention.61 Similar conclusion was reached in Glasenapp v 
Germany concerning the denial to the applicant a permanent post of civil 
servant because of his extremist political beliefs. The Court found no 
interference with article 10 ECHR, since such denial was based on the failure 
to meet the personal qualifications for appointment to the civil service, 
including, among others, commitment to ‘the principles of free democratic 
constitutional system’ of Germany.62 Other important cases where the 
Court/Commission assumed a militant stance against applicants inspired by the 
totalitarian doctrine or expressing ideas that represent a threat to the democratic 
order include X v Italy,63 BH, MW, HP and GK v Austria,64 Nachtmann v 
Austria65 and Schimanek v Austria.66 
Yet, the most paradigmatic case of the application of the doctrine of 
militant democracy by the ECtHR is Refah Partisi v Turkey.67 The case 
concerns the dissolution of the leading political party, the Refah Party, by the 
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Turkish Constitutional Court on charges of undermining the principle of 
secularism and advocating violence. The Court recognised that ‘totalitarian 
movements, organized in the form of democratic parties, might do away with 
democracy, after prospering under a democratic regime’ and accepted the 
action of the Turkish Constitutional Court as a legitimate exercise of power to 
preventively defend democracy: ‘[A] State cannot be required to wait, before 
intervening, until a political party has seized power and began to take concrete 
steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the Convention 
and democracy’.68 This decision marked a new phase in the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence, whereby the doctrine of militant democracy became an explicit 
feature of the European legal order. Subsequent cases where the Court upheld 
dissolution of political parties and movements for their extremist and violence-
inciting views include Batasuna v Spain,69 HU-T and others v Germany70 and 
Vona v Hungary.71 Another leading case where the Court displayed its 
intolerant attitude towards anti-democratic actors is Zdanoka v Latvia that 
concerns ineligibility of the applicant to stand for election by reason of former 
membership of the Communist Party. The Court held that ‘the Latvian 
authorities were entitled, within their margin of appreciation, to presume that 
a person in the applicant’s position had held opinions incompatible with the 
need to ensure the integrity of the democratic process, and to declare that 
person ineligible to stand for election’.72 
Such vigilant stance of the Court with respect to political extremism has 
been roundly criticised for its nondemocratic outcomes. As Albetto Asor Rosa 
astutely noted: ‘[D]emocracy, precisely because it is a system of mediocrity 
that cannot make itself out to be an absolute or an end in itself […] is a game 
whose defining feature is that it allows its own rules to be called into question. 
If it does not, it is already something else’.73 In other words, exclusion of 
certain voices from the political debate in the name of democracy endangers 
political pluralism and leads to the creation of a kind of ‘petrified oligarchy’74 
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instead of democracy. Moreover, the role of the ECtHR in deciding issues of 
essentially domestic constitutional nature is rather dubious given its limited 
mandate to interpret and apply the ECHR. This notwithstanding, the trend laid 
down by the Court to defend democracies against breakdown is irreversible 
and speaks eloquently about (substantive) democracy as the only form of 
government compatible with the ECHR. To halt misuse, the CoE’s advisory 
body, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (better known 
as the Venice Commission), issued the Guidelines on the Prohibition and 
Dissolution of Political Parties and Analogous Measures, in which it asserted 
the subordinate status of such measures to freedom of political expression and 
association as well as their exceptional nature.75 
In terms of geographical breadth, the most comprehensive system of 
collective defence of democracy in Europe has been developed within the 
framework of the OSCE, created in 1973 as a predominantly security-oriented 
organisation.76 Its mandate also includes issues of human rights, the rule of law 
and democratic governance, which constitute one of the organisation’s security 
pillars. The political, as opposed to legal, nature of the organisation — what 
has been dubbed as ‘soft’ organisation77 — has facilitated far-reaching 
pronouncements on democracy and its defence. Following the end of the Cold 
War, the OSCE adopted several important documents which laid down 
foundations for its system of democracy protection. The first document, the 
1990 Copenhagen Document, underscored the importance of representative 
democracy for ensuring respect for human rights and committed the 
participating states ‘to defend and protect […] the democratic order freely 
established through the will of the people against the activities of persons, 
groups or organisations that engage in or refuse to renounce terrorism or 
violence aimed at the overthrow of that order or that of another participating 
state’.78 This nebulous formulation has been interpreted by some as a right and 
responsibility of participating states to restore democracy and, if necessary, by 
military means.79 In fact, the provision in question does not give an 
authorisation to use force but neither does it exclude it. This was the first 
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recognition in an international instrument of the importance of democratic 
form of governance for human rights and security. The commitments of the 
Copenhagen Document were strengthened with the adoption of the 1990 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe,80 which refers to democracy as ‘the only 
system of government of our nations’ and sets up adherence to democracy and 
human rights as a condition of membership.81 
Yet, the first document that introduced democracy clause is the 1991 
Moscow Document that was adopted after the attempted coup in Moscow.82 It 
condemns ‘forces which seek to take power from a representative government 
of a participating State against the will of the people as expressed in free and 
fair elections and contrary to the justly established constitutional order’ and 
directs member states not to recognise the usurping force.83 Further, it provides 
for support ‘in case of overthrow or attempted overthrow of a legitimately 
elected government of a participating State by undemocratic means’ for the 
legitimate government of the state, which is, according to the 1991 Document, 
the one upholding human rights, democracy and the rule of law.84 The 
collective defence mechanism was further elaborated in the 1992 Prague 
Document stating that in ‘cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of 
relevant CSCE principles’  and ‘in order to develop further the CSCE’s 
capability to safeguard human rights, democracy and the rule of law’ 
appropriate action could be taken by either the Council or the Committee of 
Senior Officials, ‘if necessary in the absence of the consent of the State 
concerned’.85 The document was eventually used as a basis for the exclusion 
of Yugoslavia from participation in the OSCE in July 1992 in response to 
Yugoslavia’s human rights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.86 The 
suspension was removed in November 2000 when the FRY was admitted to 
the OSCE as a new member distinct from the SFRY.87 Significantly, the 
decision to readmit the FRY was made only after the 2000 presidential 
elections, even though the civil war had ended many years previously. 
It is clear from the above analysis that the OSCE’s defence mechanism is 
rather weak, since the enforcement measures are quite limited in scope and do 
not envisage suspension from the Organisation. Moreover, the above-enlisted 
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instruments were adopted as political commitments and do not impose binding 
obligations. On the other hand, even though the four mentioned documents are 
not treaties in the meaning of article 31 VCLT, they have been adopted at the 
level of heads of state or government and through a process of consensus and 
thus are, as was famously proclaimed by Franck, ‘deliberately norm-
creating’.88 Moreover, the rhetoric of human rights and democracy has had a 
significant impact on events in the region.89 
The third framework within which the European system of external 
defence of democracy has been established is the EU. Set up in 1952 as an 
engine of economic integration, the EU has evolved to regulate a wide plethora 
of issues, including human rights and democracy. Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) holds that ‘[t]he Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights’.90 Article 49 TEU restricts membership to any 
European state ‘which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is 
committed to promoting them’.91 The same requirement had already been 
expressed in the 1993 ‘Copenhagen criteria’ that guided the EU on its 
enlargement decisions with respect to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
One of these criteria include ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities’.92 
The democracy clause is found in article 7, which provides that in case of ‘a 
serious and persistent breach by a Member State of the values referred to in 
Article 2’, the Council may decide to suspend certain of the rights of the 
implicated state, including the voting rights.93 As the Commission itself 
clarified, the scope of article 7 is not confined to violations of EU law but also 
covers violations in areas of member states’ national jurisdiction.94 Moreover, 
whilst the enforcement of the European law provisions is almost uniquely 
relied on individual litigations, article 7 TEU is targeted at more systematic 
problems, such as democratic backsliding. 
This mechanism has been applied in 2000 with respect to Austria for 
allowing Jörg Haider’s ultra-rightist Freedom Party (FPÖ) to participate in the 
country’s government. The EU reacted by minimising bilateral relations with 
the Austrian government integrating the FPÖ and calling on not to promote 
Austrian candidates for positions in international organisations. Moreover, the 
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European Commission announced it would implement article 7 suspension 
mechanism if necessary. The sanctions were lifted upon the Party’s leaders 
renouncing their positions in the government.95 The mechanism was again 
tested in Hungary in 2010, when the right-wing populist party led by Viktor 
Organ began to abuse its majority by restricting democratic checks and 
balances, and in Romania in 2012, when Prime-Minister Victor Ponta staged 
an impeachment coup against President Train Basescu.96 In both cases, the EU 
has reacted in rather unassertive and partial manner. Whilst it condemned 
certain encroachments on democracy, it let others remain unchallenged. 
Moreover, in neither case was article 7 invoked. The same holds true for the 
Brussel’s ‘soft’ policy with regard to other cases of extreme-right populism in 
Europe, including the Netherlands (2010), France (2012), Greece (2012) and 
Italy (2013).97 Such reluctance on the part of the EU to sanction states 
experiencing democratic backsliding has been explained by the lack of will of 
the member states fearing that these sanctions might one day be turned against 
them too. ‘[T]he ponderous nature of the procedure and the stigmatization 
inherent in Article 7 TEU put the political stakes very high’.98 Moreover, the 
very idea of sanctions is incompatible with the EU’s policy of diversity and 
pluralism. It has been also asserted that the EU’s policy of intervention is based 
less on broad principles of human rights and democracy and more on practical 
considerations of neoliberal economics.99 All in all, article 7 democratic clause 
does not envisage intervention as such, rather ‘it enables a kind of moral 
quarantine’ as it can only effect ‘normative isolationism’ of the EU and its 
member states with respect to the non-complying state.100 
In view of the inefficacy of the article 7 mechanism, it has been suggested 
that systemic violations of the article 2 TEU values amount to infringements 
of article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
enlisting EU citizenship rights and can thus be defended by national courts in 
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cooperation with the European Court of Justice (ECJ).101 As the Court declared 
in Ruiz Zambrano, ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national measures which have 
the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the 
Union’.102 The ‘substance’ of the citizenship rights may, as the argument runs, 
be defined through the lens of article 2 TEU. It follows that breaches of values 
referred to in article 2, even within the framework of matters falling under 
national jurisdiction, can be considered as an infringement of the substance of 
EU citizenship and can thus be adjudicated by national courts, which, in their 
turn, would engage the Court of Justice to clarify the meaning of articles 2 
TEU and 20 TFEU.103 Although this procedure puts the politicised article 7 
mechanism into the realm of law, it is dubious how such abstract principles as 
democracy or the rule of law can be enforced through individual litigations, 
unless they are framed as demands to remedy violations of concrete civil and 
political rights. 
Another EU’s democracy-defending mechanism can be derived from 
articles 258-260 TFEU, which authorise the Commission and member states 
to initiate infringement proceedings against any EU member state for non-
compliance with European law. If political dialogues between the parties fail, 
the Commission can take the case before the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU), which, in case of violation, can proscribe the deviant state necessary 
measures to comply with its judgment. If the state concerned has not complied 
with the judgment, the Court may impose a lump sum or penalty on it.104 The 
recent case law of the CJEU reveals that the Commission invoked not only 
violations of specific provisions but also ‘general practice contrary thereto’.105 
This novel application of infringement actions in order to counter general and 
persistent violations may serve ‘a middle ground between the Article 7 TEU 
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procedure and the classic [individual-instigated] use of Article 258 TFEU’.106 
It this way, it could address situations in which ‘non-compliance can only be 
redressed by a revision of the general policy and administrative practice of the 
Member State’.107 The issues of democratic dismantlement and breakdown fall 
neatly within these schemata. However, akin to the article 7 procedure, this 
mechanism has been criticised for being heavily politicised. The mechanism’s 
significant informal dimension is extremely prone to political manipulation 
and ‘horse-trading’.108 
The European region is unique for its high and heterogeneous level of 
institutionalised cooperation in a wide spectrum of activities. The tripartite 
system of regional integration — the CoE, the OSCE and the EU — produced 
a multitude of specific obligations with respect to protection of democracy. The 
underlying feature of the European system of defence of democracy is its 
endorsement of substantive democracy — which apart from free and fair 
elections includes the principles of the rule of law and protection of human 
rights — and the attendant sensitivity to democratic threats falling short of 
traditional coups. As to the overall effectiveness of the regime, it is germane to 
point to the fact that the significant overlap in membership across these 
institutional arrangements as well as the cross-organisational interplay have 
generated greater levels of commitment and compliance with the democratic 
norms. Extreme cases of democratic disruptions, such as military coups, are 
rare and when they do occur the reactions of the European community are 
assertive and unequivocal. On the other hand, the enforcement of democratic 
clauses across the three forums is not immune from flaws. The CoE, which is 
a leading human rights organisation in Europe including 47 members, has a 
weak system of oversight which ultimately relies on the will of member states. 
The democratic clause of its constitutive document has as a matter of fact never 
been employed. The cases when it was invoked date back to the 1960s-1970s 
outright democratic reversals, with the recent cases of democratic erosion 
being largely unnoticed. The ECHR’s mechanism to deal with threats to 
democracy is highly sensitive to even minor democratic disruptions but it was 
designed to remedy individual violations rather than system’s failures and 
relies heavily on the will of member states. Another pillar of European 
cooperation with the most comprehensive geographical coverage (57 member 
states), the OSCE, is based solely on political commitments with minimal 
supervision mechanisms. Whilst, on the account of some scholars, these 
commitments were deliberately created to serve as authoritative rules, the 
democratic clause of the Organisation’s Moscow Document has never been 
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applied in practice. Finally, the EU has established the most developed 
institutional mechanism to monitor and enforce the implementation of its rules, 
including the mandate to pass judgment on the extent to which states are in 
compliance with their obligations under European law. Yet, its membership is 
limited to 28 states, and political and economic considerations all too often 
take primacy over democratic commitments. 
 
5.3. ‘Intervention without Intervening’: The American 
Model of Collective Defence of Democracy 
 
Until the late 1960s, Latin America was the most unstable region in the world, 
where army cliques overthrew governments as well as each other with 
astounding frequency. From the mid-1970s and up to the early 1990s, the 
region witnessed the ‘third wave’ of democratisation when the number of 
elected governments expanded to an unprecedented scale.109 Following these 
developments, American states embarked upon a task of modernisation of the 
OAS system with a view to strengthen its capacity in democracy promotion, 
including defence of democratic order against authoritarian threats. 
The first well-documented instance of democracy promotion in the 
American hemisphere is the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS in 1962 due to 
the alleged incompatibility of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba with the 
inter-American system: ‘The present connections of the Government of Cuba 
with Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evidently incompatible with the 
principles and standards that govern the regional system, and particularly with 
the collective security established by the Charter of the Organization of 
American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance’.110 
However, after the forty-seven-year ban, Cuba was readmitted to the OAS, 
which, in turn, declared that the 1962 resolution ‘ceases to have effect’.111 
Since the Cuba case, it took decades before the OAS seriously embarked 
upon its mission of democracy promotion in the American continents. The 
American collective system of defence of democracy has been institutionalised 
through four important documents: the 1991 Santiago Commitment, 1991 
Resolution 1080, the 1992 Protocol of Washington, an amendment to the OAS 
Charter, which altogether became to be known as ‘Santiago Commitment’ or 
‘Santiago Doctrine’,112 and the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter 
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(IADC). Under the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of 
the Inter-American System, the OAS, ‘mindful that representative democracy 
is the form of government of the region,’ committed itself to ‘the defense and 
promotion of representative democracy’.113 The generic language of the 
Declaration does not reveal any concrete means of democratic defence. 
Moreover, the relevant provisions must be weighed against the Organisation’s 
conventional principles of self-determination and non-intervention.114 
The same year, the OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 1080 
‘Representative Democracy’. Whilst the principle of non-intervention again 
explicitly features in the text of the Resolution, it is not unqualified and shall 
be put aside ‘in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or 
irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the 
legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government of the 
Organization’s member states’.115 On top of that, the Resolution instructs the 
Secretary General to immediately convene a meeting of the Permanent Council 
should such interruption of the legitimate order occur. The Council would then 
examine the situation and convene a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs or a special session of the General Assembly within a ten-day period. 
In either forum, states would look into the events collectively and adopt any 
decisions deemed appropriate in accordance with the OAS’s Charter and 
international law.116 It was for the first time that the OAS was provided with 
an automatic and rapid-response mechanism against coups d’état. In 
evaluating the significance of Resolution 1080, Pastor claimed that by adopting 
it ‘the governments of the Americas sidestepped Article 18 [now Article 19] 
of the OAS Charter [prohibiting any form of interference into domestic matters 
of states]’ and commenced a journey ‘toward a collective defense of 
democracy’.117 For Graham, it was an extraordinary change, since ‘[n]o 
regional organization outside Western Europe and not even the United Nations 
had struck out so boldly for the values of democratic governance’.118 
The Resolution 1080 mechanism of the external defence of democracy was 
invoked for several times. The earliest and most prominent example is the 1991 
Haiti crisis when the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
was overthrown by a military coup on 13 September 1991. The coup led not 
only to a regional response but also occasioned the military involvement of the 
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UN for the restoration of democracy.119 Despite the reference in UNSC 
Resolution 841 to an ‘exceptional and unique situation’ in Haiti and the 
subsequent statements that the resolution in question did not constitute a 
precedent, this was the first time when a purely internal political crisis 
occasioned such a drastic response. The collective defence mechanism was 
again applied in Peru in 1992120 and Guatemala in 1993,121 when the 
interruptions of the constitutional rule were caused not by a military putsch but 
by means of autogolpe, as well as in Venezuela (1992)122 and Paraguay 
(1996)123 after the attempted coups d’état against the incumbent presidents.124 
Resolution 1080 is a breakthrough but it is not unique. Other resolutions 
contain even more broad commitments with respect to undemocratic 
interruptions. For instance, the 1990 Declaration of Asuncion proscribes ‘all 
forms of intervention with the free expression of the popular will’,125 whereas 
in the 1992 Declaration of Nassau, aimed to complement and give effect to the 
provisions of Resolution 1080, the OAS declares its ‘strongest and most 
categorical rejection of any attempt against the democratic institutional order 
in any of the member states’.126 The obvious weakness of Resolution 1080 is 
that by virtue of being a ‘mere’ resolution of the General Assembly it is only 
of a recommendatory character, not to mention its lack of precision as to the 
concrete measures in response to democratic interruptions. This 
notwithstanding, its impact on the further development of the proactive attitude 
against democratic disruptions in the Americas is hard to overstate. 
The Santiago Doctrine’s sanction mechanism was consolidated in 
December 1992 with the adoption of the Protocol of Washington. The Protocol 
amended the OAS Charter by inserting a new article bestowing the 
Organisation with the power to suspend the participation in the Organisation’s 
policy-making bodies of a member state whose ‘democratically constituted 
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government has been overthrown by force’. The power to suspend is to be 
exercised only after diplomatic means to resolve the issue have failed and only 
following an affirmative vote of the two-thirds of the member states.127 Given 
the binding nature of the Protocol and its detailed and unequivocal reaction 
mechanism, it was ‘the first time in the organization’s history, [that] a 
particular domestic political circumstance — the interruption of democratic 
government — is declared to be grounds for collective action’.128 For Roth, 
this development signified a more general trend whereby the adherence to due 
constitutional process is now regarded as the conditio sine qua non of 
legitimate government, with the effective control doctrine being put aside.129 
The Santiago Doctrine became a building block for the adoption of the 
2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter130 — ‘the most complete inter-
American instrument enacted to date for promoting democratic practices in the 
states of Hemisphere’131 and, thus, the most significant document on 
democracy in the Americas. It was adopted as a response to the emergence of 
new, ‘more sophisticated’ than the conventional military coups, ways of 
usurpation of constitutional processes, which came to be known as autogolpes 
(American term for executive coup). It states that ‘an unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the 
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member 
state constitutes […] an insurmountable obstacle to its government’s 
participation’ in the political bodies of the Organisation.132 This provision 
expanded the democracy clauses of Resolution 1080 and article 9 of the OAS 
Charter, which only referred to the traditional overthrow by force of a 
democratically constituted government, to include the cases of autogolpes and 
‘impeachment coups’ and, hence, finalised the ‘conditionalisation’ of the 
notion of sovereignty in the Inter-American system. More importantly, should 
‘unconstitutional interruption’ or ‘unconstitutional alteration’ occur, article 20 
IADC provides for a collective action whereby any member state or the 
Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent 
Council, which, in its turn, may undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives. 
If such initiatives fail, the Permanent Council is to promptly convene a special 
session of the General Assembly, which shall adopt decisions it deems 
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appropriate in accordance with the IADC, the OAS Charter and international 
law.133 Article 21 of the Charter invests the General Assembly with the power 
to suspend the member state whose democratic regime is, in the view of the 
Assembly, altered or interrupted. 
Since the IADC was adopted as a general assembly resolution, it is, 
according to the majority view, not a treaty and, consequently, not binding. 
However, the binding nature of this instrument can still be defended. The 
preamble of the Charter acknowledges ‘the progressive development of 
international law and the advisability of clarifying the provisions set forth in 
the OAS Charter’.134 It seems that the member states have recognised it as an 
interpretation of the OAS’s democracy clause. Pursuant to article 31(3) of the 
1969 VCLT, in treaty interpretation ‘[t]here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions’.135 
It follows that the IADC has the same binding force as the OAS Charter which 
it interprets; it is binding because it constitutes a normative development of the 
OAS Charter’s provisions. This conclusion is shared by many American 
analysts.136 This argument becomes, however, more attenuated with respect to 
states that have not ratified the Washington Protocol unless one accepts that 
the democracy clause has become a regional customary norm in the Americas. 
The IADC was referred to on various occasions, including Venezuela 
(2002), Haiti (2004 and 2010), Ecuador (2005 and 2010), Belize (2005), 
Nicaragua (2005), Bolivia (2008) and Guatemala (2009) crises. In all these 
cases, the responses of the OAS were quite soft and were largely limited to 
diplomacy.137 Yet, the most serious test of the IADC took place with the 2009 
impeachment coup against Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in response to 
his call for a referendum to rewrite the constitution, which would lead, in the 
opinion of many, to the extension of his tenure. Zelaya was arrested on charges 
of treason and abuse of power and substituted with the President of Congress 
Roberto Micheletti. The procedure was allegedly in accordance with the 
                                               
133 ibid art 20. 
134 ibid preamble (emphasis added). 
135 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 33 (VCLT) art 31(3). 
136 For an extensive overview of political and scholarly opinions defending the binding nature 
of the Inter-American Democratic Charter as an interpretation of the OAS Charter, see Timothy 
D Rudy, ‘A Quick Look at the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS: What Is It and 
Is It “Legal”?’ (2005) 33 Syracuse J Int’l L & Com 237, 241-42; Jean-Paul Hubert, ‘Follow-Up 
on the Application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter’ (OAS/Ser. Q, CJI/doc.317/09 
corr.1, Bogota, 19 March 2009) 11, 18-19; Vasiliki Saranti, ‘A System of Collective Defense of 
Democracy: The Case of Inter-American Democratic Charter’ (2011) 3 Goettingen J Int’l L 675, 
695. Compare with Jean d’Aspremont, ‘La Licéité des Coups d’État en Droit International’ in 
Société Française pour le Droit International (ed), L’État de Droit en Droit Internationale 
(Pedone, 2009) 129. 
137 For a more detailed overview, see Vasiliki Saranti, ‘A System of Collective Defense of 
Democracy: The Case of Inter-American Democratic Charter’ (2011) 3 Goettingen J Int’l L 675, 
702; Jorge Heine and Brigitte Weiffen, 21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: 
Standing Up for the Polity (Routledge 2015) 83-96. 
External Defence of Democracy 
 
 
203 
Honduran Constitution. This notwithstanding, the OAS vehemently 
condemned the coup d’état, ‘which has produced an unconstitutional alteration 
of the democratic order’, and made clear that no government arising from the 
coup would be recognised.138 Thereafter, a special session of the OAS General 
Assembly was convened in order ‘to take whatever decisions it considered 
appropriate in accordance with the OAS Charter, international law and the 
provisions of the IADC’.139 On 4 July 2009, Honduras was suspended from 
participation in the OAS140 and member states imposed a range of sanctions on 
the Micheletti regime, including closure of diplomatic relations and financial 
cuts. Notwithstanding these measures, the ousted President Zelaya was never 
reinstated, and the de facto regime remained in power until the next elections, 
which were admittedly used to consolidate its position. Regardless of the 
apparent fiasco of the OAS to reinstall the legitimate president, after the 1991 
Haitian crisis the OAS’s response to the Honduran coup was the most powerful 
in terms of the scope of international condemnation, isolation and sanctioning 
of the golpistas. It ‘established a fundamental precedent: an attack on 
democracy in the region entails high political, economic, and diplomatic 
costs’.141 
Whilst the significance of the IADC is hard to overestimate, it is not 
unproblematic. According to one account, the IADC proved to be a ‘paper 
tiger’.142 It has teeth to intervene but in practical terms they have provided little 
support for the ousted regimes. Moreover, the Charter’s democracy clause is 
like a half-full and half-empty glass, since it does not envisage a solution to a 
situation when the punitive government was suspended from the Organisation 
but reneged upon its obligation to put democracy back on track, as the 
Honduran crisis evidences. Another principle limitation of the Charter 
concerns the lack of a clear definition of what constitutes an alteration or 
interruption of constitutional process, which may imperil the effective 
response by the OAS. As Legler points out, there is 
 
[A]n important magnitude issue at play; […] it is unclear what antidemocratic 
measures are serious enough violations of the Democratic Charter to warrant 
OAS action; were the OAS to respond to every minor infraction of the 
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Democratic Charter, it would need to intervene constantly in its Member 
States’ internal affairs to defend democracy; yet by choosing not to respond 
to minor transgression and to focus only on major threats, the OAS runs the 
risk of allowing the incremental erosion of democracy, or its “death-by-a-
thousand-cuts”.143 
 
The lack of a broad definition leads to the existence of grey areas that limit the 
scope of application of the IADC to only the most transparent cases, such as 
military coups and autogolpes, whereas the cases of electoral fraud or minor 
constitutional irregularities remain largely unnoticed, the present case of 
communist Cuba being but one example. It is, thus, fair to suggest that the OAS 
prioritises constitutional facade over the quality of democratic institutions. 
Another characteristic feature of the OAS’s coup policy is the Organisation’s 
selectivity with regard to when and to what extent it applies the IADC’s 
democracy clause. Whereas in Honduras and to a certain degree in Venezuela, 
the formal mechanisms were employed, including sanctions and membership 
suspension, the responses to democratic backsliding in other cases were 
marked by relying on informal measures. The paradigmatic case is the 2004 
Haitian crisis. Whilst the overthrow of the President Aristide in the 1991 coup 
was strongly and swiftly condemned up to the resort to military force, the 
2004’s reaction of the international community (including the OAS itself) to 
the second ouster of this very president was much more lukewarm as no formal 
mechanisms were utilised.144 It means that the OAS treats coups d’état 
differently: instead of an automatic and uniform condemnation of every coup, 
the OAS looks first at the legitimacy of the toppled regime and shapes its policy 
of response accordingly. Whilst for some scholars such selectivity is 
problematic,145 it is nevertheless fair to underscore the flexibility and 
sensitivity to local idiosyncrasies that this approach obtains, particularly if one 
accepts an idea that certain coups are better than others.146 
Finally, the actionability and effectiveness the OAS’s mechanism of the 
external defence of democracy is obfuscated by the fact that the principle of 
non-intervention is still one of the leading principles of the OAS and is in a 
clear tension with the latter’s democracy clauses. The OAS Charter 
unequivocally prohibits all states from intervening ‘directly or indirectly, for 
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any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State’147 
and affirms that ‘[e]very State has the right to choose, without external 
interference, its political, economic, and social system and to organize itself in 
the way best suited to it’.148 How this language of neutrality with respect to 
member states’ domestic politics is to be reconciled with the provisions of the 
IADC having a direct bearing on clearly ‘internal’ constitutional affairs of 
states is still a matter of debate. Indeed, such a sovereignty-versus-democracy 
clash is one of reasons why some scholars came to characterise the OAS’s 
mechanism of collective action in response to democratic interruptions as 
‘intervention without intervening’.149 
 
5.4. Military Defence of Democracy in Africa 
 
The African region developed one of the most robust systems of the collective 
defence of democracy. Albeit the continent is generally known as a gatekeeper 
of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference into 
the domestic matters of states,150 the one exception relates to unconstitutional 
changes of government by coup d’état, which have been regarded by African 
regional organisations, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and its 
successor since 2003 the African Union (AU), as a threat to the regional 
security and economic development.151 However, they were not the pioneers 
in the development of the regional norm of non-toleration of unelected regimes 
in Africa. The first steps were taken by the African Commission on Human 
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and Peoples’ Rights (ACmHPR). Because the wording of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)152 is substantially narrow, the 
African Commission followed the lead of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in elaborating the terms of the Charter in both its declarations 
and individual cases. In a Resolution on the Military, the Commission 
recognised ‘the trend world-wide in Africa in particular to condemn military 
take-overs and the intervention by the military in politics’, affirmed that ‘the 
best government is one elected by, and accountable to, the people’ and upheld 
that ‘the forcible take-over of government by Army civilian or military group 
contravenes Articles 13(1) and 20(1) of the […]’ACHPR.153 
These principles were eventually applied in the Commission’s case law. 
In Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organization v Nigeria, 
where the Federal Military Government announced the annulment of the 1993 
presidential election results in Nigeria, the Commission acknowledged that 
such an annulment constituted a coup and was in violation of article 13(1) 
ACHPR, which provides for every citizen’s right to participate in the 
government of his country.154 Similar verdict was given by the ACmHPR in 
Sir Dawda K Jawara v The Gambia, in which the complainant, the former 
Head of State of the Republic of The Gambia Dawda Jawara, brought the 
question of the legality of the 1994 military coup that overthrew his 
government. The Commission found that the coup was ‘a grave violation of 
the right of Gambian people to freely choose their government as entrenched 
in Article 20(1) of the Charter’.155 Since then, the African Commission 
continued to issue resolutions condemning military usurpation of 
constitutional processes. In its Resolution on the Political Situation in Niger, 
it affirmed that ‘coups d’état are, in essence, human rights violations, 
characterized by denial of civil and political rights as well as economic 
stagnation in the countries’.156 
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The turning point occurred on 25 May 1997 when the government of 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was overthrown by a group of soldiers from 
the Sierra Leone Army. The ECOWAS, backed-up with the support of the 
OAU, militarily intervened to Sierra Leone and reinstalled the legitimate 
president. Similar responses towards military coups followed in the Comoros, 
Ivory Coast and Niger.157 Against the backdrop of a new wave of military 
usurpations of power in Africa and a need to articulate a general policy against 
military politics, the member states of the OAU issued the 2000 Lomé 
Declaration, in which they recognised coups d’état as a threat to peace and 
security of the continent and as a flagrant violation of the basic principles of 
the Organisation and the UN. In addition, the Declaration set up a mechanism 
of collective response to an unconstitutional seizure of government power, 
whereby the implicated government is required to restore its constitutional 
order within six months. During this period, such government cannot 
participate in the policy-making organs of the Organisation. If it does not 
comply with this obligation, the Organisation may then institute sanctions, 
including visa denials, restrictions of intergovernmental contacts and trade 
limitations.158 
This mechanism has been applied on several occasions. In 2003, the 
Central African Republic was precluded from participating in the work of the 
AU following the military overthrow of the democratically elected president 
Ange-Felix Patasse. The Central African Republic was only allowed to resume 
its participatory rights when presidential elections were held in 2005. Other 
cases when the AU condemned anticonstitutional putsches in accordance with 
the Lomé mechanism include Sao Tome and Principe (2003) and Guinea-
Bissau (2003).159 Importantly, the deterrent effect of the Lomé Declaration on 
potential coup-plotters is hard to overlook, because since its adoption the 
number of successful coups dropped sharply.160 Moreover, following the 
adoption of the Declaration, all coup-plotters began to employ the language of 
democracy and attempted to legitimate their power by committing themselves 
to restore the constitutional order. Such altered patterns of behaviour displayed 
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an acceptance of democracy as a legal norm, albeit more through violation than 
adherence.  
Consolidation of a system of collective defence against unconstitutional 
changes of governance in Africa occurred with the adoption of the 2000 
Constitutive Act of the African Union.161 This important instrument gives the 
status of an enforceable law to previously soft law undertakings. Its article 
14(p) defines ‘condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
governments’ as one of the principles of the AU. Moreover, the Act envisages 
the suspension of the membership rights to states whose governments ‘shall 
come to power through unconstitutional means’.162 Additionally, in order to 
effectively deal with conflict and crisis situations, the AU set up the Peace and 
Security Council (PSC) as its standing organ,163 whose functions resemble 
those of the UNSC. It became a mechanism through which the AU reacts to 
unconstitutional events that are prohibited by the Constitutive Act. Article 
7(1)(g) of the PSC Protocol bestows the PSC with the power to ‘institute 
sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in 
a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration’.164 Its decisions are 
legally binding. Further, under article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, the AU has 
the right to intervene in a Member State in respect of ‘grave circumstances’, 
such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.165 It is clear that 
not every coup d’état results in such violations. However, the 2003 
Amendment Protocol, which expands the AU’s authority to employ force in 
AU member states, inserts a new ‘grave circumstance’ triggering the right of 
the AU to intervene, namely ‘a serious threat to legitimate order’.166 Albeit the 
Protocol does not elaborate what a serious threat to legitimate order might be, 
the unconstitutional change of government by virtue of endangering regional 
peace and stability and yet falling short of the three earlier mentioned crimes 
might well be characterised as such. 
The AU’s democratic defence mechanism was put in action in Togo in 
2005, when following the military overthrow of the President Gnassingbe 
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Eyadema, the AU mandated ECOWAS to ‘take all such measures as it 
deem[ed] necessary to restore constitutional legality in Togo within the 
shortest time’.167 This was essentially an authorisation to use military force to 
reinstate the legitimate government akin to the 1997 Sierra Leone case. By the 
same token, the AU opposed coups in Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Guinea 
(2008), Guinea-Bissau (2009 and 2012), Madagascar (2009) and Niger (2010) 
by calling on putschists either to immediately relinquish power or to hold 
elections within six months.168 The AU either imposed sanctions in the form of 
travel bans and visa restrictions or suspended the countries from the 
participation in the policy organs of the Organisation (Niger, Guinea-Bissau 
2012) or both (Mauritania, Guinea and Madagascar). 
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007,169 
which gave treaty effect to the 2000 Lomé Declaration as well as expanded 
some of its provisions, is even more explicit in its intolerance of military 
politics. Its article 2(4) states that one of its objectives is to ‘[p]rohibit, reject 
and condemn unconstitutional change of government in any member State as 
a serious threat to stability, peace, security and development’.170 Moreover, 
article 14(2) of the Charter provides that ‘State Parties shall take legislative 
and regulatory measures to ensure that those who attempt to remove an elected 
government through unconstitutional means are dealt with in accordance with 
the law’.171 Article 23 of the Charter enlists circumstances that constitute an 
unconstitutional change of government. These are: 
 
1. Any putsch or coup d’Etat against a democratically elected government. 
2. Any intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected 
government. 
3. Any replacement of a democratically elected government by armed 
dissidents or rebels. 
4. Any refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the 
winning party or candidate after free, fair and regular elections; or 
5. Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instruments, which 
is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.172 
 
The first four cases of unconstitutional changes of government are also 
envisaged under the Lomé Declaration, whereas the fifth case is an innovation 
of the African Democracy Charter. The first three forms of unconstitutional 
change are pro-incumbent provisions, which protect sitting governments from 
being ousted by rebel and dissident groups. Conversely, the remaining two 
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cases, namely failure to concede power to winning parties (art 23(4)) and 
tenure prolongation (art 23(5)), can be considered to be more democracy-
oriented as they attempt to tie the hands of incumbents. 
On top of that, the 2007 Charter gives the PSC the power to act in situations 
that may affect ‘democratic political institutional arrangements or the 
legitimate exercise of power’ of the member state.173 Even though the exact 
content of this provision is somewhat unclear, it appears to vest into the AU 
the power to militarily intervene when the democratic order of the member 
state is endangered by unconstitutional usurpation. Finally, the Charter 
envisages a set of sanctions against the government that acceded to power by 
unconstitutional means, which include suspension of the government 
concerned from participation in the organs of the AU, prohibition of 
perpetrators of unconstitutional change from participating in elections or from 
holding any political office, the trial of the perpetrators before the competent 
court of the Union and imposition of other punitive measures.174 Indeed, the 
provisions of the 2007 Charter on unconstitutional change are so extensive in 
comparison with the previous instruments that one can confidently claim that 
the illegitimate usurpation of power in Africa is now to be considered a ‘crime 
against democracy’.175 
Subsequent to the adoption of the African Democracy Charter, the 
responses of the AU to unconstitutional takeovers have not been uniform. On 
the one hand, in Cote d’Ivoire, the AU supported the ouster of Gbagbo who 
lost democratic elections to Ouattara in 2010 but refused to hand over power. 
In response to the crisis, the AU suspended ‘the participation of Cote d’Ivoire 
in all AU activities until such a time the democratically-elected President 
assumes state power’176 and welcomed the deployment of the UN and French 
forces to secure the safe accession to office of President Outtara.177 On the 
other hand, when the ‘Arab Spring’ was sweeping across Egypt and led to the 
demise of the Mubarak’s regime by means of coup d’état, which was staged in 
response to popular uprisings, the PSC, instead of condemning the 
unconstitutional revolt in line with its previous practice, issued a communique 
expressing support to the ‘legitimate aspirations of the Egyptian people for 
democracy’.178 Such peculiar reaction of the AU to the Arab Spring 
unconstitutional changes of government had already been documented with 
respect to Tunisia, where following the revolutionary overthrow of President 
Ben Ali, the PSC ‘expressed its solidarity with the people of Tunisia’ and 
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‘strongly condemned the excessive use of force against the demonstrators’.179 
Likewise, in Libya in 2011, the Union not only failed to condemn and reject 
the anticonstitutional putsch of the Gaddafi’s regime but also underscored that 
‘the aspirations of the people of Libya for democracy, political reform, justice 
and socio-economic development are legitimate’180 and expressed its support 
to the former rebels who had formed the National Transitional Council of 
Libya, which eventually became the new Libyan government.181 Albeit an 
argument can be made that the AU is beginning to refine its policy towards 
unconstitutional changes of government, which do not now cover the cases of 
the dethronement of autocratic leaders, the actual justifications for such 
manifest violations of the Charter and the AU Constitutive Act arguably related 
to the superior status of the UNSC Resolutions (e.g., Res 1970 and 1973) with 
respect to the AU instruments.182 It remains to be seen whether the AU’s PSC 
will clarify why and under what circumstances a civilian-led uprising against 
an undemocratic state leader should not be designated as an unconstitutional 
change of government. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, African legal framework as well 
as practice exhibits a strongly negative attitude towards democratic 
disruptions. However, it is not unproblematic. As Petersen noted, it is both 
over- and under-inclusive. On the one hand, military coups have been 
condemned irrespective of the legitimacy of toppled regimes. On the other 
hand, the AU has been reluctant to act with respect to other unconstitutional 
events, such as electoral rigging and constitutional amendments to entrench 
one’s power.183 This is arguably to say that the AU’s responses to 
unconstitutional changes of government were in defence of incumbent 
governments rather than democracy per se. Yet, African legal instruments and 
declarations are more refined than the AU’s actions. In contrast to the blanket 
policy of the AU with regard to all coups in practice, the relevant legal 
provisions reveal that coups d’état or armed rebellions ousting unelected 
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regimes are not technically unconstitutional changes of government184 since 
only ‘democratically elected governments’ enjoy protection. Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, some scholars refute the claims for a more nuanced AU’s 
policy towards unconstitutional changes of government. For them, any type of 
constitutional regime is better than unpredictable post-coup politics, since 
under constitutional regimes there are more ways through which political 
changes can be effectuated than under military regimes.185 On a more 
theoretical level, the problem of the African collective system of defence 
against democratic disruptions is the AU’s procedural understanding of 
democracy. With its emphasis on democracy of origin, the Organisation only 
reacts to coups that topple elected regimes and stands idle when elected leaders 
abuse their power (democracy of exercise).186 However, considering the fact 
that the difference between electoral democracy and authoritarian regime is 
increasingly blurred given the latter’s propensity to resort to some form of 
elections to legitimise its rule, the African external defensive mechanism 
remains for now largely ineffective. 
Lastly, the practice of the AU with respect to democratic disruptions has 
been widely criticised for its ostensible incongruence with the collective 
security provisions of the UN Charter establishing the primacy of the SC in 
deciding on the issues of the use of force. By setting up its own ‘mini-Security 
Council’, the AU exceeded its authority that the Charter accords to regional 
organisations.187 Because in practice such regional arrangements have not been 
challenged by states in any significant way, some scholars concluded that 
multilateral pro-democratic intervention is now an accepted norm, at least at 
the regional level.188 For others, this simply reaffirms the undetermined status 
of pro-democratic intervention ‘destined to remain awkwardly poised between 
condoned practice and accepted law’.189 
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5.5. Asia: Between Statutory Conservatism and 
‘Constructive Engagement’ 
  
Unlike the regional cooperation in Europe, the Americas and Africa aimed at 
fostering peace and development through political homogenisation (albeit with 
significant variations), the vast region of Asia is mostly marked by the need to 
secure the sovereignty of newly decolonized countries as a ‘hard won prize’190 
and to lessen the possibility of external intervention. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that regional organisations in the Asian region have not adopted 
admission criteria based on human rights and democracy, nor have they 
committed themselves to suspend their members for reneging upon such 
standards. For instance, the founding document of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) — an organisation entrusted with the task to foster 
closer cooperation between states in Southeast Asia — provides that ASEAN 
is ‘open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region’ 
subscribing to its ‘aims, principles and purposes’.191 Moreover, prospective 
members are also required to ratify the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia laying down certain fundamental principles, including 
‘[m]utual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity’ and ‘[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of one another’.192 With 
a view of strengthening ASEAN’s legal status and codifying its institutional 
framework, the ASEAN Charter was adopted in 2007.193 Concerning its 
provisions on membership, it merely provided that the new members must be 
willing to ‘carry out obligations of the membership’.194 Similar policy of non-
interference in the internal affairs of states is adopted by the League of Arab 
States — a regional organisation of Arab countries in and around North Africa 
aiming to secure closer relations and cooperation between them — whose 
constitutive document proclaims that ‘[e]very independent Arab State shall 
have the right to adhere to the League’.195 It further states that ‘[e]very member 
State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other 
States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as 
one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action 
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tending to change that form’.196 Likewise, the (revised) Charter of the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, formerly the Organisation of 
Islamic Conference), which safeguards and protects the interests of the Muslim 
world, holds that ‘[a]ny State, member of the United Nations, having Muslim 
majority and abiding by the Charter, which submits an application for 
membership may join the Organisation if approved by consensus only by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers on the basis of the agreed criteria adopted by the 
Council of Foreign Ministers’.197 
One exception is the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the 
British Commonwealth – an intergovernmental organisation of 53 states that 
were mostly territories of the former British Empire, including Asian states. A 
commitment to democracy can be found in the 1971 Declaration of 
Commonwealth Principles (Singapore Declaration), which recognises 
participation ‘by means of free and democratic political processes’ as an 
‘inalienable right’,198 and is reiterated in the 1991 Harare Declaration.199 The 
Harare principles were later on adopted as a criterion for determining future 
membership of the organisation.200 The formal democracy clause was included 
in the 1995 Millbrook Action Programme on the Harare Declaration, which 
provides that ‘in the event of an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically 
elected government,’ the measures include, among others, ‘suspension of 
participation at all Commonwealth meetings and of Commonwealth technical 
assistance’ if no progress is made after a period of two years as well as a set of 
‘further bilateral and multilateral measures by all member states,’ including 
‘suspension from the association’.201 To put this plan into practice, the 
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Commonwealth established the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group 
(CMAG) entrusted with the task of assessing states’ compliance with 
democratic standards and recommending measures for collective action in case 
of democratic disruption.202 The CMAG was empowered to deal not only with 
traditional coups but also with any serious or persistent violations of the Harare 
Declaration principles. Its menu of possible steps in response to democratic 
interruption is particularly detailed, comprising such measures as public 
expression of disapproval by the Commonwealth’s Secretary-General; good 
offices; bilateral demarcates by member countries; appointment of special 
envoys when necessary; stipulation of up to two years as the time frame for 
restoration of democracy if elections cannot be held within six months; 
exclusion of the recalcitrant government from the ministerial level meetings; 
suspension of participation at all Commonwealth meetings if progress is not 
made after two years; and consideration of appropriate further multilateral and 
bilateral measures.203 One should not, however, be overtly enthusiastic about 
the existence of an explicit democratic clause in Asia since the Commonwealth 
encompasses only a small portion of Asian states and is a ‘soft’ organisation, 
which ‘does not encroach on the sovereignty of its individual members. Nor 
does it require its members to seek to reach collective decisions or to take 
united action’.204 
However, the failure to formally recognise democracy as an essential 
attribute of states in Asia and the Arab world does not tell the whole story of 
the impact of democracy in these regions. In Southeast Asia, the incremental 
democratisation within the region led ASEAN to adopt a ‘more relaxed view 
of state sovereignty and the attendant norm of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states’.205 In 1998, Thailand urged a change from ‘non-intervention’ 
to ‘constructive intervention’, or ‘flexible engagement’,206 acknowledging 
that: 
 
[T]he dividing line between domestic affairs on the one hand and external or 
transnational issues on the other is less clear. Many ‘domestic’ affairs have 
obvious external or trans-national dimensions, adversely affecting 
neighbours, the region and the region’s relations with others. In such cases, 
the affected countries should be able to express their opinions and concerns 
in an open, frank and constructive manner.207 
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This has been supported by Philippines and Indonesia, the latter claiming that 
the ASEAN doctrine of non-interference ‘is no longer a principle which cannot 
be openly discussed’.208 Moreover, the 2007 ASEAN Charter for the first time 
explicitly refers to the strengthening of democracy, good governance and the 
rule of law as the Organisation’s purposes.209 
The first instance of the ASEAN ‘constructive engagement’ with issues of 
internal regime of a state is the case of Burma/Myanmar.210 Whilst Myanmar 
was admitted to ASEAN irrespective of the authoritarian character of its 
government (military dictatorship) and poor human rights record, it was denied 
the opportunity to chair the Organisation (a position that rotates alphabetically 
among the member states) until democratic reforms had been implemented.211 
In 2005, ASEAN urged Myanmar to foster its ‘Roadmap to Democracy’ and 
to release detainees.212 More robust initiatives include the suggestion to 
suspend Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN in the case there was no progress 
by December 2006.213 Although this suggestion has never materialised, it is 
hard to overlook the sea change in the political climate of Southeast Asia, 
where the so long cherished principle of non-intervention is becoming 
increasingly circumscribed by the commitments to democracy and human 
rights. 
Another instance of ASEAN growing readiness to meddle into the internal 
affairs of its future members is that of Cambodia. After the First Prime Minister 
Prince Ranarridh was ousted by the Second Prime Minister Hun Sen in 1997 
due to the failure to reach an agreement on certain political issues, including 
the status of former Khmer Rouge soldiers, the reaction of the state members 
of ASEAN was largely negative. Considering the fact that Cambodia was at 
that time at the process of admission to the Organisation, Thailand, for 
instance, claimed that a state’s internal policies were ‘an important factor to 
consider’.214 Cambodian admission was eventually delayed until order was 
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restored and elections were held. In his comments to such an unprecedented 
move in the ASEAN history, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Jayakumar stated 
that ‘[a]ny unconstitutional change of government is cause for concern. Where 
force is used for an unconstitutional purpose, it is behaviour that ASEAN 
cannot ignore or condone’.215 The similar view was expressed by Malaysia’s 
Foreign Minister Abdullah pointing out that ‘[i]f an election can be carried out 
— a peaceful and free election conducted in adherence to the UN-brokered 
Paris Peace Accord — a government chosen by its people will see the 
admission of Cambodia into ASEAN’.216 It remains to be seen whether 
ASEAN will broaden its policy of constructive engagement by, inter alia, 
sanctioning states experiencing anti-constitutional overthrows, particularly 
considering the fact that the 2007 ASEAN Charter omits any reference to 
expulsion or suspension from the Organisation. However, article 20(4) of the 
Charter entrusts the ASEAN Summit with the power to make a decision ‘in the 
case of a serious breach of the Charter or non-compliance’.217 This article could 
serve as a potential legal ground for such actions. For now, however, soft 
diplomacy, informality, discussion and organisation minimalism are preferred 
to coercive politics of suspension and/or expulsion, which is commonly 
dubbed as the ‘ASEAN way’.218 Moreover, the democratisation process in 
Southeast Asia remains incomplete and uneven considering that several states, 
such as Burma and Vietnam, remain firmly under authoritarian rule. 
Another example of a shift from the ‘Non-Western Way’ to a more robust 
engagement occurred in the Pacific Islands Forum (formerly the South Pacific 
Forum) established in 1971. Initially created as an informal group of seven 
Pacific nations — Nauru, Western Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, the Cook Islands, 
Australia and New Zealand — aimed at solving issues of common concern, the 
Forum has experienced a stable increase in size and formality.219 In 2000, the 
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Biketawa Declaration was adopted.220 It includes a set of principles and courses 
of action aimed to guide the Forum leaders on matters of their national politics, 
including good governance, equal rights, democracy and sustainable 
development.221 Moreover, the Declaration envisages a mechanism of response 
in time of crisis, which can be characterised by, among others, lack of good 
governance, that includes the creation of a Ministerial Action Group, third 
party mediation, convening of a special high level meeting of the Forum 
Security Committee or an ad hoc meeting of Forum Ministers and other 
necessary targeted measures.222 The Biketawa Declaration has been recognised 
by many as a significant step forward in terms of promotion of democracy, ‘a 
quantum leap forward’.223 As Rolfe rightly observed, the Declaration signifies 
that ‘[t]he Pacific Way is potentially heading away from its roots towards the 
Western way’.224 
The Western way tendency was further affirmed in 2009 when Fiji was 
suspended from meetings of the Forum in response to its military regime’s 
failure to put the country back on the democratic track within the acceptable 
timespan.225 The Forum was concerned with constitutional issues as well as 
human rights violations in Fiji226 and urged the Fijian interim Government to 
respect its commitment to hold elections ‘in the shortest practicable time’.227 
In 2009 at a special leaders’ retreat in Port Moresby, the Forum leaders called 
for the restoration of democracy in Fiji ‘without further delay’ and agreed on 
a set of ‘targeted measures’, including ‘suspension of participation by the 
Leader, Ministers and officials of the Fiji Interim Government in all Forum 
meetings and events’, which would take effect unless ‘the Fiji Interim 
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Government nominates an election date by 1 May 2009’.228 Following the 
failure of Fiji to comply, the suspension was announced by the Chair of the 
Forum Toke Talagi on 2 May 2009: ‘It is with considerable sorrow and 
disappointment that I confirm the suspension of the current military regime in 
the Republic of the Fiji Islands, from full participation in the Pacific Islands 
Forum, with immediate effect from 2 May 2009’.229 Talagi further maintained 
that ‘[a] regime which displays such a total disregard for basic human rights, 
democracy and freedom has no place in the Pacific Islands Forum’.230 This was 
the first time in the Forum’s history that a member state was suspended for its 
non-democratic politics. The decision of the Pacific Islands Forum was 
supported by the Melanesian Spearhead Group — a sub-regional organisation 
formed with focus to promote economic growth among Melanesian countries 
— which encouraged Fiji to comply with the timetable for elections.231 
Distaste to military regimes has also been shown by the Commonwealth, 
whose commitment to defend democracy is clearly revealed by its decision to 
suspend several states from its membership on the basis of their failure to 
adhere to democratic standards. In 1995, Nigeria was suspended from 
membership ‘in response to […] a serious violation of the principles of the 
Harare Declaration’.232 On a closer reading of the communique it stands clear 
that the decision to suspend was motivated by the military coup. After the 
restoration of a civilian rule, Nigeria regained its membership status. Since the 
action against Nigeria, Pakistan was suspended in 1999 after a military coup. 
In its Durban Communique, the Commonwealth declared that ‘no legitimacy 
shall be accorded to the military regime’.233 It was suspended again in 2007 in 
                                               
228 Pacific Islands Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, ‘Leaders’ Decision’ (Port Moresby, 27 
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<http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/south-pacific/2380019/Fiji-formally-ousted-from-Pacific-
Islands-Forum> accessed 28 February 2017. 
231 ‘Melanesian Spearhead Group to Help Fiji Hold Elections Next Year’ Radio New Zealand 
International (28 May 2008) <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-
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response to the imposed state of emergency234 but reinstated in 2008 following 
parliamentary elections and the new President’s commitment to stand down as 
Chief of any Staff.235 Fiji was suspended from the councils of the 
Commonwealth twice, in 1987 and 2000, and in 2009 it was fully suspended 
form the organisation following military coups that overthrew elected 
governments. In the context of the 2009 political crisis, the Commonwealth 
proclaimed that Fiji was in violation of the Commonwealth values and 
principles and should satisfactory progress not be made by Fiji towards 
reinstatement of democracy ‘Fiji Islands will be fully suspended from the 
Commonwealth at the Group’s next meeting [on 26] September 2009’.236  On 
1 September 2009, Fiji was fully suspended from the organisation.237 
To conclude, whilst Asia’s stance toward democracy promotion, 
including defence of democratic institutions, has shifted dramatically towards 
Western style, it varies considerably across the Asian region and it remains 
largely ad hoc and confined to quiet diplomacy, informal consultation and 
consensus. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that states are increasingly willing to monitor each 
other’s domestic politics by enlarging the corpus of international law with the 
norms explicitly prohibiting democratic disruptions and acting accordingly. 
Whilst at the global level such practice of reacting to democratic threats is 
predominantly confined to the situations representing a threat to international 
peace and security and remains patchy at best, at regional levels, namely in 
Europe, the Americas and Africa, democracy is now a legal norm, and any 
unconstitutional interruption of democracy creates an abnormal situation that 
must be corrected, even though the practice remains inconsistent, contradictory 
and heavily dependent on short-term political objectives of states. Moreover, 
depending on regional peculiarities, the scope and robustness of the external 
system of defence of democracy varies, beginning with the soft model of 
‘intervention without intervening’ in the Americas and culminating in the 
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(London, 3 March 2009) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/london-
wikileaks/8305179/COMMONWEALTH-ISSUES-STRONG-STATEMENT-ON-FIJI-
AFTER-MINISTERIAL-MEETING.html> accessed 23 September 2016. 
237 Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Fiji Suspended from the Commonwealth’ Press Release (1 
September 2009) <http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth/commonwealth-
membership/withdrawals-and-suspension/> accessed 23 September 2016. 
External Defence of Democracy 
 
 
221 
stringent African mechanism envisaging outright military intervention to 
restore democracy as the last resort. In both regions, the definition of threats to 
democracy is rather narrow as it is restricted to military and executive coups 
and is reactive in nature. The European system of collective action in defence 
of democracy lies somewhere in between, encompassing the widest 
assortiment of responses to even minor cases of democratic backsliding and 
emphasising the preventive dimension of defence against undemocratic 
transgressions. Considering the long-standing democratic tradition within 
Europe and consequently more sophisticated and specific requirements 
towards states with respect to their national politics, it comes as no surprise 
that the European tripartite system of reaction to democratic threats is so far 
the most efficient. Lastly, the Asian model of ‘flexible engagement’ is the 
weakest in terms of legalisation, institutionalisation and enforcement. Bearing 
in mind the exceptional panoply of variations within the vast region of Asia 
stretching from ASEAN’s preferred policy of informal diplomacy and respect 
for the principle of non-intervention to the Commonwealth’s more sustained 
pattern of sanctioning antidemocratic usurpers, the Asian regional system of 
collective defence of democracy is close to non-existent as the concept is 
understood in other regions. 
These considerable variations notwithstanding, the preceding 
comprehensive overview of democracy clauses in the charters of international 
and regional organisations and other multilateral instruments reveals that they 
contain a number of common features. They typically include a set of shared 
general democratic principles, set up a mechanism of collective action in 
response to democratic disruption and specify a procedure for collective 
response with an array of possible outcomes. Such homogenisation of, and 
convergence between, the international system of external defence of 
democracy and regional mechanisms of collective action in response to 
democratic disruptions speak for the gradual institutionalisation of the 
enforcement mechanism of the right to democracy. Indeed, if states are now 
not only abstractly required to introduce and maintain democracy but also 
forced to do so through a plethora of international and regional collective 
arrangements, how can one effectively argue that democracy is at best a 
political principle not susceptible to legal delineation?
6. Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to 
Revolution 
 
Unless in certain conditions we have the right to rebel, much talk of human 
rights can be dismissed as empty rhetoric.1 
 
Having previously ascertained that the doctrine of global constitutionalism 
represents not only an academic artefact but also the actual process of 
transformation of international relations where the right to democracy is an 
inherent element, it is fair to claim that certain normative claims in defence of 
constitutional integrity of international law are not only permissible but also 
indispensable. In fact, it has long been accepted in jurisprudence and legal 
theory that the descriptive cannot be estranged from the normative and the two 
often inform and reinforce each other.2 Distinct from positive law, the 
legitimacy of such normative claims is derived from their inherent moral value 
for the international community at large. The right to revolution is one such 
claim. However, to say that revolution lacks conventional basis in law is not to 
say that it is a purely natural norm, standard of justice or any other form of 
‘oughtness’. It is rather to accept that the role which revolution plays in the 
international legal system resembles that of dark matter in the universe: it does 
not directly interact with any norm of international law and, yet, its presence 
is constantly felt. It shapes and directs international legal dynamics and 
constructs international legal conscience. International law is reliant on 
revolution because the latter is a type of anarchy against which the law 
affirmed itself. On the other hand, the potential destructive power of revolution 
represents a direct threat to the law’s existence and integrity, which hinders 
legal commentators from invoking the concept on the level of first-order legal 
norms. The progressive development of international human rights law, which 
emerged from the ruins of the Second World War, brings in new dynamics into 
this conundrum. It adds both moral legitimacy and extra-legal material for 
normative claims, for whom traditional state-to-state international law was too 
hostile an environment to establish themselves. It means that the notion of 
revolution as a right is not purely an academic invention bolstered by the 
considerations of morality and justice but has a decent legal basis in modern 
international law, to be examined in the following sections. 
The democratic entitlement thesis implies a particular role for revolution, 
namely that of the ultimate remedy against democratic disruption. The Latin 
legal maxim ubi ius, ubi remedium (where there is a right, there must be a 
                                               
1 Tony Honore, ‘Right to Rebel’ (1988) 8 Oxford J Leg Stud 34, 34. 
2 Stephen R Perry, ‘Hart’s Methodological Positivism’ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 427, 438, 466; 
Jean d’Aspremont, ‘International Legal Constitutionalism, Legal Forms and the Need for 
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remedy) means that human rights should be secured by remedies. As Tony 
Honore astutely noted, in order to maintain a tight distinction between rights 
and aspirations, two interrelated elements are crucial: recognition and remedy.3 
Indeed, what is the rationale behind possessing a human right if there are no 
means to vindicate it when it is violated? If rights did not imply remedies than 
the right holder would be a mere critic: he would solely condemn the violation 
of his interests without employing the language of legal obligation.4 Rights 
without remedies are empty, naked and illusory. The preceding chapters have 
demonstrated that there is a right to democracy in international law. If 
democracy is a human right applicable to anyone on Earth what happens if it 
is violated? What right holders can do if they have never experienced this right 
by virtue of living in an authoritarian state?  
Whilst the right to revolution as an ultimate remedy in defence of 
democracy is more easily justified against a tyrannical state, this is less so with 
respect to democratic governments. Classical democratic theory maintains that 
pouvoir constituant is expressed through elections as the only way to determine 
public values and goals.5 The existence of liberal democratic institutions, such 
as the rule of law and independent judiciary, and a set of constitutionally 
guaranteed human rights protecting the freedom of expression and peaceful 
protest is said to render any form of non-state political violence redundant and, 
thus, unjustified.6 Moreover, because revolutions are always unconstitutional 
in that they involve the overthrowing of the existing regime through a violation 
of the established constitution, there is a fundamental incompatibility between 
a democratic constitutional order and revolutionary change. One can, 
nonetheless, imagine a situation when even in a true democracy the 
government has become oppressive over the course of its mandate and it is too 
long to wait for new elections to replace it. It is, thus, fair to ask whether any 
remedy exists against such transgressions of legitimate authority. Because ‘the 
essence of justice is resistance against injustice’7 to completely dispense with 
the right to resist against unjust government is to undermine the very value of 
democracy. Thus, the right to resist is recognised in classical democratic theory 
but it is rather a ‘small scale right to resist’,8 which entails recourse to law, 
peaceful protest, the exercise of civil and political rights, passive resistance 
and (non-violent) civil disobedience. This ‘petty’ resistance must be 
                                               
3 Tony Honore, ‘Right to Rebel’ (1988) 8 Oxford J Leg Stud 34, 35. 
4 ibid. 
5 True, referenda, public protests and active engagement in the activities of civil society 
organisations play an important role in shaping public debate. Yet, they do not substitute 
elections as the main means to participate in political decision-making. Moreover, the peaceful 
character of such forms of political activism is crucial for their legitimacy and legality. 
6 But see David Miller, ‘The Use and Abuse of Political Violence’ (1984) 32 Pol Stud 401, 409 
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7 Arthur Kaufmann, ‘A Small Scale Right to Resist’ (1986) 21 New Eng L Rev 571, 571. 
8 ibid. See also Illan Rua Wall, ‘The Defense of Conscience: A Limited Right to Resist’ (2004) 
5 Hibernian LJ 275. 
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continuously invoked to render ‘grand’ resistance, or revolution, superfluous.9 
In addition, under the classical doctrine, revolution is never acceptable because 
it never arrives at the right time: it is either too early or too late. As Kaufmann 
explains, the right to revolution cannot occur if ‘the public authority stayed 
within the form and boundaries of law or as long as the at least elementary 
principles of the rule of law and constitution had not been abandoned, that 
extreme situation to which the right to resist should be restricted was not 
present; law and order had priority over the fighting of injustice which might 
have been connected with outbreaks of violence’.10 He insists, however, that if 
‘the last remnants of the rule of law and constitution had been eliminated and 
despotism firmly established, resistance was useless because it seems hopeless 
[…] because the legitimacy of resistance requires potential success’.11 
Contemporary (European) democratic theory invented the concept of 
‘militant’ or ‘intolerant’ democracy (stereitbare Demokratie) to avert 
democratic dismantlement by anti-democratic forces. Militant democracy is a 
specific sub-type of liberal democracy which was developed in post-war 
(West) Germany by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany12 to prevent 
the descendants of the Nazi and Communist parties from gaining power within 
the democratic order.13 Whilst German case represents the most paradigmatic 
and far-reaching endorsement of this doctrine, the instruments of militant 
democracy can also be found in most post-war European constitutions and 
ordinary laws, such as, for example, the 1958 French Constitution (art 16), 
which endows the President with ‘exceptional power’ to defend the institutions 
of the republic, national independence and territorial integrity in the case of an 
acute crisis, and the 1978 Spanish Constitution (art 6), which requires that 
political parties are democratically organised14 as well as the 2015 
‘decommunisation’ laws in Ukraine banning Communist parties from 
participation in elections.15 Other states impose substantive restrictions on the 
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10 ibid 575-76. 
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12 See The Quasi-Nazi Socialist Reich Party (1952) BVerfGE 2, 73; German Communist Party 
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‘Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I’ (1937) Am Pol Sci Rev 417. See also Gregory 
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14 See generally Markus Thiel, The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies 
(Ashgate 2009). 
15 On 15 May 2015, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed four laws ‘On the 
condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes and prohibition of 
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views that parties may hold, such as Turkey, which require fidelity to the 
principles of secularism and territorial integrity16 as a condition of eligibility 
for elected office, and Israel, which prohibits the participation in elections to 
any party that does not uphold the democratic and Jewish character of the state 
and incites to racism. Finally, some states refuse the entry to the electoral arena 
to parties that support terrorist and paramilitary groups, with Spain banning 
parties sharing the goals of the Basque separatist ETA insurgents being the 
most prominent case.17 
More recent works in law and political science advocate a shift from 
militant democracy to ‘defending democracy’, which represents a 
comprehensive paradigm to protect democracy through civic education and an 
engagement of civil society, with the outright banning of antidemocratic parties 
being the measure of last resort.18 Other common mechanisms (or remedies) to 
abridge antidemocratic tendencies include ‘tired constitutional amendments 
thresholds,’ which imply the use of textual provisions to entrench certain 
vulnerable political issues by requiring higher supermajorities or other 
mechanisms, and the ‘unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine’, 
which gives courts the power to strike down certain constitutional amendments 
that by virtue of their unconstitutionality may undermine the current 
democratic order.19 
This thesis suggests that neither classical democratic theory nor the 
modern comparative constitutional law are of help when democracy is 
overthrown or abused to such an extent that it lost its essential characteristics, 
such as self-empowerment and equality. In fact, a small-scale right to resist is 
of no use when legal and institutional framework for its realisation is 
compromised by authoritarian policies of a government of the day. The 
doctrine of militant democracy, whilst was intended to protect democracy, is 
not in effect a remedy but rather a state (pre-emptive) self-defence mechanism, 
which is highly criticised for its antidemocratic outcomes.20 The same holds 
                                               
totalitarian regime of 1917-1991’, ‘On the commemoration of the victory over Nazism in the 
2nd World War of 1939-1945’, and ‘On the legal status and commemoration of fighters of 
Ukraine’s independence in the 20th century’. See Ukrainskyi Instytut Nacional’noi Pam’yati, 
Laws <http://www.memory.gov.ua/laws?page=1> accessed 4 August 2016. Prior to this, a set 
of decrees were issued following Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 
banning the Communist Party of Ukraine and seizing its assets. See Alexei Trochev, ‘Ukraine: 
Constitutional Court Invalidates Ban on Communist Party’ (2003) 1 Int’l J Const L 534, 535. 
16 See Dicle Kogacioglu, ‘Dissolution of Political Parties by the Constitutional Court in Turkey: 
Judicial Delimitation of the Political Domain’ (2003) 18 Int’l Soc 258. 
17 For an excellent outline of various approaches to antidemocratic mobilizations in the electoral 
arena, see Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Fragile Democracies’ (2007) 120 Harv L Rev 1405, 1421-51. 
18 See eg Stefan Rummens and Koen Abts, ‘Defending Democracy: The Concentric 
Containment of Political Extremism’ (2010) 58 Pol Stud 649. 
19 David Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’ (2013) 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 193-94, 217. 
20 See eg Brad Roth, Response, ‘Democratic Intolerance: Observations on Fox and Nolte’ (1996) 
37 Harv Int’l L J 235, 237 (‘If one is to say to the people, in essence, “The fundamental principle 
of democracy dictates that you can have any government except the one the majority of you 
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true for tired constitutional amendments thresholds and unconstitutional-
constitutional amendments doctrine. Significantly, on a purely theoretical 
level, the modern understanding of democratic constitutionalism rests on the 
assumption that democratic constitution cannot negate its citizens the right to 
initiate constitutional change because the very idea of a finished constitution 
is incompatible with democracy.21 That being said, the author of this work 
suggests that revolution is an ultima ratio means to restore democracy and an 
ultimate remedy to effectuate the right to democratic governance. This 
‘extreme’ right will be indispensable ‘as long as the international community 
lacks the means for the effective, worldwide enforcement of fundamental 
human rights’.22 In other words, because the external mechanisms of collective 
action in defence of democracy leave much space for improvements in view of 
their politicisation, inconsistencies, selectivity and regional peculiarities, 
ascertaining the legal framework for internal response to democratic 
transgressions is an inalienable constitutive part of the enforcement dimension 
of the right to democracy. Because revolution’s groundedness in law is rather 
ambiguous on conventional analysis, it is important to first explore its 
conceptual core and intellectual history. The next two sections are devoted to 
these issues. 
 
6.1. Revolution: Some Conceptual Issues 
 
Revolution, like the doors of the temple of Janus, has two faces. One is an 
elegant, abstract and humanitarian face, an idyllic face, the dream of 
revolution […] The other is crude, violent and very concrete, rather 
nightmarish […].23 
 
Revolutions are social phenomena which are as old as political thought itself. 
The term derives from the Latin revolvere, ‘to revolve’. It was first applied by 
Copernicus in 1543 in his On the Revolutions of Celestial Bodies to describe 
the rotation of planets. From astronomy, the term migrated to astrology, which 
studied the heavens with the aim to foresee future. Sixteenth-century 
astrologers designated by ‘revolution’ abrupt and unforeseen events 
occasioned by the location of planets.24 However, the distinct notion of 
                                               
that it enables the people to choose. There is nothing intrinsically valuable about choosing 
among undesired options’). 
21 For a more comprehensive debate, see Allan Hutchinson and Joel I Colon-Rios, ‘Democracy 
and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?’ (2013) Victoria University of Wellington Legal 
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‘revolution’ as a political event emerged at the end of the seventeenth century. 
After the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89, which resulted in the dethronement 
of King James II of England and his replacement by William III of Orange, the 
term ‘revolution’ entered the sphere of politics.25 In 1776, the term was 
appropriated by American revolutionaries to describe their struggle for 
independence from the Great Britain and acquired even more radical 
connotations. Ultimately, it was the 1789 events in France that gave birth to a 
modern conception of revolution — ‘mutation soudain, catastrophique et 
irréversible, orientée selon la dimension du progrès de l’humanité vers un 
surplus de valeur et de bonheur’.26 In other words, revolution became to be 
understood as an agglomerate of three key elements: violence, mass 
mobilisation and rapidity. More recent scholarship added the fourth 
constitutive element of revolution — impact. The change must have impact 
reaching beyond ruling-class circles to be truly revolutionary.27 
While the concept of revolution has been studied in great detail since then, 
there is not yet an accepted definition of this social phenomenon. Undoubtedly, 
most commentators would agree that events such as the French, American, 
Russian and Chinese revolutions qualify as such. These revolutions not only 
fundamentally altered the internal structure of a state by substituting power-
holders with rebel groups, but also transformed the nature of relationships 
between individuals and the state by, inter alia, promulgating democratic 
ideals, enabling the participation of previously excluded groups in political life 
and facilitating the materialisation of these ideas in constitutional documents. 
Yet, beyond these four major historical upheavals it becomes less clear.28 
Studies of the phenomenon vary from the highly inclusive to the highly 
exclusive. As Sumida rightly pointed out, ‘[t]he entire continuum of historical 
events from the palace coup to the “true socioeconomic revolution” to the 
worldwide system-transforming revolution of modernization has been 
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27 Isaac Kramnick, ‘Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent 
Scholarship’ (1972) 11 Hist & Theory 26, 30. 
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subsumed under the concept of revolution’.29 Similarly, Joder acknowledged 
that ‘[t]he term “revolution” is one of the most used and, one suspects, one of 
the most misused of words. Both within and without the literature of the social 
sciences it has acquired a variety of meanings which make it as adaptable to 
personal purposes as is the chameleon’s skin’.30 Hence, the term ‘revolution’ 
has been used to designate any type of change, from a change in the location 
of sovereignty to a change of ideological, economic, and religious fabric of 
society. Some authors even claim that underlying political, social or economic 
changes are only material manifestations of revolution, whilst real revolutions 
occur at the level of values, mores and attitudes towards the traditional 
institutional order.31 
The majority of commentators (including the author of this thesis), 
nonetheless, hold to a political understanding of revolution, that is a change in 
the location of sovereignty. Whilst such change unavoidably shakes other 
aspects of social life and might be rooted in a variety of causes, the main 
rationale behind revolution is a political reversal. This restricted understanding 
of revolution is clearly visible in the often-cited definition formulated by 
Huntington: ‘A revolution is a rapid, fundamental and violent domestic change 
in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social 
structure, leadership and government activity and policies’.32 He elaborates 
this definition in the following way: 
 
[T]he most significant results of the great revolutions are either precisely in 
the political sphere or directly related to that sphere. A full-scale revolution 
involves the destruction of the old political institutions and patterns of 
legitimacy, the mobilization of new groups into politics, the redefinition of 
the political community, the acceptance of new political values and new 
concepts of political legitimacy, the conquest of power by a new, more 
dynamic political elite, and the creation of new and stronger political 
institutions. All revolutions involve modernization in the sense of the 
expansion of political participation; some revolutions also involve political 
development in the sense of the creation of new patterns of political order.33 
 
Revolution should be distinguished from other modes of resistance, such as 
lawful opposition, civil disobedience, rebellion, insurrection, civil riots, 
national liberation movements, revolts, coups and wars of independence, by 
virtue of its comprehensive (a high degree of mass participation and/or 
support) and radical scope (to bring down the whole political structure instead 
of effectuating a particular legal or policy reform), high intensity (widely 
                                               
29 Gerald Sumida, ‘The Right of Revolution: Implications for International Law and Order’ in 
Charles A Barker (ed), Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs (The John Hopkins 
Press 1971) 130, 136. 
30 Dale Yoder, ‘Current Definitions of Revolution’ (1926) 32 Am J Soc 433, 433. 
31 ibid 441. 
32 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale UP 1968) 264. 
33 ibid 308. 
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shared cause and reasonable prospect of permanence)34 and its complete 
defiance of the laws, policies and decisions of the incumbent government. In 
fact, revolution can be effectuated by means of the enumerated kinds of 
activities, at least at certain stages, but it should be understood as a distinct 
mode of resistance towards a distinct end — a complete, total, overthrow of 
the existing illegitimate order. As Kramnick observed, ‘[t]here must be a 
peculiar direction and purposive orientation to the change; a novel structuring 
of society, a new and millennial order must be sought’.35 However, some 
authors tend to view the difference between revolution and other counter-
governmental acts as a matter of degree rather than quality. For instance, for 
Frazier, the difference between revolution and civil disobedience is not that 
clear-cut as one may think. For him, it would be 
 
[M]uch too simple, to say that the resister asserts his right to defy the state 
only in certain areas, while the revolutionary preaches complete defiance. It 
would be too simple because revolutionaries always share some common 
ground with their opponents. Rather than attempting to speak of resistance 
and revolution as two distinct modes of action, it seems preferable to consider 
them as part of a continuum of actions that vary in their degree of opposition 
to the given order.36 
 
It is a legitimate view but it does not attend a broad scholarly support: ‘This 
linking of the two notions [civil disobedience and revolution] is a mistake […] 
it represents a conceptual confusion’.37 Moreover, whilst it is undeniable that 
in certain circumstances it is difficult to draw a watertight line between 
revolution and civil disobedience (e.g., Gandhi in India), the underlying goals 
behind these modes of action are utterly different: deliberate and public 
infraction of the laws in force to propagate a moderate reform in the case of 
civil disobedience and wholesale (usually violent) repudiation of the authority 
of the current legal and political system with a view of their replacement in the 
                                               
34 This is an essential element of revolution, which distinguishes it from a mere rebellion — 
sporadic challenge to the established government which remains ‘susceptible to rapid 
suppression by normal procedures of internal security’ — and insurrection (insurgency) — ‘half-
way house between essentially ephemeral, spasmodic or unorganised civil disorders and the 
conduct of an organised war between contending factions within a State [belligerency]’. See 
Edre U Olalia, ‘The Status in International Law of National Liberation Movements and Their 
Use of Armed Force’ (IAPL 2003) 2. 
35 Isaac Kramnick, ‘Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent 
Scholarship’ (1972) 11 Hist & Theory 26, 30. 
36 Clyde Frazier, ‘Between Obedience and Revolution’ (1972) 3 Phil & Pub Aff 315, 326. 
37 Rex Martin, ‘Civil Disobedience’ (1970) 80 Ethics 123, 125. See also Hugo A Bedau, ‘On 
Civil Disobedience’ (1961) 58 J Phil 653, 656, 661; Carl Cohen, ‘Civil Disobedience and the 
Law’ (1966) 21 Rutgers L Rev 1, 3 (‘Civil disobedience is not revolution. Revolution seeks the 
overthrow of constituted authority, or at least repudiates that authority in some sphere; civil 
disobedience does neither. The civil disobedient accepts, while the revolutionary rejects, the 
frame of established authority and the general legitimacy of the system of laws’); Carl Cohen, 
‘What Civil Disobedience Is Not’ in Carl Cohen (ed), Civil Disobedience: Conscience, Tactics, 
and the Law (1st edn 1971, MPublishing 2013) 42ff. 
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case of revolution. In other words, whereas civil disobedience typically 
involves a certain willingness to ‘work with the system’, revolution, 
conversely, seeks to overthrow it.38 Revolution is, in short, an illegal change in 
what are considered the fundamental principles of legality. 
Yet, the most widespread conceptual confusion is observable between the 
concept of revolution and that of coup d’état. On the one view, the distinction 
is hardly to overlook. First, military coups are typically conducted by small 
bands consisting of individuals used to hold governmental offices, whereas 
‘grandes révolutions’ are sparkled by mass political action. Second, the main 
goal of the usurpers is usually to displace the incumbent government without 
necessarily seeking to bring about broader social reforms, whereas revolution 
cuts deeper into the existing structure of a society and profoundly alters its 
socio-political institutions. Thus, while the both phenomena involve the 
overthrow of an established government, revolution is the most dramatic and 
far-reaching event, which brings about fundamental change in the political 
system itself, as opposed to a mere change in the dominant political policy or 
the replacement of the governing elite.39 Some authors, nonetheless, claim that 
coups d’état are a type of revolution as they ‘break down decades-old 
governance structures and replace them with a new regime’.40 For Kelsen, a 
revolution occurs whenever the legal order is replaced in an illegitimate way, 
in way not envisaged by the former order. It is, thus, irrelevant whether the 
replacement is effectuated by means of violent uprising or in a peaceful way. 
It is also irrelevant whether revolution is carried out by masses or through the 
action of those in government positions.41 Hence, in this context, any 
illegitimate usurpation of power, that is in contradiction to the constitution, is 
a revolution. In the way similar to Kelsen, Muhammad Munir defines 
revolution in the following manner: 
 
A revolution is generally associated with public tumult, mutiny, violence and 
bloodshed but from a juristic point of view the method by which and the 
persons by whom a revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial. The 
change may be attended by violence or it may be perfectly peaceful. It may 
                                               
38 Frederic Megret, ‘Civil Disobedience and International Law: Sketch for a Theoretical 
Argument’ (2008) 46 Can YBIL 143, 166. See also Hugo A Bedau, ‘On Civil Disobedience’ 
(1961) 58 J Phil 653, 661 (‘Anyone commits an act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts 
illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, 
policies, or decisions of his government’). 
39 Andrew Heywood, Politics (Macmillan Press 1997) 198. See also Crane Brinton, The 
Anatomy of Revolution (Vintage 1952) 3-4; George Blanksten, ‘Revolutions’ in Harold E Davis 
(ed), Government and Politics in Latin America (Ronald Press 1958) 72; David P Forsythe, 
Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions (University of Nebraska 
Press 1993) 56. 
40 Ozan O Varol, ‘The Democratic Coup d’État’ (2012) 53 Harv Int’l L J 292, 307-08. 
41 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Welberg tr, Harvard UP 1946) 115, 
209. See also Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law 
(Droz 1954) 25 (‘[Revolution] covers every change in the legal order of the state other than one 
brought about by constitutional means’). 
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take the form of a coup d’état by a political adventurer or it may be effected 
by persons already in public positions.42 
 
Once again coup d’état is but one manifestation of a revolution. Likewise, 
Tanter and Midlarsky suggest that ‘[a] revolution may be said to exist when a 
group of insurgents illegally and/or forcefully challenges the governmental 
elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of political authority’.43 It is 
clear from the definition that the authors view any replacement of the ruling 
elite in contradiction with the constitution of the day as a revolution. Moreover, 
drawing on the work of Huntington, they suggest four types of revolution: mass 
revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup and palace revolution.44 Thus, 
coups d’état are, on their account, subspecies of a revolution. Only their 
concept of ‘mass revolution’ akin to the 1776 American Revolution and the 
1789 French Revolution, or ‘Great Revolutions’ as George Pettee calls them,45 
corresponds to the definition of revolution as the term is used in this study. 
Such conceptual ambiguity between revolution and military coup is 
understandable, at least in legal science, since jurists do not have appropriate 
tools to measure sociological impact of the event in order to categorise it. All 
they can ascertain is whether a government was replaced according to the rules 
in place or in violation thereof. Should the existing succession rules have been 
violated, it is not legally relevant what cause they pursued. Such confusion is 
also enhanced by the fact that the notion of revolution is increasingly becoming 
elastic and ‘transcendental’46 to serve its original goal of emancipation and 
salvation to ever-broader strata of actors emancipated by the progressive 
human rights rhetoric and seeking only a limited change in policy within their 
respective governments, instead of the radical restructuring of the political 
system. To illustrate, a chain of mass demonstrations in the Arab world and 
particularly in Ukraine, demanding greater democratisation and improved 
human rights record in the countries which had not been hostile to democracy 
and human rights and even rhetorically committed to these values, implied that 
the revolutionary cause was not a significant or complete change but rather the 
improvement and strengthening of the order which had already been there but 
                                               
42 The State v Dosso and Another 1958 PLD 538 (Supreme Court of Pakistan). 
43 Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, ‘A Theory of Revolution’ (1967) 11 J Conflict Resol 
264, 267. 
44 ibid 266. Huntington on his part differentiated between four categories of revolution: the 
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Huntington, ‘Patterns of Violence in World Politics’ in Samuel Huntington (ed), Changing 
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failed to be fully put in practice. However, the author of this study asserts that 
the distinction between coup d’état and revolution is deeper than merely the 
extent of mass support and the scope of socio-political change. Whilst coup 
d’état is a denial of the peoples’ right to dispose of themselves, revolution is 
the affirmation of this right; whereas coup d’état is a violation of democratic 
entitlement, revolution is a remedy for its vindication. 
Last but not least, some commentators distinguish between democratic 
(virtuous) and non-democratic (vicious) revolutions, what have become to be 
known as a ‘democratic revolution theory’. For them, a revolution is 
democratic, and thus legitimate, if the revolutionary regime institutes 
democratic rule and governs in accordance with the recognised international 
norms, whilst non-democratic revolution does not yield mass support and leads 
to the establishment of undemocratic regime.47 For the purposes of the present 
study, this distinction is redundant as revolution, as the notion is used in this 
paper, is always democratic as it is always characterised by mass support 
(albeit may not necessarily lead to the establishment of a fully-fledged 
democratic regime), whilst the notion of ‘non-democratic revolution’ is 
subsumed by other forms of resistance discussed above. The main reason why 
this work does not subscribe to the definition of a democratic revolution, as is 
developed by the proponents of the democratic revolution theory, is the latter’s 
conceptualisation of a ‘legitimate’ revolution as a ‘wait and see’ phenomenon 
whereby the normative question of legitimacy of revolution is conflated with 
assessment of the post-revolutionary environment in terms of its democratic 
progress.48 In other words, one cannot know whether the popular upheaval is a 
realisation of the right to revolution until a post-revolutionary government 
establishes itself. Thus, for the purpose of the present study, a revolution is a 
mass uprising aimed at the unseating of the (repressive) ruling government 
along with the fundamental change of the institutional structure of the political 
system, typically pursued by violent means and in disobedience to the laws of 
the implicated state. Uprising is mass whenever it is characterised by popular 
dissatisfaction, whether without direct involvement or with overt complicity or 
active support of the insurgents. 
Democracy and the right of revolution are intrinsically linked. Both 
concepts spring from the principle of popular sovereignty and are founded on 
                                               
47 See eg Ali Khan, ‘A Legal Theory of Revolutions’ (1987) 5 BUJ Int’l L 2; Richard Albert, 
‘Democratic Revolutions’ (2011) 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228284070_Democratic_Revolutions> accessed 8 
March 2016; Kalkidan Obse, ‘The Arab Spring and the Question of Legality of Democratic 
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University Working Paper 2013-3012 
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Question of Legitimacy of Democratic Revolution in Theory and Practice’ in the 6th Graz 
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the ever-present imperative of equality and empowerment. Moreover, both 
concepts are constitutive aspects of internal self-determination as they 
represent an inherent right of people to decide on their political, social and 
economic development. However, whilst democracy entails peaceful means to 
effectuate governmental change, revolution envisages forceful, often violent, 
overthrow of the incumbent government. Moreover, whilst the constitution of 
the day represents an inalienable ‘codifying’ framework which is essential for 
the effective functioning of democracy, revolution presupposes rejection of the 
old constitutional order and establishment of a new one. Revolution can also 
be viewed as an ultimate political tool to install democracy as well as to disrupt 
it. Ultimately, revolution is one of the remedies, sometimes the only one, that 
people have when their right to democracy has been abridged. It is the last 
aspect of revolution that this thesis will focus on. The thesis will argue that 
revolution is a remedy, or a human right to remedy, so to speak, to which 
everyone is entitled when democracy is in peril and other less radical means to 
reinstall democratic rule are not available or their use will not bring the wished 
result within a reasonable timespan. 
 
6.2. Philosophical Foundations of the Right of Revolution 
 
The idea that revolution can take form of a right, which has also been 
commonly defined as the right to resist, the right of resistance, the right to rebel 
and the right of rebellion,49 has evolved gradually both in Western and Eastern 
legal traditions. As Arendt observed, ‘whatever political organization man may 
have achieved has its origin in crime’.50 Whilst the earliest proclamations of 
the right to revolution drew their justification from some higher form of law 
beyond the government’s boundaries, subsequent invocations of the right at 
stake were based on a more diverse array of motivations. 
                                               
49 Some scholars tend to distinguish between the right to resist (right of resistance) and the right 
to rebel (right of rebellion). For them, the right to resist is an umbrella concept entailing both 
violent and non-violet dimensions. Only the latter can be properly called ‘the right of rebellion’. 
See Yulia Razmetaeva, ‘The Right to Resist and the Right of Rebellion’ (2014) 21 Jurisprudence 
758, 774. Likewise, Kaufman distinguishes between ‘justified resistance’ and ‘revolution’. For 
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In the West, some of the earliest discussions on revolution as a right can 
be found in the works of Plato, who argued in his Republic that people stripped 
of power and resources by their tyrant will strive for freedom and liberty and, 
thus, spark a revolution.51 He also admitted a possibility of the tyrant’s 
assassination if no other means to stop his rule are available.52 This idea, which 
became to be known as a theory of tyrannicide,53 was transmitted to Roman 
law, whose extremely influential Corpus Juris declared that ‘it is lawful to 
repel violence by violence’.54 This provision was widely interpreted as 
justifying resistance against tyranny. 
In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas wrote in Summa Theologica 
that ‘[a]ll who govern in the interests of themselves rather than of the common 
good are tyrants […] Against the regime’s efforts to enforce its decrees, one 
has the right of forcible resistance; as a private right this could extend as far as 
killing the tyrant as a foreseen side-effect of one’s legitimate self-defence’.55 
Importantly, in Aquinas’ understanding, resisting tyranny was not rebellion per 
se but a struggle against unjust dominion, which itself amounted to a rebellion 
against the legal order. The right of assassination of the unethical tyrant was 
also advocated by John Salisbury in his Policraticus. For him, a tyrant is the 
‘image of depravity […] [who] […] springs from evil and should be cut down 
with the axe wherever he grows’.56 To depict the right of violent resistance as 
not merely entitlement but also as a duty was common in the Middle Ages. 
Moreover, the development of the nation-state at the Late Middle Ages was 
accompanied by the need to codify existing law, including the right of 
revolution. Thus, the 1215 Magna Carta, an English charter that required the 
king to renounce certain rights, included a ‘security clause’ that entitled the 
barons, in the case some of its provisions are violated, to take hold of the king’s 
possessions, lands and castles and resort to any other means whilst sparing the 
king’s family ‘until the excess shall have been redressed’.57 Similar provisions 
were included in the Golden Bull of 1222, edict issued by King Andrew II of 
Hungary. The Golden Bull enshrined the rights of noblemen in Hungary, 
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including the right to disobey (jus resistendi) the King when he acted in 
contravention to law.58 Likewise, the thirteenth-century German 
Sachsenspiegel59 as well as the 1573 Henrician Articles60 contain clauses 
authorising the ouster of the king should he fail to adhere to the terms of the 
respective agreement. 
In the modern period, Jean Calvin, while insisting upon a general 
obligation of Christians to obey their rulers, contended that magistrates had a 
positive duty to protect the people’s freedoms against their leader who 
disobeyed God’s will. While he did not explicitly teach a right to revolution, 
his works laid solid grounds for this idea.61 In 1644, the Scottish Presbyterian 
Samuel Rutherford published Lex Rex: or the Law and the Prince, where he 
argued that resistance to tyranny is not only a right but a Christian duty. He 
extrapolated this right from the natural law right to self-defence.62 The right of 
rebellion was also recognised, albeit in a paradoxical manner, by the founding 
father of modern international law Hugo Grotius. On the one hand, he appealed 
to a social contract theory to disqualify any violent resistance: the 
establishment of a state requires that ‘the State has a power to prohibit the 
unlimited Use of that Right’.63 The very existence of the state, so the argument 
runs, would be endangered if the right to violent resistance existed. On the 
other hand, he accepted that ‘some of the Laws of God, however general they 
be, seem to admit of tacit Exceptions in Cases of extreme Necessity’.64 In other 
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words, although Grotius insisted that individuals when establishing a state 
forfeit their ‘promiscuous’ (unlimited) right to resist, they retain a qualified 
right to resist utter injustice. Emmerich de Vattel absorbed this idea and 
developed it further in his just war theory by introducing an element of 
proportionality: ‘When mild and innocent remedies can be applied to the evil, 
there can be no reason for waiting until it becomes extreme’.65 
In the Age of Enlightenment, one of the most important contributions to 
the development of the right of revolution was John Locke’s Two Treatises of 
Government. The right of revolution formed an integral part of his social 
contract theory: since governments exist by the consent of the people in order 
to protect their rights and public good, governments that are incapable to 
perform towards these ends can be resisted and overthrown because tyranny 
erased the social contract and put the people back into a state of nature. As a 
natural law protagonist, he claimed that a right to revolution was a natural right 
given its roots in the natural right of self-defence.66 Locke’s conceptualisation 
of popular revolt as an enforcement mechanism for the social contract helped 
crystallise the philosophical underpinnings of the contemporary right to resist. 
Another Enlightenment scholar, Montesquieu, was highly influenced by 
Locke’s ideas: ‘[I]f a prince, very far from making his subjects live happy, 
endeavors to oppress and ruin them, the foundation of obedience ceases; 
nothing ties them, nothing attaches them to him, and they return to their natural 
liberty’.67 Moreover, he claimed that because people’s power is not unlimited 
it could not have been transferred to the ruler: ‘[W]e cannot […] give to another 
more power over us, than we have ourselves’.68 The right of revolution was 
also considered by Kant, although in a rather paradoxical fashion. In many of 
his works he condemns revolution: a constitution cannot have within it a 
positive law sanctioning the abrogation of the constitution, law cannot permit 
lawlessness,69 ‘there is no right of sedition, much less a right of revolution’.70 
However, his opposition to revolution was not unequivocal: the successful 
revolution ‘binds the subjects to accept the new order of things as good 
citizens, and they cannot refuse to honor and obey the suzerain [Obrigkeit] who 
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now possesses authority’.71 Thus, while roundly criticising revolutionary 
attitudes, Kant acknowledged the legitimacy of successful revolution. 
The ideas of the Enlightenment scholars became the principal justification 
for the American and French revolutions and eventually found their way to the 
two classical declarations, which for the first time in history proclaimed the 
right to revolution as a universal human right. American Declaration of 
Independence of 1776 asserts that ‘wherever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government’.72 Similarly, the French one of 
1789 proclaims that ‘[t]he aim of every political association is the preservation 
of the natural and imprescriptible rights of Man. These rights are Liberty, 
Property, Safety and Resistance to Oppression’.73 A decade later, the French 
Constitution of 1793 declared in para 35: ‘When the government violates the 
rights of the people, insurrection is for the people, and for every portion 
thereof, the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties’. These 
ideas were also exported to other parts of the world in works, such as Thomas 
Paine’s Rights of Man (1791), which posits that mass revolution is permissible 
when a government fails to safeguard the natural rights of its people: 
‘Sovereignty, as a matter of right, appertains to the nation only, and not to any 
individual; and a nation has at all times an inherent, indefensible right to 
abolish any form of Government it finds inconvenient’.74 In his later work, he 
suggested that ‘[i]t is possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is 
impossible to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; 
and when all other rights are taken away the right of rebellion is made 
perfect’.75 
However, the establishment of international law as a positivist science in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries led to the rejection of the right to 
resist. It was considered to be replaced by the modern mechanisms of judicial 
review and the rule of law. As one prominent scholar of that time observed, it 
became superfluous and obsolete: ‘With the spread of the constitutionally 
based rule of law, therefore, the theory of resistance had become sociologically 
defunct. Its legal and moral premise had been satisfied; its logical justification 
for existence had ceased to exist’.76 The period of decay of the doctrine of 
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revolution did not last long, however. The rise of Nazi Germany and the 
attendant atrocities it committed in the name of civilisation, prompted a 
renewed interest in the right to resist. The much-quoted ‘Radbruch’s formula’ 
succinctly reflected the changing mood of that time: ‘[P]ositive law, secured 
by constitution and by force, takes precedence even if it is substantively unjust 
and inexpedient, unless the contradiction of positive law reaches such an 
intolerable level that the law, as an “unjust law”, has to yield place to justice’.77 
After the end of WWII, Germany incorporated the right to resist in some of its 
Land constitutions78 and in 1968 in the Grundgesetz of the Federal Republic 
of Germany.79 
These post-war developments did not remain unnoticed in academic 
circles. Camus in his L’Homme Révolté justified the right of revolution by 
appealing to a moral rule grounded in human nature which requires those who 
face intolerable conditions to act against those who created these conditions 
and/or are complicit in their maintenance.80 Like Camus, Honderich concluded 
that in certain cases, the acts of political violence remain the only available 
means to achieve particular aims, such as equality and possibility to partake in 
political life of one’s community, within a reasonable span of time.81 By the 
same token, Stephen Carter in his celebrated Massey Lectures asserted that if 
it is dissent, not consent, that democratic rule is meant to facilitate, then the 
morality of revolution seeks in the same spirit not to dry out the seeds of dissent 
but rather to sow them into fields of consent. On his account, there is no higher 
authorising force than citizens themselves en masse giving expression to their 
convictions.82 So widely endorsed is now this doctrine that one prominent 
international lawyer concluded that ‘the right of a people to revolt against 
tyranny is now a recognized principle of international law’.83 
The right of revolution was also recognised in Chinese legal tradition 
through the promulgation of the concept of the Mandate of Heaven. The 
Mandate of Heaven is an ancient Chinese belief, which originated during the 
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Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BC) and was championed by a Chinese philosopher 
Mencius. According to this belief, heaven (tian) granted emperors the right to 
rule if they were sufficiently virtuous to rule justly and in public good. If a 
ruler failed to govern in accordance with normative ethical standards (li), 
natural and/or social disasters would ensue. The theory of the Mandate of 
Heaven is often identified with the right of rebellion, even though it is not 
explicit about this. According to Mencius, it was tian, and not the people, as a 
source of constraint but the people’s behaviour reflected the will of heaven.84 
This has led many contemporary scholars to argue that Mencius doctrine of the 
Mandate of Heaven is supportive of the right to rebel,85 albeit to be exercised 
only by noble families.86 If a rebellion was successful in overthrowing the 
emperor, it was an indication that he lost his Mandate of Heaven and the rebel 
leader had gained it.87 Although the right of revolution is not coded into any 
official law, it is still considered as a moral right in China. 
The right of revolution is also firmly rooted in Islamic legal thought. The 
classical Islamic discourse on rebellion developed in the late second/eighth 
centuries and continued to be restated and re-articulated until the 
eleventh/seventeenth centuries. The early Islamic legal tradition propagated a 
duty of obedience to those in power, even if the one in power is a ‘mutilated 
Abyssinian slave’.88 The counter-obedience discourse can be, nonetheless, 
derived from Qur’an. For instance, it states: ‘Why do you fail to fight in the 
cause of God, and for the oppressed men, women, and children who pray, “O 
Lord, get us out of this city whose peoples are oppressors, and send us by Your 
Will an ally and send us an aid”.’89 Although it is clear that Qur’an refers to 
injustice and oppression and not rebellion, ‘it does create a powerful symbolic 
construct that can be easily utilized to justify armed resistance to oppression’.90 
It is in fact due to this contradiction between the Qur’anic symbolism and the 
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traditions of obedience that some scholars claimed that the doctrine of absolute 
obedience was illegitimately fabricated.91 Be this as it may, numerous 
authoritative reports as well as the works of most Islamic jurists of the time 
reveal the acceptance of legitimacy of rebellion by endorsing two main ideas, 
namely that (1) ruler should only be obeyed if he rules fairly; and (2) rebels 
should not be held liable for life and property destroyed during the course of 
insurrection.92 Doctrinal discourses eventually led to the emergence of the law 
of rebellion. 
In the modern age, this classical discourse has been largely ignored and 
supplemented by a reconstructed debate on waging jihad against corrupt and 
unjust rulers.93 Jihad (just struggle) was originally conceived as a spiritual 
struggle in the defence of Islamic faith. It eventually evolved into a state 
doctrine justifying the use of force in self-defence to resist aggression and in 
the post-Prophet period as a basis for conquest. Since the nineteenth century, 
the doctrine acquired an entirely new dimension: it ceased to be an exclusively 
state doctrine and became increasingly invoked by non-state actors as a 
justification for revolutionary use of force against corrupt and inefficient 
national regimes.94 A host of less deserved armed groups developed the 
offensive theory of jihad (as opposed to the defensive jihad envisaged in 
Islamic law) to target governments and the international community as a whole 
by advancing radical visions of Islam.95 
In summary, it is clear form the above discussion that the right to resist, 
or the right to revolution as the term is used in this work, has deep intellectual 
roots and has existed in various political traditions across time and space. The 
emergence and development of this right across the globe has a common 
feature, namely the idea that the right of resistance was coined as a check 
against abusive state power. Its evaluative function of government 
performance was first based on certain external standard, such as God, nature, 
reason etc., and later on it was derived from the social underpinnings of the 
state itself, such as the social contract theory. The reason d’être of the 
entitlement to rebel has been the idea that the government mindful of the 
potential legitimate rebellion would most likely administer its power justly, or 
at least more moderately, than if it was not. Whilst the views of the world-
renowned philosophers do not carry legal authority per se, as they used to do 
in the past, they provide an important evidence of the right to revolution’s 
global pedigree and acceptance on the level of ideas. 
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6.3. Revolution and International Law 
 
The conceptual ambiguity of the notion of revolution is paralleled by the 
uncertainty as to its legal status. It is commonly asserted that today’s 
international law is not concerned with revolutions. Whilst the world’s 
grandest revolutions took place in the Western hemisphere, such as the 
American revolution of 1775-83, the French revolution of 1789, the European 
revolutions of 1848 and the 1917 Soviet revolution, the West seems hesitant to 
evoke this principle in the twenty-first century. According to the orthodox 
view, international law does not address the question of regime legitimacy, and 
revolutions are thus simply facts (fait accompli) that are neither legal nor 
illegal under international law: ‘International law does not address the 
problem. It is legally neutral about it’.96 It means that any internal conflict or 
insurrectionary movement will be in violation of domestic law of the state 
where it occurs but not international law.97 This is partially due to the fact that 
revolution has been predominantly viewed as a ‘pathology’ which can disrupt 
legal systems.98 This view is authoritatively echoed by Halliday insisting on 
revolution’s lack of ‘fit’ or ‘out-of-placeness’99 in social sciences: ‘the study 
of revolution is not at home in any of the social sciences’.100 
This widely-shared view on revolution as an aberration or abnormality is 
unsettling if one considers the direct and long-term effects of revolutions (or 
more precisely revolutionary ideas) on the evolution and development of 
international law. For instance, the French revolution was sparked by the ideas 
of Enlightenment philosophers whose conception of natural equality served a 
new foundation and a new justification for the principle of sovereign equality: 
all states were recognised equal irrespective of their size and wealth. This 
principle constitutes one of the cornerstones of the international community 
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until today.101 Another achievement of the French revolution is the recognition 
of peoples as subjects of international law by laying foundation to the modern 
conception of the principle of self-determination. As a violent rebellion against 
aristocratic privileges, the French revolution, and subsequently the American 
one, introduced the notion of accountability of the rulers to their peoples, that 
is the shift from dynastically legitimated monarchical sovereignty to popularly 
legitimated national sovereignty.102 This idea was subsequently taken up by the 
European revolutionaries in 1848 in their fight against feudal structures. Albeit 
the self-determination proclaimed by the revolutions was conceptually limited 
with respect to the contemporary understanding of the principle (it was neither 
applied to colonies and minorities, nor did it envisage democratic practices 
within states), revolution’s impact on the development of the modern 
conception of self-determination remains undeniable.103 The logical 
consequences of the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination is 
the prohibition of interference in internal affairs of states. Whilst this principle 
had been recognised before the French revolution, the latter gave rational 
foundation and a new logic thereto. It remains one of the fundamental 
postulates of international relations. Other basic ideas born or reinvigorated by 
the French revolution and transcending the extant international law include the 
prohibition of the war of aggression, the principle of humanitarian 
intervention, the prohibition of slavery and certain principles related to the 
conduct of war.104 The major legacy of the American revolution is the idea of 
the rule of law embodied in the written constitution as a limit on governmental 
powers available for all to see and understand. This significantly enriched the 
conception of political legitimacy.105 The 1917 October revolution was not less 
significant in its impact.106 It introduced new dimensions to the principle of 
self-determination of peoples, including the right of colonial and oppressed 
peoples to claim independence. Moreover, the principle broadened to include 
the interests of minorities to determine their political destiny.107 The Bolshevik 
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revolution also reaffirmed the principle of sovereign equality of states 
introduced by the French revolution. Whilst political and military 
considerations at that time hampered the full-fledged integration of the 
principle in positive international law, it served as an inspiration for developing 
countries gaining independence in the 1950-60s to take an affirmative duty-
based stance against the former colonisers. 
Apart from directly affecting the development of international law, the men 
of the Revolution advanced a myriad of principles which produced effects in 
the long term, when favourable historic circumstances arose. One of these is 
the notion of international community. The idea that every people on Earth 
constitutes a whole, that citizen of every state is also a world citizen belonging 
to the unity of mankind irrespective of race, religion, language and customs 
was picked up and advanced by the French revolutionaries. Albeit this notion 
was dormant for many years thereafter, it gained new impetus in the recent 
scholarship.108 Another concept that featured in the declarations of numerous 
French revolutionaries is that of international solidarity, encompassing the 
values of social justice and equality, goodwill among people and nations and 
integrity of the international community. Similarly to the concept of 
international community, the principle of solidarity was left inert for years. Yet, 
with the growth of globalisation and interdependence between states, it 
acquired new forms and is now a constitutive part of the international 
obligation of cooperation.109 It is also worth mentioning such revolution-
inspired ideas as respect for human rights and democratic legitimacy. Albeit 
not directly born by the revolution, these principles found support in the 
revolutionary documents and gained universal recognition.110 All in all, the 
contemporary value orientation of international law and its increasing 
humanisation and constitutionalisation are largely due to the impact of the 
grand revolutions in the formative phases of the modern international law. 
These values include human rights, self-determination, solidarity, equality and 
democratic legitimacy. The 21-century revolutions, such as the Arab Spring 
and the Euromaidan revolution, enriched, or more precisely, gave new force, 
to the value of democratic legitimacy in the international community. The net 
impact of these events is yet to be seen. All in all, it is clear from the 
aforementioned that international law is deeply indebted to revolutions. 
Moreover, the view on revolution as abnormality is particularly disturbing 
if one considers that international law has long ago embraced the doctrine of 
revolutionary legality developed by Hans Kelsen as part of his general theory 
of law, which he called ‘a pure theory of law’. Kelsen observed that revolution 
becomes validated by the sheer reality of its success and effectiveness by 
changing the basic norm (Grundnorm) of the legal order: 
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If [revolution] […] succeed[s], if the old order ceases and the new order 
begins to be efficacious because the individuals whose behaviour the new 
order regulates actually behave, by and large, in conformity with the new 
order, then this order is considered a valid order. It is now according to this 
new order that the actual behaviour of individuals is interpreted as legal or 
illegal […] If the revolutionaries fail, if the order they have tried to abolish 
remains efficacious, then, on the other hand their undertaking is interpreted, 
not as legal, a law-creating act, as the establishment of a constitution, but as 
an illegal act, as the crime of treason, and this according to the old […] 
constitution and its specific basic form.111 
 
It follows that the theoretical focus for resolving the issue of validity of the 
revolutionary government is on efficacy — the power and capability of the 
new regime to enforce its laws and secure obedience. In other words, a legal 
order is an effective order. Importantly, both the means through which 
revolution is effectuated as well as the cause of revolution are irrelevant to the 
determination of revolutionary legality. This doctrine has been applied by 
numerous national and international courts.112 In Madzimbamuto v Lardner-
Burke (1966) and Baron v Ayre (1966) — what have been dubbed as 
Grundnorm cases because of the central role that Kelsen’s doctrine of 
revolutionary legality played in them — two detainees, Madzimbamuto and 
Baron, challenged the renewal of their detention under the new 1965 
constitution established by the revolutionary Rhodesian government as being 
illegal because carried out by the authority having no legal existence. The court 
concluded that in order to determine the legality of the revolutionary regime 
and its constitution, the recourse should be made to the doctrine of 
revolutionary legality. It was asserted that not only is this a doctrine of 
international law but it is ‘a statement of the obvious proposition that what is 
destroyed no longer exists’.113 It was further stated that: 
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It may be accepted that a successful revolution which succeeds in replacing 
the old Grundnorm (or fundamental law) with a new one establishes the 
revolutionaries as a new lawful government […] If in the instant case the 
stage is reached when it can be said with reasonable certainty that the 
revolution has succeeded, then in the eyes of international law Rhodesia will 
have become a de jure independent sovereign state, its ‘Grundnorm’ will have 
changed and its new constitution will have become the lawful constitution. 
There is ample authority for this proposition […] See for example Kelsen 
General Theory of Law and State at p. 118.114 
 
The court eventually held that the Rhodesian revolution regime was not firmly 
established as Britain was still regarded as ‘rival sovereign’ and, thus, 
revolution was unsuccessful; the detention orders were recognised as ultra 
vires and of no legal force.115 Thus, even though Kelsen’s doctrine was 
accepted as the appropriate test to determine the validity of revolutionary 
regime, it was found to be inapplicable to colonial entities. Two years later this 
conclusion was revisited in R v Ndhlovu.116 The Rhodesian Court of Appeal 
concluded that the Rhodesian Revolution was now successful as it has passed 
the Kelsenian test: a new basic norm was established and the old legal order 
ceased to exist.117 This was based on a conclusion that the British government 
would not succeed in regaining control and that ‘the 1961 Constitution has 
been annulled by the efficacy of the change’.118 Apart from the practice of 
endorsement of Kelsen’s doctrine by domestic courts, a famous international 
decision, the Tinoco case, likewise astutely reflects this effectiveness-based 
approach: 
 
To hold that a government which establishes itself and maintains a peaceful 
administration, with the acquiescence of the people for a substantial period 
of time, does not become a de facto government unless it conforms to a 
previous constitution would be to hold that within the rules of international 
law a revolution contrary to the fundamental law of the existing government 
cannot establish a new government. This cannot be, and is not, true.119 
 
The significance of these judgments is hard to oversee. Taken together, they 
manifest ‘an extraordinary judicial consensus on one point: Kelsen’s test of 
revolutionary legality was endorsed as the legally correct way to determine the 
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lawfulness of a revolution’.120 Importantly, the substance, merits and goals of 
revolution were considered as irrelevant for its legality. This is particularly 
striking in the case of Rhodesia where the Smith’s revolutionary government 
was recognised as legal irrespective of its international condemnation as an 
‘illegal racist regime’.121 Despite the numerous scholarly contestations of the 
validity of the doctrine,122 it remains the dominant position within international 
legal circles that effectiveness of the government determines its legality. This 
is well reflected in the Montevideo Convention, which provides that in order 
for a state to be recognised as possessing legal personality under international 
law it should meet the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; 
(b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with other states.123 
Yet, a more recent practice of states and UN organs illustrates that the 
principle of effectiveness is no longer the one governing the law of statehood 
and governmental legitimacy. Other legality-based criteria are increasingly 
acquiring importance. These are often formulated in negative terms and require 
that a state is not created in pursuance of racist policies, as a result of the illegal 
use of force and in violation of the principles of self-determination and 
democracy. The failure to consider other relevant legal principles is but one 
bone of contestation that Kelsen’s doctrine of revolutionary legality has 
attracted. On this view, the doctrine ‘cannot form the basis of a truly legal 
decision’ because it is solely based on the principle of effectiveness which is 
not sufficient on its own to evaluate legitimacy.124 A related criticism is voiced 
by the representatives of a ‘democratic revolution theory’. For them, the 
legality of revolution is to be determined not by its success but its adherence 
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to democratic principles.125 The pertinence of other principles in ascertaining 
revolutionary legality has already been manifested with respect to the twenty-
first-century democratically inspired revolutions, such as the 2010-12 ‘Arab 
Spring’ and the 2013-14 Euromaidan revolution, which attracted international 
support not because they were successful, indeed most of them were not, but 
because they pursued legitimate cause, such as eradication of tyranny and 
installation of democracy. These events undoubtedly reinvigorated scholarly 
interest to redefine the nexus between revolutions and international law.126 Yet, 
much of what has been written on the topic so far is limited in context, nature 
and scope and the concept of revolution remains largely under-theorised.127 
Moreover, on a philosophical level, the advancement of democracy as a human 
right and the corollary need to protect and restore it whenever it is in danger 
inevitably entails the investigation of the concept of revolution from a wholly 
new angle, that is as a last remedy against antidemocratic usurpers. 
That said, there are five grounds to claim legality of revolution in 
international law: revolution as a human right, revolution as a self-defence, 
revolution as a general principle of law, revolution as a legitimate belligerency 
and revolution as a legal remedy. This thesis asserts that neither stands scrutiny 
on its own, particularly considering the fact that there is no watertight 
separation between the five aforementioned justifications. Each of them 
implies the second-order character of revolution, namely its remedial function. 
Thus, the right to revolution can be at best characterised as a right sui generis 
by virtue of its auxiliary nature. Since it does not protect inherent objective 
value, such as life, equality, physical integrity etc., akin to conventional human 
rights, but serves to maximise protection for these other rights, it cannot be 
regarded as a human right in and of itself. It is a second-order right aimed to 
secure other (more conventional) rights and to fill a gap when traditional 
remedies are not available. Because the concept of a right sui generis does not 
fit comfortably within the traditional binary approach to international law, 
under which the norm is either legal or is disregarded as non-law, the recourse 
will be had to the formula of ‘illegal but justifiable’ action — a product of the 
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progressive march of the substantive legitimacy talk in international law — to 
clarify revolution’s exceptional second-order status. The more detailed 
exposition of these issues is provided in the subsequent sections. 
 
6.3.1. Revolution as a Human Right 
 
As section 6.2 has shown, at various points of human history, the recognition 
of the right to resist has been accepted as vital for maintaining a balanced social 
organisation. Throughout the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries, explicit 
legal recognition of the right was considered undebatable. It was even 
proclaimed as the ‘supreme’ human right by one of the most distinguished 
legal scholars.128 However, in the twenty-first century, the general status of the 
right of revolution within the framework of international human rights law is 
at best precarious. This section will reconsider this claim. 
It is increasingly admitted that a so-called ‘right to revolution’ constitutes 
an inherent part of international human rights law and particularly the right to 
democracy: it constraints future government abuse, empowers citizens and acts 
as ‘an insurance policy against undemocratic backsliding’.129 Indeed, this right 
cannot be claimed in abstract but only when fundamental human rights are 
violated by an oppressive government and all peaceful means to resolve the 
issue have been exhausted. It follows that the right of revolution is a secondary 
(derivative) rather than primary right: rather than to serve as a substantive limit 
on state authority, it can only be invoked when a grave wrong has been 
committed. Its goal is to provide a remedy against serious human rights 
violations rather than to secure a specific objective value. Thus, international 
human rights law constitutes a primary legal framework from which the right 
of revolution springs. It is important to note, however, that the very second-
order nature of the right of revolution makes it natural, inherent and 
independent of the recognition in positive law. It exists by virtue of possessing 
human rights and rests on the notions of human dignity and autonomy. It is, 
hence, fair to suggest that human rights instruments can only be used as 
declaratory of this right rather than its source.130 This notwithstanding, 
clarifying legal basis of revolution is essential if it is to be used in support of a 
particular legal argument — in the present case, the democratic entitlement 
thesis. 
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Having said that, the positive foundations of the right of revolution can be 
derived from the UDHR, which characterises the lack of protection of human 
rights as a circumstance justifying rebellion: ‘[I]t is essential if man is not to 
be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law’.131 While 
it is not entirely clear from the wording that the Declaration recognises the 
right of revolution, Sumida provocatively asserted that the right in question 
can be derived from the Declaration as its preamble reflects the growing 
acceptance of this right from the time of the American Declaration of 
Independence, an acceptance so pervasive that allowed the writer to conclude 
that ‘the right of a people to revolt against tyranny is now a recognized 
principle of international law’.132 Likewise, Paust, using the preamble language 
of the UDHR as an inspiration, asserted that ‘[t]oday, the right of revolution is 
an important international precept and a part of available strategies for the 
assurance both of the authority of the people as the lawful basis of any 
government and of the process of national self-determination’.133 However, 
those claiming that the right of revolution cannot be read into the text of the 
Declaration can be equally forgiven. On this view, the preamble of the 
Declaration merely assumes resistance as a possible outcome of rights 
violations without affirming any legal right to resist.134 This view seems to 
better reflect the realities of the ideological East-West rivalry when the 
Declaration was adopted as an ‘agreement to disagree’ rather than a catalogue 
of enforceable human rights. Furthermore, one should not discount a persistent 
lack of consensus as to the explicit inclusion of the provision on resistance into 
the text of the Declaration evidenced in the preparatory works.135 The 
positioning of revolution in the preambular text was a political compromise, 
which a priori implies its non-right nature. Thus, the preamble of the UDHR 
cannot in and of itself serve as a positive source of the right of revolution, albeit 
it lends important intellectual support for such a claim. 
The right of revolution can also be implied from article 21 of the 
Declaration, which reflects the theory of government as propagated by the 
Enlightenment philosophers: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections, which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures’. It is fair to suggest that if 
these normal procedures for replacing government are abridged people should 
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be able to avail themselves of the right of revolution.136 On this account, 
revolution is an ultimate form of political participation.137 This idea finds 
support in the drafting history of the article. During the travaux préparatoires, 
there were several proposals (especially from Chile and Cuba) to either amend 
article 21 by the inclusion of the provision explicitly acknowledging the right 
to revolt against oppressive government or to include a separate article on the 
matter. However, the delegates from the USA, the United Kingdom, Belgium 
and Austria objected to the inclusion of the right to rebel into the substantive 
text of the Declaration because, as Roosevelt explained, ‘it would be unwise 
to legalize the right to rebellion, lest the formula should be invoked by 
subversive groups wishing to attack or undermine genuinely democratic 
Government. Honest rebellion against tyranny was permitted by the 
Declaration. Subversive action was quite a different matter’.138 In the end, a 
carefully crafted provision on the right to resist tyranny was included in the 
preamble. Thus, the drafting history of both article 21 and the preamble reveals 
that whilst the choice of the right terminology was a matter of debate, 
disagreement and even confrontation, the majority of the delegates agreed in 
principle on the existence of the right to rebel. This notwithstanding, a strong 
opposing view is that the textual interpretation of the Declaration implies that 
‘the will of the people’ can only be expressed in elections.139 It is in order to 
remind the reader that although the UDHR is not strictly speaking binding, it 
is widely perceived by the international community as an authoritative 
interpretation of the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. Consequently, 
even though the idea of violent resistance to tyranny and oppression can be 
implied from the Declaration, the latter does not explicitly recognise revolution 
as a human right. 
Another relevant legal instrument for the right of revolution is the ICCPR. 
It declares in its article 2(3)(a) that each State Party undertakes ‘to ensure that 
any person whose rights to freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy’.140 Importantly, what constitutes an effective remedy 
under the ICCPR is apparently not limited to legal or judicial remedies,141 and 
other tools, including forceful measures by non-state actors, are not explicitly 
prohibited. It means that people’s self-defensive action as a means to remedy 
human rights violations cannot be excluded. In addition, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has been careful to point out that the prohibitions on propaganda 
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for war ‘do not prohibit advocacy of the sovereign right of self-defense or the 
right of peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations’.142 
Furthermore, article 1 ICCPR states that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. A 
right of revolution is a necessary concomitant of national self-determination. 
On one view, the right to self-determination incorporates only one aspect of 
the right of revolution, namely resistance against colonial domination, alien 
occupation and racist regimes. However, as the argument proceeds, the right 
of self-determination does not encompass other situations involving 
subjugated and oppressed nations.143 This conclusion finds support in the 1970 
UN Declaration on Principles of International Law that explicitly warned 
against the use of the principle as an authorisation of ‘action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity 
of sovereign and independent States’.144 This does not, however, prevent some 
scholars from advancing theories of constructive ambiguity — the deliberate 
use of ambiguous language with respect to a sensitive issue to advance some 
political purpose — in order to claim that the right of self-determination 
includes a latent right to revolution.145 On this view, article 1 ICCPR read in 
conjunction with article 25 on the right to political participation and article 
2(3)(a) on the right to an effective remedy of the Covenant, combined with the 
lack of an explicit prohibition on resistance, implies the right of revolution. 
To push this claim further, whilst secession embodies the most extreme 
display of external self-determination, revolution represents the most radical 
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execution of internal self-determination.146 The two rights are very close as 
both stem from gross violations of human rights and allow for the use of force 
to displace the sitting government or secede from the state concerned. Along 
these lines, the most sophisticated argument in favour of the right to resist was 
advanced by Honore who turned the language of the 1970 Declaration on its 
head by suggesting that whilst the wording of the Declaration is aversive to the 
dismemberment of states it is only so when the latter respect the principle of 
self-determination. Should states act contrary to their people’s aspirations, they 
forfeit their right to (internal) sovereignty and territorial integrity in that ‘group 
which forms a unit of self-determination can resort to force to make good their 
right’.147 To put it differently, the people, in the words of Honore, can exercise 
their right of self-determination by means of armed rebellion. Honore’s 
interpretation seems to fit well within certain provisions of the Declaration, 
such as, e.g., ‘[i]n their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action 
[which deprives peoples of their right to self-determination] in pursuit of the 
exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek 
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter’.148 Despite the sophisticated reasoning and compelling logic behind 
such claim, reading the right to revolution into the ICCPR is far from 
controversial. Opposing views abound149 and, most importantly, this claim has 
never been judicially tested and may or may not hold up to scrutiny. The same 
holds true for other major human rights conventions as they neither codify nor 
prohibit the right to revolt. As Murphy has put it, ‘[f]or now, the International 
Bill of Human Rights remains at best a source of lacunae in the law on the 
right to resist’.150 
One can also briefly mention another context where the right to resistance 
is widely acknowledged, that is the right to resist genocide.151 Whilst scholars 
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are more or less unanimous on the right to resort to violence against the 
government consistently practicing genocidal policies on a wide scale, it is 
clear that this situation is of a limited importance for the general right to 
revolution, since not all authoritarian governments that deny their people even 
a minimum possibility to partake in the political process commit genocide. 
Meanwhile, regional human rights instruments display divergent 
approaches. Whereas the European and Inter-American systems do not only 
fail to accord the right of resistance legal recognition but even implicitly 
disavowal it,152 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights codifies it 
in an express provision. In article 20(2) it proclaims: ‘Colonized or oppressed 
peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of domination 
by resorting to any means recognized by the international community’.153 It is 
the adjective ‘oppressed’ that caused so much ambiguity as to the whole scope 
and meaning of article 20(2). According to the restrictive interpretation, the 
right to resist oppression is only to be exercised against colonial or racist 
regimes. On this understanding, oppressed people are solely those under 
colonial or racial domination. A more liberal interpretation, however, implies 
extending the scope of oppression to despotism, dictatorship or hegemony. On 
this view, the qualifier ‘oppressed’ was intentionally used to ensure that the 
article is not obsolete in a contemporary post-colonial Africa. According to this 
position, article 20(2) recognises a people’s right to rebellion.154 However, such 
interpretation seemingly stands in a stark contradiction with article 23(3) of the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which holds that 
‘[a]ny replacement of a democratically elected government by armed 
dissidents or rebels’ constitutes an unconstitutional change of government and 
shall be sanctioned by the AU appropriately.155 Be this as it may, article 23(3) 
refers to illegal replacement of a democratically elected government and it is 
still unclear whether authoritarian government, which came to power by coup, 
or the democratically constituted government, which eventually developed 
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into autocracy, enjoy the same protection.156 Moreover the concept of ‘armed 
dissidents or rebels’ is not co-terminus with mass protests and popular 
uprisings that sparkle revolution. It seems, thus, that the underlying purpose of 
the article concerned is the protection of democratic regimes from the threat of 
forcible removal by the military or armed groups and does not cover the ouster 
en masse of unelected or unaccountable regimes. Ergo, revolutions do not 
seem to constitute unconstitutional changes of government under the AU 
standards. 
Another explicit provision on the right of rebellion can be found in the 
Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, which asserts that ‘[a]ll peoples have 
the right to resist foreign oppression’.157 While it is more restrictively 
formulated it is also unqualified.158 Further, the Universal Islamic Declaration 
of Human Rights states that ‘[e]very individual and even people has the 
inalienable right to freedom […] and shall be entitled to struggle by all 
available means against any infringement or abrogation of this right; and every 
oppressed individual or people has a legitimate claim to the support of other 
individuals and/or peoples in such a struggle’.159 It is clear from the wording 
of the text of the Declaration that the right of revolution is explicitly envisaged. 
However, reading the right to revolution into the existing human rights 
framework is contestable on both normative and conceptual grounds. Firstly, 
apart from article 20(2) ACHPR and article 2(4) of the Arab Charter, no 
international treaty contains an express provision on the right of revolution. 
This creates an aura of ambivalence rather than signifies either acceptance or 
rejection of the right in question, at least at this point. Further, the above 
arguments have not been tested at the World Court or any other international 
tribunal, and consequently their credibility cannot be ruled out but neither can 
it be upheld. One should also consider the fact that there are no correlative 
duties on affected states to refrain from suppressing or criminalising legitimate 
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rebellions,160 nor obligations on the part of third states to assist those,161 nor 
even duties on states to secure the non-extradition of rebels for political 
crimes.162 Secondly, on a purely theoretical level, to legalise the right to 
revolution is to recognise the legitimacy of violence. In this sense, the right to 
rebel is a sort of ‘a right to do wrong’.163 It is a right to engage in activities that 
are undoubtedly unlawful and even criminal under the municipal law of the 
state against which rebellion is directed. The exercise of the right at stake can 
lead to human injuries, even death, and unleash havoc to state infrastructure 
and property. Against this backdrop, Honore astutely maintained, ‘[d]oes it 
make sense to speak of a right to rebel, to which will presumably correspond 
a duty on the part of the state not to resist the rebellion, and on third parties to 
help the rebels, or at least not to obstruct them?’164 The fact that one is ‘at times 
entitled to use violence against […] [his] fellow citizens […] is hard to 
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stomach’.165 It is a vital observation and has been employed by many scholars 
to deny the existence of a right of revolution.166 Another conceptual problem 
with the right to revolution argument relates to its susceptibility to abuse, 
whereas the language of legitimate resistance is used by various national 
liberation movements to justify their atrocity crimes, including terrorism. In 
particular, it is often claimed that ‘the right of resistance is justified in 
asymmetrical conflicts, where one side (usually the state) has overwhelming 
military superiority. Without access to comparable weapons […] armed groups 
are not in a position to take on “military targets” and are obliged to attack softer 
targets, including civilians’.167 On this view, the right to revolution lacks any 
inherent moral content. Ultimately, the right of revolution is often seen as 
redundant because, as runs the argument, it is today superseded by a right to 
avail oneself of constitutional procedures before national and international 
authorities responsible for the protection and safeguarding of human rights,168 
particularly judicial proceedings.169 It follows that the right to revolution 
cannot be characterised as a human right. 
 
6.3.2. Revolution as a Self-Defence 
 
6.3.2.1. Self-Defence as a General Principle of Law 
 
Any law, international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to force, is 
necessarily limited by the right of self-defense.170 
 
Humanity has always recognised that individuals should have the right to 
defend themselves from violence. When a state’s government represents a 
significant danger to its own people, the latter can resort to force to repeal the 
danger. Having evolved from ‘inherent instinct’ to ‘natural right’ and to 
‘individual right’, the right to self-defence is now, in the words of some 
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commentators, a fundamental general principle of international law,171 ‘hidden 
in the shadows of the more prominent right of interstate self-defence’.172 Some 
scholars even assert that personal self-defence is now a ‘véritable droit de 
l’homme’,173 a ‘fundamental human right’,174 a ‘well-established human right 
under international law’,175 an ‘international human right’176 or even a ‘non-
derogable human right’.177 Yet, this view is not widely supported178 and no 
international treaty explicitly recognises the right. Ergo, it can be submitted 
that the right to personal self-defence is not a human right, but an individual 
sui generis right (rooted in natural law) since it is distinct from human rights 
in its historical, social and political functions. Unlike human rights, which 
emerged in response to unchecked state power and abuse and are primarily 
directed against the state, the right to self-defence is a pre-societal right that 
evolved in the absence of the state and is directed against any unlawful 
attacker.179 It finds its analogy in criminal law’s concept of personal self-
defence, according to which a person may be stripped of criminal 
responsibility for violent acts committed in self-defence. 
The right to personal self-defence operates on three levels: the state-to-
individual level, the individual-to-individual level and the individual-to-state 
level.180 It is the third dimension of this right which is of interest here, namely 
the right of individuals and peoples to forcibly resist certain types of human 
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rights violations committed by their governments, or, applying the concept 
used in this thesis, the right to revolution. Whilst this ‘sub-right’ is not 
expressly set forth in the primary sources of international law, such as treaties 
and custom, it gathered a broad support from prominent scholars. Noteworthy, 
during the classical period of international law, scholarly opinions were 
perhaps the most important source of international law considering the paucity 
of international treaties and state practice. Such scholarly works may provide 
a better clue on legal underpinnings of the otherwise ambiguous sui generis 
right. If it is established that the right to personal self-defence enjoys a status 
of a legal norm then positive underpinnings of the right to revolution as a 
means of self-defence against oppressive government are somewhat clarified. 
Thomas Aquinas was one of the first to derive the right to resist tyranny 
from the natural right of self-defence: ‘All who govern in the interests of 
themselves rather than of the common good are tyrants […] Against the 
regime’s efforts to enforce its decrees, one has the right of forcible resistance; 
as a private right this could extend as far as killing the tyrant as a foreseen side-
effect of one’s legitimate self-defence’.181 Along the same lines, Francisco de 
Vitoria claimed that a right to oppose tyranny springs from the natural right of 
self-defence: ‘[E]ven if the commonwealth has given away its authority it 
keeps its natural right to defend itself’.182 He even maintained that there was a 
natural right of self-defence against an evil pope. Likewise, Francisco Suarez, 
drawing on the works of Vitoria, asserted that self-defence is ‘the greatest of 
rights’, which may, as last resort, justify killing a tyrant ‘by the authority of 
God, Who has granted to every man, through the natural law, the right to 
defend himself and his state from the violence inflicted by such a tyrant’.183 
In 1674, in Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Samuel Pufendorf 
acknowledged that the right of self-defence encompasses the right to revolt 
against a tyrant. If people feel unsafe under the rule of their leader, then ‘a 
People may defend themselves against the unjust Violence of the Prince’.184 
Moreover, on his account, people would never enter into a social compact if 
the ruler demolished their inherent right of resisting an unjust government. 
People would rather suffer the ‘Fighting and Contention’ of a state of nature 
than to face ‘certain Death’ because they had given up the right to ‘oppose by 
Arms the unjust Violence of their Superiors’.185 A similar view is held by 
Emmerich de Vattel, who contends that the right of revolution against a 
tyrannical government is an extension of the right of self-defence: akin to an 
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ordinary criminal, a tyrant ‘is no better than a public enemy against whom the 
nation may and ought to defend itself’.186 
Other prominent theorists of state legitimacy, such as Hobbes and Locke, 
also insisted that the right of self-defence is so unalienable that it cannot be 
surrendered by the establishment of state authority. Thomas Hobbes, the 
famous advocate of absolute monarchy, observed that it is impossible to give 
up one’s right of self-defence: ‘The right men have by Nature to protect 
themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant [the 
agreement between individuals to form a government] be relinquished’.187 
Similarly, John Locke interrogates ‘Must men alone be debarred the common 
privilege of opposing force with force, which nature allows so freely to all 
other creatures for their preservation from injury? I answer: self-defence is a 
part of the law of nature, nor can it be denied the community, even against the 
king himself […]’.188 
More contemporary voices are well reflected in the often-cited statement 
by Miller which reads as follows: ‘[T]he right to self-defence extends to both 
private and public threats, including self-defense against agents of a tyrannical 
government. Moreover, the right is individual. Individuals — not just 
communities — have the right to protect themselves from public violence. 
Individuals — not just militias — have the right to defend themselves against 
tyranny’.189 Likewise, Kaufmann suggested that ‘[i]n its traditional, “classic” 
meaning, the right to resist is a right to social self-defence against a criminal 
government, which exercises its power in such a way that it results in a physical 
or psychological menace and threat to the people’.190 Noteworthy, the recent 
work by Hessbruegge reveals that recognition of individual self-defence as 
morally and legally justified extends well beyond the West and transcends 
Islamic, African, Chinese and Indian traditions.191 
These authorities provide a solid intellectual support for the conceptual 
affinity between self-defence and resistance to tyrannicide, or, applying more 
contemporary terms, unaccountable and repressive regime. Whilst the works 
of the quoted scholars constitute an essential (intellectual) part of international 
law, they are not in themselves direct sources. Thus, one may not claim that 
there is a positive right to personal self-defence solely on the basis thereof. 
However, the wide scholarly consensus among the publicists of an 
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overwhelming majority of legal systems over the existence of a certain right 
may accord the latter the status of a ‘general principle of international law 
recognised by civilised nations’. In fact, the recent studies by Kopel, Gallant, 
Eisen and Hessbruegge are based on this suggestion.192 They surveyed the 
development of the right to self-defence in major legal systems, both ancient 
and modern, and concluded that the right in question is now a general principle 
of international law. Without attempting to compromise the importance of 
these large-scale works, it is doubtful whether ancient legal systems per se 
have any direct impact upon the development of contemporary general 
principles. Secondly, their concept of self-defence is rather broad 
encompassing also scenarios other than anti-governmental resistance, which 
makes it difficult to apply the results of their study to revolution as a form of 
self-defence. In fact, it is more difficult to justify self-defence against state 
authorities than self-defence between private persons since state’s monopoly 
on the use of force is outright abandoned. Thirdly, even if one accepts an idea 
that self-defence is a legal norm by virtue of its status of a general principle of 
international law, it is not that clear whether political resistance can be 
conceptualised as a sub-species of self-defence solely on the basis of the broad 
scholarly support. Finally, the range of means of self-defence is never 
unlimited. They must be both necessary and proportionate. Whether 
revolutionary violence, which all too often results in deaths of the innocent, is 
always necessary and proportionate is open to debate. Considering the fact that 
revolution can grow into war, as happened in Syria, the suffering caused by 
recourse to defensive force may outweigh the value of the right sought.193 
Ultimately, whereas during the classical period of international law, wide 
scholarly consensus across various legal systems was sufficient for a norm to 
attain a status of general principle, it is doubtful whether this is the case today. 
One has to show that the norm in question has been affirmed in a broad 
plurality of national legal systems on legislative level or in any other legally 
relevant form. Turning to self-defence, there is no overwhelming evidence of 
such explicit legal recognition at the domestic levels.194   
This notwithstanding, international law incorporates the concept of self-
defence in a variety of ways. Thus, if one finds unequivocal support for self-
defence in international law, the latter’s status as a general principle can be 
justified by its solid international legal basis. To reiterate, apart from derivation 
of general principles of law from municipal legal systems, it is commonly 
agreed that they can be deduced from international legal logic, or, what has 
been dubbed, opinio juris communis195 (common legal conscience), which, in 
its turn, can be ascertained by investigating into the legal logic behind a 
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normative statement in the international forum. If a normative statement can 
be proven to constitute part of the ‘common legal conscience’ it can be 
considered being a general principle.196 All in all, this suggest that general 
principles can be derived from acceptance directly in an international setting 
extending to treaty law, state practice, judicial decisions and even soft law. In 
what follows, it will be examined the legal contours of international acceptance 
of self-defence within such paradigmatic areas as the law of the use of force, 
the law of state responsibility and criminal law and what effect this may have 
for the right to revolution. 
 
6.3.2.2. Self-Defence in International and Criminal Law  
 
Whilst the right to personal self-defence is not explicitly recognised in the 
written law, some treaties suggest its existence. In international criminal law, 
self-defence is one of the grounds excluding criminal responsibility. According 
to the 1998 Rome Statute, 
 
[A] person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person’s 
conduct: […] (c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or 
another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for 
the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for 
accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and unlawful use of 
force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the 
other person or property protected […].197 
 
Some commentators suggest that this provision has acquired status of 
customary norm.198 Whilst it is established that the Rome Statute is only 
applicable to the most serious crimes, such as genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and aggression,199 it is fair to suggest that the defences 
available to charges on these crimes may also be applied to the notion of 
revolution, if one accepts the view that revolution is a crime against a state, not 
to mention the situations when revolutionary violence may amount to one or 
more of the above-enlisted crimes. The extension of self-defence as a ground 
excluding criminal responsibility to situations of rebellion can also be justified 
by reference to the principle ex re sed non ex nomine, meaning that equity will 
look to the substance of a transaction rather than its form. This equitable 
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principle is designed to mitigate the excessive deficiencies of formalism in 
situations where the blind following of formal requirements will lead to an 
inequitable result. It does not mean that formalities shall be dispensed with 
altogether but that ‘unnecessary formalities’200 shall be avoided.201 It follows 
that punishing rebels for their acts of violence irrespective of the cause of their 
action, namely self-defence against serious and sustainable abuse of 
governmental power, may lead to complicity in oppression. 
The requirement of imminence designates the temporal facet of self-
defence. To be valid, the pleas of self-defence are only accepted when the lethal 
response of the defendant is immediate and directly responsive to the attack. 
Whilst it is not always clear whether governmental oppression may amount to 
an ‘imminent’ use of force (albeit it is by definition always ‘unlawful’ since it 
is in contradiction to the internationally recognised human rights, including the 
right to democracy) considering the fact that it does not happen overnight but 
is rather effectuated as a continuous and sustained state policy, it may in certain 
cases be regarded as imminent, particularly when peaceful demonstrations are 
violently suppressed, or are under a threat of being violently suppressed, and 
unless demonstrators do not defend themselves by using offensive force, they 
will compromise their success. However, the requirement of imminence 
precludes the use of defensive force against state officials who order, but who 
do not personally implement, oppressive policies, unless one subscribes to an 
expanded (pre-emptive or anticipatory) interpretation of self-defence.202 On 
this view, imminence is conceived as broader than an immediate threat, and 
forcible resistance against an oppressive state, including its agents not directly 
involved in oppression, which is likely to cause harm in the future, is 
excused.203 However, such view is open to criticisms, with the dominant 
position being that ‘[l]egitimate self-defence must be neither too soon nor too 
late’.204 However, this view fails to account for modern types of warfare where 
recent innovations in military technology changed the whole calculus of self-
defence. Nor does it accommodate the specificities of non-state violence where 
private actors are in a clear position of military inferiority with respect to state 
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coercive machinery, which, if allowed to strike first, might significantly 
disadvantage an otherwise weaker opponent. 
In addition to requirements of an imminent and unlawful attack, 
international law requires two further conditions to be met: proportionality and 
necessity. Both concepts are closely related to the notion of imminence, in that 
imminence provides an objective yardstick against which to gauge the 
necessity of force and to balance the aggressor/defendant interests. Both 
elements are recognised in the Rome Statute which provides that  
 
The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death 
or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or 
another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this 
threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than 
the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be: (i) Made by other 
persons; or (ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person’s 
control.205 
 
Importantly, the categories of duress and necessity are substantively different: 
whereas duress refers to compulsion by human threats, necessity is borne by 
emergencies arising from natural forces or objective circumstances. This 
notwithstanding, the two categories are often used interchangeably and it is 
commonly recognised that necessity encompasses duress.206 Applied to 
revolutions, persons rebelling against their government with a view to change 
its authoritarian policies cannot be regarded as acting on the basis of 
duress/necessity since underlying cause of their action is political, rather than 
purely defensive (there is no concept of ‘political necessity’),207 albeit it is fair 
to suggest that peaceful rallies protesting against political injustice which are 
violently suppressed by their government may evolve into revolutions whose 
primary cause is defensive. 
Self-defence is also a paradigmatic norm of international law, enshrined in 
both the UN Charter as one of the exceptions to the prohibition on the use of 
force208 and the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility as a circumstance 
precluding the wrongfulness of a breach of an international obligation.209 
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Whilst the two instruments are silent on their applicability to non-state actors, 
it is argued that, with respect to the ILC’s articles, at least certain circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness can be applied by analogy to non-state entities.210 Of 
particular relevance are articles 21 (self-defence) and 25 (necessity) of the 
articles on state responsibility. This is not to mean that non-state groups are 
now subjects of international law akin to states but to acknowledge that they 
are ‘capable of possessing international rights and duties’ and have the 
‘capacity to maintain […] [their] rights by bringing international claims’.211 
Article 21 reads: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the 
act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the 
Charter of the United Nations’. Whereas the Charter does not contain any 
explicit limitations on actions taken in self-defence, the Court in the Nicaragua 
case explained that self-defence, as a norm of customary international law, 
would warrant only measures which are proportionate and necessary.212 While 
it is clear that self-defence as a charter right is only applicable to states, it might 
not be so with respect to self-defence as custom, which pre-exists international 
law of the Charter, particularly considering the fact that the principles of 
interstate self-defence were developed by drawing on the concept of personal 
self-defence.213 As the Court had an occasion to point out, because the actual 
text of article 51 of the UN Charter mentions ‘the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence’, it is logical to assume that the right to self-defence 
is ‘natural’ and ‘it is hard to see how this can be other than of a customary 
nature’.214 It follows that if there is an ‘inherent’ or ‘natural’ right (droit 
naturel) to self-defence, it should equally appertain to non-state actors. As 
Rodin underscored, it is ‘difficult to see why such groups should be denied an 
analogous right to defend their integrity with force’.215 This view finds some 
support in the practice of national liberation movements to refer to the notion 
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of self-defence in the sense of article 51 of the UN Charter as a justification 
for their armed resistance.216 If one accepts that the appeal to the Charter right 
of self-defence is equally applicable to revolutionary struggles (particularly 
considering the fact that revolutions can be regarded as a modern form of 
national liberation)217 then in the exercise of their ‘inherent’ right of self-
defence against oppression, rebellion movements must abide by international 
humanitarian law (obligations of total restraint) and international human rights 
law. Violations of the most fundamental provisions of humanitarian treaty and 
customary law as well as certain non-derogable human rights can hardly ever 
be justified by self-defence.218 
According to article 25 of ILC’s articles on state responsibility, 
 
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of 
that State unless the act: (a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) does not 
seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the 
obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.219 
 
Necessity is subject to strict limitations which must be cumulatively satisfied 
to safeguard against abuse. As the famous Webster’s formula holds, it must be 
‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation’;220 peril must be objectively identified and not merely 
apprehended as feasible;221 necessity ‘must have been occasioned by an 
“essential interest” of the State which is the author of the act conflicting with 
one of its international obligations’; it must not have been used to justify a 
violation of international obligation excluding the possibility of invoking 
necessity; the act in question must have been the ‘only means’ of safeguarding 
that interest and ‘must not have “seriously impair[ed] an essential interest” of 
the State towards which the obligation existed’; and the state committing the 
act in question must not have ‘contributed to the occurrence of the state of 
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necessity’.222 Akin to self-defence, necessity long predates exiting instruments 
regulating inter-state relations, which means that it is a customary norm,223 and, 
thus, there is no legitimate reason to exclude its application to non-state groups. 
When state commits grave human rights violations, it can thereby cause an 
imminent peril to the essential interests of its people, who in turn may justify 
their defensive force on grounds of necessity. Recent cases of recognition of 
opposition groups by the international community in Libya, Syria and Ukraine 
seem to support this claim. Similarly to self-defence, necessity does not justify 
killings of innocents, unless such killings would prevent even worse horrors. 
Yet, there is an important difference between individual right of self-
defence and self-defence exercised in inter-state relations. Due to the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, interstate self-defence allows states greater latitude 
to employ defensive action than individuals. In fact, the Rome Statute 
elucidates that ‘[t]he fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation 
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility’224 and in Kordic and Cerkez, the ICTY established that 
such operations do not justify violations of IHL.225 In Erdemovic, the ICTY 
similarly held that even defence against war crimes and crimes against 
humanity cannot justify the killings of innocents.226 It follows that attacks on 
innocent civilians may not be qualified as defensive, since such persons cannot 
be regarded as presenting an imminent threat of unlawful force. Less so are 
such actions proportionate, since proportionality implies that innocent persons 
shall be spared. Proportionality also requires that the quantum of lethal force 
used in self-defence shall not inflict greater harm than that against which it is 
directed. For some this would mean that as long as proportionality is 
concerned, it would hardy ever be possible to justify the resort to lethal force 
against governments that deprive their subjects of effective political 
participation, since innocent deaths are almost an inevitable outcome of any 
violent intercourse.227 However, this argument is complicated by the fact that 
in certain situations killing one innocent will save more lives or otherwise 
secure overall good effects — a so-called ‘lesser evil’ thesis.228 Revolutionary 
use of force aimed to address present political injustices and leading to 
innocent casualties (unless it entailed forms of violence that are categorically 
outlawed under international law, such as, e.g., war crimes, crimes against 
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humanity, torture, enforced disappearances and other violations of peremptory 
law) can be justified by a general good that it seeks to achieve, namely that the 
succeeding generations will live in a democratically constituted state. 
However, this argument easily invites abuse and may equally be employed by 
less benevolent actors to justify their atrocities. 
In summary, the normative foundations of revolution as personal self-
defence against gross and sustained human rights violations clearly transcend 
existing structures of international law stretching from a more general layer of 
legal principles to more specific subject-areas, such as international criminal 
law, the law of state responsibility and the law of the use of force. Yet, the 
constellation built on this scheme is fragile and may be based on false 
assumptions, which makes it vulnerable to criticisms. It is, hence, safer to 
conclude that the concept of self-defence is only of a limited significance when 
it comes to the legal justification of the right to revolution. 
 
6.3.3. Revolution as a General Principle of Law 
 
The right of revolution can be argued to be of itself a general principle of 
international law recognised by civilised nations given its wide endorsement 
in various constitutions of nation-states. Importantly, to qualify revolution as 
a general principle is not to strip it of its quality as a right. As Hessbruegge 
rightly noted, although international human rights are traditionally considered 
to be anchored in treaties and/or customary international law, there should be 
no legitimate objection to an idea that they may find their source in general 
principles.229 This view is shared by Alston and Simma, who attempted to 
explain the rapid recognition of the fundamental corpus of international human 
rights by their conceptual and structural proximity to general principles of 
law.230 Indeed, akin to general principles, human rights tend to be formulated 
in open and general terms that do not consist in ‘specific rules formulated for 
practical purposes, but in general propositions underlying the various rules of 
law which express the essential qualities of juridical truth itself’.231 
As was previously mentioned, there are several ways to discover general 
principles. The most conventional view is that general principles of 
international law derive from general principles generally recognised in a large 
number and variety of domestic legal systems.232 This means that basic tenets 
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and processes of legal justice, which are adhered to in major domestic legal 
systems, are direct sources of international law. Such principles may be 
determined through recourse to decisions of international courts and tribunals, 
or, in the absence of such decisions, by means of comparative law. Because 
the issue of revolution does not feature in the decision of any international 
adjudicating body, one is left with the comparative law method. 
Since decisions of international adjudicative bodies do not normally reveal 
the method they utilised to arrive at a certain principle, it is not clear what 
comparative law research is exactly about. This led to a large amount of 
academic literature and debate. Raimondo suggested that the ascertainment of 
general principles of law by means of comparative law consists of two separate 
operations: ‘vertical move’ and ‘horizontal move’. The former involves the 
abstracting of principles from the rules of municipal legal systems. The second 
operation entails the verification that the major plurality of nations accepts the 
legal principle thus obtained.233 This two-move methodology bears some 
resemblance with Burke’s three-step strategy, that is, first, to follow the logic 
of the World Court, second, to apply this logic in the discovery of a legal 
principle to developed legal systems and, third, to make sure that all or nearly 
all developed legal systems embrace the principle in issue.234 Importantly, both 
Raimondo and Burke attempted to give a new meaning to the expression 
‘civilised nations’ as features in article 38(3) of the ICJ Statute. Whilst for 
Burke, civilised nations are to be understood as ‘States with developed legal 
systems’,235 Raimondo, drawing on the works of Bassiouni and Tomuschat, 
asserted that the phrase in question should exclude nations which fail to 
comply with international human rights.236 Such a new interpretation of 
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‘civilised nations’ is useful in limiting the number of potentially examined 
municipal systems to those that are most developed in connection with the 
legal issue at hand and follow their international human rights obligations. 
However, in assembling the sample of the most appropriate national legal 
systems, one has to make sure that they represent all major legal traditions and 
geographical regions. In this way, the legitimacy of general principles can be 
enhanced. 
Within this framework, the most obvious place to search for the right to 
revolution is world’s constitutions.237 Importantly, as Honore put it, 
‘[s]overeign states can hardly be expected as a matter of course to grant their 
subjects a right to secede or rebel’.238 Yet, sometimes they do. Ginsburg et al 
came up with two explanations: states either enshrine such a right into 
constitutional text to recommit the nation to democratic rule or they may adopt 
it as an ex post facto legitimation of the leader that gained power through 
undemocratic means.239 The former, so called ‘forward-looking’, explanation 
is viable with respect to Germany, which after the Second World War, as a 
result of the demand imposed by the Allies to pass emergency laws, 
incorporated the right of revolution (Wiederstandrecht) into its Basic Law: ‘All 
Germans have the right to resist anyone seeking to abolish this constitutional 
order, if no other remedy is available’.240 Similarly, a number of the Eastern 
European counties recognised the right to resist in their new democratic 
constitutions. To illustrate, the 1991 Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms, which after the fall of the Czechoslovak Federative Republic 
became an integral component of the constitutional system of Czech Republic, 
provides that ‘[c]itizens have the right to resist anybody who would do away 
with the democratic order of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
established by this Charter, if the actions of constitutional bodies or the 
effective use of legal means have been frustrated’.241 The Basic provisions of 
the Charter were directly integrated into the Slovak Constitution, which 
declares that ‘[c]itizens have the right to put up resistance to anyone who would 
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eliminate the democratic order of human rights and basic liberties listed in this 
Constitution, if the activity of constitutional bodies and the effective use of 
legal means are rendered impossible’.242 Likewise, the 1992 Estonian 
Constitution acknowledges every Estonian citizen’s ‘right to initiate resistance 
against a forcible change of the constitutional order’ provided that ‘no other 
means are available’.243 
The second device to entrench the right to resist into the text of a 
constitution was to adopt it after a fundamentally undemocratic event with the 
purpose to backwardly legitimise it. History abounds with examples of such 
constitutional designs.244 Since the purpose of this study is to examine 
contemporary legal constitutions with the view to ascertain whether the right 
to resist is globally recognised to be qualified as a general principle of law, one 
has to stick to modern constitutional texts. Nowadays, it is primarily in Latin 
America where the right to resistance was incorporated into constitutions as a 
backward-looking justification. The Constitution of Venezuela is but one 
relevant case. It was modified by the president Hugo Chavez who, albeit being 
elected through democratic elections, embraced a right to resist to effectuate 
an ex post facto legitimation of his illegal acts committed prior to his 
consolidation of power, including the attempted coup d’état in 1992.245 Thus, 
he replaced the 1961 Venezuelan Constitution with a new one containing a 
brand-new right: ‘The people of Venezuela, true to their republican tradition 
and their struggle for independence, peace and freedom, shall disown any 
regime, legislation or authority that violates democratic values, principles and 
guarantees or encroaches upon human rights’.246 A right to resist was also 
introduced into the Constitution of Togo in the aftermath of the military coup: 
‘Tout citoyen a le devoir de combattre toute personne ou groupe de personnes 
qui tenterait de changer par la force l’ordre démocratique établi par la présente 
constitution’.247 
To be sure, the distinction between the forward-looking and backward-
looking tools to codify the right to resist into the text of a constitution is not 
relevant for the purpose of the ascertainment whether the right in question is 
recognised by the plurality of major legal systems. This division is embraced 
here to theoretically facilitate the understanding by the reader of how 
constitution-makers went about the inclusion of such controversial a right into 
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the highest laws of their countries. Moreover, the overlap between these two 
strategies is emphasised by the fact that the backward-looking strategy may 
eventually evolve into forward-looking when the same constitution sets the 
framework for oncoming democratic regimes. That said, other countries that 
expressly recognised the right of revolution whether as an insurance policy 
against democratic backsliding or as a means to retroactively uphold 
legitimacy of past political crimes are Algeria,248 Argentina,249 Azerbaijan,250 
Benin,251 Cape Verde,252 Chad,253 Cuba,254 Democratic Republic of Congo,255 
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Ecuador,256 El Salvador,257 France,258 Gambia,259 Ghana,260 Greece,261 
Guatemala,262 Guinea,263 Honduras,264 Lithuania,265 Mexico,266 Paraguay,267 
Peru,268 Portugal,269 South Sudan,270 Timor-Leste,271 and Uganda.272 
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accessed 29 April 2016 (‘Observance of the constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the 
Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone who 
attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution’). 
262 Constitution of the Republic of Guatemala (31 May 1985) art 45 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016 
(‘The Resistance of the people for the protection and defense of the rights and guarantees granted 
in the Constitution is legitimate’). 
263 Constitution of the Republic of Guinea (7 May 2010) art 21 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan049269.pdf> accessed 
29 April 2016 (‘They [the people of Guinea] have the right to resist oppression’). 
264 Constitution of the Republic of Honduras (11 January 1982) art 3 
<http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/Honduras.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016 
(‘No one owes obedience to a usurping government nor to those who assume office or public 
service by force of arms or by using means or procedures which violate or ignore the provisions 
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established by this Constitution and other laws. The acts adopted by such authorities are null. 
The people have the right to resort to insurrection in defense of the constitutional order’). 
265 The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (25 October 1992) art 3 
<http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm> accessed 29 April 2016 (‘No one may 
restrict or limit the sovereignty of the Nation or arrogate to himself the sovereign powers 
belonging to the entire Nation. The Nation and each citizen shall have the right to resist anyone 
who encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of the State 
of Lithuania by force’). 
266 Constitution of the United Mexican States (5 February 1917) art 136 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2007.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016 
(‘This Constitution shall not lose its force and effect (fuerza y vigor) even if its observance is 
interrupted by rebellion. In the event that a government whose principles are contrary to those 
that are sanctioned herein should become established as a result of a public disturbance, as soon 
as the people recover their liberty, its observance shall be reestablished, and those who had taken 
part in the government emanating from the rebellion, as well as those who cooperated with such 
persons, shall be judged in accordance with this Constitution and the laws that have been enacted 
by virtue thereof’). 
267 Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay (20 June 1992) art 138 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 
April 2016 (‘The citizens are authorized to resist those usurpers, through every means at their 
reach. In the hypothesis that [a] person or group of persons, invoking any principle or 
representation contrary to this Constitution, [should] wield the public power, their actions are 
declared null and of no validity [valor], nonbinding and, for this, the People exercising their 
right to resist oppression, are excused from complying with them. The foreign states that, for 
any circumstance, relate themselves to such usurpers, may not invoke any pact, treaty or 
agreement subscribed to or authorized by the usurping government, [so as] to demand it later as 
an obligation or commitment of the Republic of Paraguay’). 
268 Constitution of the Republic of Peru (31 December 1993) art 46 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2009.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 April 
2016 (‘No one owes obedience to a usurper government or to anyone who assumes public office 
in violation of the Constitution and the law. The civil population has the right to insurrection in 
defense of the constitutional order. Acts of those who usurp public office are null and void’). 
269 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (2 April 1976) arts 7(3) and 21 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 April 
2016 (Art 7(3): ‘Portugal shall recognise peoples’ rights to self-determination and independence 
and to development, as well as the right to insurrection against all forms of oppression’. Art 21: 
‘Everyone shall possess the right to resist any order that infringes their rights, freedoms or 
guarantees and, when it is not possible to resort to the public authorities, to use force to repel 
any aggression’). 
270 The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan (9 July 2011) art 4(3) 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2011.pdf> accessed 2 May 2016 
(‘Every citizen shall have the duty to resist any person or group of persons seeking to overthrow 
the constitutional government or suspend or abrogate this Constitution’). 
271 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (20 May 2002) art 28 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 
April 2016 (‘All citizens have the right to disobey and to resist illegal orders or orders that affect 
their fundamental rights, freedoms and guarantees. The right to self-defense is guaranteed to all, 
in accordance with the law’). 
272 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (8 October 1995) arts 3(4) and 3(5) 
<http://www.statehouse.go.ug/sites/default/files/attachments/Constitution_1995.pdf> accessed 
29 April 2016 (Art 3(4): ‘All citizens of Uganda shall have the right and duty at all times — (a) 
to defend this Constitution and, in particular, to resist any person or group of persons seeking to 
overthrow the established constitutional order; and (b) to do all in their power to restore this 
Constitution after it has been suspended, overthrown, abrogated or amended contrary to its 
provisions’. Art 3(5): ‘Any person or group of persons who, as required by clause (4) of this 
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Apart from forward-looking and backward-looking strategies to explicitly 
incorporate the right of revolution into the text of a constitution, one may find 
implicit endorsements of revolution in the preambles of constitutions. For 
instance, the Algerian Constitution explicitly refers to the 1945 Revolution as 
a legitimate event and builds on the values of the Revolution.273 Likewise, the 
Constitution of Iran mentions in the preamble ‘the great Islamic Revolution of 
Iran’ as ‘a united movement of the people’ against ‘despotic rule’.274 Similar 
provisions are enshrined in the Constitution of Afghanistan that acknowledges 
‘jihad and just resistance of all the peoples of Afghanistan’275 and the 
transitional Libya’s Constitution that explicitly justifies the legitimacy of the 
Revolution of 17 February 2011.276 Similarly, the Constitution of Cuba 
acknowledges ‘heroism and sacrifice’ of ‘our ancestors’ who ‘defended the 
Revolution at the cost of their lives, thus contributing to its definitive 
consolidation’.277 
The right to forcefully resist may also be implied from the text of the 
constitution. For instance, the Constitution of the Dominican Republic 
provides that ‘the acts issued by usurped authority, [and] the actions or 
decisions of the public powers, institutions or persons that alter or subvert the 
constitutional order and any decision reached by requisition of armed force, 
are null of plain right’.278 In the same vein the Hungarian Constitution asserts 
that ‘[n]obody may direct their activity at the acquisition or exercise of public 
authority by force, or seek its exclusive possession’. However, it introduces 
the right to resist with a caveat: ‘Everyone shall have the right and obligation 
to resist by lawful means such attempts’. Moreover, ‘[o]nly state authorities 
shall have the exclusive right to use force in order to enforce the Constitution 
and laws’.279 It seems that the Hungarian Constitution merely recognises a right 
to civil disobedience, which is a progeny of the general right to resist but falls 
short of the right to revolution. However, absent legitimate state authorities 
                                               
article, resists the suspension, overthrow, abrogation or amendment of this Constitution commits 
no offence’). 
273 Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (23 February 1989) preamble, 
arts 9, 62, 73, 76 <http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/local_algeria.pdf> accessed 9 
September 2016. 
274 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran (3 December 1979) preamble 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989.pdf?lang=en> accessed 9 September 
2016. 
275 The Constitution of Afghanistan (4 January 2004) preamble 
<http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/afg/images/pliki/TheConstitution.pdf> accessed 9 
September 2016. 
276 Libya’s Constitution (3 August 2011) preamble 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2011.pdf> accessed 9 September 2016. 
277 The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba (15 February 1976) preamble 
<http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Cuba%20Constitution.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016. 
278 The Constitution of the Dominican Republic (26 January 2010) art 73 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un-dpadm/unpan048943.pdf> 
accessed 29 April 2016. 
279 Constitution of Hungary (18 April 2011) art C 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2011.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016. 
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and effective legal framework to invoke ‘lawful means’ it would be against the 
spirit of the constitution to forbid a more robust resistance. It follows that the 
right to revolution is effectively implied. This is also the case with other 
constitutions that explicitly refer to the right to civil disobedience.280 The right 
to revolution can also be implied from the Constitution of Maldives, which, 
absent the expressive reference to the right of resistance by any means, states: 
‘No employee of the State shall impose any orders on a person except under 
authority of a law. Everyone has the right not to obey an unlawful order’.281 
Similar provisions are contained in the constitutions of Mozambique,282 
Rwanda283 and Uruguay.284 
Ultimately, absent explicit or implicit references to the right of revolution 
in the text of national constitutions, States, in terms of Sumida, are nonetheless 
presumed to recognise the right concerned since it is considered to be ‘one of 
the pillars of Western civilization’.285 For instance, in the midst of the 2013-14 
Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, Lyubomyr Guzar, a former head of the 
Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, claimed that it was not necessary to 
entrench the right to revolution into the text of the Ukrainian constitution 
because it is a ‘law of nature’. Under this law every individual and every nation 
                                               
280 See Constitution of Burkina Faso (2 June 1991) art 167 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2012.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 
April 2016 (‘The Source of legitimacy follows from this Constitution. All power which does not 
derive its source from this Constitution, notably that resulting from a coup d’etat or from a putsch 
is illegal. In this case, the right to civil disobedience is recognized to all citizens’); Constitution 
of the Republic of Mali (12 January 1992) art 121 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992.pdf?lang=en> accessed 29 April 
2016 (‘The foundation of all authority in the Republic of Mali resides in the Constitution. The 
republican form of the State shall not be subject to question. The people have the right to civil 
disobedience for the preservation of the republican form of the State. Any coup d’etat or putsch 
shall be an imprescriptible crime against the Malian People’). 
281 Constitution of the Republic of Maldives (7 August 2008) art 64 
<http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/Documents/ConstitutionOfMaldives.pdf> accessed 
29 April 2016. 
282 Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique (2 November 1990) art 80(2) 
<http://www1.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/c_Mozambique.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016 
(‘All citizens shall have the right not to comply with orders that are illegal or which would 
infringe upon their Constitutional or other legal rights’). 
283 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda (26 May 2003) art 48 
<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2010.pdf> accessed 29 April 2016 
(‘In all circumstances, every citizen, whether civilian or military, has the duty to respect the 
Constitution, other Laws and regulations of the country. He/she has the right to defy orders 
received from his/her superior authority if the orders constitute a serious and manifest violation 
of human rights and public freedoms’). 
284 Constitution of Uruguay (27 November 1966) art 10 
<http://landwise.resourceequity.org/record/467> accessed 29 April 2016 (‘No inhabitant of the 
Republic shall be obliged to do what the law does not require or prevented from doing what it 
does not prohibit’). 
285 Gerald Sumida, ‘The Right of Revolution: Implications for International Law and Order’ in 
Charles A Barker (ed), Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs (The John Hopkins 
Press 1971) 130. See also Aleksandr Marsavelski, ‘The Crime of Terrorism and the Right of 
Revolution in International Law’ (2013) 28 Conn J Int’l L 241, 273. 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 276 
have a right to self-defence: ‘[O]ne may resort to arms when facing arms’.286 
For other commentators, it is not the redundancy of positive norms on the right 
to rebellion that is at stake but rather unacceptability of incorporating such 
norms into the constitutional texts. Such positivisation contradicts the very 
essence of the right to revolution ‘because it would be the fixture by statute of 
a right which by its nature can exist only above any statute, the regulation of 
something which in no way can be regulated’. In other words, ‘[a] legal system 
cannot institutionalise its own control outside of the system from within the 
system’.287 Finally, it is important to bear in mind that national constitutions 
do not typically provide for an exhaustive list of human rights and freedoms, 
which means that the right to revolution is effectively implied. 
It remains to be ascertained what standard one has to be guided by in 
determining whether the right to revolution is a general principle shared by the 
majority of national legal systems. Should one refer solely to explicit 
entrenchment of the right to revolution in the constitutional texts, one is solely 
left with about twenty per cent of the world’s (written) constitutions 
recognising the right in question, which is clearly not enough for meeting the 
criteria of plurality and representativeness of a general principle of 
international law recognised by civilised nations. If one includes also 
constitutions that contain provisions logically implying the right concerned, 
one would definitely be closer to meeting the criteria, but the robustness of 
such strategy is essentially compromised by the lack of precision and the 
unjustified generalisation. Lastly, if one endorses the natural law pedigree of 
the right to revolution without attempting to locate its positive sources, one 
cannot claim undertaking objective comparative study and renders himself 
bare to the accusations of wishful thinking and exercise in politics rather than 
law. 
Further, the mere textual similarity of the revised constitutional provisions 
may not be sufficient for claiming that the right to revolution is a general 
principle. General principles are abstractions from concrete legal rules, whose 
contents are different from those of the legal rules from which they are 
derived.288 This means that provisions of municipal law cannot be relied on as 
embodying general principles as they stand but by the way of analogy, 
considering the distinctiveness of the international legal system vis-à-vis 
municipal legal orders. This point was clearly emphasised in the South West 
Africa cases, where South Africa contended that general principles of law 
 
                                               
286 Lyubomyr Guzar, ‘Pravo na povstannya — to ye zakon pryrody’ Ukraina Moloda (10 January 
2011) <http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/2395/180/85201/> accessed 30 June 2016. See 
also SP Pogrebnyak and EA Uvarova, ‘Soprotivlenie ugneteniyu. Povstanie. Revolyuciya 
(teoretiko-pravovoy analiz v svete doktriny prav cheloveka)’ [Resistance to Oppression. 
Rebellion. Revolution (Theoretical-Legal Analysis in Light of the Doctrine of Human Rights] 
(2013) 2 Pravo i gromadyanske suspilstvo 4, 25. 
287 Arthur Kaufmann, ‘A Small Scale Right to Resist’ (1986) 21 New Eng L Rev 571, 573. 
288 See Max Sorensen, ‘Principes de droit international public. Cours general’ (1960) 101 
RCADI 1, 25. 
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[A]re taken from the realm of municipal law, they are elevated by analogy 
from that law into international law relationships and applied there […]. They 
relate to the definition of legal relationships in domestic law […] and from 
those relationships they are then taken by way of analogy [and] applied in the 
sphere of relationships as they obtain in international law.289 
 
South Africa’s approach was endorsed by Judge Tanaka290 and represents the 
classic view of the mechanism of ascertainment of general principles.291 
Turning to the question of revolution as obtained in constitutional provisions 
of domestic systems, in addition to the varying underlying rationale expounded 
in such provisions, ranging from the reference to their natural law pedigree or 
their role as a means to realise an inherent right to self-defence against tyranny, 
such provisions vary in the scope and extent of the permitted resistance, and 
whether the latter is qualified as a right or as a duty.292 Thus, in order to derive 
an abstract general principle out of these provisions, one has to do away with 
some of their particular elements. Importantly, minor differences in the content 
of constitutional right-to-resit provisions pertaining to different national legal 
systems do not hinder the determination of a general principle of law. What 
matters is the existence of a common legal principle underlying these 
provisions.293 It therefore suffices to establish that the current problem in 
international law is analogous to one obtaining in the domestic sphere, and that 
the domestic solution is one which is adequate to account for the international 
law problem. Thus, the ‘task of deriving general principles of law from 
national laws should not consist of looking technically for coincidences among 
legal rules, but of determining their common denominator’.294 How exactly 
this is to be done is not clear. Even though the Court has faced this challenge 
on several occasions, it has never engaged in expounding this process in any 
clear and consistent manner. 
All in all, with very few exceptions, national laws do not endorse the right 
of revolution, nor could they be expected to do so. It is inherently against the 
established legal order of the state to institutionalise the means for its own 
destruction: ‘The pre-revolutionary set of legitimising norms, the earlier 
paradigm, can in no way conceive legitimacy for its revolutionary replacement. 
                                               
289 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Pleadings) cited 
in Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, vol 1 (OUP 
2013) 238. 
290 South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Merits) 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka [1966] ICJ Rep 6, 296-97 (‘If we limit the application of 
Article 38, paragraph 1 (c), to a strict analogical extension of certain principles of municipal 
law, we must recognise that the contention of the Respondent is well-founded’). 
291 Hugh Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, vol 1 (OUP 
2013) 238. 
292 For a more comprehensive analysis, see Tom Ginsburg, Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez and Mila 
Versteeg, ‘When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right to Resist in the World’s 
Constitutions’ (2013) 60 UCLA L Rev 1184, 1221-28. 
293 See eg Michael Akehurst, ‘Equity and General Principles of Law’ (1976) 25 ICLQ 801, 814. 
294 Fabian O Raimondo, General Principles of Law in the Decisions of International Criminal 
Courts and Tribunals (Martinus Nijhoff 2008) 49. 
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The pre-and post-revolutionary sets of fundamental values are utterly 
incompatible’.295 Moreover, considering the fact that the right in question was 
frequently codified into the text of national constitutions ex post facto, that is 
as a means of legalisation of the unconstitutional transfer of power, it is logical 
to assume that its status as a constitutional right to be implemented akin to 
other rights is rather dubious, if not outrightly suspended. 
 
6.3.4. Revolution as a Legitimate Belligerency 
 
Whenever revolution crosses the threshold of an armed conflict, international 
humanitarian law (IHL) is an appropriate normative framework. There are 
certain guarantees in IHL with respect to self-determination movements that 
imply the lawfulness, or, more precisely, the permissibility, of non-state 
violence if effectuated in conformity with international humanitarian norms 
irrespective of its cause. Importantly, whilst IHL is designed to serve neutral 
humanitarian purposes, not to confer legitimacy and/or legality upon actors 
taking part in hostilities,296 dealing with revolutionary violence within the 
framework of IHL would assist in depoliticising the notion of revolution and 
place it within the setting of applicable legal rules, as opposed to the more 
conventional ‘fait accompli’ status. 
Under international laws of war, the highest degree of protection of 
persons taking a direct part in hostilities is ensured by according them a 
(privileged) combatant status (belligerent status), meaning that persons 
meeting the requisite criteria for designation as combatant will not be punished 
for legitimate acts of war. In principle, this can only be done in cases of 
international armed conflicts and with respect to all members of the armed 
forces of a party to the conflict as well as members of a levée en masse.297 
Liberation movements are not explicitly mentioned in the Geneva 
Conventions. Yet, it has been suggested that under certain conditions the four 
Geneva Conventions may be applicable to wars of national liberation.298 
Whilst the Conventions are in principle open to states only, they contain two 
provisions governing the possible accession to them or their acceptance. The 
common articles including accession provisions state: ‘From the date of its 
coming in force, it shall be open to any Power on whose name the present 
                                               
295 Isaac Kramnick, ‘Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent 
Scholarship’ (1972) 11 Hist & Theory 26, 34. 
296 To say that a non-state group has rights and duties when it participates in war (jus in bello) is 
not the same as saying that it has the authority to initiate a war (jus ad bellum). 
297 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III) art 4. 
298 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War’ (1972) 3 Annales 
d’Études Internationales 93, 104; Jean Salmon, ‘Les guerres de libération national’ in Antonio 
Cassese (ed), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (Napoli 1979) 72-73; Georges Abi-
Saab, ‘Wars of National Liberation in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols’ (1979) 165 
RCADI 353, 400ff. 
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Convention has not been signed, to accede to this Convention’.299 The other 
common provision is article 2(3), which conditions the participation in the 
Conventions on acceptance and actual application: ‘Although one of the 
Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers 
who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They 
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if 
the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof’. It has been asserted that 
the term ‘Power’ can also refer to non-state actors, such as liberation 
movements, and that the latter can therefore be bound by the Conventions 
under one of the two above-mentioned provisions. Yet, this view did not attain 
wide support, particularly considering the context and the wording of the 
various provisions of the Geneva Conventions which imply that the term 
‘Powers’ was intended to refer to states.300 This has been supported by the 
ICRC.301 Thus, the four Geneva Conventions do not directly apply to non-state 
actors pursuing the cause of liberation (apart from Common Article 3 
establishing minimum protection for people in wartime, which is commonly 
agreed to be the only article applicable in non-international conflicts). 
The 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions broadened the 
applicability of rules regarding international armed conflicts to situations that 
‘include armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right of self-determination’.302 Thus, peoples’ struggle for self-
determination is not a mere domestic issue. In response to states’ fears that 
such provision recognised the legitimacy of any anti-governmental force, 
including ‘terrorist’, on the basis of a ‘cause’,303 the ICRC made clear that there 
should be at a minimum a certain level of international personality before the 
                                               
299 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 
UNTS 31 (GC I) art 60; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, 
entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (GC II) art 59; Geneva Convention (III) 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 
October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (GC III) art 139; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 
October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (GC IV) art 155. 
300 See eg Antonio Cassese, ‘Wars of National Liberation and Humanitarian Law’ in Paola Gaeta 
and Salvatore Zappala (eds), The Human Dimension of International Law (OUP 2008) 102. 
301 See The 2016 ICRC Commentary to the First Geneva Convention, para 3205 <https://ihl-
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defined by international law’). 
302 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (adopted 8 June 1977, 
entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 17512 (Geneva Protocol I) art 1. 
303 The Protocol was even christened a ‘law in the service of terror’. See Douglas J Feith, ‘Law 
in the Service of Terror’ (1985) 1 National Interest 36. 
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use of force by a liberation group can be viewed as legitimate.304 Moreover, 
the just cause was strictly confined to three scenarios: fight against colonial 
domination, alien occupation and racist regimes. Self-determination struggles 
fought against other types of regimes, e.g. authoritarian and repressive 
regimes, seem to fall foul of the Protocol’s scope of application. Yet, the 
preparatory works reveal that some states adopted a more relaxed view on self-
determination which, as the argument proceeded, also encompassed other 
classes of wars of national liberation, not exhausted by the three enumerated 
types of situations.305 This position was rapidly picked up by the literature.306 
As Wilson has famously commented in relation to article 1 of Protocol I, ‘its 
subjective character makes it a prime target for flexible interpretation based on 
the exigencies of the moment’.307 One should also note the word ‘include’ in 
paragraph 4 of article 1, which implies prima facie that the list is not 
exhaustive. Indeed, the practice of the UN and the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, to which the article refers, exhibit strong evidence of an open-ended 
understanding of the right to self-determination, that is as a right appertaining 
to all peoples equally and in every respect and not confined to the three enlisted 
scenarios. 
This thesis suggests that since the notion of self-determination has 
significantly broadened since its initial decolonisation context (to cover cases 
of consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested human rights violations 
amounting to denial of the people’s right to dispose of themselves not only 
externally but also internally), to confine it to the three aforementioned 
situations is utterly outdated not only because these situations are far less 
frequent in the post-colonial era and are bound to disappear in the near future 
but also because such limited understanding of self-determination is not 
supported by the international practice.308 Moreover, from a strictly 
                                               
304 See Yves Sandoz and others (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
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humanitarian standpoint, the extension of the applicability of Protocol I to a 
broader category of armed conflicts would result in the wider application of 
the humanitarian rules to these conflicts and, hence, would lead to greater 
safeguard of human life.309 The most common objections against such an 
extension are that the wider applicability of Protocol I would encourage non-
state actors to use violent means to advance their political agenda, including 
terrorism, and privatise war.310 However, the primary objective of IHL is not 
to legitimise cause but to delineate rights and duties of parties involved in 
armed hostilities, which means that conferring combatant immunity to a 
broader array of actors simply ensures that there is greater incentive for them 
to abide by the humanitarian constraints on violence. This is not to privatise 
war but to pragmatically accept that non-state groups already fight wars and 
will do so in the future even if denied combatancy. It is, thus, fair to suggest 
that non-state use of force in furtherance of revolution falls under the scope of 
article 1 of Protocol I, which means that those engaged in such use of force 
enjoy the full status of lawful combatants. 
Further, article 44(3) of Protocol I provides for more relaxed conditions of 
combatancy than the previous Hague requirements311 acknowledging that 
warring parties failing to distinguish themselves from the civilian population 
retain their combatant immunity (immunity from the operation of domestic 
criminal law), including the POW status, if they fall into the power of an 
adverse party provided that they carry their arms openly during military 
engagements and that they are visible to the adversary while engaged in a 
military deployment.312 It is clear that article 44 complements the requirements 
of article 1(4) by a set of procedural criteria specifically tailored for self-
determination movements. Whilst this provision has been traditionally 
regarded as solely applicable with respect to occupied territories and struggles 
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against colonial powers,313 its ratione personae scope has broadened to include 
secessionist movements pursuing internal, rather than purely external, causes. 
Ultimately, members of the armed forces of a party to a conflict are considered 
to be combatants even ‘if that Party is represented by a government or an 
authority not recognised by an adverse Party’.314 It follows that members of 
self-determination movements may qualify as combatants and enjoy immunity 
for lawful acts of war. 
However, states not parties to Geneva Protocol I may continue to treat the 
situations of struggles for self-determination as conflicts of a non-international 
character. The defining feature of non-international armed conflicts and 
situations of lesser internal violence is states’ broad discretion as to how to deal 
with insurgents. It means that members of rebel movements may not be 
acknowledged as privileged combatants and may be subject to criminal judicial 
proceedings under the national laws of the state concerned. Whilst it has been 
suggested that article 1 of Protocol I — which internationalises self-
determination movements — might be regarded as constituting at least 
emerging customary norm by virtue of influencing state practice,315 it is too 
premature to accord a status of a customary norm to the provision that has been 
rarely directly evoked by states and is often characterised as possessing a 
largely rhetorical value.316 This can be exacerbated by the fact that Geneva 
Protocol II explicitly excludes from the purview of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not 
being armed conflicts’.317 Whilst revolutions are by definition more than just a 
riot or sporadic act of violence, it is not always clear where the threshold lies. 
For sure, states can recognise the opposing movements as belligerent outside 
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of the framework of Protocol I, which would result in the full application of 
the laws of war. Yet, such recognitions are extremely rare, particularly with 
regard to such politically sensitive events as revolutions, because recognition 
implies loss of control over territory and private violence and a degree of 
governmental failure, and states are reluctant to relinquish their sovereign 
authority to identify and penalise actors interfering with their monopoly to use 
force.318 
If the existence of an international armed conflict is not established 
according to the criteria outlined above, the law of a non-international armed 
conflict, codified in Common Article 3 and Protocol II, provides for certain 
guarantees for non-state groups engaged in struggles for self-determination, 
albeit far less satisfactory in comparison with Protocol I. Because Common 
Article 3 only provides for rudimentary protection to those involved in a non-
international armed conflict, such as basic principles of humane treatment of 
persons taking no part in hostilities, and is commonly recognised as vague and 
impractical,319 it has been eventually supplemented by Protocol II as ‘the first 
attempt to regulate by treaty the methods and means of warfare in internal 
conflicts’.320 However, the Protocol requires high level of intensity of conflict 
to be triggered, which means that it can only rarely be applied. For instance, it 
ties the legitimacy of the use of force by non-state armed groups to the control 
of territory, not to mention other requisite criteria setting a high bar for 
applying the Protocol: ‘This Protocol shall apply to […] armed conflicts […] 
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed 
forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, 
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory 
as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol’.321 This reflects an exceedingly conservative 
approach which bears little relation to reality because it fails to account for the 
fact that revolutionary movements all too often do not exercise control over 
territory since their raison d’être is to alter existing governmental structures, 
not state borders. Even if they do, states more often than not are willing to 
minimise, or outright deny, the existence of the requisite conditions (control of 
the territory, responsible command, the capability to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations etc.) that would render Protocol II applicable. As 
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Rwelamira comments: ‘Individual States are […] left with a carte blanche to 
decide when the Protocol or common Article 3 should be invoked’.322 
Another scenario where revolutionary may claim a privileged combatant 
status is an ‘internationalised’ armed conflict, that is when an internal armed 
conflict due to a number of factors transforms into an international armed 
conflict. There are three possibilities here: (1) a non-state actor may establish 
a new state in the course of the conflict; (2) a foreign state may intervene in 
support of a non-state entity against the state on the territory of which the 
conflict occurs; and (3) a foreign state may intervene against a non-state group 
without the consent of the host state.323 However, the practical usefulness of 
these scenarios is of a limited significance to revolutionary violence, since they 
are either dependent on the actual success of rebellion or on the involvement 
of the third state. 
All in all, the relevance of the IHL framework for revolutions is rather 
meagre considering the fact that revolutions all too often either do not meet the 
threshold of a war or are deliberately characterised as such for the reasons of 
political convenience. Moreover, individual states tend to view the 
applicability of IHL within their domestic jurisdictions rather leniently, with 
broader government strategic considerations being of primary concern. Once 
the applicability of the laws of war is acknowledged, no derogation beyond 
military necessity and proportionality is generally allowed. This inability to 
derogate from humanitarian restrictions incites governments to react speedily 
and excessively to any show of insurgent force because ‘the legal parameters 
for action when military necessity and proportionality are concerned require 
far higher standards of care than might otherwise be thought’.324 This 
notwithstanding, the provisions of humanitarian law on liberation movements 
are not without effect altogether. They reinforce the international standing of 
revolutions as liberation struggles against oppressive regimes in defence of 
self-determination and thereby implicitly recognise their legitimacy. State 
parties to Protocols I and II are now under an increased pressure to adhere to 
Geneva Conventions when faced with violent resistance. 
 
6.3.5. Revolution as a Legal Remedy 
 
Political scientists typically perceive the right of rebellion as a form of voice 
exercised by citizens in extreme circumstances. It is only to be resorted to in 
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cases of intolerable governmental abuse and ‘legal alienation’325 and when the 
normal channels of voice are not available or are ineffective. Most 
significantly, the right of revolution is to be claimed when fundamental human 
rights are reneged upon and when conventional remedies are compromised or 
non-existent. However, the legal status of revolution remains uncertain. For 
majority of legal scholarship, revolution is a simple fact unregulated by 
international law, less so is it a legal right. However, denying the right of 
resistance a legal standing in international law presents an ethical problem: if 
the right to revolution is simply non-existent, if rebellion is to be banned in all 
circumstances, how people are then expected to enjoy and vindicate their rights 
enlisted in a wide plethora of international instruments? Would not it then be 
better to accept that there are no human rights, that those items enshrined in 
the International Bill of Rights are merely political values to be superseded by 
more exigent considerations, such as international peace and stability? As 
Tony Honore pointedly noted, 
 
Would it make sense to deny someone the right to do what he is compelled to 
do in the sense not of being coerced but of having no other means of 
vindicating his fundamental interests? To deny it would be to assert that 
people may be bound indefinitely to submit to conditions of life which we 
and they recognize as intolerable; that their interests may properly be 
disregarded and they themselves treated as unworthy of respect.326 
 
Indeed, to deny revolution any legal status in international law is to assert that 
law is an instrument of oppression by virtue of juridical immortalisation of the 
effective status quo and complacency in injustices that such status quo may 
generate. To deny the right to revolution is to effectively accept that 
international law abandons people facing en masse grave human rights 
violations perpetrated by their governments. Grave and systematic state 
oppression dissolves the social bonds between state and its subjects and 
consequently ‘it is no longer open to state to define the conditions in which 
subjects may lawfully use force’.327 The importance of the right of revolution 
is also acknowledged by other scholars who compellingly insist that ‘[i]n 
certain circumstances, violence may be the last appeal […] for some measure 
of human dignity’ and that denial of the right to resist injustices ‘can be 
tantamount to confirmation and reinforcement of those injustices’.328 The 
cause of this drastic action is so exigent that it ‘has been transformed into a 
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“right”.’329 The intuitive appeal of this position is reinforced by Lauterpacht 
who postulates that: 
 
[T]he international community was no longer a society for the mutual 
protection of established governments. A revolution might be a crime against 
the State, but it was no longer a crime against the international community. 
So long as international society did not effectively guarantee the rights of man 
against arbitrariness and oppression by governments, it could not oblige 
States to treat subversive activities […] as a crime.330 
 
It follows that there must be a right to rebel. It might not be a formal legal right 
in the sense that it lacks a solid foundation either in treaty law or custom, but 
neither is it a purely moral entitlement. It holds a semi-formal status flowing 
form the notion of human dignity and international principles embodied in the 
human rights instruments.331 It is quite astonishing that numerous scholars332 
similarly to Honore ended up to cautiously conclude that even though the right 
of resistance to tyranny is a part of the natural law tradition and its existence 
is presupposed by the very fact of possessing human rights and/or it is logical 
to imply the existence of this right by interpreting existing human rights 
undertakings, the status of the right in question is somewhat different from 
other rights by the fact that no international treaty text explicitly states it and 
state practice is close to non-existent. It is even more astonishing that no legal 
scholar considered a possibility to invoke the third source of law as a legal 
justification for the right of revolution.333 
Because the right to revolution is a secondary right, that is it is only 
activated when other (primary) human rights have been abridged, it would be 
more logical to regard it as a safeguard or a remedy rather than as a full-fledged 
human right. The right of revolution cannot be other than the ultimate means 
of redress, the ultimum remedium.334 To claim otherwise would be to confuse 
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cause and effect. The Preamble of the UDHR by asserting that ‘it is essential, 
if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion 
against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law’335 confirms this view. 
Thus, the most robust legal justification for the right to revolution lies in 
the third source of international law, namely ‘general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations’. As established previously, general principles 
have generally been considered vague, ambiguous and non-consensual and 
consequently were almost never explicitly referred to as a legal justification 
for action. Instead, international courts attempted to couch their reasoning in 
terms of customary international law or simply referred to ‘general 
international law’ in contrast to treaty law.336 Such cautious an approach that 
renders general principles a status of a subsidiary source, an afterthought 
conceived to prevent a non liquet, is generally understandable given the 
voluntaristic underpinnings of classical legal doctrine. And yet, nowhere in the 
drafting history of the statutes of the PCIJ and the ICJ is there any justification 
for such a hierarchy of sources. Moreover, with the expanding 
constitutionalisation of international law ‘there will doubtless be greater 
reliance on international law as a means to resolve a variety of issues which 
neither conventional nor customary international law is ready to meet’.337 This 
means that general principles of international law are increasingly invoked as 
a self-standing source of rights and obligations. 
The principle ubi ius, ubi remedium is an equitable principle meaning that 
for every wrong committed there must be an adequate remedy. It was stated in 
as early as 1646 by Grotius in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis that ‘fault creates the 
obligation to make good the loss’.338 While the exact scope of this principle is 
not clear, it does not, in the words of Burke, entail automatic restitutio in 
integrum for every wrong committed. Instead, it falls under the equity’s 
praeter legem function, which is to fill the lacunae of international law and to 
obviate a non-liquet.339 Thus, the most evident application of this principle 
ensues when there is a positive right conferred upon individual and when the 
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realisation of this right is dreadfully compromised if there is no remedy to 
protect it when it is violated. 
Even though the status of this principle in international law is obscure, 
international courts and tribunals had a chance to pronounce themselves on the 
principle in some of their cases. In the Spanish Zone of Morocco Claims, 
regarding 51 claims by British subjects or British-protected persons against the 
Spanish authorities for significant damage to life and/or property in the 
Spanish zone of Morocco during the riots of the 1920s, it has been asserted 
that ‘responsibility is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an 
international character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in 
question is not met, responsibility entails the duty to make reparation’.340 The 
significance of this case is underscored by the fact that it served as one of the 
major precedents in the International Law Commission’s work on state 
responsibility. Further, in the landmark 1928 Chorzow Factory case, involving 
Polish exploitation of German-owed industrial property within the territory of 
Poland and the eventual damage suffered by German companies, the PCIJ 
stated that ‘reparation is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a 
convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention 
itself […] [it is] a general conception of law that any breach of an engagement 
involves an obligation to make reparation’.341 Thus, in the opinion of the Court, 
it is a principle of international law that any breach of an obligation involves a 
duty to make reparation. For Burke, this was a breakthrough statement ‘as it 
assumed and implied power of the Court […] to create a remedy where none 
was explicitly provided for’.342 The successor of the PCIJ, the ICJ, 
acknowledged this principle in its advisory opinion in the Reparation for 
Injuries case by affirming the capacity of the United Nations to claim 
reparation for the injuries caused to its agents by the responsible de jure or de 
facto government.343 In this case, the Court assumed a rather broad 
interpretation of the UN Charter with a view to obtain an equitable result. As 
Rossi noted, the Court subscribed to a teleological interpretation of the Charter 
and other international instruments ‘to avoid the manifestly unreasonable 
result that otherwise would have obtained’.344 This view was again reiterated 
in 1973 in the separate opinion of Judge Ammoun, who postulated that the 
obligation to make reparation for injury caused by fault was ‘one, if not indeed 
the most important, of the principles common to nations in the sense of Article 
38, paragraph 1 (c) of the Court’s Statute’.345 
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Yet, the most emblematic case in terms of the applicability of ubi ius, ubi 
remedium in international law is the ICJ’s landmark decision in the Barcelona 
Traction case.346 The case concerns the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited which was incorporated in 1911 in Toronto (Canada). It 
created a number of subsidiary companies with a view to ensure electric power 
production and supply in Catalonia, Spain. By 1936, the subsidiary companies 
provided for the major electricity distribution in Catalonia. Some time later, 
Barcelona Traction’s share capital came to be largely held by Belgian 
nationals. After the Spanish civil war, the company faced difficulties in 
acquiring foreign capital for resuming business. The company was eventually 
declared bankrupt without proper notification, which resulted in the forfeiture 
of the right to enter a plea of opposition. As a result of the arguably unfair and 
non-transparent bankruptcy proceedings, representations were made to the 
Spanish Government by the British, Canadian, United States and Belgian 
Governments. When Canada in 1955 ceased its interposition, it was Belgium 
that maintained its objections and eventually brought the case to the ICJ. 
When assessing the Belgian Government’s jus standi in exercising 
diplomatic protection of company on behalf of its shareholders, the Court 
observed that the right of diplomatic protection was originally conceived as a 
means to protect natural persons rather than corporate entities. However, the 
Court recognised that in the field of diplomatic protection, international law 
was in continuous evolution and where it was a question of an unlawful act 
committed against a foreign company, national state of the company could 
exercise diplomatic protection for the purpose of seeking redress. In other 
words, it was solely Canadian government that had locus standi to exercise 
protection over Barcelona Traction. The importance of this case lies in the fact 
that Court recognised that the interests of justice required the extension of the 
right to diplomatic protection to juristic entities in order to ensure that the right 
(of shareholders) is followed by remedy. 
The fact that the Court has never had an occasion to apply this principle to 
the situation where people’s right to democracy was abridged by the action of 
their government does not mean that remedy in such situations is non-existent. 
As Burke has astutely observed, the Court does not create remedies. Rather, it 
discovers already extant remedies which exist independently of the Court’s 
judgments.347 Just because scholars do not have courage to invoke principles 
that were not previously referred to by the World Court in its decisions does 
not impact their normativity. Consequently, the ambit of application of the 
principle of ubi ius, ubi remedium is wider than what the Court had an occasion 
to define and can encompass situations not hitherto envisaged. 
The right to vote and stand for elections, which is argued in the preceding 
chapters to effectively constitute the right to democracy, is recognised in a 
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variety of international and regional instruments, not to mention national 
constitutions of states. The most notable example is article 25 ICCPR. Despite 
the solid foundation of this right in treaty law, the protection of right concerned 
in case of violation remains blatantly inadequate, albeit not completely non-
existent. The so-called pro-democratic interventions, whether unilateral or 
collective, in, inter alia, Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), Haiti (1994), Sierra-
Leone (1996) and Libya (2011) as well as less intrusive responses by the 
international community to democratic threats in the form of election 
monitoring, non-recognition of the incumbent governments, suspension of aid 
and/or suspension from the membership of the international organisation in 
Angola (1992-1993), Guatemala (1993), Cambodia (1991-1998), Paraguay 
(1996), Pakistan (1999), Venezuela (2002) and more recently in Honduras 
(2009) and Madagascar (2009) are all evidences of the attempt of the 
international community to remedy the violations of democratic principles. 
However, there are many similar cases of offences against democracy that 
were flagrantly condoned by the community of states. For instance, the SC 
condemnation, non-recognition, economic embargo and eventually the 
authorisation of military force against Haiti’s de facto government in the 
aftermath of the 1991 putsch was taking place in parallel with a general non-
reaction to the Algerian military coup occurring the year later. Moreover, the 
so much celebrated pro-democratic intervention in Sierra Leone in 1996 as an 
indication of the development of the democratic entitlement occurred against 
the backdrop of the total international condonation of the military coup in 
Nigeria just three years earlier. The world history of military coups is abundant 
with similar inconsistencies.348 This makes the right to democracy utterly 
vulnerable and dependent on political will and strategic interests of third states, 
which compromises its effectiveness to the extent that one may easily conclude 
that no effective remedy exists in such situations. However, as the above-
examined jurisprudence of the World Court elucidates, every right has a 
remedy by virtue of a general principle of ubi ius, ubi remedium — that equity 
will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. When democratic rights of 
people are blatantly abridged by power-greedy cliques, few would object to 
the egregious violation of international human rights law, not to mention 
evident wrongfulness and injustice, that ensue. Such illegality, coupled with 
moral injustice, may call into play the maxim ubi ius, ubi remedium. The 
practical implication of this maxim is that people, instead of passively waiting 
for the action by the international community to remove the self-proclaimed 
government and vindicate their right to democracy, can take action by 
themselves by instigating a revolution against undemocratic government if no 
other means proved effective. Moreover, considering the fact that revolutions 
are not outlawed in international law it follows that the application of the 
principle that for every wrong committed there should be a remedy to these 
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situations does not conflict with any existing international legal rule. Here, one 
must remind oneself of the Lotus principle ‘everything which is not expressly 
prohibited in international law is allowed’.349 Whilst to say that the absence of 
any express prohibition of revolution in international law is not to affirm the 
latter’s status as a right, the general permissibility of revolution in international 
law coupled with its inalienability for realisation of fundamental human rights, 
including the right to democracy, and the existence of the general principle 
mandating remedy for every violation committed provide in tandem a strong 
case for revolution as a right, albeit of a secondary, remedial character. 
Following this analysis, the equitable principle ubi ius, ubi remedium 
provides solid legal support for the right to revolution as a legal remedy against 
democratic disruptions. Yet, because the content of the principle as well as 
precise modalities of its application are highly ambiguous, one cannot claim 
that the right to revolution is a human right on the sole basis thereof. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that the World Court has never pronounced itself on 
the issue of the right to revolution as a remedy in its jurisprudence. Even 
though it is agreed that the principle is general in nature and can, therefore, be 
applied to situations not considered by the Court, one should be careful in 
drawing far-going conclusions from the claims, which find little support in 
state practice, attract contradictory scholarly opinions and have never been 
tested in the courtroom. Moreover, the application of the principle that for 
every wrong committed there should be a remedy implies a secondary status 
of the right to revolution: the latter is a derivative of human rights, in that 
respect for human rights and their effective enforcement rely on it, without 
being a human right itself. It exists in the shadow of the more conventional 
human right to an effective remedy for human rights violations. This builds on 
the consideration that governments, aware of the risk of rebellion by their 
citizens, may be more prone to adhere to their human rights obligations. If they 
do, the right to revolution is never justifiable. This effectively means that the 
right to revolution, albeit sharing some of the characteristics of a human right 
(including the goal of curbing state power), differs from conventional human 
rights in certain critical aspects. First, unlike traditional human rights, the right 
to revolution does not protect any objective values stemming from human 
dignity, such as life, physical integrity, equality, participation and the like. 
Instead, it seeks to protect these objective values against unlawful attack. It is, 
thus, auxiliary in nature, seeking to maximise protection for other rights that 
protect objective values. Second, because the right to revolution implies 
violence against the state and fellow citizens, it can only be a measure of last 
resort, when conventional remedies cannot be applied effectively. Otherwise, 
it would represent an unjustified violation of other human rights. In this sense, 
it assumes a second-order status not only with respect to human rights but also 
in relation to other remedies aimed to counter human rights violations. All in 
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all, it is fair to conclude that by virtue of the auxiliary nature, the right to 
revolution is a right sui generis in international law.350 
 
6.3.6. ‘Illegal but Justifiable Revolution’? 
 
In failing to recognise a right to resistance even in the gravest circumstances, 
international law divests itself of the cloak of moral legitimacy from which it 
ultimately derives its force.351 
 
The status of a right sui generis is rather dubious in international legal doctrine. 
From the traditional viewpoint, international law is binary: the claim is either 
legal by virtue of being rooted in one of the recognised legal sources (lex lata) 
or is relegated to the category of non-law (lex ferenda). The soundness, 
authoritativeness and persuasiveness of legal argument ultimately depends on 
how firmly it is based on lex lata. The sui generis second-tier status of the right 
to revolution lies somewhere in between: it is neither legal in the same sense 
as other human rights are, nor is it a mere moral aspiration. It is grounded in 
natural law but draws its legitimating force from the existing principles of both 
international law and national constitutional orders. Because such ‘oscillating’ 
position cannot be defended within traditional legal doctrine, a novel approach 
is needed. One possibility to conceptualise the sui generis character of the right 
to revolution is to suggest that revolution is ‘illegal but justifiable’. The 
formula ‘illegal but justifiable’ mirrors a general tendency of the increasing 
invocation of the legitimacy narrative in the debate on the use of violence for 
the cause of humanitarian values. This builds on the consideration that 
legitimacy (moral imperatives, political feasibility) may at times override 
legality (compliance with legally binding rules) and to ensure the ongoing 
relevance and authority of international law a so-called ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
approach is necessary. In what follows, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
formula of ‘illegal but justifiable’ are clarified by reference to the substantive 
conception of legitimacy. Thereafter, the formula is applied to revolutions to 
elucidate and legitimate the latter’s extraordinary status. 
 
6.3.6.1. Conceptualising Legitimacy in International Law: From 
Procedural to Substantive Conception 
 
Legitimacy is one of the most used and abused concepts in social sciences. On 
the one hand, the legitimacy talk is inevitable as it introduces constructive 
flexibility into otherwise rigid normative frameworks. On the other hand, its 
semantic ambiguity has been used strategically to advance subjective 
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preferences and political expediency. Because legitimacy has been ascribed 
different meanings by different authors depending on contextual ramifications 
and authors’ subjectivities, it has been asserted that it lacks normative 
content.352 This resulted in the legitimacy discourse being ‘neglected’,353 
‘ignored’,354 ‘fallen out of favour’,355 ‘under-scrutinised’356 or still remaining 
‘in its infancy’.357 Yet, following the publication of Thomas Frank’s renowned 
work on legitimacy in 1990,358 there has been an explosive upsurge of interest 
in the concept in international relations and international law.359 
To begin, legitimacy can be understood as word, concept and 
conception.360 As a word, it acquired a variety of meanings over time and space 
and it can refer to different concepts at the same time. As a concept, legitimacy 
encapsulates a certain idea of what may be perceived as ‘legitimate’, which 
can be expressed through different conceptions. A particular conception of 
legitimacy refers to its content, which may be associated with justice, morality, 
equity, effectiveness etc., and specifies the criteria to be met by the rule or 
decision in order to qualify as legitimate. The majority of literature is 
concerned with specific conceptions of legitimacy, the most common typology 
being procedural and substantive legitimacy.361 The term ‘legitimacy’ 
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etymologically stems from the Latin legitimus, meaning ‘lawful’. Thus, 
legitimacy has historically been understood as ‘conformity to law, rule or 
principle; lawfulness, conforming to sound reasoning, logicality’.362 Such 
‘procedural legitimacy’, as is famously defended by Thomas Franck,363 refers 
to mechanisms by which power is assigned and exercised. It is concerned with 
the formal validity of authority which is established by secondary rules about 
making, altering and invalidation of laws.364 As Franck has put it, ‘[a] process, 
in this sense, is usually set out in a superior framework of reference, rules about 
how laws are made, how governors are chosen and how public participation is 
achieved’.365 In his procedural conception of legitimacy, legitimacy is 
measured by criteria of coherence, consistency, adherence and symbolic 
validation.366 Moreover, the notion of procedural legitimacy lies at the heart of 
legal positivism, since law is to be obeyed notwithstanding its substance: ‘[I]ts 
background norms are often taken for granted and its procedures are followed 
for their own sake without deeper consideration of whether they are serving a 
more fundamental substantive aim or resulting in the best outcomes’.367 
Procedural legitimacy is, thus, a constitutive element of legality (law 
rationality): it strengthens legality and enhances its compliance pull. This 
conception is the one which is favoured mostly in international legal circles 
and understandably so since this is the safest position on legitimacy which an 
orthodox lawyer can take to retain its legal identity and ‘culture of 
formalism’.368  
However, in recent discourse legitimacy increasingly assumes a 
dichotomous relationship with legality.369 By being assimilated to morality, 
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fairness, equity and other substantive values, the novel legitimacy rhetoric – 
what has been dubbed as ‘substantive legitimacy’ – is concerned with the aim 
served by the object of legitimation, such as justice, human rights, 
development, global welfare and other extra-legal standards.370 It is a source 
of meta-legal authority standing for values which are to be privileged at any 
one moment irrespective of their positive underpinnings. The need to invoke 
substantive legitimacy is largely occasioned by the growing complexity and 
fragility of world order, increasing globalisation, interdependence and 
attendant homogenisation of values and emergence of common interest. As 
Clark pointedly observed, ‘once again, after decades of structural orthodoxy, 
ideas are thought to matter’.371 It is, hence, logical to suggest that, by virtue of 
the focus on ‘non-consensual’ elements within international law, substantive 
legitimacy and global constitutionalism are two sides of the same coin.372 
The increasing appeal to the language of substantive legitimacy implies 
that existing international law is somewhat deficient and incapable of response 
to a perceived urgency. Particularly after the NATO’s military action in 
Kosovo in 1999, it is commonly accepted that when the law is unjust, obsolete 
or fails some wider test about ultimate moral principles, legitimacy has to 
assume a corrective function. It ‘watches over laws, ensuring that they serve 
their fundamental purpose – to improve the lives of those they govern’ and 
serves to correct legality when necessary.373 In this sense, substantive 
legitimacy introduces constructive flexibility in international law in situations 
when blind following of legal rules may reinforce injustices. Ideally, 
legitimacy and legality go hand in hand. However, such unity is not always 
present and is well illustrated by the fact that global recognition of human 
rights in international instruments may be hampered by national laws and 
policies of individual governments which cover their oppressive actions with 
the mantra of legality. Such ‘oppressive legality’ may work for a certain period 
of time until it ‘reaches such an intolerable level that the law, as an “unjust 
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law”, has to yield place to justice’.374 Substantive legitimacy is, thus, often 
equated with justice and/or morality. However, it is more pertinent to speak of 
the substantive conception of legitimacy as the one concerned with morality 
only since ‘legitimacy is a less-demanding standard than justice in the sense 
that an institution can be legitimate though not fully just’.375 Hence, legitimacy 
claims may facilitate moral evaluations of particular acts even where 
consensus on justice is lacking. 
Yet, some authors distinguish between legitimacy and morality. For 
Thomas Franck, these are to be differentiated as process and substance 
respectively. He explains that ‘[t]he legitimacy-based claim […] derives from 
a secular political community’s preference for, and dependence on, order and 
predictability. The identical-appearing justice-based claim, in contrast, derives 
from the belief of a community of shared moral values’. He further states that 
‘[i]n a community of moral values, promises are sacred because trust and 
reciprocity are believed to be instrumental in advancing not order, but 
fairness’.376 On this account, legitimacy is about predictability and order and 
stands as a counterpoint to justice as fairness, or morality. This view 
notwithstanding, the contemporary debate on legitimacy tends to avoid this 
separation. The most obvious example is the 1999 Kosovo’s crisis, when the 
military intervention occurred in violation of the law of the use of force. 
Because the SC authorisation was impeded by Russian and Chinese vetoes, the 
strict adherence to legality would be equivalent to a passive condoning of 
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The NATO opted for an illegal but morally 
justified use of force. The response of the international community was largely 
supportive and crystallised the hitherto ambiguous formula of ‘illegal but 
legitimate’.377 Not only did this precedent mark a major milestone in 
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international relations by incorporating the concept of substantive legitimacy 
into the fabric of international law through the ‘illegal but legitimate’ 
approach378 but it also crystallised a moral difference, or gap, between legality 
and legitimacy as the one between what legality requires and what morality 
demands.379 The Commission on Kosovo itself situated the ‘illegal but 
legitimate’ approach in an ambiguous grey zone between an extension of 
international law and a proposal for an international moral consensus: ‘In 
essence, this grey zone goes beyond strict ideas of legality to incorporate more 
flexible views of legitimacy’.380 This was reaffirmed by Franck, who argued in 
his later works that ‘necessity and common sense have a role in tempering the 
law, in narrowing the gap between legality and legitimacy, between the letter 
of the law and its spirit, between normativity and morality’.381 He described 
the gap as one between ‘strict legal positivism and a common sense of moral 
justice’.382 Similarly, Buchanan designated legality and legitimacy as fidelity 
to law and fidelity to basic moral values.383 Falk, the then member of the 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo (IIC), restated the issue in 
even more subtle manner. He stated that the war in Kosovo ‘while technically 
illegal, was politically and morally legitimate’.384 In this sense, substantive 
legitimacy was equated to morality. Thus reconfigured, the campaign might 
not have been legal, properly so called, but could be sanctioned by its 
compelling moral purpose. 
The post-Kosovo legitimacy talk occasioned a strong backlash from 
eminent international lawyers. The turn to substantive legitimacy was dubbed 
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as the ‘turn to ethics’385 seeking to supplant legal discourse: ‘[I]t has been 
applied as a loose substitute for “legality”’ and as an emancipation from 
‘disciplinary constraints’ of legal science.386 Another criticism concerns 
legitimacy’s semantic ambiguity characterised by the lack of normative 
content despite legitimacy’s claims to do so: it ‘is not about normative 
substance. Its point is to avoid such substance but nonetheless to uphold a 
semblance of substance’.387 Strongly related to this is an assumption that if 
legitimacy is indeed imprecise and there is no undisputed authority mandated 
to assess it,388 it is easily susceptible to abuse by (predominantly powerful) 
states following their egoistic, short-handed interests. In this sense, the modern 
turn to legitimacy is less about ‘the turn to ethics’ and more about the turn to 
empire, since it is typically powerful actors possessing means and expertise 
who are capable of imposing their understanding of the legitimate upon the 
international community.389 
However, to say that the modern legitimacy talk shifts legal discourse to 
the periphery is to misunderstand the close relationship between the two. Many 
orthodox lawyers assert that the concepts of legality and legitimacy are 
synonymous and should remain such: what is legitimate is what law requires 
and vice versa.390 However, if this is the case, the concept of legitimacy is 
essentially redundant, and one might exclusively speak of conformity to law.391 
Additionally, international practice evidences that the use of legitimacy 
vocabulary implies its distinctiveness from legality. For example, in the 
context of the Iraq war it has been asserted that ‘[l]awful and legitimate are not 
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necessarily the same thing’.392 Moreover, to insist on their complete 
identification is to disable an important instrument of international change. As 
Clark has pointedly observed, ‘[i]t is precisely the political space between the 
two concepts that contributes to normative change in international society, to 
refinements of international law, and to developments in actual state 
practice’.393 Legitimacy serves as an engine for redefining and reshaping 
legality, by appeal to other norms.394 Thus, recourse to a legitimacy rationale 
is not an abandonment of legal debate but a more subtle shift from a first-tier 
legal guidance to a second-tier framework. This brings in an important 
dimension into legal debate by giving an alternative to respect for international 
law, which is not a violation of international obligation, properly so called, but 
a more attenuated notion of ‘legitimate’ action where the resulting behaviour 
falls outside of the black-and-white framework of legal prescriptions and 
appeals to a principled setting of secondary regime of obligatory rules.395 As 
to the legitimacy’s semantic ambiguity, it is imperative to note that it does not 
claim to have a predefined substance. Rather, the point of legitimacy is to bring 
additional avenues for debate over controversial conduct or norm instead of 
blindly embracing ‘a posture of legal nihilism’.396 Surely, such conceptual 
flexibility is prone to abuse. However, how is this different with respect to 
international legality? In fact, legality is particularly subject to manipulation 
by powerful states.397 International practice shows the persistent pattern of 
conduct in violation of the first-order legal norms, ‘thereby effectively blurring 
the distinction between violations and interpretations, treating “law” as a 
process of authoritative decision rather than a framework of rules’.398 In fact, 
legitimacy serves as a framework of more controlled criteria for the 
interpretation of legal rules with a view to adapting those to changing 
circumstances. 
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6.3.6.2. Applying the Substantive Conception of Legitimacy to 
Revolutions 
 
The previous section has shown that the ‘illegal but justifiable’ formula is the 
product of the progressive march of the substantive legitimacy talk in 
international law. It encapsulates the second-order guidelines to remedy the 
inefficiency, limitless or obsoleteness of the first-order norms without waiting 
for cumbersome formal lawmaking procedures to create an adjustment.399 The 
formula was crystallised by the Kosovo precedent in the context of 
humanitarian intervention aimed to advance human rights. At first blush, it 
seems dubious whether the formula is applicable to other cases where the strict 
following of legality may result in injustices, such as, for example, revolutions. 
On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the idea that an action 
may be illegal but legitimate is as old as international law itself. Human history 
abounds with examples when law was challenged because it was in 
contradiction with what morality strongly demanded. Consider, for instance, 
the Nuremberg Tribunal, whose legal underpinnings, both substantive and 
procedural, were dubious at best. While its creation and mandate were not 
explicitly authorised by law, its actions were widely considered as legitimate 
and were eventually followed by the adoption of appropriate laws, such as the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention to ‘catch up’ with 
legitimacy demands.400 Consider also the international practice of extradition 
of political offenders, which entailed granting of immunity to individuals who 
committed a political offence in an enemy state. Whilst it has never been 
legally established what the qualifier ‘political’ meant, the implicit 
requirement was that the political offender would be committed to the 
legitimate cause, namely that of fighting against oppression.401 Thus, 
legitimacy shaped the conceptual ramifications of legality. Another case of 
‘illegal but justifiable’ approach is the Corfu Channel judgment concerning the 
unilateral minesweeping operation by the UK in Albanian waters after mines 
damaged its warships. Whilst the Court confirmed illegality of Britain’s 
conduct, the only remedy it gave was a declaration of illegality.402 In other 
words, legitimacy mitigated state responsibility. The 1999 Kosovo crisis 
provided the hitherto implied legitimacy rationale with the mantra of explicit 
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international acceptance. Importantly, the IIC itself acknowledged the 
relevance of the ‘illegal but legitimate’ approach for situations other than 
humanitarian intervention.403 
In addition, it is fair to suggest that there is no moral distinction between 
the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and revolution since both are 
undertaken for the same cause. If interventions in the name of high 
humanitarian ends, including in defence of fundamental human rights, are 
sometimes accepted, or at least condoned, to deny the similar justification to 
revolutions is to undermine the integrity of legal argument. Hence, to maintain 
the law’s legitimacy and integrity, limited acts of violence in collective 
furtherance of human rights could be regarded as ‘illegal but justifiable’. In the 
words of Thomas Franck, ‘[t]his would recognize that in the absence of 
collective international enforcement of human rights, it may be necessary to 
license remedial violence by victims themselves’.404 He also suggested that the 
‘illegal but justifiable’ approach can be paralleled to the domestic concept of 
mitigation.405 On this account, mitigating circumstances do not alter the 
illegality of a conduct but may affect its consequences, for instance, by 
imposing less stringent punishment. To support this argument, he referred to 
two famous cannibalism cases Regina v Dudley and Stephens and US v 
Holmes.406 In both cases, defendants were found guilty of murder and yet 
received lenient sentences in recognition of mitigating factors. Commenting 
on the cases, Franck (and Rodley) observed that 
 
In exceptional circumstances […] a large power may indeed go selflessly to 
the rescue of a foreign people facing oppression. But surely no general law is 
needed to cover such actions […] in human experience, it has proven wiser 
to outlaw absolutely conduct which, in practical experience, is almost 
invariably harmful, rather than to try to provide general exceptions for rare 
cases. Cannibalism, given its history and man’s propensities, is simply 
outlawed, while provision is made to mitigate the effect of this law on men 
adrift in a lifeboat.407 
 
It follows, à la Franck, that the international approval of ‘technically illegal 
but morally justified action’ in Kosovo served as a kind of mitigation of illegal 
use of force in the same sense as the courts used the concept with respect to 
absolutely illegal but morally excusable (because resorted to in the view of 
self-preservation) cannibalism. Thus, moral cause does not render an otherwise 
illegal action legal (justification) but it may reduce the actor’s culpability 
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(mitigation). The mitigation argument was endorsed by a number of other 
scholars, referring to the ‘excusable breach approach’,408 ‘emergency exit 
approach’409 and ‘exceptional illegality approach’.410 Albeit intuitively 
plausible, the mitigation approach to the ‘illegal but justifiable’ action seems 
problematic in several respects. First, the conceptual difference between 
justification, excuse and mitigation is fuzzy in international law. All the three 
end up drawing heavily on moral justification. Second, the very formula 
‘illegal but justifiable’ assumes the rightfulness of the action, whereas excuse 
and mitigation are premised on the wrongfulness of the conduct. To claim that 
the action is morally justified and yet to subscribe to the mitigation argument 
is conceptually incongruent. It would be better then to speak of ‘illegal but 
excused’ or ‘illegal but mitigated’ conduct.411 But such qualifications would 
not capture the essence of the international reaction to the Kosovo’s 
intervention, which implied the rightfulness (moral necessity) of such action. 
Notably, the 2001 Articles on State Responsibility define necessity as a ground 
precluding wrongfulness, rather than a ground for excusing or softening 
culpability.412 
Thus, the ‘illegal but justifiable’ formula is based on the doctrine of 
justification, meaning that the action in question is ‘almost legal’, that is ‘only 
a thin red line separates […] [the] action […] from international legality’.413 In 
other words, legitimacy may render technically illegal but morally imperative 
action legal. To claim otherwise is to ‘bring the law into disrepute’.414 Indeed, 
the debate on the so-called ‘right to revolution’ oscillates between 
considerations of legality and legitimacy. It is widely accepted that whilst the 
positive foundations of this ‘right’ are rather dubious, its moral standing based 
on the long philosophical pedigree in both Western and Eastern traditions is 
undeniable. It flows from the notion of human dignity and international 
principles embodied in the human rights instruments; its existence is 
presupposed by the very fact of possessing human rights. It is ‘a right to have 
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rights’, to use the wording of Hannah Arendt, in the sense that people claiming 
rights must also dispose of means of their vindication. Otherwise such rights 
are merely rights of the rightness and therefore a void or a ‘mere 
abstraction’.415 Because the global enforcement of human rights is still 
underdeveloped (Kosovo being rather an exception to the global pattern of 
inaction in the face of abhorrent humanitarian crises) the bottom-up remedial 
violence against governmental oppression is indispensable416 if human rights 
are not to be dismissed as an empty rhetoric. Hence, revolution is not a human 
right in and of itself but an individual right sui generis, whose recognition is 
justified by the need to secure other (more conventional) rights. Thus, 
revolution as a right or mechanism of self-defence lacks solid legal ground and 
is yet morally legitimate. Hence, the concept of ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
A close examination of the philosophical and normative foundations of 
revolution shows that it is not a human right in and of itself but constitutes a 
right sui generis under international law. It is, therefore, a second-order right 
whose derivative nature flows from a set of internationally recognised human 
rights, such as the right to democracy, the right of self-determination and the 
right to an effective remedy. It also draws significant normative support from 
the concept of self-defence and the principle ubi ius, ubi remedium. Moreover, 
the permissibility of revolution is enhanced by the fact that whenever it makes 
it to the level of an armed conflict, it becomes legitimate belligerency to whom 
the whole array of IHL is applicable. Such status of a second-tier right does 
not make the right to revolution ineffective or less significant than other, more 
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conventional, rights. As international practice shows, individuals can have 
rights under international law without every such right amounting to a human 
right.417 It simply implies that the right in question assumes a distinct social 
and political function, which is the maximisation of the enjoyment of human 
rights rather than securing a specific objective value. Moreover, the right to 
revolution involves a more complicated balancing process because by virtue 
of elevating violence to the level of a permissible action in furtherance of 
humanitarian cause, the right may excessively interfere with the enjoyment of 
other (human) rights and even turn out to be destructive thereof. The 
complexity of such balancing is not only evident in the high stakes in terms of 
human rights restrictions but also in the fact that it involves a wide stratum of 
second-tier ethical rules determining legitimacy of violence, which are going 
to be considered in detail in the following sections. Ultimately, because the sui 
generis character of the right to revolution does not fit neatly within the black-
and-white approach to legal doctrine, which is traditionally framed in terms of 
law and non-law and is hostile to anything that falls in between, 
conceptualisation of revolution as ‘illegal but justifiable’ in line with the recent 
international practice aided in clarifying the exceptional nature of the right to 
revolution as the ultimate means of democracy enforcement. 
It is important to note, however, that recognising revolution as a remedy 
does not suggest legitimating just any form of non-state jus ad bellum violence 
as long as the cause is just. Some forms of violence are impermissible per se, 
such as arbitrary violence, cruelty and indiscriminate terror. Moreover, 
revolutionary recourse to violence is constrained by rules and principles of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law that 
circumscribe the permissible uses of force by the principles of necessity and 
proportionality. That said, sketching precise modalities for exercising the right 
to revolution as well as developing criteria to distinguish it from less deserved 
types of non-state use of force would not only strengthen the revolution’s still 
shaky position in international legal discourse but also support the claim that 
international law recognises the right to democracy and provides for the 
external and internal mechanisms of its defence and enforcement. These issues 
are analysed in the succeeding sections. 
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6.5. A Second-Tier Framework for ‘Illegal but 
Justifiable’ Revolution 
 
It is a common assertion within international legal circles that ‘one’s man 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’. In other words, what one views as 
terrorism, another can view as freedom-fighting. It means there is no clear 
distinction between persons fighting against oppression and those committing 
terrorist acts, since both categories of actors pursue certain political goals and 
employ violence. Such conceptual confusion is well illustrated by the fact that 
classic revolutions, such as the French and the American, often involved the 
resort to terrorism.418 A more recent example is the current Syrian crisis where 
President Assad in order to justify his violent crackdown on demonstrators 
asserted that ‘[n]o political dialogue or political activity can succeed while 
there are armed terrorist groups operating and spreading chaos and 
instability’.419 Similar label of terrorism is applied by Israel to portray 
Palestinian resistance to obscure confiscation of land and other restrictions on 
Palestinians. Importantly, this is against the backdrop of the UN’s 
acknowledgement of such resistance as a legitimate struggle against unlawful 
occupation of lands by Israel.420 By the same token, the freedom movement of 
Kashmir views itself as freedom fighters against illegal Indian occupation, 
whereas India continue to brand them as terrorists.421 Thus, the concept of 
‘terrorism’ is often used to describe revolutionary violence. Noteworthy, it is 
not only states who employ this conceptual ambiguity to their advantage, but 
also the most unsavoury non-state groups can avail themselves of the elasticity 
of the notion of revolution to style their crimes as resistance. The conceptual 
permeability between revolution and terrorism was also acknowledged by a 
host of scholars at the roundtable held under the aegis of the American Society 
of International Law in 2006 asserting that ‘[r]evolution (like terrorism) 
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appears to represent a moment of extraordinary force which stands outside or 
before the law’.422 
Such difficulty to draw a clear line between liberation movements and 
terrorist criminals has not only impeded the emergence of a legal definition of 
terrorism for almost a century, but also significantly undermined any efforts to 
incorporate the notion of revolution into a positive layer of international law. 
Because, the current state of international law makes no distinction whatsoever 
between the causes of different non-state actors and, hence, provides no 
guidance on what armed action is permissible, it leads to a paradoxical state of 
affairs, where the corpus of international human rights law (IHRL) is ever 
expanding and making itself felt in almost every aspect of international 
relations, but its enforcement dimension lags somewhat behind, rendering 
human rights, particularly the right to democracy, pretty much an empty 
rhetoric in the authoritarian part of the world. Groups fighting for democracy 
cause are abandoned to their fate because international law denies them 
international legal recognition ‘of the only action they can take to save 
themselves in extreme situation where nonviolent resistance leads to only more 
government atrocities and an international intervention is not forthcoming’.423 
The notion of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution, based on a principled setting 
of secondary regime of obligatory rules, introduces a novel framework within 
which one could reimagine such distinction. It is difficult to overstate the 
importance of such an exercise, since revolution as an internal mechanism of 
democracy defence will never be fully operative as long as there reigns a 
confusion as to whether a particular act of non-state violence is to be qualified 
as legitimate resistance or a less deserving case. This consideration is 
particularly relevant in the post-9/11 political milieu where it is much easier 
and less costly for states in terms of international acceptance to suppress 
opposition movements by applying the label ‘terrorism’.424 Moreover, such 
distinction would not only impede authoritarian governments from 
indiscriminately employing delegitimising terrorist rhetoric but would also 
encourage actors pursuing certain political cause to employ means that are 
more acceptable by the international community. Ultimately, a clear distinction 
between terrorist acts and acts of resistance would secure a better realisation 
of human rights, since states aware of the legitimate right of their citizens to 
resist, and violently if necessary, would be more prompted to fulfil their human 
rights obligations. As Saul has aptly observed, ‘[i]f international law is not to 
become complicit in oppression by criminalizing legitimate political 
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resistance, justifications for terrorist violence must be taken seriously by the 
law’.425 
Beyond the concrete ‘terrorists v freedom fighters’ dilemma, one should 
accept the shifting content and meaning of the term revolution and the role of 
political semantics in such conceptual fluctuation. ‘The term “revolution” 
becomes meta-historical, transcendental and applicable to all times and places, 
used to refer to a kind of “great leap” forward along the progressive line of 
human development’.426 In these senses, it represents a tool of salvation and 
emancipation at the hands of actors viewing themselves as subjugated and 
willing to change what they view as unjust. In order to meet demands for 
justice of the increasing number of people inspired by the globalisation and 
humanisation of the current international legal order, demands that imply only 
a limited restructuring of the incumbent government politics instead of the 
radical change of the political order akin to historical revolutionary 
movements, the concept of revolution seems to loose certain of its distinctive 
features, making itself even more vulnerable to serve selective political 
objectives. Even when a significant change is rhetorically sought, the practice 
of the twenty-first-century anti-constitutional changes of government dubbed 
as revolutions shows that the post-revolutionary environment is nevertheless 
often marked by structural continuities, which implies that the label 
‘revolution’ is increasingly employed strategically. In face of this, a subtle 
conceptual framework is vital in order to add shade and texture to otherwise 
highly amorphous concept. 
In what follows, the notion of ‘illegal but justified’ revolution is 
delineated through a prism of the second-order rules originating in the just war 
theory (JWT), such as legitimate cause, legitimate means, legitimate target and 
a set of legitimate conditions, including subsidiarity, legitimate authority and 
reasonable prospect of success. The notion of terrorism as the most acute 
constraining factor within any debate on the permissibility of non-state 
violence is taken as a contrasting example to facilitate the understanding of 
strengths and possible limits of the application of the just war criteria to the 
concept of revolution. Thus, before constructing a second-tier framework of 
differentiation between revolution and terrorism as a means of the delineation 
of conceptual boundaries of the notion of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution, 
the thesis will first look at the conceptual evolution of the notion of terrorism 
and sketch out its legal underpinnings. It is demonstrated that even though the 
notion of terrorism is not sufficient in itself to illuminate the limits of 
permissible action against the state, it provides an essential conceptual and 
legal basis for framing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
forms of non-state violence. In this sense, clarifying the dilemma of ‘terrorists 
v freedom fighters’ is asserted to be an inevitable step towards the delineation 
of the second-order framework for revolution as the most widespread form of 
modern freedom-fighting. However, because the notion of freedom-fighting 
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historically refers to a limited set of cases of anti-government resistance, 
namely struggles against colonial, alien and racial domination, other situations 
involving subjugated and oppressed people seemingly fall foul of freedom-
fighting. Against this backdrop, it is asserted that not only is revolution 
conceptually close to the notion of freedom-fighting, but also the revolutionary 
cause of defending democracy and human rights has come to enlarge the 
concept of freedom-fighting due to the evolving nature of the principle of self-
determination, which underpins both revolutionary and national liberation 
battles. This thesis eventually investigates the concept of the JWT, its legal 
status and applicability to non-state use of force to assert that the second-tier 
regime of the JWT is the most relevant normative setting for ‘illegal but 
justifiable’ revolution. It is concluded that whenever non-state violence abides 
by the aforementioned strata of secondary norms, it is by definition legitimate. 
 
6.5.1. Terrorism as an Illegitimate Form of Political Violence 
 
Because the phenomenon of terrorism represents the major constraining factor 
within any debate on permissibility of non-state use of force and the principle 
political obstacle militating against the legalisation of revolution as an ultimate 
means of defence against an oppressive regime, it is imperative to trace its 
conceptual evolution and legal underpinnings. Moreover, the examination of 
constitutive elements of the crime of terrorism, such as, e.g., purpose, means 
and target, as well as the extent to which they are codified in international law 
will aid in delineating crucial divergences vis-à-vis revolutions. 
The term ‘terrorism’ is one of the most slippery and abused terms in 
international relations. It is ideologically and politically loaded,427 
pejorative,428 emotive,429 capable to stigmatise and delegitimise,430 denigrate 
and dehumanise those at whom it is directed431 and the one which invokes 
moral, social and value judgment.432 To make matters worse, the term is highly 
imprecise, ambiguous and is said to ‘serve […] no operative legal purpose’.433 
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In as early as 2011, 250-plus various official and academic definitions of 
terrorism were identified.434 In the words of one scholar, ‘the search for a single 
definition has come to resemble the quest for the Holy Grail’.435 In view of the 
absence of a universally-agreed definition of terrorism, the ‘struggle over the 
representation of a violent act is a struggle over its legitimacy’,436 namely who 
is entitled to use violence, against whom and for what purposes. Because the 
disagreement over the definition of terrorism is rather political than technical, 
it is possible to generally sketch the contours of the definition. One of the most 
authoritative definitions is the 1988 academic consensus definition of 
terrorism. Noteworthy, this definition had been arrived at as an outcome of two 
rounds of questionnaire responses, whose results were published in the 1984 
and 1988 editions respectively of Schmidt et al’s research guide Political 
Terrorism. 
 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed 
by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal, or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to assassination — the 
direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human 
victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or 
selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and 
serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication 
process between terrorist (organisation), (imperilled) victims, and main 
targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a 
target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on 
whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.437 
 
This definition has received considerable acceptance both inside and outside 
academia438 and was eventually refined in 2011.439 Its main elements are: (1) 
dual character of the term ‘terrorism’; (2) threefold context; (3) perpetrator as 
a source or agent of violence; (4) political; (5) violent act; (6) threat-based 
communication; (7) differentiation between direct civilian victims and the 
ultimate target audience; (8) terror/fear/dread; (9) intent; (10) campaign.440 It 
is clear from the aforementioned that the academic definition of terrorism is 
quite specific on the paradigmatic characteristics of the terrorist violence 
which may serve as a useful yardstick in an attempt to draw up the distinction 
                                               
434 Alex P Schmidt, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ in Alex P Schmidt (ed), The Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research (Routledge 2011) 99-148. 
435 Omar Malik, Enough of the Definition of Terrorism (Royal Institute of International Affairs 
2000) xvii. 
436 Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (OUP 2006) 3. See also Michael V 
Bhatia, ‘Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent Actors’ (2006) 
26 TWQ 5, 13. 
437 Alex P Schmidt and others, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories, and Literature (2nd edn, Centre for International Affairs 1988) 28. 
438 See Alex P Schmidt, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ in Alex P Schmidt (ed), The Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research (Routledge 2011) 61. 
439 ibid 86-87 (This came to be known as a ‘revised academic consensus definition of terrorism’). 
440 ibid 76-83. 
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between this and revolutionary violence. Yet, it lacks legal authority in 
international law. As far as international law is concerned, a generally accepted 
comprehensive definition is still lacking, with only certain elements identified 
above having been agreed to constitute the crime of terrorism. Such ‘limited’ 
definition cannot provide a clear dividing line between terrorists and freedom 
fighters because it was intentionally designed to avoid such a sensitive issue. 
This merits a more detailed examination. 
The process of criminalisation of terrorism went through three phases: (1) 
codification of political crimes (1800s-1890s); (2) anti-anarchist legislation 
(1890s-1920s); and (3) international conventions on terrorism (1930s-
present).441 The final stage of the last epoch is the Global War on Terror 
                                               
441 The most important conventions (also called ‘sectoral’ treaties) are Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (adopted 16 November 1937, not in force) LN Doc 
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Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 
1992) 1678 UNTS 374; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection (adopted 1 March 1991, entered into force 21 June 1998) 2122 UNTS 359; 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted 9 December 
1994, entered into force 15 January 1999) 35457 UNTS 2051 (UN Personnel Convention); 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (adopted 15 December 
1997, entered into force 23 May 2001) 2149 UNTS 256 (Terrorist Bombings Convention) 
(converted the crimes from the previous conventions into terrorist offences by listing them in its 
Annex); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197 (Terrorist Financing 
Convention); International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(adopted 13 April 2005, entered into force 7 July 2007) 2445 UNTS 89; Draft Comprehensive 
Convention against International Terrorism, UN Doc A/59/894 (12 August 2005); Protocol to 
the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located 
on the Continental Shelf (adopted 14 October 2005, not yet in force) 
<https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Protocol%20Fixed%20Platforms%20EN.pdf> accessed 14 
October 2016; Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (adopted 14 October 2005, not yet in force) 
<https://www.unodc.org/tldb/en/2005_Protocol2Convention_Maritime%20Navigation.html> 
accessed 14 October 2016. 
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triggered by the 9/11 attacks on Twin Towers in New York.442 It is the third 
phase that constitutes the focus of this research. The distinctive feature of the 
majority of the anti-terrorism treaties is their delineation of specific activities 
as terrorist without creating a generic crime of terrorism — a so-called 
‘enumerated acts approach’.443 Any attempt to adopt the comprehensive 
definition failed because, inter alia,  some states supported the use of terrorism 
to advance political goals.444 Moreover, the UN’s commitment to self-
determination clouded its vision with respect to terrorism.445 Yet, a few of the 
treaties do mirror a more comprehensive approach to the definition of terrorism 
by prohibiting acts aimed to compel a third party ‘to do or abstain from doing 
any act’.446 Yet, the generic and imprecise wording of these conventions is an 
inevitable compromise with recently liberated states holding the position of 
solidarity in relation to national liberation movements.447 The 1999 Terrorist 
Financing Convention comes closest to delineating an essential definition of 
terrorism. It prohibits the financing of: 
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446 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (adopted 17 December 1979, 
entered into force 3 June 1983) 1316 UNTS 205 (Hostage-Taking Convention) art 1(1); 
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (adopted 9 December 
1994, entered into force 15 January 1999) 35457 UNTS 2051 (UN Personnel Convention) art 
9(1)(c); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (adopted 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 221 (Safety 
of Maritime Navigation Convention), art 3(1)(b), (c) and (e); Protocol for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (adopted 
10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 1678 UNTS 374, art 2(2)(c); International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (adopted 13 April 2005, entered 
into force 7 July 2007) 2445 UNTS 89, art 9(d). 
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& Comp L Rev 23, 38. 
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Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or 
to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of 
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.448 
 
Considering the fact that it has attracted 188 ratifications as of December 2018, 
its definition of terrorism remains one of the most influential and framed a 
basis for the negotiations of the draft Comprehensive Convention against 
International Terrorism (CCIT) definition. Whilst most articles of the draft 
Comprehensive Convention have been completed, finalisation is held up by, 
among others, the question of definition. As of autumn 2018, the following 
informal text of article 2 exists with regard to definition: 
 
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention 
if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:  
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or  
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public 
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an 
infrastructure facility or to the environment; or  
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 
1(b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; 
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do 
or to abstain from doing any act.449 
 
Hence, the common feature of the terrorism conventions laying down the 
essential elements of terrorism is the requirement that the prohibited act be 
committed to intimidate or compel certain persons and actors to do or refrain 
from doing any act. Thus, coercion is an underlying motive: ‘[O]rdinary 
offences […] become terrorist because of the motivations of the offender’.450 
What lies behind coercion, that is an emotion prompting an act, such as a 
specific ideological or political belief, is immaterial. Yet, when it comes to the 
‘terrorists v freedoms fighters’ puzzle, this definition is meaningless as it lumps 
together terrorist activities and struggles for freedom, since both types of 
violence imply coercion. This is unacceptable for states, predominantly of the 
Arab world, making use of terroristic tactics for their own political ends: on 
the one hand, general criminalisation of terrorism is an important tool of 
                                               
448 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted 9 
December 1999, entered into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197 (Terrorist Financing 
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449 Draft Comprehensive Convention against International Terrorism, UN Doc A/59/894 (12 
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maintaining internal sovereignty, on the other hand, watering down this 
definition so that it would not encompass terrorist groups they sponsor is an 
equally crucial objective.451 
This double-edge-sword approach is clearly visible in some regional 
treaties containing contradictory exclusion clauses. For instance, article 2(a) of 
the 1998 Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism states: ‘All cases 
of struggle by whatever means, including armed struggle, against foreign 
occupation and aggression for liberation and self-determination, in accordance 
with the principles of international law, shall not be regarded as an offence’.452 
Similar provision features in the 1999 OIC Convention on Combating 
International Terrorism: ‘Peoples struggle including armed struggle against 
foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at 
liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of 
international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime’.453 Paradoxically, in 
both conventions these exclusions co-exist with a more general requirement 
that the ‘motives or intentions/purposes’ behind the prohibited acts are 
irrelevant to their terrorist character.454 Finally, the 1999 OAU Convention 
                                               
451 Boaz Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’ 
(2002) 3 PPR 287, 288. For an overview of states’ concerns in relation to the comprehensive 
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453 Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
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7 May 1999) art 1(2) <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf> accessed 
14 October 2016 (Defining terrorism as ‘any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or 
purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing 
terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in 
danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or 
property or to occupy or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource’) (emphasis 
added); Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International 
Terrorism (adopted 1 July 1999, entered into force 7 November 2002) art 1(2) <http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/convenion/terrorism_convention.htm> accessed 14 October 2016 (‘“Terrorism” 
means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated 
to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or 
threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or 
exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying 
or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the 
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elucidates that ‘the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the 
principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, 
including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and 
domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts’.455 
Similarly to the Arab League and OIC Conventions, it includes a disclaimer 
stating that ‘[p]olitical, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or 
other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act’.456 This 
is reiterated in the 2004 Protocol to the Convention.457 Importantly, such 
exclusion clauses are omitted in the regional instruments of the Americas and 
Europe.458 Thus, whilst regional treaties on terrorism provide for more 
elaborated definitions of terrorism than their international counterparts, by 
combing both generic and enumerated approaches, these definitions vary 
significantly and well reflect fundamental disagreements about the 
permissibility and classification of political violence. 
Because the means of effecting terrorism are ever-evolving, the sectoral 
approach to the definition of terrorism has been recognised as severely limited 
and the interest remains to agree on a generic definition of terrorism. The 
adoption of the CCIT is one such possibility, the other being the inclusion of 
the crime of terrorism within the Rome Statute of the ICC.459 Apart from treaty 
law, it is increasingly suggested that prohibition of terrorism, or at least of 
certain terrorist acts, has become a norm of customary international law.460 This 
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international concern’). However, the Final Act of the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
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is evidenced by adoption of various international and regional anti-terrorism 
conventions, UNGA resolutions and criminalisation of terrorism in numerous 
national laws containing largely similar definitions of the offence. As the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has observed, there is ‘a settled practice 
concerning the punishment of acts of terrorism’ and ‘this practice is evidence 
of a belief of States that the punishment of terrorism responds to a social 
necessity (opinio necessitatis) and is hence rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule requiring it (opinio juris)’.461 However, objections to such a 
hasty conclusion are also aplenty.462 Ultimately, some terrorist acts may fall 
under the definition of other international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide or torture, if they contain the elements of these 
crimes.463 Yet, the question whether the prohibition of terrorism is a treaty 
norm or a customary rule is not pertinent considering the fact that the 
comprehensive definition of terrorism is still lacking. The main bone of 
contention in disputes on the comprehensive definition is whether freedom 
fighters engaged in national liberation struggles can be classified as terrorists. 
As long as agreement on this issue is missing, no consent on the (legal) notion 
of terrorism is ever to evolve. If this state of affairs is not remedied, the status 
of revolution as a legitimate form of political violence will continue to remain 
in the state of legal limbo, not to mention the negative impact of such 
ambiguity on the counter-terrorism measures. Thus, even though the concept 
of terrorism alone is only of limited significance for elucidating the legal 
dimension of revolution, it may be taken as a useful starting point to build the 
distinction between virtuous and non-virtuous types of political violence. In 
this sense, resolving the enigma of ‘terrorists v freedom fighters’ is an essential 
step towards the ascertainment of revolution’s extraordinary standing in 
international law. 
Yet, before drawing a principled framework of ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution based on the differentiation between deserved and undeserved types 
of non-state violence, one has to investigate the link between revolution and 
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freedom-fighting — a link which all too often seems to be taken as a given 
within scholarly circles. 
 
6.5.2. Revolution as a Modern Form of Freedom-Fighting 
 
While a lot of effort has been put into an attempt to delineate the concept of 
terrorism, freedom-fighting has escaped such profiling. The term ‘freedom-
fighting’ has been commonly used interchangeably with ‘national liberation 
movements’, ‘wars of national liberation’, ‘resistance against foreign 
occupation’, ‘guerrilla warfare’ and ‘self-determination movements’. In this 
sense, freedom-fighting is a political struggle by a people against the 
established government to achieve self-determination. Whilst struggles of this 
type have been led since the foundation of the sovereign state system, the lion 
share of such conflicts occurred in post-colonial Africa in the second half of 
the twentieth century.464 Their distinctive feature is the use of non-state armed 
force to challenge the established government. National liberation movements 
view such resort to force as a ‘just war’, as legitimate exercise of a right to 
revolution in the name of self-determination.465 Thus, freedom-fighting is a 
revolutionary struggle aimed to advance self-determination. Its other central 
features are mass popular support and defensive character. Freedom 
movements are not the activities of small groups of isolated individuals but 
peoples’ movements ‘seeking freedom, independence, and/or autonomy from 
what are perceived as oppressive and usually “alien” regimes’.466 They are, in 
the words of Taber, struggles of ‘rebellious nations against foreign invaders or 
the ruling classes of their society, of exploited against exploiters, of the 
governed against the governors’.467 They are invariably defensive responses to 
oppression and ethnocide (suppression of culture through forced assimilation), 
which can also be driven by aspirations for a different and more just order. 
Thus, such set of common characteristics as violent action, mass support, 
defensive nature and anti-government orientation approximate the concept of 
freedom-fighting with the notion of revolution. In fact, both concepts can be 
generically designated as resistance against oppression. Such conceptual 
mergence is, for example, clearly visible in the definition of a ‘freedom fighter’ 
given by the Oxford dictionary, which designates him as ‘[a] person who takes 
part in a revolutionary struggle to achieve a political goal, especially in order 
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to overthrow their government’.468 Indeed, it is clear from the definition that 
the concepts of ‘freedom-fighting’ and ‘revolution’ are treated synonymously. 
Yet, the notion of freedom-fighting also embraces certain characteristics 
which revolution may or may not have. Whereas both types of resistance 
revolve around the ideas of freedom and self-determination, the latter two are 
accommodated differently within their underlying causes. In fact, freedom 
movements are more often than not nationalist movements seeking first greater 
autonomy and evolving over time into full-scale independence movements.469 
This means that they do not only stand against a government they regard 
oppressive but also against the whole, so to say, ‘alien’ state, including the 
large portion of its population with whom they do not share a sentiment of 
patriotism and national belonging. Indeed, in the terminology of international 
law, freedom-fighting, or more commonly ‘national liberation movement’, 
refers to an organisation struggling by force of arms against colonial, alien or 
racist domination.470 Revolutions, in their turn, typically lack this nationalistic 
and ethnic-based perspective and target specifically oppressive regimes 
without invoking territorial claims. In addition, freedom as self-determination 
is perceived differently by freedom fighters and revolutionaries. Whereas for 
the former, freedom is fully achieved in national independence (freedom from 
foreign rule), for the latter, freedom is attained in the establishment of 
democratic rights and civil liberties for the individual (freedom to personal 
development, equality and empowerment). Finally, legal standing of national 
liberation movements is more or less settled in international law, whereas legal 
status of revolution is still in search of a doctrine. The above discussion seems 
to suggest that freedom-fighting and revolution are distinct modes of resistance 
and cannot be conflated. 
Yet, this thesis suggests that revolution is a modern variation of freedom-
fighting precipitated by changes in dynamics of contemporary conflicts and 
the evolving concept of self-determination. This is not to say that traditional 
causes of freedom fighting, such as fight against colonial domination, alien 
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occupation and racist regimes, are not invoked in the post-colonial context (the 
most prominent example being the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which is 
internationally recognised as a legitimate struggle for national liberation 
against foreign occupation and was granted the permanent observer status in 
the UN) but that they are less frequent and are bound to disappear in the near 
future.471 Instead, revolutionary causes, such as defence of individual liberty 
through the establishment of democracy and protection of human rights, are 
more prominent and continue to expand the conceptual limits of the notion of 
freedom-fighting.472 This development is an inevitable consequence of the 
progressively widening scope of the concept of self-determination 
underpinning both traditional liberation struggles and revolutions. Because the 
decolonisation process did not bring the desired self-determination of peoples, 
with many ethnic groups being locked in multi-ethnic states, who are, in turn, 
unwilling to account for the interests of their ethnic communities, the principle 
of self-determination has acquired a new, internal, dimension which includes 
the right of people to free determination of their political status and free 
pursuance of their economic, social and cultural development473 but within the 
borders of an existing state. People’s struggles for the above-enlisted causes 
underpin modern revolutions. 
However, one may legitimately object to the view that revolutionary 
struggles are self-determination struggles properly so called. The concept of 
self-determination is traditionally grounded on the ethnic-based understanding 
of ‘people’ as a unit of self-determination, whereas people engaged in 
revolutionary struggles are, as indicated above, bound together by certain non-
ethnonatural characteristics, such as common cause (to defend democracy and 
human rights). Indeed, article 1 of the UN human rights covenants provides 
that ‘all peoples have the right of self-determination’. This implies that not 
every population has this right; solely peoples do. According to the historical 
account of this issue, ‘peoples’ are only the indigenous populations of the 
territories of Asia, Africa and elsewhere that were colonised by Western 
European powers in the period from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries.474 
Under the law of decolonisation, such peoples possess an inherent right to free 
themselves from the yoke of colonialism and establish independent states, 
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including by the means of armed force. Such situations are now commonly 
treated as wars of national liberation and collectivities waging such wars as 
national liberation movements, or freedom fighters. Departing from this 
restrictive view was in the opinion of many equivalent to bringing chaos to 
international relations. However, with the collapse of communism, it was 
accepted that not only unjustly conquered populations had the right to free 
themselves from colonial domination but also a broader spectre of ‘people’ not 
confined to historical colonies could exercise such right, including the states 
of the Soviet bloc which broke the chains of communist domination and 
claimed independence. However, the rapid transformation of the doctrine of 
self-determination did not stop there. Gradually, the notion of ‘people’ has 
broadened even further to incorporate subjugated ethnic groups appealing to 
ethnicity bonding as a justification for their separation from the parent state. 
This came to be known as the nationalist view of self-determination.475 Akin 
to the historical account, the nationalist view is likewise ethnic-centred: the 
populations and nations are peoples defined by some sort of ethnic minority 
status with respect to the dominant population. 
Despite the considerable support of the nationalist conception in 
diplomatic practice and scholarly community, it is increasingly acknowledged 
that the nationalist and more generally ethnicity-based view on self-
determination is inadequate because it fails to provide for consistent and 
exhaustive criteria designating ‘a people’ and is in tension with the democratic 
exigencies of the principle itself. Moreover, the principle of self-determination 
viewed through the ethnicity spectacles is dangerous because instead of the 
promised emancipation it easily leads to exclusion, discrimination, ethnic 
conflict and even genocide.476 Premised on certain romantic notion of popular 
sovereignty, the appeal to national self-determination is bound to be raised 
whenever one views one’s ethnic divergence (race, religion, language or 
culture) as a ground for affirming the existence of foreign domination — 
whether real or imaginary. As one scholar observed, ‘[i]f the exercise of this 
right [to self-determination] is only limited to ethnic groups — who have to be 
different from the rest of the population of the state — then a very dangerous 
thing can occur: they will try to prove that they are indeed different. In order 
to do that they will construct a national hallucination’.477 These challenges 
have well been exposed in the host of recent ethnicity-based tensions and 
conflicts, including Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque regions, the South Ossetia, 
Kosovo, Scotland and Ukraine, where ethnicity, religion and language were 
advanced as sufficient justifications for groups to secede from the parent states. 
Considering these and other difficulties, recent interpretations of self-
determination have distanced themselves from nationalism. Such 
                                               
475 Fernando R Teson, ‘Introduction: The Conundrum of Self-Determination’ in Fernando R 
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238. 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 320 
interpretations are increasingly based on non-ethnic criteria of peoples 
invoking self-determination, such as a shared sentiment of justice and 
collectively experienced wrong inflicted by the parent state (e.g., the doctrine 
of remedial secession),478 and focus on non-territorial means of achieving self-
determination (e.g., the doctrine of internal self-determination).479 In this 
configuration, self-determination is recognised whenever a state is unjustly 
oppressing its citizens and massively and sustainably violating their human 
rights irrespective of their race, religion or language. Hence, peoplehood 
ceases to be the basis for self-determination, injustice is. This implies that the 
‘self’ of the principle of self-determination does not exist in any absolute sense 
to whom the right to self-determination would unproblematically appertain, 
but such ‘self’ only belongs to people who decide to constitute themselves as 
such by virtue of sharing a common aspiration to self-determine,480 triggered 
by the injustices they encountered. People are, thus, no longer defined in ethnic 
(objective) terms but in political (subjective) terms, that is instead of searching 
for a set of pre-defined and incontrovertible objective features, such as 
language, religion and ethnicity, one has to look at the subjective element of 
the notion of people, which is a shared belief among members of the 
collectivity that they constitute a distinctive political unit. Such non-ethnic 
approach to self-determination is also, to a certain degree, supported by Walzer 
who views the use of force as one of the prerequisites of a people entitled to 
self-determination. He opines that ‘[t]he mere appeal to the principle of self-
determination isn’t enough; evidence must be provided that a community 
actually exists whose members are committed to independence and ready and 
able to determine the conditions of their own existence. Hence the need for 
political or military struggle sustained over time’.481 He further states that 
‘communities which do not fight are not entitled to self-determination, for, 
actually, they are not genuine communities at all’.482 In this sense, the ability 
of peoples to group together and organise themselves militarily illustrates their 
wish to self-determine and even their ability to organise politically. 
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Such a broadened conception of self-determination seems to accommodate 
revolutionary struggles as remedial struggles based on non-territorial claims. 
In this sense, revolution is the only remedy available to people, united by a 
common perception of injustice, to end oppression and reinstate freedom. It is 
a freedom struggle against subjugation and intimidation from within, not from 
without. It is a freedom-fighting against internal enemy (authoritarianism) akin 
to the historical freedom-fighting waged against external enemy (colonialism). 
To claim that revolution is a (internal) form of realisation of self-determination 
is not only to do away with a biased assumption that only groups that are 
externally viewed as sufficiently ‘stable’, ‘authentic’ or ‘sustainable’ are 
privileged to be entitled to self-determine483 but also to return to the original 
meaning of self-determination as a freedom to lead one’s life in one’s own 
terms.484 
That the right of armed revolution derives from the principle of self-
determination has been recognised by a host of scholars.485 Illustratively, Paust 
observed, ‘[t]oday, the right of revolution is an important international precept 
and a part of available strategies for the assurance both of the authority of the 
people as the lawful basis of any government and of the process of national 
self-determination’.486 Similarly, Simma et al asserted that ‘[t]he right of self-
determination supports in its essence any people fighting in its majority for 
democratic institutions of government […] In a sense, it is coming back to its 
roots as a principle in support of revolutionary change’.487 Ultimately, Nahlawi 
and Marie affirmed that revolution represents the execution of an internal self-
determination claim against oppression and dictatorship.488 Moreover, state 
practice of recognition of revolutionary movements either in toto, as in 
Ukraine, or partially as legitimate representatives of a people, as in Libya and 
Syria, because the pre-revolutionary government lost legitimacy, because 
peoples aspirations were legitimate and because the opposition group was 
representative, broad and enjoyed a reasonable prospect of permanence is not 
substantively different from national liberation movement’s recognition.489 
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This too speaks in favour of the close conceptual proximity between traditional 
wars of national liberation and contemporary revolutionary struggles. 
From all the foregoing, it is clear that apart from battles against colonial 
domination, alien occupation and racist regimes, the concept of freedom-
fighting has broadened to include other self-determination causes, such as fight 
against systemic and systematic violations of human rights and government 
oppression. In other words, revolutionary struggles for democracy and human 
rights constitute a modern variation of freedom-fighting. 
 
6.5.3. Delineating the Second-Tier Framework for ‘Illegal but 
Justifiable’ Revolution by Reference to the Just War Theory 
 
As have been previously ascertained, international practice evidences that 
legitimacy is an essential element of international law. Because both the 
substantive conception of legitimacy and global constitutionalism have similar 
objectives, namely promotion of flexibility of legal argument and law’s 
effective response to global challenges, global constitutionalism provides for 
the most suitable theoretical framework for incorporating the substantive 
legitimacy rationale, which is, in turn, based on an idea that when adhering to 
the letter of law would lead to the morally abhorrent outcomes, the violation 
of the fundamental norm of international law is only justified when carried out 
in observance with a stratum of secondary norms.490 Thus, the actor appealing 
to the legitimacy rationale is only freed from first-order legal constraints and 
is to adhere to second-order rules. If such violation of a first-tier norm involves 
recourse to violence, the reference is typically made to the second-tier 
principles of the just war theory (JWT),491 most of which either constitute 
customary international law or have been widely codified in international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of the use of force.492 The impact of these 
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490 The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, 
International Response, Lessons Learned (OUP 2000) 163-98. 
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principles is also felt in other (emerging) areas of international law, such as, 
for example, post-conflict settlement and reconstruction. 
The IIC on Kosovo in its memorable verdict that the NATO military 
intervention in Kosovo was ‘illegal but legitimate’ because ‘all diplomatic 
avenues had been exhausted’, ‘because the intervention had the effect of 
liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression 
under Serbian rule’493 and because the NATO ‘adhered to principles of 
discrimination, proportionality and necessity’494 evidenced that a set of just 
war principles was invoked to justify the otherwise unlawful intervention. The 
Commission called them ‘threshold principles that must be satisfied in order 
for any claim of humanitarian intervention to be legitimate’.495 As Tony Blair 
himself acknowledged, the war in Kosovo ‘is a just war, based not on any 
territorial ambitions but on values’.496 Prior to this, the Danish Institute of 
International Affairs suggested five ‘possible criteria’ for legitimate use of 
force for humanitarian cause, which were used by the IIC for elaborating its 
own principled framework for legitimate intervention. These largely 
incorporated ideas of the JWT, including legitimate cause, legitimate means 
and legitimate authority.497 Similarly, in a 2001 report on responsibility to 
protect, the recently-established Canadian-sponsored International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identified a set of 
‘precautionary criteria’ for justified military intervention for human protection 
purposes, including just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, 
proportional means and reasonable prospect.498 Whilst the Commission 
acknowledged the uncertainty as to legal status of the principles concerned, it 
accepted their robust ethical importance in situations where the gap between 
legality and legitimacy reached unacceptable dimensions. By the same token, 
the elements of the JWT have been incorporated into the 2004 report by the 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan arguing that the SC should consider ‘five 
criteria of legitimacy’ when contemplating military intervention, such as 
seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proportional means and 
balance of consequences.499 
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The importance of the ethical principles in the debate on legitimacy of 
controversial conduct has also been underscored by a number of scholars. For 
instance, Falk insisted that ‘claims of legitimacy should be implemented only 
in exceptional circumstances, and then within a framework of principled 
restraint’.500 He further maintained that ‘whenever the [legal] straitjacket is 
loosened in response to moral and functional imperatives, the resulting 
behaviour continues to be constrained by secondary rules’.501 Likewise, 
Honore claimed in the context of the right of resistance that ‘given certain 
conditions, there is indeed a right to rebel, a right which has some claim to a 
recognised place in international law and political morality’.502 The recent 
works by Megret and Marsavelski are even more pronounced on the second-
tier setting for revolution stating that a set of just war principles is to be 
followed if revolutionary force is to be recognised legitimate and, thus, distinct 
from other less benevolent forms of non-state violence.503 It follows that the 
legitimacy of the formula ‘illegal but legitimate’ is predicated upon the 
adherence to a set of second-tier rules, which derive from the JWT. Applied to 
revolutionary violence, it follows that the right to ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution is only activated when primary human rights are abridged 
(legitimate cause) and other channels of action are not effective or non-existent 
(last resort). Moreover, in order to claim legitimacy revolutionary violence 
shall abide by relevant norms of international law (legitimate means) and be 
carried out in the interests of the people and with their support (legitimate 
authority). In other words, the just war principles constitute a framework of 
second-order legal constraints adherence to which legitimises the violation of 
first-order legal constraints. 
Before turning to a closer examination of the principles of the just war 
tradition in the context of the right to revolution, it is worth pausing to consider 
the legal significance of this doctrine in modern international law and its 
applicability to non-state use of force. The just war tradition is a broad concept 
that developed and evolved over centuries and comprises a plurality of just war 
theories and sub-traditions — secular, divine, legal, moral etc. — which share 
three common factors: (1) there should be restrictions on the resort to war as 
well as the conduct of war; (2) they all derive from Western philosophical 
traditions; (3) they all crystallised over a set of principles seeking to regulate 
the resort to war, or jus ad bellum (just cause, right authority, right intention, 
proportionality of ends, last resort, reasonable prospect of success), the conduct 
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of war, or jus in bello (proportionality of means, noncombatant immunity, 
necessity), and, increasingly, the cessation of war, or jus post bellum (right 
vindication, elimination of unjust gains, punishment, demilitarisation and 
political rehabilitation).504 Importantly, the range and content of these 
principles are constantly in flux, some become obsolete whereas others emerge 
or change their scope, and there is no consensus within the scholarly 
community on their exact ramifications and regulative role. Yet, given their 
long historical pedigree, universal reach and solid philosophical 
underpinnings, these principles exert a strong (moral) impact within any legal 
debate on the legitimacy of violence, whether in state-versus-state context or 
non-state-versus-state context. 
Illustratively, the fulfilment of the UN’s stated purpose ‘to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war’, ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights’ and ‘to ensure […] that the armed force shall not be used, save in the 
common interest’505 is dependent on the ethical paradigm (of the JWT) for 
making morally legitimate decisions whenever violence is concerned. 
Moreover, one of the primary purposes of the UN is to ‘take effective collective 
measures’ in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security ‘in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law’.506 The 
inclusion of justice in this provision supports the idea that the UN Charter can 
be viewed as an instrument for the implementation of the just war. In other 
words, the so-called ‘neo-just war doctrine’ — an altered version of the 
original JWT limited to defensive causes — provides an intellectual basis for 
the operation of the UN. As Claude observed, with the creation of the UN 
‘came the development of secular replacements for the ecclesiastical 
accoutrements of the medieval just war doctrine: […] the United Nations 
serves as church, the secretary-general as Pope, and the doctrine of collective 
security as theological creed of the twentieth-century community of saints that 
is sometimes known as the multistate system’.507 Moreover, the large portion 
of the just war principles has been codified in the major subject areas of 
international law (IHL and the law on the use of force) as well as have been 
crystallised into customary international law. Whilst this by no means suggests 
that the just war principles now per se constitute a part of positive international 
law (unless the principle attained the status of a treaty or customary law), they 
do imply that in situations where the gap between what legality requires and 
what morality ordains reaches unacceptable dimensions, violations of the first-
order rules can be justified if committed in adherence to the second-tier ethical 
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constraints. This evidences the revival of the medieval just war thinking in the 
twenty-first century508 — an empirical affirmation of the substantive 
legitimacy thesis’s progressive punch. 
Albeit historically the JWT has been dominated by statists, on a purely 
ethical level, the application of the doctrine to non-state actors seems 
unproblematic considering the fact that it predates the advent of the modern 
state system, which was only institutionalised in the seventeenth century. 
However, the traditional legal doctrine of statehood entailing that states hold a 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their territories509 seemingly 
imposes legal constraints on the applicability of the JWT to non-state entities. 
Legitimisation of groups standing in violent opposition to states would imply, 
inter alia, the illegitimacy of state, an erosion of state authority, or the 
legitimacy of using force against the state. Yet, a set of contemporary legal 
norms enshrined in, for example, the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions and the two 1966 Covenants (the right to self-determination) 
suggest that non-state movements can have certain rights and obligations 
appertaining to the use of force. Because having certain rights and obligations 
under international law is distinct from possessing international legal 
personality, legitimising limited patters of non-state violence does not 
jeopardise the notion of statehood. Indeed, if states may employ ‘violence 
strategically for political ends on a regular basis — to maintain public order 
and national security’ and such violence is ordinarily considered lawful, ‘the 
possibility must remain that some forms of political violence can be justifiable, 
and thereby escape condemnation as “terrorism”.’510 The gist of the JWT is, 
hence, to delineate the criteria of justifiability of violence irrespective of the 
type and/or status of the actor. 
Thus, while it is now established that the JWT can be applied to non-state 
violence, it is still unclear whether it is equally applicable to violence not 
attaining the level of an armed conflict or violence which is (deliberately) 
characterised as falling short of war, which is often the case with revolution 
and terrorism. Since, the nature of conflict has dramatically changed since the 
end of World War II, where traditional wars waged between nations employing 
conventional forces have been increasingly substituted by so-called 
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‘asymmetric conflicts’, in which the notion of combatants is ever more 
attenuated, it is fair to suggest that such conflicts should fall within the purview 
of the just war principles, even if the JWT has to revise some of its premises 
to accommodate such conflicts. As Whitman observes, ‘JWT possesses the 
necessary conceptual tools to deal with whatever changes in global politics and 
war-fighting methods demanded in these allegedly new circumstances’. For 
him , ‘[t]o abandon […] a system of moral and legal norms that has been built 
up over more than a thousand years, and painstakingly codified into 
international law over several hundred years’ would be ‘extremely 
shortsighted’.511 This notwithstanding, it is commonly asserted that stretching 
the boundaries of ‘war’, so that war encapsulates a wider quantum of incidents, 
may result in actual sanctioning of more killings and destruction because the 
JWT is precisely designed to deal with situations of war and its requirements 
of proportionality, discrimination and necessity are less effective in protecting 
life than the laws of peace, such as IHRL. The importance of this point is 
obvious. However, the difficulty lies in the fact that the judgement on whether 
a certain incident of violence can be characterised as war lies primarily on 
states and is more often than not negative. Consequently, one is either to accept 
that revolutionary force is always war or to apply different frameworks with 
respect to war-like revolutions and revolutions falling short of armed conflicts. 
The second approach is preferred in this work. It means that whilst the core 
principles of the JWT are applicable in both traditional warfare and asymmetric 
conflicts as long as armed force is concerned, the particularities of, and legal 
grounds for, their application come from different normative frameworks: the 
laws of war with respect to the former and the laws of peace to the latter. All 
in all, the pertinence of the JWT to the debate on revolution qua legitimate 
violence as opposed to terrorism is hard to overestimate, particularly 
considering the fact that most of its core principles have found their way into 
positive international law. 
It is perhaps worth noting here that an attempt to justify non-state political 
violence through the recourse to the just war principles is not novel as such.512 
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Yet, the principal contribution of the present work is the development of solid 
theoretical foundations for such an enterprise based on the evolving concept of 
legitimacy in international law. Thus, the significance of the present 
framework for ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution is that it is not merely morally-
laden as is often the case with the existing literature on the subject but is also 
situated within the appropriate limits of legal discourse. In what follows, the 
principled second-tier framework for ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution is 
constructed against the backdrop of the concept of terrorism, as the most 
prominent illegitimate form of political violence, and by reference to such just 
war principles as legitimate cause, legitimate means, legitimate target as well 
as a set of legitimate conditions, such as subsidiarity, legitimate authority and 
reasonable prospect of success. The central claim of this section is that 
revolution is ‘illegal but justifiable’ whenever it is undertaken in defence of 
human rights (legitimate cause), abides by the relevant norms of international 
law (legitimate means), targets representatives of oppressive regime 
(legitimate target), is exercised as a means of last resort (subsidiarity) and 
represents aspirations of the majority of population (legitimate authority). 
 
6.5.3.1. Legitimate Cause 
 
According to the JWT, war should only be fought against aggressors, whether 
in self-defence or in furtherance of human rights.513 Thus, self-defence and 
defence of others are the key grounds for the justification of war. Because 
motive remains a paradigmatic feature of terrorism, it is fair to suggest that the 
main criterion to distinguish acts of terrorism from acts of legitimate struggles 
for freedom is the underlying motive, or cause. Whereas terrorists’ principal 
intent is to incite a state of terror in the mind of some persons, the overriding 
rationale of freedom fighters is self-defence against governmental abuse and 
vindication of human rights. In other words, whereas terrorism is a tactic, 
‘freedom-fighting’ is the justification. 
One may, however, legitimately object by stating that terrorist’s cause is 
also political and can similarly be wrapped in the mantle of self-defence and 
freedom against oppression. As Derrida has astutely noted, ‘[e]very terrorist in 
the world claims to be responding in self-defence to a prior terrorism on the 
part of the state, one that simply went by other names and covered itself with 
all sorts of more or less credible justifications’.514 Be this as it may, the key 
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distinction is that the legitimacy of such cause (second-order motive) is 
overshadowed by the illegitimacy of the immediate intent to seriously 
intimidate a population (first-order motive). In this sense, the immediate intent 
to inflict violence as the means to a greater end, has become an end in itself. 
Another possibility would be to regard the first-order motive, or terror, as 
means and the second-order motive, or freedom, as a goal. Because legitimate 
goal cannot justify illegitimate means, the overall cause is illegitimate. 
Moreover, the legitimacy of goal is also dubious since ‘[t]errorists usually 
aren’t fighting for anyone’s freedom. Instead, they’re usually fighting for their 
own chance to be tyrants, hence their disregard even for the lives of the people 
they may claim to be “liberating”.’515 
Yet, there is a danger in viewing motive as the preponderant criterion for 
distinguishing terrorists from freedom fighters. It is all too often the case that 
parties to an armed conflict, particularly those involving armed groups fighting 
against government forces, commit acts with a view to compel a government 
to do or to refrain from doing any act. Thus, as long as IHL is concerned, acts 
that are lawful according to the laws of war cannot be criminalised as terrorist 
irrespective of their cause.516 To put it slightly differently, because IHL already 
prohibits most acts that would be considered ‘terrorist’ if committed in 
peacetime it is untenable to speak about terrorism in armed conflict but solely 
about war crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave breaches of 
humanitarian law. It seems, thus, that the discussion about the distinction 
between terrorists and freedom fighters in times of war is redundant. This is 
confirmed by an approach of certain sectoral treaties on terrorism to explicitly 
exclude from their scope of application situations of armed conflict regulated 
by IHL.517 This notwithstanding, the treaty rules ‘show that acts can be both, 
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acts of war and at the same time terrorist acts’.518 Consider, for example, article 
33 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention which provides that ‘collective 
penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are 
prohibited’.519 Similarly, article 51(2) of the 1977 First Additional Protocol to 
the Geneva Conventions prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population’.520 To solve 
this conundrum, it has been suggested that only acts of terrorism aimed to 
spread terror among persons taking no active part in hostilities shall be 
considered as terrorist.521 Moreover, whenever there is conflict between 
terrorism conventions and IHL, it is possible to argue that IHL as the lex 
specialis trumps other conflicting norms. Importantly, the draft UN 
Comprehensive Convention supports this view: ‘The activities of armed forces 
during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international 
humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not governed by the 
present Convention’.522 
Because it is a well-established practice among states to refrain from 
characterising situations of internal unrest, such as revolutions, as armed 
conflicts precisely in order to avoid the application of the laws of war, it is 
more compelling to draw a distinction between terrorism and legitimate 
struggles against oppressive governments in times of peace. As Condorelli and 
Naqvi pointedly observed, ‘[i]t would be desirable that such an approach to a 
rule prohibiting terrorist acts, which forbids the act or threat of terror against 
the civilian population regardless of scale or motive, also influenced the 
attempts to define terrorism outside the domain of the jus in bello’.523 Yet, the 
traditional divide between western states that are opposed to any type of 
exception to the scope of the crime of terrorism dependent on the political 
cause of the perpetrator and countries of the Arab League, the OIC and the AU, 
which advocate for such an exception, can be regarded as the main obstacle to 
reaching an agreement on a common definition of terrorism and the criteria of 
its differentiation from freedom-fighting based on legitimate cause. 
This notwithstanding, international law has long embraced a certain core 
of grounds on which violence by non-state actors remains legitimate. One of 
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these is a so-called ‘right of self-defence’. Whilst it has been previously 
established that the status of the notion of personal self-defence is ambiguous 
in international law, political history reveals that humanity has always 
recognised that individuals should have the right to defend themselves from 
violence. It has been therefore suggested that the right in question is now a 
general principle of international law by virtue of its wide endorsement in all 
major legal and philosophical traditions as well as its direct acceptance in such 
paradigmatic branches of international law as the law of the use of force, the 
law of state responsibility and criminal law.524 That the principle of self-
defence is an essential element of common legal conscience was also 
confirmed in the context of the 2013-14 Ukrainian revolution, where a former 
head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church  Lyubomyr Guzar attested that 
the Euromaidan revolution is justifiable because under the ‘law of nature’ 
individual and every nation has a right to self-defence: ‘[O]ne may resort to 
arms when facing arms’.525 
In order for self-defence to be invoked, oppression should amount to 
substantial violations of internationally recognised human rights. However, if 
one accepts an idea that revolution is not only a part of international law but 
also transcends all domestic legal systems as a general principle of law, then 
serious and flagrant violations of domestic constitutions are also sufficient to 
justify revolution. Violations are substantial whenever they are continuous and 
affect peoples massively. The most obvious cases are genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing, since even international 
responsibility (to protect) is engaged when they are infringed.526 If the 
international community may claim a right to use military force in such 
extreme cases, it is logical to assume that victims of these atrocities can protect 
themselves by the same violent means. In fact, such bottom-up self-help is 
more efficient than international intervention because, apart from being 
people-based and empowering, it is more likely to arise immediately and in 
direct response to patterns of violence, it benefits from considerable knowledge 
of terrain and avoids making complex moral choices, such as who should be 
saved first and what degree of sacrifice is acceptable.527 Violations of human 
rights that do not reach the level of the above-mentioned crimes can also be 
                                               
524 See section 6.3.2. 
525 Lyubomyr Guzar, ‘Pravo na povstannya — to ye zakon pryrody’ Ukraina Moloda (10 January 
2011) <http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua/number/2395/180/85201/> accessed 30 June 2016. See 
also SP Pogrebnyak and EA Uvarova, ‘Soprotivlenie ugneteniyu. Povstanie. Revolyuciya 
(teoretiko-pravovoy analiz v svete doktriny prav cheloveka)’ [Resistance to Oppression. 
Rebellion. Revolution (Theoretical-legal Analysis in Light of the Doctrine of Human Rights] 
(2013) 2 Pravo i gromadyanske suspilstvo 4, 25. 
526 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para 139 (‘The international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of 
the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity’). 
527 Frederic Megret, ‘Beyond the “Salvation” Paradigm: Responsibility to Protect (Others) vs 
the Power of Protecting Oneself’ (2009) 40 Sec Dialogue 575, 584. 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 332 
regarded as substantial if they touch upon interests that ‘are felt to be crucial 
by […] the individual[s] who suffer […] from being deprived of them’,528 
perpetuated continuously and en masse. 
Another ground on which non-state violence can be justified is the 
principle of self-determination. The principle has developed around the notion 
of legitimate cause and its substantive scope is evolving continuously. Such 
traditional ‘just causes’ as struggles against colonial domination, alien 
occupation and racist regimes are being overtaken by more contemporary 
political struggles, such as for human rights and greater democracy.529 Violent 
resistance to sustained human rights violations can, thus, be regarded as the 
extreme realisation of internal self-determination.530 This view is rather 
contested531 but it finds support in the text of the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations,532 which is now commonly viewed as reflecting customary 
international law. Whilst the wording of the Declaration is aversive to the 
dismemberment of states, it is only so when the latter respect the principle of 
self-determination. If states act contrary to their people’s aspirations, they 
forfeit their right to (internal) sovereignty and territorial integrity in that ‘group 
which forms a unit of self-determination can resort to force to make good their 
right’.533 The Declaration further states that ‘[i]n their actions against, and 
resistance to, such forcible action [which deprives peoples of their right to self-
determination] in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, 
such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter’.534 In other words, the text of the 
Declaration seems to recognise the legitimacy of the cause of people acting 
forcibly (by means of revolution) against their governments in pursuit of their 
right to self-determination. This is reaffirmed in the UDHR, which 
characterises the lack of protection of human rights as a circumstance 
justifying rebellion: ‘[I]t is essential if man is not to be compelled to have 
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recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that 
human rights should be protected by the rule of law’.535 
One should also be reminded of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions, which extended the applicability of rules relating to international 
armed conflicts to situations that include people’s struggles in the name of self-
determination. In this sense, the legitimacy of cause (self-determination) is the 
ground for the full applicability of the laws of war, including a (privileged) 
combatant status, to the non-state use of force. To put more bluntly, the 
legitimacy of anti-governmental force can be recognised on the basis of the 
legitimacy of a cause.536 Interestingly, here one can see a conflation of jus ad 
bellum with jus in bello, since the motive behind a conflict is the criterion for 
the application of IHL. 
It follows that self-defence against state oppression and self-
determination struggles for human rights and democracy constitute legitimate 
causes justifying non-state violence, assuming that other criteria are met. 
 
6.5.3.2. Legitimate Means 
 
The second criterion imposed upon non-state actors employing violence is the 
legitimacy of means used. Violence that does not abide by certain standards is 
illegitimate by definition irrespective of the legitimacy of cause. To the extent 
that the violence attains the level of an armed conflict, IHL is applicable. There 
are certain guarantees in IHL with respect to non-state actors that imply the 
lawfulness, or, more precisely, the permissibility, of revolutionary violence if 
effectuated in conformity with international humanitarian norms. Importantly, 
whilst IHL is designed to serve neutral humanitarian purposes and not to confer 
legitimacy and/or legality upon actors taking part in hostilities,537 it provides 
humanitarian protection to warring parties by according to them a belligerent 
status, meaning that persons meeting the requisite criteria for designation as 
combatant will not be punished for legitimate acts of war. Thus, adherence to 
the laws of war implies that violence cannot as such be considered terroristic. 
That said, IHL explicitly confers a (privileged) combatant status to such 
warring non-state actors as members of a levée en masse538 and peoples 
‘fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’.539 It has been 
earlier ascertained that non-state use of force in furtherance of revolution falls 
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under the scope of article 1 of Geneva Protocol I (peoples fighting in the 
exercise of their right of self-determination) and, thus, a full array of the laws 
of war is applicable to revolutions making it to the level of an armed conflict.540 
Be that as it may, this does not strip liberation movements from an obligation 
to adhere to the minimum humanitarian standards of legitimate warfare. 
The most relevant principles of IHL regulating the means and methods of 
waging war are proportionality, distinction and military necessity. The 
principle of proportionality implies that the inflicted harm should be 
proportional to the goals sought, thus prohibiting destruction that goes beyond 
that which is required to achieve the military goal. It prohibits certain means 
and methods of warfare that cause unnecessary suffering to both combatants 
and noncombatants541 as well as prohibits the employment of certain weapons 
that cause unnecessary suffering.542 The principle of distinction, also known as 
the principle of noncombatant immunity, dictates that only combatants and 
‘legitimate military objectives’ may be deliberately targeted.543 Finally, the 
principle of military necessity provides that collaterally harming 
noncombatants can only be permissible if not inflicted intentionally and if 
reasonable precautions are taken to minimise the harm.544 Non-state use of 
force employed in adherence to these principles cannot by definition be 
terroristic. Whilst the adherence to the fundamental humanitarian principles 
does not indulge non-state warring groups with legitimacy, particularly 
considering the fact that there is no consensus on whether Protocol I is 
applicable to broader spectrum of wars than a strictly delineated set of causes, 
such as colonial domination, alien occupation and racist regimes, obeying IHL 
undeniably makes violence by such actors more legitimate than violence by 
those reneging upon such minimum requirements. As Ben Saul admitted, the 
universal application of Protocol I would exclude legitimate liberation 
movements from the scope of terrorism.545 
If the laws of war do not apply or states are unwilling to apply those does 
not necessarily suggest that violence arising outside of armed conflict is 
illegitimate because it would mean that international law paradoxically 
condones more rather than less violence by only recognising as legitimate 
struggles making it to the level of an armed conflict. It is unclear how the 
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legitimacy of means can be assessed in situations short of an international 
armed conflict. Of course, certain provisions of IHL can be drawn by analogy 
but their application to events such as revolutions is complicated by the fact 
that the latter’s principle goal is not to defeat an enemy but to uphold 
fundamental human rights against an oppressor. Needless to say, domestic law 
is largely irrelevant due to the fact that states are rather unwilling to codify by 
means of a statutory law situations in which law can be violated or the 
established constitutional order overthrown. Even less so are authoritarian 
states. Hence, recourse should be had to the international laws of peace, the 
most obvious framework being IHRL. 
Whilst IHRL is essentially aversive to violence, it recognises a need to 
balance between various human rights, that is restricting certain rights may be 
permissible, even necessary, in order to secure other rights. Such restrictions 
do not stand in conflict with the idea of a right but constitute pieces of the 
complex definition of the ‘positive legal right’.546 As McGoldrick noted, ‘the 
idea of limitations is based on the recognition that most human rights are not 
absolute but rather reflect a balance between individual and community 
interests’.547 In fact, states are justified to use violence against their subjects, 
up to killing them, if the interests of public order and/or national security so 
require. Moreover, individual violence can be justified in limited situations of 
self-defence and necessity under criminal law. As Ignatieff pointed out, 
‘human rights are not an ethic of quietism’,548 and in certain cases deprivations 
of life are justified, namely in self-defence, in combat and in law 
enforcement.549 Thus, assuming that the violence employed by non-state actors 
pursues legitimate cause and there must be some constraint on the means used 
even in the situations falling short of an armed conflict, one can draw an 
analogy with the provisions of IHRL imposing restrictions on the use of state 
violence (particularly considering the capability of states to derogate from 
certain human rights obligations in situations of national emergency) as well 
as international criminal law restrictions on the use of violence by individuals 
in self-defence and necessity. Since the latter regime has been extensively 
discussed in the context of revolution as self-defence,550 it is reasonable to 
focus on the IHRL framework only. 
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In IHRL, the legitimate encroachments upon human rights are allowed 
under two regimes: limitations and derogations. Whilst limitations are an 
inherent feature of IHRL aimed to balance individual interests with public 
goals, derogations are exceptional measures which are only allowed in 
extraordinary circumstances of national crisis and are of a temporary character. 
Limitations are either put into a general provision551 or are adjoined to 
individual articles.552 Their distinctive feature is a four-prong proportionality 
test: (1) whether the governmental action pursued legitimate aim, (2) whether 
the means employed was suitable, (3) whether the governmental action was 
necessary in democratic society and (4) whether the action in question was 
proportional to the goal sought.553 The institution of a state of emergency, in 
the meanwhile, allows a state to derogate from an existing (human rights) 
obligation to respond to what it perceives as a threat to its security and public 
order. It is enshrined in several human rights treaties and national laws, 
including constitutions. The proportionality test is also a crucial tenet of the 
regime of states of emergency. For instance, article 4 ICCPR lays down the 
rule that derogations may only be made to ‘the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation’.554 A similar test is envisaged in article 15 ECHR555, 
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United Nations’); African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, 
entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (ACHPR) art 27 (‘1. Every individual shall 
have duties towards his family and society, the State and other legally recognised communities 
and the international community. 2. The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest’). 
552 See eg European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 005 (ECHR) arts 8, 
9, 10 and 11. 
553 For a more detailed discussion, see Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 Colum J Transnat’l L 73, 77. 
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(adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 005 (ECHR) art 15(1) 
(‘In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
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article 27 ACHR556 and article 4 of the Arab Charter.557 Other elements of the 
derogations regime include: (1) a threshold of severity cause, (2) the obligation 
of notification, (3) the consistency of the derogation with other international 
obligations, (4) non-discrimination and (5) the protection of non-derogable 
rights.558 The regimes of limitations and derogations tend to overlap with many 
of the same legal principles applicable, such as, e.g., proportionality, necessity 
and non-discrimination. Applied to non-state actors, this would mean that the 
use of force should be strictly necessary and proportional to the goal sought 
and encroachments on the rights of others can only be allowed to the extent 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.559 The criterion of democratic society is 
the most complicated and includes a variety of factors in the different 
international and regional jurisdictions. The two key elements include 
requirements that any action affecting the full realisation of human rights 
serves a pressing social need and the reasons therefore are relevant and 
sufficient. 
Certainly, drawing an analogy between state and non-state violence may 
be deceptive and even aversive to some since non-state actors, unlike states, 
do not have a police force or a system of courts to ensure due process. 
Moreover, from a moral perspective, what distinguishes state violence, or in 
more appropriate terms ‘state enforcement’, from non-state violence is the 
former’s regularity and predictability. It means that it is rule-governed, and 
people are able to foresee when and in what quantities it would be applied to 
them. Non-state violence, on the other hand, is unpredictable and its 
employment is not legally circumscribed. Such a morally-laden distinction 
weighs against the possible justification of non-state violence even when 
constrains on state force are applied by analogy to non-state actors. However, 
the moral justification for the state monopoly to use force is theoretically based 
on its capability to protect human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, such 
monopoly has been historically accepted on a condition that individuals retain 
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their right to self-defence where state cannot do so. When state behaves 
arbitrarily by massively violating constitutionally guaranteed rights of its 
subjects, ‘the distinction between force and violence breaks down, and it 
becomes a matter of choice whether we speak of the violence of the state’s 
agents or the force of those who resist them’.560 To negate this inherent right of 
resistance is to pose a threat to the foundations of the Rechtsstaat.561 
The conceptual similarity between the state of emergency and personal 
self-defence (in criminal law) has also been underscored by the International 
Commission of Jurists, which suggested that ‘state of emergency is the 
counterpart in international law of self-defence in penal law’.562 The view that 
IHRL’s regimes of limitations and derogations can shed some light on the 
legitimacy of non-state violence in peacetime is enhanced by the fact that it is 
increasingly accepted that IHRL is directly binding on entities other than states 
even in situations falling short of an armed conflict.563 This position is well 
reflected in the statement by the Institut de Droit International: ‘To the extent 
that certain aspects of internal disturbances and tensions may not be covered 
by international humanitarian law, individuals remain under the protection of 
international law guaranteeing fundamental human rights. All parties are 
bound to respect fundamental rights under the scrutiny of the international 
community’.564 This is particularly imperative with respect to jus cogens 
norms.565 Hence, rebellion movements acting in self-defence against an 
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oppressive government are legitimate as long as they comply with basic 
provisions of IHL (obligations of total restraint) and IHRL (proportionality, 
necessity, respect for non-derogable rights and peremptory norms). Violations 
of the most fundamental provisions of humanitarian treaty and customary law 
as well as certain non-derogable human rights can hardly ever be justified by 
self-defence.566 
Terrorist violence by definition falls short of meeting the requirement of 
legitimate means because its underlying objective is to precisely use civilians’ 
suffering as a means to compel certain actors into a course of action they 
otherwise would not be likely to take. As Michael Walzer has pointedly 
maintained, ‘[r]andomness is the crucial feature of terrorist activities’.567 
Similarly, Schmidt observed that ‘[i]t is the wanton assault on civilians and 
non-combatants that provides much of the terror to terrorism’.568 In this sense, 
innocence of the victims of terrorism is not only irrelevant but is even a special 
incentive for targeting due to the conscience-shocking impact of such extra-
normal violence of the terrorist.569 However, it can be maintained that 
revolution does not fare better in this regard, since it implies violence, and all 
too often indiscriminate violence, which whilst directed against the sitting 
government and its supporters, quite often occasions innocent deaths and/or 
bodily injuries. Thus, whether violence is deliberate or unintentional but 
entirely predictable is of a limited moral significance.570 On a more theoretical 
level, it is untenable to speak about appropriate means to ‘wage’ revolutions 
because it is precisely the extra-legal, or more emphatically anti-legal, nature 
of the phenomenon in question that makes any application of the criterion of 
legitimate means meaningless. 
Yet, it is commonly acknowledged that revolutionary violence can never 
justify indiscriminate attacks, cruelty and grave human rights violations. It is 
constrained by fundamental principles of IHL and IHRL, including 
proportionality, distinction and necessity. Some authors argue that unless 
revolution reaches the level of an armed conflict when IHL is applicable, 
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collateral civilian casualties are absolutely prohibited.571 Otherwise such 
revolutionary acts are indistinguishable from terrorism. From an utilitarian 
perspective, revolutionaries that are ready to employ terrorism as a means of 
fighting an oppressive regime are likely to become oppressive themselves once 
they gain power.572 However, maintaining an absolute prohibition on civilian 
killings in time of revolution is untenable, particularly in light of the fact that 
many countries with colonial history owe their independence to employing 
such tactics against a superior military power,573 and should be weighed against 
other relevant issues including necessity and the ‘lesser evil’ doctrine. Thus, 
rebels may assert that the revolutionary use of force is the last resort for them 
to vindicate their right to freedom and democracy and, hence, killings 
(including civilian casualties) are not arbitrary but legitimate restriction on the 
right to life, aimed to attain a more valuable objective. They could similarly 
perceive themselves in supreme emergency which brings them under the rule 
of necessity, and necessity knows no rules. However, such arguments are 
equally applicable to terrorists and are not amenable to objective verification, 
unless one considers a possibility that revolutionaries do not target civilians 
intentionally but only incidentally or as collateral damage even if such violence 
is unjustifiably indiscriminate (the doctrine of double effect),574 whereas for 
terrorists such killings are a deliberate and opportunistic (the use of suffering 
as a means) fighting strategy. The words of Osama Bin Laden well reflect this 
subtlety: ‘We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far 
as we are concerned, they [Americans] are all targets’.575 However, such 
evaluations are inherently subjective and inevitably dependant on 
circumstances, political agendas and idiosyncrasies of the actors who make 
such judgments. One way to solve this uncertainty would be to acknowledge 
that sometimes revolutionaries may employ terrorist tactics and yet qualify as 
revolutionaries. In such case, after the revolution ceases, they may be held 
responsible solely for their ‘terrorist’ actions. However, this approach is 
relevant for allocating responsibilities in the post-revolutionary environment 
and does not solve the problem of distinction as such. It follows that violence 
employed in the course of revolution that goes beyond imposing direct harm 
on (oppressive) government and its agents is barely distinguishable from 
terrorism, regardless of the legitimate cause. Thus, more criteria are needed to 
solve the ambiguity between revolutionaries and terrorists. 
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6.5.3.3. Legitimate Target 
 
A third criterion, namely that of legitimate target, may be helpful in this regard. 
The most distinctive feature of revolution is that it is effectuated against an 
oppressive government, whereas terrorism can target both democracies and 
autocracies. In principle, non-state violence cannot be used in true democratic 
political systems because elections and other constitutional methods exist to 
ensure that political decisions are discussed and criticised in a peaceful manner. 
Thus, any politically motivated violence employed without recourse to 
peaceful channels available in democracies is roughly speaking illegitimate. 
Whilst the legitimate target thesis does not feature explicitly among the 
core principles of the JWT, its support can be found in the international practice 
condoning resistance to oppressive authoritarian governments by refusing to 
extradite political offenders.576 The practice emerged in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries with the rise of constitutionalism and democratic 
governments and entailed granting of immunity to individuals who committed 
a political offence in an enemy state. Since many (primarily Western) states 
were formed on ideals of democratic rebellion, they felt uneasy about 
extraditing individuals fighting for these very values.577 Thus, they invented 
the political offence exception to remove the application of extradition to 
persons fighting against political injustices. In the nineteenth century, the 
notion of the political offence exception was refined by redefining the qualifier 
‘political’. Whilst the precise definition has never been developed, the implicit 
requirement was that the political offender would be committed to the cause of 
democracy.578 Immediately after the political offence exception was formed it 
was established that terrorism would not be qualified as such and would 
constitute exception to the exception.579 
The idea that certain acts of violence are more legitimate than others in 
view of their target found its way to a recommendation on terrorism adopted 
in 2001 by the European Parliament, which states that there is a difference 
between ‘acts whose aim […] is to alter […] structures in States governed by 
the rule of law by actually threatening to use violence or resorting to violence, 
as distinct from acts of resistance […] against State structures which 
themselves employ terrorist methods’.580 The recommendation in fact suggests 
that violence against oppressive, or terrorist, states is more legitimate than 
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against those governed by the rule of law, or liberal democracies. The (positive) 
international responses to the so-called ‘democratic military coups’ — ‘benign’ 
coups d’état whose goal is to oust nondemocratic regimes and to bring about 
free and fair elections — in Turkey, Portugal, Algeria and more recently in 
Egypt also reflect this trend.581 In other words, international attitudes with 
respect to violence are inextricably linked with attitudes towards regimes 
against which the violence is employed. 
The term ‘terrorist state’ is relevant as far as non-state political violence 
that is directed against it cannot in principal be regarded as terrorism, provided 
that other conditions are met. However, the applicability of the term ‘terrorism’ 
to the actions of governments or states is a matter of contention and constitutes 
one of the major bones of uncertainty regarding the definition of terrorism. Yet, 
academic comments provide some useful guidelines. Schmidt describes 
terrorist state as ‘a form of rule by fear […] when a repressive and illegitimate 
political regime wants to enforce conformity, obedience and non-resistance 
through extra-legal terror’.582 Falk has observed in the context of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict that ‘[c]ollective punishment of a people subject to 
the exigencies of a military occupation with territorial ambitions is clearly as 
much a form of terrorism as reliance on suicide bombers to explode deadly 
ordinance in places where innocent civilians abound’.583 Primoratz adds that 
terrorist state is a state which employs terrorism in a sustained and systematic 
manner against its own population. Thus, degree of involvement in terrorism 
is crucial for designating state as terrorist.584 Indeed, the word ‘terrorism’ was 
originally used to designate the ‘Reign of Terror’ established by the Jacobin 
regime during the French revolution, that is to a particular case of state 
terrorism, and, thus, to claim that terrorism is only applicable to non-state 
actors is to demonstrate poor analysis. On top of that, it is crucial to note that 
democracies too have engaged in terrorism: consider, e.g., the cases of ‘terror 
bombing’ of Dresden and Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki where direct 
victims were deliberately civilians.585 
However, it is not enough to show that the state against which violence is 
employed may itself commit acts which amount to terrorism. As the saying 
goes, two wrongs do not make a right. Moreover, the practical usefulness of 
the criterion of legitimate target is complicated by the fact that there is no 
universally agreed definition of democracy. To complicate things even further, 
the emergence of hybrid regimes, manifesting institutional democratic 
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features, such as elections, but failing on more substantive characteristics, 
including genuine political participation and accountability, means that it is all 
too often close to impossible to identify the legitimate target and thus decide 
on whether non-state violence is justified or can be considered as terroristic. 
Consider, for example, a situation when a democratically elected government 
has become oppressive over the course of its mandate and the period until the 
next elections take place is too long to wait, not to mention the situations when 
the government in question abuses its constitutional powers to delay such 
elections. Should such government be considered as autocratic and violence 
against it justified? If so, when does such transition occur and who is to decide 
that it occurred and on the basis of what criteria? To make things worse, from 
a utilitarian perspective, it is morally legitimate to take violent action against a 
liberal democracy when such violence can ‘reasonably be expected to relieve 
a much greater quantity of harm and suffering than it causes’.586 Consequently, 
more indications are wanting in order to construct a working framework for 
‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution. 
Legitimate target can also be understood in terms of persons. Whereas 
terrorism primarily entails intentional targeting of civilians to produce shock 
and awe, freedom fighters only attack combatants. As Ganor asserted, ‘[t]he 
most important factor of the definition of terrorism […] is […] the deliberate 
attack aimed against civilians’.587 On his account, ‘[t]errorism exploits the 
relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly” — the tremendous anxiety, 
and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against civilian targets’.588 
Similarly, Netanyahu insisted that ‘[t]errorism is the deliberate and systematic 
assault on civilians’.589 National liberation and resistance to occupation entails 
instead targeting personnel or infrastructure that is directly responsible for the 
maintaining political oppression or occupation or provides the repressive 
regime or occupiers direct material support and political legitimacy. Thus, 
whilst the goals of terrorists and freedom fighters may well be identical, they 
are distinguished from each other by the targets of their operations. As one 
scholar has observed, ‘[t]here is no merit or exoneration in fighting for the 
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freedom of one population if in doing so you destroy the rights of another 
population’.590 
There is an important nexus between these two types of target: whilst 
civilians are direct victims of terrorist violence, governments are the ultimate 
targets. As Schmidt put it, ‘most victims of terrorism, while chosen as 
representative or symbolic targets of direct violence, are only secondary 
targets, mere props for the staging of a violent spectacle meant to influence the 
perception and behaviour of one or several other audiences — the ultimate 
targets in the macabre spectacle of terror’.591 Such differentiation between 
direct and ultimate targets lies at the very core of terrorism, as opposed to 
revolutionary violence. 
 
6.5.3.4. Legitimate Conditions 
 
Legitimate end, means and target fail to capture the entire spectrum of what 
might justify non-state use of force in international law. What still needs to be 
addressed is a certain nexus between these three elements. To this end, Frederic 
Megret suggested a so-called ‘legitimate conditions’ requirement to serve as a 
sort of glue between the three principal legitimacy criteria. These conditions 
include subsidiarity, proportionality, legitimate authority (representativity) and 
reasonable prospect of success.592 Noteworthy, the Canadian Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report on the responsibility to protect 
identified similar principles as ‘precautionary criteria’ for legitimate use of 
force. These include, inter alia, last resort, proportional means, right authority 
and reasonable prospect.593 Because proportionality is one of the essential 
elements of legitimate means, only three remaining conditions will be 
considered here. 
Subsidiarity implies that violence is legitimate if applied as last resort and 
all peaceful means to resolve the issue, including administrative, judicial and 
constitutional, have been exhausted. The preambular provision of the UDHR, 
that ‘it is essential if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should 
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be protected by the rule of law’,594 suggests such a last-resort and remedial 
nature of permissible violence. The condition of last resort is also widely 
accepted within the international scholarly community. As Macfarlane has 
observed, if a state ‘refuses to permit constitutional methods of protest and uses 
brute force, intimidation, and bloodshed to break up peaceful acts of non-
violent protest’, then ‘a prima facie case for the use of violence in support of a 
substantiated rejection of political obligation can be made’.595 Similarly, 
Honore claimed that ‘[t]he right of rebellion should be conditioned on the 
exhaustion of nonviolent remedies’.596 More emphatically, Lackey insisted that 
‘[i]f the just cause might be achieved by other means that have not been 
attempted, then war for that just cause is not just war’.597 
Thus, a revolutionary movement must show that it has made every effort 
to pursue nonviolent options before resorting to armed force, which may 
include political negotiations, appeals to human rights mechanisms, civil 
disobedience, pleas to the international community etc. Only if these peaceful 
options failed, especially if they were brutally repressed, may violent campaign 
be considered. Terrorism does not meet this condition because, as a rule, it is 
not occasioned by political failure but is an informed and conscientious choice 
made by individuals and/or groups without even considering other options. As 
Fotion has submitted, terrorism does not meet the criterion of subsidiarity 
‘because it is very difficult to show convincingly that there is no other less 
painful way to get the revolutionary job done’.598 If it does meet the criterion 
then its terrorist nature should be reconsidered. For example, it has been said 
with respect to so-called ‘terrorist’ tactics by the African National Congress 
(ANC) in South Africa that: ‘The armed actions of the long-suffering victims 
came after a long search for political solutions, which were entirely foreclosed 
by the apartheid system. The ANC adopted violent means only after 48 years 
of fruitless negotiations with various South African governments’.599 Similarly 
the Terrorist Fraction of the ‘Narodnaya Volya’ resorted to ‘terror’ as ‘the only 
possible weapon available to it in the circumstances of Russia’s autocratic 
tyranny’ because it ‘robbed them of “any possibility of exerting an influence 
peacefully and in a cultured manner on the life of society”’.600 Thus, albeit the 
two cases of resort to violence were dubbed as terrorist, they in fact exhibit 
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legitimacy by meeting the condition of subsidiarity. Whilst it is true that the 
mere absence of other ways of attaining a certain goal cannot automatically 
render violence legitimate, it definitely makes such violence more legitimate 
than the one committed without any attempt to seek peaceful channels. 
Needless to say, ascertaining whether freedom fighters engaged in violent 
struggle actually met the condition of subsidiarity is not an easy task and 
should be weighed against an empirically-based evidence that undemocratic 
regimes can be more successfully challenged using non-violent resistance.601 
Nonviolent resistance is more effective because it sets lower physical, moral 
and informational barriers for participation, which, in turn, ensures mass 
involvement on a scale that violent campaigns cannot. Moreover, nonviolent 
resistance is more likely to gather international support.602 Violent armed 
resistance, on the other hand, occasions disruption and havoc, which 
compromises considerably the successful achievement of the political goal 
sought. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest that this criterion is extremely 
challenging to meet, if at all, and thus no violence can be justified on its basis. 
On the other hand, if the governing regime seeks to suppress pro-democracy 
movement by way of mass atrocities, nonviolent campaign becomes 
meaningless since it is not the undemocratic nature of the regime as such which 
is challenged but its criminal policy of unjustified repression and murder. 
A second crucial condition for distinguishing between terrorism and 
revolution is that of legitimate authority. In order for non-state groups to be 
acknowledged as pursuing legitimate cause, which is a goal to achieve certain 
public good, such as democracy and human rights, they have to show that they 
represent the aspirations of the majority of population. In words of Paust, ‘the 
right of revolution is in the nation as a whole and is not a right of some minority 
of an identifiable people’.603 Thus, representativeness yields legitimacy to 
authority claiming to act on behalf of people. However, in the contemporary 
legal doctrine legitimate authority is understood to lie solely with states, which 
means that only states can legitimately engage in conflict. Such state’s 
monopoly on violence is considered necessary to maintain global peace and 
order. However, it is widely accepted that many authoritarian states do not 
represent interests of their people and cannot, thus, claim legitimacy.604 It 
follows that if legitimacy can be denied to some states, it is logical to assume 
that legitimacy of some non-state actors can be upheld. As Thomson has 
astutely pointed out: ‘[I]f a revolutionary organization fighting against a 
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tyrannical government manages to command the support of most of the people, 
it has a far better claim to be a legitimate authority than does their state’.605 The 
pertinence of this claim is also evidenced by the international recognition of 
rebel governments in Syria and Libya as the legitimate representatives of their 
peoples, not to mention the PLO in Palestine, which was granted observer 
status by the UN in 1975. In addition, the very idea of the right to self-
determination is based on an assumption that it can be carried out by non-state 
entities. Because revolution represents the extreme form of internal self-
determination, people engaging in revolution can claim legitimate authority 
provided that they act against illegitimate government and represent the 
interests of the majority of the population. Ergo, legitimate authority should be 
understood not as an abstract quality appertaining solely to states in view of 
their special moral standing as guardians of peace, order and human rights but 
as a representativity, that is whether the body fighting the war is authorised to 
do so by the polity it represents.606 In fact, the common point on which most 
terrorist movements fail is that they claim to speak in the name of populations 
that have never granted them a mandate. ‘This makes many terrorist groups 
little more than totalitarian boutiques, catering to their own fanaticism rather 
than popular grievances’.607  
However, it is possible to envisage situations when popular resistance does 
not necessarily enjoy the majority support because people are unaware of the 
need of revolution due to the deceptive official propaganda and are, thus, 
unable to make an informed choice or they may be unable to manifest their 
support due to severe political oppression. In such cases it would be enough 
for a resistance movement to show that they are acting in true interests of the 
people and they reasonably believe that the majority of citizens would support 
the revolutionary violence if they were aware of the relevant circumstances or 
had possibility to express their approval.608 Ultimately, representativeness 
implies certain internal democratic organisation within an entity claiming 
legitimate authority, such as possibility of minimal participation and 
deliberation. It is too a point on which most terrorist movements fail since their 
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external violence is replicated in their internal structure, which is often 
‘tyrannical, if not cultish’.609 
The last condition which should be present for a revolutionary movement 
to claim legitimacy and, hence, detach itself from terrorism is arguably 
reasonable prospect of success. The idea is widely cited with respect to 
legitimacy of non-state use of force and implies that violence which 
exemplifies a poor political judgment and does not envisage even a minuscule 
plausibility of success is normatively unjustifiable since it will cause more 
harm than good it claims to achieve.610 It is, nonetheless, rather doubtful 
whether the requirement of reasonable prospect of success can serve as an 
effective criterion of legitimacy of political violence. Applied to terrorist 
violence, it is widely acknowledged that terrorism is in general politically 
ineffective, entails futile acts of mass violence and has hardly ever achieved 
national liberation611 and, hence, falls foul of this criterion. However, it can 
fairly be asserted that achieving even a partial goal (attacking international 
attention or gaining political concessions from their adversaries), what 
terrorists have more often succeeded in, may be enough to justify political 
violence. Similar considerations are also applicable to revolution. As 
Kaufmann observed, ‘resistance which appears at the outset completely 
hopeless and therefore meaningless is not legitimate’.612 Similarly, Orford 
speculated that the only legitimate rebellion is a successful one.613 To accept 
the idea that the legitimacy of revolution is tied to its success is to essentially 
altogether deny that there is a right to revolution, since on this view revolution 
is only permissible unless the oppressive government has institutionalised its 
dictatorship to such an extent that any prospect of success is close to non-
existent. However, if such dictatorship is not absolute and leaves certain legal 
space for peaceful resistance then such avenues should be utilised first and 
revolutionary forces would fall foul of the consideration of subsidiarity.614 This 
would lead to an unfortunate conclusion that any violence that is ‘hopeless’ can 
be designated as unjustifiable. Not only does this condition set too low a 
threshold for qualifying violence as illegitimate but it also insights greater 
violence: force should be either overwhelming to secure the legitimate aims or 
should be avoided entirely. Another problem with the requirement of 
reasonable prospect of success is its post-facto application, namely the 
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legitimacy of revolution can only be assessed afterwards, leaving the ongoing 
revolutionary violence in a sort of legal limbo. Moreover, the evaluation of the 
outcome of the revolution does not occur immediately after it ceases but may 
take years, even decades, considering also the fact that certain legal and 
political reforms need not only changes in legislation but also in mentality and 
culture to be fully implemented. As Marsavelski eloquently stated, if state is 
compared to a living organism, ‘revolutions are like medical surgeries and so 
is their outcome: usually, it is going to get worse before it gets better. If the 
condition does not improve, the physician is not automatically responsible for 
medical malpractice if he acted in accordance with the medical rules’.615 It 
follows that the criterion of reasonable success is of no practical significance 
for the task of sketching a framework of justifiable revolution. 
 
6.5.4. Conclusion 
 
It has been established that the notion of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution is 
based on the second-tier framework of ethical principles rooted in the JWT, 
which include legitimate cause, legitimate means, legitimate target and a set of 
legitimate conditions, such as subsidiarity, legitimate authority and reasonable 
prospect of success. The phenomenon of terrorism as the most prominent and 
deeply studied example of illegitimate political non-state violence has been 
used as an opposing premise against which the framework for justifiable use 
of force could be comprehensively defended. The relevance of the JWT for 
clarifying the content and modus operandi of the concept of ‘illegal but 
justifiable’ revolution has been affirmed on three grounds. First, the ethical 
framework of the just war tradition, albeit not constituting the positive layer of 
norms of international law on the whole (only certain just war principles have 
been codified into treaty law or acquired a status of customary law and only in 
limited context, such as in the law of the use of inter-state force and IHL), is 
acknowledged to exert a strong intellectual and moral influence within any 
debate on legitimacy of political violence. Its reinvigoration is triggered by the 
increasing invocation of the substantive legitimacy rationale in international 
relations in order to account for situations where the divide between what law 
requires and what morality ordains is insurmountable and where maintaining 
the prohibition on violence is as important as permitting justice in individual 
cases. It is further asserted that international practice as well as scholarly 
opinions exhibit strong signs of endorsement of the just war framework for 
‘illegal but justifiable’ use of force. Second, it is demonstrated that the JWT’s 
core principles are applicable to non-state actors, such as revolutionaries, 
because the just war tradition historically predates states, because international 
law increasingly vests non-state actors with rights and obligations appertaining 
to the use of force and because such applicability does not contradict the 
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doctrine of statehood, since modern conceptualisation of state as Rechtsstaat 
implies that state retains its monopoly on the use of force as long as it is capable 
of guaranteeing its subjects fundamental rights and freedoms. Ultimately, just 
war principles were shown to be applicable to political violence not attaining 
the level of an armed conflict on either factual or legal grounds due to the fact 
that the changing nature of the conflict waters down the notion of combatancy. 
It is concluded that revolution is ‘illegal but justifiable’ when it is staged 
in response to gross and sustainable human rights violations, including the 
violation of the right to democracy, is undertaken in adherence to the relevant 
norms of international law, such as IHL and IHRL, targets persons and 
property representing and/or supporting oppressive regime, is carried out as a 
measure of last resort and represents aspirations of the majority of population. 
This is not, however, to say that the application of these second-order ethical 
principles now fully resolves the unusual sui generis status of the right to 
revolution and modalities of its exercise. These principles are rather general 
and, hence, incapable of capturing all the particularities and local specificities 
of peoples’ struggles for freedom, which sometimes leads to the blurring of 
conceptual boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate political violence. 
The case of Nelson Mandela’s ANC, where revolutionary violence 
incorporated terrorist tactics but was eventually recognised as legitimate by the 
international community, is but one prominent example.616 
All in all, albeit the second-tier framework for ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution based on the JWT might appear as lacking sufficient clarity and 
legal robustness by virtue of being too abstract and normative (prescriptive) to 
serve as a clear guide for action, it introduces additional avenues for debate 
over controversial conduct and provides a setting of more controlled criteria 
for the interpretation of first-tier legal rules with a view of adapting those to 
changing circumstances. Its virtue of providing a flexible alternative to 
context-isolated binary assessments having no options other than ‘legal’ or 
‘illegal’ outweighs on balance the costs. To affirm exceptional legitimacy of 
political violence in furtherance of revolution is not only to generally recognise 
that the very existence of human rights plainly depends on the possibility of 
(violent) resistance in cases of their sustained and mass violations but also to 
accept the specific claim of this thesis, namely that revolution is an ultimate 
measure of democracy defence, constituting an essential element of the 
enforcement dimension of the democratic entitlement. 
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In order to test this hitherto rather theoretical suggestion, it is imperative 
to have a look at state practice in response to the twenty-first-century major 
democratically inspired upheavals, which have exerted a significant impact not 
only on the international political layout and modalities of inter-state 
interactions but also on the international legal theory, touching upon such 
fundamental issues as state legitimacy, recognition of states and governments 
and the doctrine of effectiveness. This suggests that the concept of revolution 
is gradually affirming its position in international law but in a rather peculiar 
fashion. The following sections analyse these issues in more details. 
 
6.6. The 21-Century Revolutions as an Evidence of the 
Acceptance of the Right to Revolution 
 
It has been established that the right to revolution has come to enrich the 
normative corpus of international law. However, the bizarre sui generis status 
of revolution, albeit somewhat clarified by the reference to the legitimacy 
rationale, is still largely an academic artefact lacking solid evidence of state 
practice. This state of affairs is about to change or, to put more precisely, is 
already undergoing a fine change. Particularly after the revolutions in North 
Africa and the Middle East in 2010-12 and in Ukraine in 2013-14, the 
responses of the international community have ardently shaken the classical 
view of revolutions as a fait accompli, considered to be beyond the bounds of 
the law. Not only have revolutions been recognised as giving rise to full-grown 
legal consequences, such as non-recognition of governments and state leaders 
against which revolutions were directed, but also as a measure for achieving 
legitimate aspirations of people, one of which is democracy. In this sense, 
revolutions have been endorsed as tools of democracy promotion and 
democracy defence. Overview and analysis of state practice with respect to the 
afore-mentioned democratic revolutions can aid in ascertaining whether there 
is now a customary norm of defending democracy by revolutionary means. To 
identify such customary norm is to provide an important empirical evidence of 
the enforcement dimension of the democratic entitlement thesis developed in 
this work. 
 
6.6.1. The Arab Spring 
 
The ‘Arab Spring’, also known as ‘Arab Awakening’ and ‘Arab Uprisings’,617 
is a socio-political phenomenon that took place in North Africa in late 2010 
with the aftershocks still felt in Syria. The Tunisian street vendor’s self-
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immolation in protest of police corruption and abuse of power sparked protests 
in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, which brought down the Tunisian 
government. The success of the Tunisian upheaval led to a wave of similar 
protests and demonstrations in Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and 
Libya, developed into a civil war in Syria and shook Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
Kuwait and Lebanon. By the end of February 2012, regimes had been forced 
from power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen whilst civil uprisings and 
military repression are still ongoing in Syria.618 
Since the collapse of the communism in the early 1990s, the political 
earthquake generated by Arab uprisings is of such a magnitude that it is viewed 
as ‘the world’s first true human rights revolution’.619 It involved over seventeen 
Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, with an overall 
population of over 300 million people. Whilst it is not an easy task to delineate 
a common thread behind the Arab events due to the varying local trajectories, 
one can nonetheless identify following factors that triggered the protests: 
authoritarian regimes, lack of transparency and representation, corruption, 
nepotism and cronyism.620 As one scholar suggested, Arab uprisings were a 
‘culmination of a century of Arab popular struggle for freedom and 
sovereignty’.621 Revolting citizens spoke the language of human rights and 
democracy in their struggle against internal aggression of their autocratic 
governments. Thus, the lack of democracy was one of the primary triggers of 
the revolutions throughout the Arab world. 
Faced with these pro-democratic revolutions, the responses of the 
international community ranged from a total inaction in certain cases like 
Yemen and Bahrain, limited response in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria to the 
military intervention in Libya. This work will restrict itself to examining the 
cases of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria because these are the cases where the 
most extensive international action was taken in support of the people 
exercising their right to revolution. 
 
6.6.1.1. Tunisia 
 
In the Arab Spring, the popular uprising in Tunisia is ‘case zero’.622 The 
country-wide protests that commenced in late 2010 forced Tunisia’s dictator 
of 23 years, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, to surrender power and leave 
the country. Facing the growing magnitude of the uprisings and the President’s 
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eventual call for repressive measures, senior military officers refused to obey 
Ben Ali’s order to turn their guns on protesters and decided that he would have 
to leave. He eventually boarded a plane heading to Saudi Arabia. 
Ben Ali was only the second president of Tunisia after it gained 
independence from France in 1956. He acquired his office by means of a 1987 
constitutional coup against Habib Bourguiba, the first president of Tunisia. 
Whilst he claimed to assume the role of liberaliser and facilitator of Tunisia’s 
democratic transition, he in actual fact installed a full-fledged autocratic 
regime characterised by a neopatrimonial form of governance.623 
The 2010 uprising was sparked by a 26-year old fruit vendor, Mohamed 
Bouazizi, setting himself on fire in central Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on 17 
December 2010 as sign of protest against local police ill-treatment. This tiny 
act of despair unleashed a powerful wave of popular protests in Sidi Bouzid 
calling for socio-economic and political reforms. When the social unrest 
reached the country-wide dimensions, protesters demanded the ouster of Ben 
Ali and instalment of more representative governmental institutions. The 
turning point occurred when protesters filled the street of the Tunisian capital, 
Tunis. Confronted with the largest demonstration in the history of Tunisia, Ben 
Ali finally fled the country. The demonstrations ended on 27 February 2011 
when the key figures of the Ben Ali regime resigned their posts. On 23 October 
2011, Tunisians voted for the members to a Constituent Assembly charged 
with rewriting of Tunisian Constitution. On 22 December 2014, Mohamed Beji 
Caid Essebsi was elected as Tunisia’s president in the country’s first free and 
direct presidential elections.624 
The international reactions to the Tunisian revolution, albeit belated, were 
generally supportive of the Tunisian people’s right to express their views by 
means of protest. For instance, the UN Secretary-General expressed concern 
about violence against peaceful protesters and supported the establishment of 
an inclusive interim government.625 Moreover, he confirmed ‘the commitment 
of the United Nations to stand with the people of Tunisia […] and work to 
preserve the gains of the revolution’.626 Likewise, the head of the Arab League, 
Amr Moussa, claimed that ‘[t]he Arab citizen entered an unprecedented state 
of anger and frustration’. He called for an Arab ‘renaissance’ to alleviate this 
frustration.627 The EU and US echoed this position. Catherine Ashton, the EU 
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chief diplomat, and Stefan Fule, the enlargement commissioner, said in a joint 
statement: ‘We want to express our support and recognition to the Tunisian 
people and their democratic aspirations, which should be achieved in a 
peaceful way’. They also expressed their engagement with Tunisian people 
and willingness to help find democratic solutions to the crisis.628 In January 
2011, the European External Action Service (EEAS) deployed a senior 
officials’ mission to Tunisia in order to provide ‘political, legal, technical and 
material support to the democratic transition’ in the country.629 On top of that, 
the EU instituted sanctions against Ben Ali’s regime for the misappropriation 
of Tunisian state funds.630 By the same token, the US Assistant Secretary 
Jeffrey Feltman expressed the USA’s support for ‘Tunisia’s democratic 
transition’ and the commitment to aid Tunisia to chart a course ‘toward greater 
political and social freedoms’ and to achieve ‘transparent, credible and timely 
elections’.631 Similar notes of support were individually given by such states 
as France, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, Qatar, Morocco, 
Philippines, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Egypt and Sudan.632 
 
6.6.1.2. Egypt 
 
Revolutionary spirit of Tunisian uprisings was rapidly picked by Egyptian 
people unsatisfied with police brutality, state-of-emergency laws, lack of free 
elections and freedom of speech, corruption, rising inequality and poverty. 
Anti-government protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and consisted of 
demonstrations, marches, riots, non-violent civil disobedience and strikes. 
Regardless numerous attempts of the Mubarak’s regime to halt the protests by 
eliminating the national internet access and employing security forces, the 
number of protestors continued to increase and in three days it attained over 
tens of thousands demonstrating in Egypt’s major cities, with the number 
rapidly rising to hundreds of thousands (many claimed that the toll reached 
400,000).633 Whilst the protests began as largely non-violent, this came to 
change in response to circumstances. The documented cases of violence 
included burning down the ruling party’s headquarters, throwing stones to the 
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attackers, setting fire to police stations and vehicles and attacking the interior 
ministry. Violent clashes between the Mubarak’s forces and protesters resulted 
in over 800 peopled being killed and over six thousand injured.634 
In response to a situation going out of control, Mubarak dissolved his 
government and appointed a new vice-president. Moreover, he facilitated the 
formation of a new government and pledged not to seek re-election in the next 
presidential elections. Yet, Mubarak’s actions did not quell the dissent and on 
11 February 2011, Vice-President Omar Suleiman handed over power to 
military forces, which, in turn, suspended the constitution, dissolved the 
parliament and announced their intent to rule until the next elections. Mubarak 
was put to trial on charges of complicity in the murder of protesters but 
eventually released.635 Parliamentary elections were consequently held from 
November 2011 to February 2012 and presidential elections in June 2012, the 
latter ending with Mohamed Morsi’s victory of 51,73% of total votes. He 
became the first democratically elected president of Egypt. 
International response to the uprising was similar to that in Tunisia. 
International and regional organisations as well as a large number of mostly 
Western European and North American states supported the protestors’ call for 
political change and condemned the use of violence against demonstrators. 
They urged the Egyptian government to respect human rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly and called for transition process. To illustrate, the UN 
Secretary-General commended ‘the people of Egypt for the peaceful, 
courageous and orderly manner in which they have exercised their legitimate 
rights’ and called on ‘transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the 
Egyptian people and includes free, fair and credible elections’.636 To assist the 
transition, the UN Department of Political Affairs dispatched electoral offices 
to provide electoral support and advice during the 2011-12 elections.637 
Similarly, the AU PSC expressed unequivocal support of the protestors and 
noted: 
 
[T]he deep aspirations of the Egyptian people, especially its youth, to change 
and the opening of the political space in order to be able to democratically 
designate institutions that are truly representative and respectful of freedoms 
and human rights; [and] expresse[d] AU solidarity with the Egyptian people 
whose desire for democracy is consistent with the relevant instruments of the 
                                               
634 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2012: Events of 2011 (New York, HRW 2012) 546. 
635 For a more complete overview of the events see ‘Egypt Uprising of 2011’, Encyclopedia 
Britannica (2016) <https://global.britannica.com/event/Egypt-Uprising-of-2011> accessed 11 
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636 UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General’s Statement on the Situation in Egypt’ (New York, 
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637 UNDPA, ‘2012 Annual Report’ (May 2013) at 13 
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AU and the continent’s commitment to promote democratization, good 
governance and respect for human rights.638 
 
This was echoed by the Arab League, which stressed the inadequacy of 
Mubarak’s superficial reshuffling policy by stating that ‘new ministers does 
not necessarily mean a change’ and claimed that ‘clear lines of policy will have 
to be declared’,639 as well as by the EU, which urged the Egyptian authorities 
‘to fully respect and protect the rights of their citizens to manifest their political 
aspirations’.640 Similar statements of support with even more open-ended 
wording were expressed by, among others, Canada, Cuba, United States, 
Nigeria, South Africa, India, Sri Lanka, Iran, Iraq and Turkey.641 Only a small 
number of states, for primarily geopolitical reasons, condemned the protests 
and voiced support for Mubarak, including Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait and 
Israel. Yet, as in Tunisia, none of these states and international organisations 
took coercive measures to exert impact on the events in Egypt. Egypt’s first 
democratically elected president was internationally recognised, 
notwithstanding the fact that the presidential elections were held in discord 
with the Egyptian constitution and were characterised as unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Constitutional Court.642 As Trager elucidates, ‘[t]he international 
community was far less averse to its [the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi’s party] 
emergence that it anticipated. Foreign officials routinely encouraged the 
Brotherhood to respect the peace treaty with Israel and embrace pluralism but 
exerted no significant pressure toward those ends’.643 For instance, 
Washington declared its full embrace of the Arab Spring: ‘[I]t will be the 
policy of the United States to promote reform across the region, and to support 
transitions to democracy […] That effort begins in Egypt and Tunisia’. It was 
further emphasised that ‘both nations can set a strong example through free 
and fair elections; vibrant civil society; accountable and effective democratic 
institutions; and responsible regional leadership’.644 
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6.6.1.3. Libya 
 
Of all states affected by the Arab Spring, Libya underwent one of the most, if 
not the most, traumatic experience since the popular protests, inspired by the 
success of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, grew into a full-blown civil war 
marked by the international armed interference and culminating in the death of 
its tyrannical leader Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi and key political figures, 
who ruled the country for 42 years. 
Qaddafi’s sultanist regime kept Libya in iron hands since the military coup 
in 1969. His politics that combined socialism, pan-Arab nationalism, tribalism 
and anti-imperialism allegedly aimed to engineer a forward-looking republic 
governed by people — which is also visible from the title of the Libyan state: 
the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya — essentially led to the creation 
of a non-state. Moreover, considering the turbulent history of Libya and 
constant lack of independence, Libya was said to be an artificial state created 
by external powers and lacking national identity, which was efficiently 
exploited by Qaddafi to entrench his unchallenged power and dominance.645 
Inspired in part by the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, 
the first demonstrations demanding Gaddafi’s withdrawal took place in the city 
of Benghazi on 15 February 2011 and were harshly repressed. The root of the 
problem was poverty and political oppression. Indeed, for about a half-century 
Libya was dominated by a political vision that formally denied any form of 
civil activism outside the governing regime. Those who attempted to challenge 
the government faced unlimited imprisonment and death.646 By 20 February, 
protests had spread to the capital Tripoli where they were followed by huge 
military campaign on the part of the Gaddafi regime. With the rising death toll, 
numbering in thousands, the situation quickly degenerated into a civil war. By 
the end of August, Tripoli was in the hands of the opposition and Gaddafi was 
forced to flee, before being killed on 20 October 2011. 
The violence used against protesters was strongly criticised by the Arab 
League and the African Union. On 21 February 2011, Libya was suspended 
from the League,647 whereas the AU asserted that the demands of the Arab 
people for change were legitimate.648 On 26 February, the UNSC adopted 
Resolution 1970 under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which condemned 
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‘the violence and the use of force against civilians’ and demanded ‘an 
immediate end to the violence and […] steps to fulfil the legitimate demands 
of the population’.649 The resolution also inflicted Chapter VII sanctions on 
Libya, including an arms embargo; a travel ban against sixteen Libyan officials 
involved in violence; and an indefinite asset freeze against six members of the 
regime.650 In addition, the Libyan case was referred to the ICC for investigation 
of the crimes against humanity that were allegedly committed by Libya’s 
regime.651 More unprecedentedly, on 1 March 2011, the UNGA suspended 
Libya’s membership in the Human Rights Council, the Organisation’s pre-
eminent human rights body.652 Such a move was welcomed by the UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who stated that ‘[t]he winds of change are 
sweeping the Middle East and North Africa’ and the UN stood ready to assist 
in every way possible as the people of Libya demanded new rights and 
freedoms.653 Inspired by the international support, the rebel forces established 
the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC) on 27 February 2011, which 
on 5 March 2011 declared itself to be the ‘only legitimate body representing 
the people of Libya and the Libyan state’.654 
When it became clear that the 1970-resolution measures were not 
protecting the Libyan people — due to Gaddafi regime’s blatant breaches of 
the resolution — the League of Arab States called on the SC to impose a non-
fly zone on Libyan military aviation and to establish safe areas to protect the 
civilian population. This initiative was crucial and led to the adoption of UNSC 
Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which referred to ‘the legitimate demands 
of the Libyan people’, reiterated the Council’s concern that crimes against 
humanity might have been committed and defined the situation in Libya as a 
threat to international peace and security.655 Additionally, it reaffirmed the 
establishment of a no-fly zone and ban on flights; added additional 
designations of individuals subject to travel ban or the asset freeze; reinforced 
arms embargo; and authorised the use of ‘all necessary measures […] to protect 
civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack […] while 
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory’.656 
Resolution 1973 served as a legal justification for subsequent NATO’s 
military intervention in Libya in the form of air strikes aimed to protect the 
civilian population. This resolution has been arguably the first implementation 
of the R2P doctrine. Military intervention significantly weakened the position 
                                               
649 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, para 1. 
650 ibid paras 9-10, 15, 17. 
651 ibid para 4. 
652 ‘General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’ (1 March 2011) UN Doc 
GA/11050 (press release). 
653 ‘Secretary-General’s Remarks to the General Assembly on Libya’ (New York, 1 March 
2011) <http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=5116> accessed 7 July 2016. 
654 ‘Interim Transitional National Council’ Temehu <https://www.temehu.com/ntc.htm 
<accessed 7 July 2016. 
655 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, para 1. 
656 ibid paras 4, 6-8, 13, 19, 22. 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 359 
of the Gaddafi and forced him to relinquish power. He was subsequently killed 
by the opposition forces on 20 October 2011. Meanwhile, the opposition-
formed NTC gained country-wide support and international recognition (first 
as the legitimate representative of the people of Libya and at a later stage as a 
government)657 and occupied the country’s seat at the United Nations.658 In July 
2012, parliamentary elections were held and in August 2012, the NTC handed 
power to the elected General National Assembly.659 As the above analysis 
reveals, the pro-democratic revolution in Libya attracted the most forcible 
response from states and international organisations and can be regarded as the 
most powerful case of the recognition of the right to revolution. Importantly, 
the reaction of the AU to the overthrow of the Libyan regime was remarkable. 
The popular uprisings of 2011 were not regarded in the same light as the coups 
d’état that the AU has acted against elsewhere on the continent. 
 
6.6.1.4. Syria 
 
The last case to consider here is that of Syria, which represents the least 
successful example of people’s struggle for democracy in the course of the 
Arab Spring, with a full-blown civil war still plaguing the country. Syrian 
revolution began with small and peaceful protests taking place in the city of 
Daraa on 15 March 2011 in response to the detention and torture of some 
teenagers for painting a graffiti ‘The people want the fall of the regime’ on the 
walls of their schools. Apart from demonstrating their outrage over the fate of 
the teenagers, the protestors demanded democratic reforms, release of political 
prisoners, more political freedom, abolition of emergency laws and an end to 
corruption. The government responded by shooting demonstrators with open 
fire, which resulted in several deaths and the attendant increase in numbers of 
protestors. By July 2011, hundreds of thousands were taking to the streets 
throughout the country calling not only for political reforms but also for the 
outright overthrow of the Assad government. After the failure to pacify the 
opposition actors by offering piecemeal reforms and promises of greater 
democratisation, Assad resorted to even deadlier campaign of violence and 
repression: the towns were attacked by a full-scale military artillery including 
tanks, infantry carriers, jets and chemical weapons, with the death toll 
mounting to 500,000 plus people by late 2018.660 To defend themselves and 
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their areas of control, opposition supporters began to take arms and a full-
blown countrywide civil war unfolded.661 In November 2012, the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, commonly named 
the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), was established in Qatar to serve as a 
centre of coordination between opposition’s different factions and foreign 
backers. 
Repression of the civilian population by the Assad regime has been met 
with limited international measures. The UNSC struggled to reach an 
agreement on resolutions condemning and sanctioning the Assad regime under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which was eventually precluded by three 
consecutive vetoes by China and Russia.662 This notwithstanding, the SC could 
agree on several presidential statements and resolutions not referring to 
Chapter VII measures, in which it condemned the violations of human rights 
committed by the Syrian government and called on the Syrian authorities to 
cease violence whilst reaffirming its commitment to the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria.663 Furthermore, in order to put 
more pressure on the Assad regime, the UNGA’s Third Committee adopted a 
resolution condemning human rights violations in Syria.664 Meanwhile, the 
Arab League imposed economic sanctions on the Syrian regime,665 including 
travel bans, asset freezes and financial transactions cuts and agreed to send 
                                               
661 See ‘Syrian Civil War’ Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war> 
accessed 11 August 2016. 
662 See UNSC Draft Res 612 (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612 (‘Recalling the Syrian 
Government’s primary responsibility to protect its population […],’ stressing the need to address 
‘the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population […] [e]xpresses its intention to review 
Syria’s implementation of this resolution within 30 days and to consider its options, including 
measures under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations’); UNSC Draft Res 538 (19 July 
2012) UN Doc S/2012/538 (‘Determining that the situation in Syria constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 
[…] decides that, if the Syrian authorities have not fully complied with paragraph 4 above within 
ten days, then it shall impose immediately measures under Article 42 of the UN Charter’); UNSC 
Draft Res 348 (22 May 2014) Un Doc S/2014/348 [Sponsored by 66 member states] 
(‘Determining that the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, decides to refer the situation […] to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court’). 
663 See eg UNSC Presidential Statement 16 (2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16; UNSC 
Presidential Statement 10 (2012) UN Doc S/PRST/2012/10; UNSC Presidential Statement 15 
(2013) UN Doc S/PRST/2013/15; UNSC Res 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042; 
UNSC Res 2043 (21 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043; UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) 
UN Doc S/RES/2118; UNSC Res 2139 (22 February 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2139; UNSC Res 
2165 (14 July 2014) UN Doc S/RES/2165; UNSC Res 2209 (6 March 2015) UN Doc 
S/RES/2209; UNSC Res 2235 (7 August 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2235; UNSC Res 2254 (18 
December 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2254; UNSC Res 2268 (26 February 2016) UN Doc 
S/RES/2268. For a full list of documents on Syria, see Security Council Report, ‘UN Documents 
for Syria’ <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syria/> accessed 12 August 
2016. 
664 UN Department of Public Information, ‘Third Committee approves Resolution condemning 
human rights violations in Syria, by vote of 122 in favor to 13 against, with 41 abstentions’, 
GA/SHC/4033 (22 November 2011). 
665 League of Arab States Res 7442 (Extraordinary Session, 27 November 2011). 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 361 
monitors to observe the situation in Syria.666 Following the failure of the 
observer mission, the League suspended Syria’s membership.667 Likewise, the 
EU has introduced comprehensive restrictive measures against the Syrian 
regime, including asset freezes, travel bans, bans on import/export of oil and 
arms bans.668 Several regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Turkey, acted on their own by offering significant financial, material and 
logistical aid to the opposition fighters. Additionally, a range of Western states 
stated that President Assad lost legitimacy and should step down as well as 
imposed autonomous sanctions.669 
Shortly after its formation, the SOC was recognised as ‘the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people’.670 Whilst for the majority of scholars such 
status does not bear legal consequences (as it was a political act of recognition 
rather than legal),671 its political significance as a signal of support to 
revolutionary aspirations of people should not be underestimated. As Wilson 
observed, this type of recognition implies that these collectivises are 
‘authorities in their own right in international law, capable of legitimately 
resorting to the use of force’.672 In fact, the absence of the legal recognition of 
the SOC was due to the fact that it did not exercise effective control over the 
whole territory of Syria. Otherwise, such recognition would absolve leaders 
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who still control some parts of the country of responsibilities in their areas of 
control. By bestowing political recognition with the SOC and yet retaining 
legal recognition with the incumbent regime (albeit acknowledging that it has 
lost legitimacy),673 the international community showed their support of the 
right to revolution of the Syrian people without undermining the traditional 
effective control test. 
In sum, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, revolutions were sparked by 
the failure of the authoritarian regimes to guarantee economic, social and 
political rights of their citizens by abuse of power, denial of popular political 
participation, outright discrimination and repression. Revolution was the Arab 
Spring’s ultimate tool to vindicate international human rights, including the 
right to democracy. 
 
6.6.2. The Euromaidan Revolution 
 
From November 2013 to the end of February 2014, demonstrators gathered on 
Kyiv’s Independence Square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Ukrainian, to protest 
against the Ukrainian government decision to suspend preparations for signing 
an Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement with the EU (DCFTA), choosing closer cooperation with Russia 
instead. These protests comprised of several distinct phases, culminating in a 
nation-wide revolution, commonly referred to as the Euromaidan Revolution, 
or Revolution of Dignity, that toppled the Victor Yanukovych’s 
government.674 
The first stage, called by some as ‘Euro-romantic stage’,675 began with the 
peaceful demonstrations of predominantly students and youths at the Maidan 
on 21 November 2013 outraged with the abrupt suspension by Yanukovych of 
the process of preparation of the DCFTA with the EU676 and demanding a 
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return to a pro-European direction in foreign politics. In the eyes of many 
Ukrainians, the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement was a first step towards 
European integration, which would bring not only development and economic 
modernisation but also a change of the ‘rules of the game’ on the national 
political arena leading to the abolishment of corruption, kleptocracy and 
authoritarian turns.677 On 30 November 2013, demonstrators were brutally 
beaten by Berkut, the Ukrainian special force. The brutality against students 
served as a catalyst for phase two of Euromaidan — a mass action of a national 
scope demanding Yanukovych and his corrupted cabinet to resign. The protests 
were now less about the closer Ukraine-EU cooperation and more about the 
outright regime change. More attention was now centred on corruption, 
kleptocracy and the failure of the ruling elites to reform Ukrainian post-Soviet 
political space and to improve socio-economic conditions of the people, with 
the postponement of the Association Agreement being last drop in the ocean 
of general frustration. It was a revolution for dignity and against violations of 
basic human rights by the Ukrainian government.678 In addition, Ukrainians 
were demanding a restoration of Ukraine’s 2004 Constitution, which was 
suspended by Yanukovych in an effort to strengthen his power.679 The 
protesters viewed such action as contrary to national interests and submissive 
towards Russian avail.680 In an effort to deescalate the crisis, the opposition 
began negotiating with Yanukovych and reporting regularly to Euromaidan. 
Meanwhile, the government-sponsored provocateurs, commonly dubbed as 
‘Titushky’, began undermining the peaceful nature of the protest by sabotage 
and incitement to violence against police. Moreover, government-controlled 
media resorted to a campaign of misinformation by calling Euromaidan a 
fascist movement. A number of protestors were killed and over a hundred were 
declared missing. 
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The crisis entered its third stage when the Yanukovych’s party, the Party 
of Regions, passed a series of anti-protest laws, using the Russian legislation 
as a model, to restrict the freedom of speech and assembly by introducing 
severe penalties.681 This action by the President effected a wave of outrage and 
anger among the protestors, who began to use sticks, rocks, molotov cocktails 
and burning tires to protect themselves. The crisis reached its climax at the end 
of February. From 18 to 21 February two major bloody attacks were directed 
against the protesters by the riot police, including throwing grenades and 
shooting from the rooftops resulting in over 100 dead, coming to be known as 
the ‘Heaven hundred’, and over 1000 injured. The violence was unprecedented 
in the history of independent Ukraine and yielded disastrous repercussions for 
the incumbent regime. The final phase was marked by Yanukovych and his 
close government officials fleeing the country and an interim government 
being formed on 27 February 2014. The interim government reinstated the 
December 8, 2004 amendments of the constitution weakening presidential 
powers, dismissed a number of cabinet ministers, impeached the President on 
the basis that he had abandoned his office and set new presidential elections 
for 25 May 2014.682 
As in the Arab Spring, the international community sided with the 
protesters. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon at press conference in 
Lima appealed ‘to all parties to act with restraint, avoid further violence and to 
uphold the democratic principles of freedom of expression and peaceful 
assembly’.683 Likewise, NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen has 
called on Ukraine ‘to live up to fundamental democratic principles including 
freedom of assembly and freedom of expression’.684 The Council of the EU 
adopted Conclusions on 10 February 2014 where, in a language similar to that 
used in the Arab Spring, it urged ‘all sides to seek, through an inclusive 
dialogue, a democratic solution that would meet the aspirations of the 
Ukrainian people’. Moreover, it implicitly encouraged regime change by 
stating that ‘[a] new and inclusive government, constitutional reform bringing 
back more balance of powers, and preparations for free and fair presidential 
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accessed 16 August 2016. 
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elections would contribute to bringing Ukraine back on a suitable path of 
reforms’.685 These views were reiterated in Conclusions of 20 February 2014, 
which also introduced targeted sanctions, including asset freeze and visa ban, 
against those responsible for use of excessive force against the protesters as 
well as suspension of export licenses on equipment used for internal 
repression.686 Moreover, on 5 March 2014, the EU adopted sanctions against 
sixteen Ukrainian leaders, including former President Yanukovych, in the form 
of asset freeze for misappropriation of Ukrainian state funds,687 which has been 
repeatedly updated.688 By the same token, the US, in response to Yanukovych’s 
violent crackdown on protesters, imposed visa travel bans on around twenty 
senior political figures of the Ukrainian government.689 Similar notes of 
support condemning violence against the protesters and calling on the 
Ukrainian government to listen to the aspirations of the Ukrainian people were 
aired by other states, including Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, 
Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden and the UK.690 On the other 
hand, Russia, who saw Euromaidan as a threat of loosing control over the 
Ukrainian geopolitical space, condemned the revolution by calling it ‘more like 
a pogrom [violent persecution of ethnic minorities] than a revolution’.691 On 
10 December, the State Duma adopted a resolution blaming Western states for 
manipulating the political crisis in Ukraine to their advantage: ‘Some Western 
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amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain 
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690 See ‘International Reactions to Euromaidan’ Wikipedia 
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politicians who address oppositionist meetings make explicit calls for revolting 
against the decisions passed by the legitimately elected authorities of the 
country’.692 Considering the important role Russia plays on the global political 
arena, one should nonetheless remain cautious with regard to the merit and 
legal impact of this particular position: the de facto rationale behind 
condemning the Ukrainian revolution squared around the fact that the ouster 
of the puppet Russia-controlled Yanukovych’s regime meant the long-feared 
shift of power balance in Eastern Europe towards the West, whereas actual 
statements referring to violations of international and/or Ukrainian laws served 
a misguiding rhetoric. Another obvious aim of such allegations was to justify 
the Russian annexation of Crimea of 18 March 2014 as an alleged measure to 
protect ethnic Russians in the peninsular from ‘fascist and Russophobic’ 
government established by the ‘Maidan mob’. Even when Russia did frame its 
arguments in language of international law, they were inconsistent, lacked 
factual basis and represented a particular reading of international law favouring 
Russian interests, which came to be known as ‘Russian doctrine of 
international law’.693 
In the aftermath of the Euromaidan Revolution, the international 
community continued to support ‘legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian 
people’ by according recognition to the interim government headed by the 
opposition representative Arseniy Yatsenyuk as well as the interim president 
Oleksandr Turchynov.694 Whereas in Libya and Syria, the NTC and the SOC 
were merely recognised as ‘the sole representatives of peoples’, the interim 
government of Ukraine attained a legal recognition in toto. Because the 
government, including the President, Prime Minister and Cabinet, was formed 
in violation of the Ukrainian constitution,695 the act of recognition of such 
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government is the strongest evidence of the acceptance by the international 
community of the right to revolution. On top of that, the early presidential 
elections held on 25 May 2014 were internationally recognised as free and 
genuine and in accordance with international democratic standards.696 The 
legitimacy of the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko, winning more 
than fifty-five percent of the popular vote, was also recognised by Russia.697 
Such international recognition of the de facto post-revolutionary government 
(because it would not be in power but for Ukraine’s unconstitutional ouster and 
was, thus, not de jure or established by law) as legitimate is particularly 
spectacular if one considers the fact that the government in question does not 
have effective control over the whole Ukraine territory — the eastern 
Ukrainian region of Donbas, including the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, is 
still under the control of pro-Russian rebels, not to mention the Russia-annexed 
Crimea. Needless to say, the ‘effective control test’ is a generally recognised 
method for testing legitimacy of a government, under which a de facto 
government can only be accorded legitimacy if it maintains effective control 
over territory it purports to govern.698 Kelsen’s doctrine of revolutionary 
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legality is premised on this idea.699 The post-revolutionary Ukrainian 
government allegedly fails this test and is yet recognised as legitimate by the 
international community. 
In summary, similarly to the Arab Spring uprisings, the 2014 Ukrainian 
revolution represents a case of the justified revolution when peaceful means to 
protect human rights, such as peaceful rallies and demonstrations, were 
exhausted and the people had a right to revolt as a last remedy against 
governmental abuse. Thus, the right to revolution was triggered by a chain of 
events, which include the usurpation of power by the Yanukovych’s regime in 
executive coup, whereby the Ukrainian Parliament, the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutional Court were factually deprived of their constitutional powers; 
multiple violations of the Ukrainian Constitution and laws by the incumbent 
government, including the controversial Kharkiv Accords of 2010 extending 
the Russian lease on naval facilities in Crimea until 2042700 and the one-man 
decision on the suspension of Ukraine-EU Association Agreement as a result 
of the clandestine arrangements with Russia resulting in the latter’s loan worth 
USD 15 billion; constant and innate corruption on the part of Yanukovych and 
his close circles against the background of deteriorating standards of living of 
the Ukrainian population and declining of the rule of law; the adoption of the 
‘Draconian Laws’ of 16 January 2014 virtually abolishing the freedoms of 
expression, assembly and association; and the use of violent force against 
peaceful protesters killing over 100 and injuring more than 2000 people by the 
end of February 2014.701 The above-mentioned facts reveal that the actions by 
the Yanukovych’s government before and during the Euromaidan created 
sufficient legal grounds for invoking the right to revolution against the regime 
since it was the last measure, or ultimate remedy, at the hands of the Ukrainians 
to protect their rights after the peaceful means of resolving the crisis had been 
exhausted. As one prominent Ukrainian scholar observed, Yanukovych by his 
dictatorial actions discredited himself to the point of the complete loss of 
legitimacy: ‘[B]y the moment when the peaceful protest was transforming into 
a rebellion, the regime had lost even marginal popular support and had 
transformed into a tyranny, ostensibly disregarding fundamental human rights 
and the rights of the people, refusing to seek social consensus, and aiming at 
the violent suppression of the peaceful protests, to the point of killing its 
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participants’.702 Most importantly, the revolutionary cause of the Ukrainian 
people was recognised as legitimate by the international community, 
irrespective of the documented resort to violence by the protesters. Similarly 
to the Arab Spring revolutions, no separate mention was maid of the 
impermissibility or illegality of such antigovernment force, even though the 
international community called upon the parties to respect the principles of 
peaceful exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly. In other words, 
the international community implicitly accepted non-state violence in 
furtherance of revolution as a means to advance peoples’ democratic 
aspirations. 
 
6.6.3. The Right to Revolution as a Customary Norm 
 
As the previous sections demonstrate, the international community undertook 
a variety of actions in response to pro-democratic protests of the Arab Spring 
and the Euromaidan that could indicate support for the right to revolution: 
undemocratic governments have been designated as ‘illegitimate’ with their 
leaders being called on to resign; sanctions have been introduced against 
governments refusing to cede to the demands of popular protests; the cause of 
anti-government resistance was internationally recognised as legitimate; rebel 
groups fighting for democracy were assisted by foreign states; the use of force 
by the protestors was not explicitly condemned by the international 
community; military force has been used against a repressive government 
leading to a regime change and an instalment of a democratic government; and 
revolutionary governments have been recognised, albeit to different degree, by 
the international community despite the lack of all necessary credentials of 
political legitimacy. The question, thus, arises as to whether these actions 
suffice to claim that the right to revolution is now a norm of customary 
international law. 
As was previously mentioned,703 customary international law is 
traditionally defined as ‘a general practice accepted as law’.704 It means that 
for a customary norm to emerge, two elements are to be present, namely 
material state practice (usus) and a belief that such practice is required, 
prohibited or allowed (opinio juris),705 also referred to as objective and 
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704 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 
October 1945) 33 UNTS 993 (ICJ Statute) art 38(1)(b). 
705 See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Malta) (Merits) 
[1985] ICJ Rep 13, 29-30, para 27 (‘It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary 
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States’); 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 97-98, paras 183-84 (Holding that the 
Court had to ‘direct its attention to the practice and opinio juris of States’); Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, 122, 
Internal Defence of Democracy: The Right to Revolution 
 370 
subjective elements respectively. State practice is constituted by both physical 
and verbal state acts as well as acquiescence and should be sufficiently 
uniform, extensive and of a certain duration. As to the representativeness 
criterion, whilst some states refrained from acting in support of the revolutions 
in the Arab world and Ukraine and some even outrightly condemned these, the 
clear majority of states demonstrated acceptance of these events by a variety 
of the above-enlisted acts, which fall squarely within the meaning of state 
practice. Moreover, states that abstained from acting can be regarded as 
acquiesced to the situation born by the actions of the majority of the active 
states, that is states supporting revolution. This last statement is not 
unproblematic since it implies that norm can be created by a state doing 
nothing and implying nothing by its non-action.706 Even if this is the case, state 
non-actions are never wholly legally neutral and at the bare minimum they 
create expectations that a state concerned will act similarly in similar situations 
or at least will not condemn a situation, which it previously supported by its 
passive behaviour. This is without the prejudice to specially affected states, 
which knew or might have been expected to know about the practice and whose 
silence is almost always acquiescence.707 The issue of duration is a bit more 
complicated. Some may argue that the passage of time within which the 
revolutions under consideration occurred, which is roughly four years, is not 
sufficient for a customary norm to emerge. However, there are several points 
to consider. First, the definition of a revolution is a fluid one, which means that 
certain social upheavals that might have been considered by states as 
revolutions in the past and with respect to which they acted accordingly are not 
considered here as such, including colour revolutions of the early 2000s and 
certain recent cases of coups d’état. Second, international law does not require 
a minimum duration of time.708 As the Court declared in the North Continental 
Shelf cases, ‘the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of 
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law’ as 
long as state practice is sufficiently extensive and uniform.709 This was 
confirmed by the ILC in its 2016 report elucidating that ‘provided that the 
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practice is general, no particular duration is required’.710 Moreover, in certain 
circumstances, the emergence of ‘instant’ custom is warranted, that is when a 
clear expression of opinio juris can altogether negate the need for a record of 
state practice.711 This is based on an idea that states are their own law-makers 
and if there is a sudden change of view on a given subject which is generally 
supported, a new rule can be born overnight, or at least very quickly. It is, 
hence, fair to suggest that state practice with respect to the Arab and Ukrainian 
revolutions was sufficiently extensive and uniform, and the short timeframe 
within which this practice occurred is not relevant. 
However, it is less clear whether such state practice was followed by a 
sense of obligation (opinio juris). In fact, states have never referred in their 
verbal statements to any legal norms justifying their actions with respect to the 
Arab/Ukrainian uprisings, invoking instead the abstract principles of 
unacceptability of state violence against its citizens and the importance to 
respect legitimate aspirations of the people. Moreover, as some critical voices 
insist, over the course of the last few decades, the West-lead democratisation 
affected little, if at all, the Arab world with its autocratic regimes and 
repressive ideologies. It is often asserted that geopolitical interests and security 
concerns in the oil-reach Arab region are so overwhelming that international 
law has little say. The key factors are a reliable oil supply to the increasingly 
consuming Western society and the growing Islamist threat.712 Consequently, 
change came from within, ignited by citizens of the Arab region themselves. 
International actors had no choice but to succumb to these grass-root 
demands.713 The question then arises as to whether international custom can be 
established when it is forced into existence rather than willed to. In other 
words, can states’ ‘psychological component’ be qualified as opinio juris for 
the purposes of the customary norm formation when their actions have been 
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guided by the demands of morality or political expediency rather than a belief 
that their practice is legally required? 
In North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court stated that in order for 
opinio juris to emerge, two conditions must be fulfilled: 
 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that 
this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring 
it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States 
concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not 
in itself enough.714 
 
This traditional understanding of the subjective element was reiterated by the 
ILC in 2016, who affirmed that ‘[t]he requirement, as a constituent element of 
customary international law, that the general practice be accepted as law 
(opinio juris) means that the practice in question must be undertaken with a 
sense of legal right or obligation’.715 This notwithstanding, it is worth being 
reminded that the ICJ in much of its jurisprudence does not bother itself to look 
for proof of opinio juris when there is a well-established practice. The Court 
has shown a tendency either to give opinio juris a short mention or to 
completely disregard this.716 Similarly, the International Law Association 
(ILA) has taken a position that opinio juris is not an essential element for the 
establishment of a customary norm affirming that ‘it is not usually necessary 
to demonstrate the existence of the subjective element before a customary rule 
can be said to have come into being’.717 Moreover, opinio juris is very difficult 
to prove. States are conglomerations of political actors, whose ‘beliefs’ are not 
that easily ascertainable as those of individuals. One is also to acknowledge 
the fact that states are all too often unwilling to reveal ‘subjective’ reasons 
behind their actions precisely in order to avoid creating legal obligations that 
would tie their hands in the future. Another problem relates to a deep 
theoretical and chronological paradox within this traditional schema of opinio 
juris: custom is created when it is believed to be preceded by an already 
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existing norm which renders its subjective element superfluous.718 Thus, for a 
customary norm to emerge, states must believe that they are already bound by 
the (non-existent) norm. 
This thesis suggests that constitutionalisation of international law implies 
a different approach to the identification of opinio juris. First, custom is 
established whenever state actions reflect global constitutional principles, such 
as the respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, irrespective of 
whether they regard their behaviour as legally mandated. Such change in the 
attitude with respect to the relevance of moral and ethical principles to custom-
development has been acknowledged by Larry May stating that opinio juris 
has broadened to include the impetus ‘to follow the norm out of a sense of legal 
or moral obligation’.719 This view is also taken by Lepard arguing that for a 
customary norm to emerge it is enough for opinio juris to reflect a belief by 
states that a practice should be required instead of a traditional doctrinal view 
that it is already required.720 Moreover, in ascertaining such beliefs, one has to 
account for ‘fundamental ethical principles’ which states themselves 
recognised in the wide array of multilateral instruments, such as the UN 
Charter and the UDHR.721 This position is also shared by Tasioulas who 
contended that ‘the ethical appeal of a candidate norm’ should feature ‘among 
the criteria for determining whether it is a valid norm of [customary 
international law] in such a way that a customary norm may exist even in the 
absence of widespread state practice, or even overwhelming state consent, in 
its favour’.722 Likewise, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY held in the Kupreskic 
case that opinio juris may be the decisive element in the formation of 
customary international law ‘when the demands of humanity and dictates of 
public conscience’ so require.723 It seems therefore that in the context of IHRL 
and ICL — areas touching upon fundamental ethical issues — opinio juris has 
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undergone a process of moralisation, that is moral considerations and ethical 
principles are the key factors to account for in ascertaining the existence of an 
international customary norm. 
It has been established that the right to revolution flows from the principle 
ubi ius, ubi remedium meaning that every wrong committed should be 
followed by a remedy. When the peaceful protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Syria and Ukraine were met with a violent crackdown by government 
authorities, meaning that peaceful means for resolving conflict were exhausted, 
the people invoked their right to revolution as a last remedy to protect their 
rights. The international community’s actions evidencing the acceptance of the 
legitimacy of peoples’ struggle but falling short of explicit references to 
revolution as a right and a corresponding obligation of the international 
community to vindicate it, and, thus, failing to fulfil the criteria of the 
traditional custom given the absence of the subjective element, can yet be 
qualified as creating a customary norm because they were in accordance with 
the equitable principle of ubi ius ubi remedium, which is also recognised as a 
general principle of international law.724 
Second, the principle of good faith implies that states acting in a certain 
way with respect to particular events are expected to act similarly in similar 
circumstances in the future.725 Because a state that acts contrary to its previous 
undertakings, which placed reasonable confidence and faith with other states 
and other subjects of international law that such practice would endure, is 
acting without good faith and in contravention of international law. Following 
this line of argument, one can fairly suggest that states supported Ukrainian 
revolution and condemned regime’s oppression against demonstrators because 
their actions in support of the Arab Spring revolutions created a certain level 
of expectations, known as reasonable or legitimate expectations, that such 
practice would continue. It means that opinio juris is characterised by a sense 
of obligation flowing not only from existing legal rules but also from the 
general principle of good faith and particularly from its core element — the 
principle of legitimate expectations, meaning that states must live up to their 
promises and undertakings giving rise to legitimate expectations that they will 
act in a particular way. Such understanding of opinio juris was partially 
accepted by the ILA, which centred its definition of custom on the latter’s 
ability to raise legitimate expectations: a customary norm is ‘one which is 
created and sustained by the constant and uniform practice of States and other 
subjects of international law in or impinging upon their international legal 
relations, in circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of 
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similar conduct in the future’.726 The ILA’s definition also shows that not only 
actions of states can form custom but also those of non-state actors. This is 
increasingly supported by scholars. For example, Jordan Paust asserted that 
‘contrary to false myth perpetrated in the early twentieth century, the 
subjective element of customary international law […] is to be gathered from 
patterns of generally shared legal expectations among humankind, not merely 
official State elites’.727 This view is also taken by Lepard and Hakimi, who 
argue that the practice of non-state actors may and should influence the 
evolution of customary law norms.728 Whilst these references to the impact of 
non-state actors mostly refer to the international institutions, such as, for 
example, the international courts and tribunals, the ICRC, the ILC and the 
UNGA, it is plausible to suggest that other entities, including revolutionary 
movements struggling against oppression, can have their share in the process 
of customary law making. Such position would solidify the status of revolution 
as a customary norm. Yet, this argument purchases its sweeping conclusion 
too cheaply as the concept of legitimate expectations is still ‘in search of a 
doctrine’729 and involves complex debates on how to determine these 
expectations and on which criteria such determination should be based,730 
which in the end of the day makes the concept too fuzzy for the delineation of 
opinio juris. Further, non-state actors do not possess essential characteristics 
of international personality to make their opinions count for the purpose of 
international law making. Even such more credible actors as international 
organisations are conventionally said to have, at best, a peripheral or subsidiary 
role in custom formation. They partake only to the extent that states delegate 
lawmaking authority to them or subsequently approve their actions.731 
Another concern relates to the fact that the above-elaborated opinio juris-
minimising thesis seems to be at loggerheads with the state practice-
minimising thesis of section 4.2.2 of this dissertation, which submits that 
constitutionalisation of international law entails the decreasing importance of 
state practice vis-à-vis opinio juris. According to this analysis, the right to 
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democracy can be viewed as a customary norm irrespective of the scant state 
practice. Because both theses are justified within the framework of global 
constitutionalism, one may be legitimately suspicious of their seemingly 
inherent contradiction. Yet, what seems as a contradiction at first sight is in 
fact a great strength of the global constitutionalism thesis, according to which 
international law of the international community is in urgent need of adaptation 
to both scenarios, that is when the lack of state practice would impede the 
formation of a customary norm which is globally accepted and, on the other 
hand, when the lack of sufficient evidence of opinio juris would disqualify 
important state practice and thereby block the emergence of a customary norm. 
All in all, the above analysis shows that under the traditional method of 
custom ascertainment the right to revolution does not qualify as an 
international customary norm. Albeit states have shown their endorsement of 
the revolutionary aspirations of the peoples against the oppressive regimes of 
the Arab Spring countries and Ukraine through a variety of responses, 
including sanctions against illegitimate regimes and recognition of rebel 
governments, at no point was such practice explicitly adjoined by a clearly 
articulated belief that the actions in issue were legally required. On the other 
hand, under the modern approach, such opinio juris can be identified if it 
resonates with ‘fundamental ethical principles’ and states believe that such 
norms are desirable now or in the nearest future; and if it entails a sense of 
obligation deriving from the principle of legitimate expectations. Yet, the 
ascertainment of states’ beliefs, including with respect to revolutions, is not an 
easy task, even though the general perception of the desirability of certain 
grass-root-level means of self-help against governmental abuse can be implied 
considering the general axiom of IHRL that for any human right violation there 
should be a remedy.732 However, the most serious concern relates to the right 
to revolution’s possible disharmony vis-à-vis fundamental ethical principles. 
Indeed, it has been earlier elucidated that revolution rests on conflicting ethical 
grounds: whilst it is morally justified as the last resort against governmental 
abuse, it inevitably involves violence occasioning innocent death and damage 
to infrastructure; whilst it derives its roots from the fundamental principles of 
human dignity and equality, it may turn out to be destructive of human rights 
it claims to advance. Thus, to assert that revolution accords with fundamental 
ethical principles is to place the right of remedy over and above the value of 
human life. However, human rights scholarship does not acknowledge any 
hierarchy between human rights, albeit it is widely accepted that some rights 
are not absolute and may be limited (or derogated) in the interests of public 
order, national security and the rights of others. Whilst it has been previously 
established that it is theoretically possible to draw a parallel between IHRL’s 
regimes of limitations and derogations and revolution because they are roughly 
based on similar justifications, namely (re)establishment of the rule of law and 
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respect for human rights, such proposition is merely an academic construct and 
cannot be claimed to reflect state beliefs. Quite on the contrary, states continue 
to vigilantly defend their monopoly on the use of force and to view revolution 
as a threat to, and unwarranted interference with, their internal sovereignty.733 
Another concern is the doctrine of legitimate expectations itself. Based on the 
vague notions of reasonableness and proportionality and characterised by a 
particular extent of reliance and detriment to be invoked, the concept of 
legitimate expectations is too abstract and subjective to aid in the determination 
of unequivocal opinio juris. All in all, it seems doubtful whether the right to 
revolution has acquired a status of an international customary norm within the 
modern approach paradigm. 
This notwithstanding, it seems too hasty a conclusion to completely 
dispense with the idea of customary nature of the right to revolution, 
particularly considering international responses to such conceptually 
ambiguous events, as so-called ‘democratic coups’. At first blush, it seems 
incongruent to refer to the concept of coup at this conjunction, since it has been 
stubbornly professed throughout this work that the notions of revolution and 
military coup are conceptually different.734 To put shortly, whilst coup d’état is 
an affront to the peoples’ right to dispose of themselves (because it lacks 
popular support), revolution is the affirmation of this right; whereas coup d’état 
is a violation of democratic entitlement, revolution is a remedy for its 
realisation. Yet, the concept of the ‘democratic coup d’état’ does not fit neatly 
within this binary scheme. While, similarly to traditional military coups, 
democratic coup is perpetrated by the military officers against the governing 
(ostensibly authoritarian) regime, it is done so in response to popular 
opposition and with the latter’s support and whose main objective is not to re-
arrange state power along military’s political and economic self-interests (as is 
the case with conventional military coups) but to facilitate free and fair 
elections and to put national politics back onto the democratic track. As Varol 
in his influential article suggested, the democratic coup comprises the 
following attributes: 
 
[T]he military coup is staged against an authoritarian or totalitarian regime; 
the military responds to popular opposition against that regime; the 
authoritarian or totalitarian leader refuses to step down in response to the 
popular opposition; coup is staged by a military that is highly respected within 
the nation, ordinarily because of mandatory conscription; the military 
executes the coup to overthrow the authoritarian or totalitarian regime; the 
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military facilitates free and fair elections within a short span or time; and the 
coup ends with the transfer of power to democratically elected leaders.735 
 
It follows that the key attributes of the democratic coup, such as mass support 
and anti-authoritarian and democracy-promoting agenda, make it conceptually 
closer to the notion of revolution rather than that of a conventional coup d’état. 
To remind the reader, revolution is defined in this thesis as a mass uprising 
aimed at the unseating of the (repressive) ruling government along with the 
fundamental change of the institutional structure of the political system, 
pursued either by violent or peaceful means. Uprising is mass whenever it is 
characterised by popular dissatisfaction whether without direct involvement or 
with overt complicity or active support of the insurgents.736 It is clear form the 
definition that revolution’s distinctive features are likewise mass character of 
the event and its anti-governmental orientation with the view of restructuring 
it. Yet, the establishment of the post-revolutionary democratic regime may or 
may not be the net outcome of revolution, even though in practical terms it is 
inevitable considering the clear anti-authoritarian agenda of the modern 
revolutions. Moreover, the definition shows that in order for an event to qualify 
as revolution it should be massively staged, whether directly or indirectly. 
Thus, whether revolution is led by masses or by individual actors on their 
behalf is immaterial, nor is it relevant whether the transition process is 
controlled by civilians or military leaders. Finally, the distinctive feature of 
revolution is that it seeks to bring about fundamental change of the institutional 
design of the political system. Military coups, on the other hand, typically 
occasion a mere cosmetic political restructuring of the polity to satisfy narrow 
and short-time objectives of the ruling clique. Yet, it has been recognised that 
‘[s]ome coups, particularly those that qualify as revolutionary coups [that is 
when the masses support the coup], do bring about a radical overhaul of the 
political system’.737 Plainly, the 2011 political crisis in Egypt well illustrates 
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the conceptual permeability between the notions of revolution and democratic 
military coup. Whilst the case in question is treated in this thesis as an example 
of the Egyptian Arab Spring revolution,738 it is equally designated by some 
scholars as the most paradigmatic affirmation of the soundness of the 
democratic military coup thesis.739 It follows that the phenomenon of the 
democratic military coup may fall under the definition of revolution, if it 
attracts mass support and seeks to implement broader political reforms, and 
therefore international responses to such events can provide additional 
instances of state practice relevant for the ascertainment of the customary 
nature of the right to revolution.740 
One of the earliest examples is the 1992 Algerian coup, in which the 
military overthrew the results of the parliamentary elections whose winner was 
a radical Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). When the party was 
founded in 1989, it made clear that it intended to remake Algeria into an 
Islamic state. Moreover, several FIS leaders expressed their hostility toward 
the institutions of multiparty democracy, including elections.741 As a result, the 
international response was at least implicitly sympathetic to the coup, with 
some Western capitals endorsing the coup outright. For instance, The New York 
Times editorialised that Western governments, including President Bush and 
his administration, were ‘shamefully reluctant’ to criticise the coup.742 It was 
widely affirmed that ‘[m]ost western governments made little secret of their 
relief’.743 France went further and explicitly endorsed the coup.744 Some of 
French political activists asserted that military coup ‘constitut[ed] Algeria’s 
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last chance of saving democracy and avoiding the fatality of fundamentalist 
totalitarianism’.745 Apart from rhetorical support, Western governments 
provided economic and financial support to the junta as well as welcomed 
Algeria in various international forums.746 Whilst the 1992 Algerian coup is 
not a pure case of democratic coup d’état since it did not involve popular grass-
root mobilisation (conversely, there was a significant opposition within 
Algerian civil society) as well as its international support was by and large 
limited to Western powers, it represents an important precedent that certain 
coups are better than others. 
Another example is the 2010 coup d’état in Niger. After ten years of 
authoritarian rule, Nigerian President Mamadou Tandja was deposed by a 
group of military officers calling themselves the Conseil suprême de 
restauration de la démocratie (CSRD) and announcing their intention to ‘make 
Niger an example of democracy and good governance’ and to ‘save [the 
country] and its population from poverty, deception and corruption’.747 The 
coup attracted wide popular support, with thousands of protestors taking the 
streets in pro-coup demonstrations. The head of a prominent civil society 
coalition, Ali Idrissi, commented, ‘[d]eep down, we are cheering it. For us, it’s 
a good coup d’état’.748 The support for the coup, albeit tacit, has also been 
expressed by the international community. The vast majority of states not only 
opted not to call for Tandja’s reinstatement in office but also underlined the 
positive steps that the CSRD were taking. For instance, the US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William Fitzgerald argued that ‘[the 
CSRD] seems to be saying the right things […] we’ve seen some encouraging 
signs’.749 The possibility that some coups may be good was also considered by 
the Western media, with Newsweek asking, ‘Is There Such Thing As a Good 
Coup?’750 
One could also recall the 2005 military putsch in Mauritania attracting 
mass support from the population. Whilst the coup was initially condemned by 
the AU — and only in principle since it was aware of the ‘significant local 
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support’ and ‘international sympathy’ for the coup751 — it was eventually 
legitimised following the presidential election, the winner of which was the 
author of that military coup General Mohamed Ould Abdoulaziz. Despite 
massive irregularities in the electoral process, Abdoulaziz’s victory was 
confirmed by the international community, including the AU.752 
The 2013 coup in Egypt also strongly exhibits key features of democratic 
coup d’état. By 30 June 2013, on the first anniversary of the election of 
President Morsi, millions of people rallied across Egypt calling for Morsi’s 
resignation from office by appealing to what they considered to be his Islamist 
dictatorship.753 The numerical scale of the protests was claimed to be the 
largest in Egypt’s history.754 Three days later, on 3 July 2013, Egyptian army 
chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi led a coalition to remove Morsi from power 
and suspended the Egyptian constitution. Morsi and other key members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were arrested and put on trial, and the Chief Judge of the 
Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour was appointed as interim 
president of Egypt.755 General al-Sisi called for new presidential elections, 
which he eventually won with 96,9% of the vote. Albeit international reactions 
were mixed, with some states condemning the military’s actions and the AU 
suspending Egypt from the union, the majority of foreign leaders were 
generally supportive or neutral with regard to the Morsi’s removal, refusing to 
call it a coup, some even designating it as a second revolution.756 Moreover, al-
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Sisi’s election was widely recognised internationally757 and up until today he 
is generally seen as the legitimate Egyptian head of state.758 Such rapid 
international recognition is particularly striking if one considers the fact that 
just some year ago similar recognition was accorded to President Morsi in the 
aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring revolution.759 
Lastly, the 2014 coup in Thailand was likewise a response to mass 
mobilisations. When widespread demonstrations against the government of 
then prime minister Yingluck Shinawatra triggered turmoil, violence and 
public unrest, the military stepped in to take power. The coup was followed by 
scant international opprobrium. Neither the UNSC nor ASEAN offered 
explicit criticisms.760 Some Asian countries supported the coup-plotters by 
establishing bilateral relations with the junta government. For instance, 
Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida asserted that the Thai political 
system had to be decided by the people of Thailand. Similarly, India, the 
world’s largest democracy, failed to address the Thai coup but focused instead 
on the maintenance of business-as-usual relations with Thailand. In the same 
vein as Japan, it viewed Thailand’s democratic process as its internal matter.761 
The democratic coup thesis attracted wide scholarly support,762 with some 
influential voices claiming that ‘[a]s long as there are tyrannical regimes, there 
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always be need for good people to be assisted or sponsor coups d’état’.763 
Similarly, Oxford economist Paul Collier maintained that coups ‘do not come 
cheap, but if they are the only way of removing a bad regime, then perhaps 
they are welcomed’.764 Based on this reasoning, he called for military 
involvements in Zimbabwe and elsewhere and urged the international 
community to accept those as legitimate.765 By the same token, N’Diaye 
asserted in the context of the 3 August 2005 Mauritanian putsch that it was the 
‘best opportunity to turn the page on decades of the deposed quasi-military 
regime’s destructive politics’ and that it was ‘a model for political reform’ in 
Arab North Africa.766 Likewise, Williams interrogated ‘whether bloodless 
coups d’état that topple authoritarian regimes may advance the [African] 
Union’s stated goal of democratisation’.767 That coups against authoritarian 
regimes are desired is also affirmed by some scholars criticising the AU 
unprincipled policy of condemnation of every military coup irrespective of its 
democratic credentials.768 It follows from the aforementioned that the 
overthrowing of abusive governments is a practice that is increasingly 
internationally tolerated and at times even specifically endorsed. 
The question hence arises whether these examples provide sufficient 
evidence of state practice with respect to anti-constitutional means of 
democracy promotion and democracy defence, and whether the customary 
status of revolution can be effectively ascertained on the basis thereof. The 
complexity lies in the fact that albeit there is an undeniable conceptual affinity 
between revolution and democratic coup d’état, they differ in one crucial 
aspect, namely a form of mass support. It is clear that the very concept 
‘democratic coup d’état’ derives its legitimacy from the fact that it is massively 
endorsed. Yet, unlike revolutions, which are staged by people en masse, 
democratic military coups are nonetheless military coups undertaken by a 
group of high-ranking members of the armed forces claiming to be acting in 
the name of people and democratisation. Not infrequently, such rhetoric is a 
mere disguise for personal power ambitions and new authoritarian blows. 
Furthermore, international support of both coups and revolutions seems to be 
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predicated not so much on their democratic cause as on the community’s 
distaste toward the overthrown regimes. All too often such aversion derives 
from the latter’s unwillingness to cooperate and their potential threat to 
security rather than from their non-democratic character. Moreover, it is not 
clear whether international endorsement of military coups and revolutions 
actually represents opinio juris for the purpose of customary law formation, 
even if one accepts the changing nature of the former, because the right of 
violent resistance assumes an uneasy relationship with fundamental ethical 
principles, such as human life and dignity, and because the novel equitable 
approach to the identification of opinio juris, based on the principles of good 
faith and legitimate expectations, involves complex theoretical discussions as 
to the opinio juris precise determination. Ultimately, the above-enlisted cases 
of international support of revolutions and democratic coups are by and large 
exceptional, with state practice of condemnation of any anti-constitutional acts 
being more prominent. One should also note here the lack of consistency and 
double standards. A state which supports a self-determination claim of a 
revolutionary movement against another state would never accept such a claim 
against itself. As history reveals, no state that has actually faced a forceful 
resistance movement has recognised the authority of the movement to use force 
against it.769 All in all, albeit it is too premature to state that the right to 
revolution has per se crystallised into a customary norm, an unequivocal 
pattern of wide international support of people’s struggles for democracy and 
human rights enables one to characterise the right as an emerging norm of 
customary international law. 
 
6.6.4. Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections have demonstrated that the complex theoretical 
construct of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution as a tool of democracy defence 
finds at least partial support in state practice. International responses to the 
democratically inspired revolutions in the Arab world and Ukraine in 2010-14, 
characterised by the collective delegitimisation of authoritarian governments, 
introduction of sanctions against recalcitrant regimes, designation as legitimate 
of people’s anti-government cause, provision of assistance to rebel groups, 
non-condemnation of revolutionary violence in defence of democracy, 
collective use of military force against repressive governments and 
international recognition of revolutionary governments, exhibit strong 
evidence of international endorsement of revolution as a measure of 
democracy promotion and democracy defence. The thesis further asserts that 
these actions combined with the international support of the democratic coups 
in Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Egypt and Thailand speak for the elevation of 
the right to revolution to the level of a customary norm, albeit with a qualifier 
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‘emerging’. Such peculiar status of the right to revolution in customary 
international law is occasioned by the fact that opinio juris underpinning state 
practice in support of revolution is somewhat deficient because it is predicated 
less on a sense of obligation that such practice is legally mandated and more 
on the moral concerns of unacceptability of state violence vis-à-vis its subjects, 
not to mention ever-present political stakes associated with such actions. Even 
though it is established that the modern approach to the identification of the 
subjective element of custom is constantly progressing towards one 
accommodating fundamental ethical principles, which reflect state beliefs 
about the desirability of custom (rather than about its actual existence), and 
one based on assumption that the existence of opinio juris can also be derived 
from the principle of legitimate expectations, it is concluded that the customary 
standing of the right to revolution cannot be effectively defended on the basis 
thereof. First, it is asserted that the right to revolution assumes uneasy 
relationship with fundamental ethical principles, such as the inherent value of 
human life. Second, the ascertainment of state beliefs with respect to the 
desirability of certain practice is even more problematic than with respect to 
the practice that is already required. Third, the principle of legitimate 
expectations has proven to be too vague and subjective to aid in the 
determination of opinio juris. 
Another complexity animating the qualification of the right to revolution 
as customary has been shown to relate to the lack of sufficient conceptual 
affinity between revolutions and democratic coups. Whereas both concepts 
feature a number of crucial points of convergence, of which the most 
significant is involvement of a large portion of the population, the concept of 
democratic military coup is more controversial due to its proneness to abuse. 
Consequently, the value of the cases where military coups staged in response 
to mass popular demands of greater democratisation met positive international 
reactions is only of a limited significance when it comes to the ascertainment 
of the customary nature of the right to revolution. On top of that, it is accepted 
that prevalent political concerns behind state reactions to both revolutions and 
democratic coups, combined with the fact that the above-discussed cases of 
international support of anti-government force are rather exceptional, provide 
additional counterarguments against the right to revolution as a customary 
norm. It is concluded that the right to revolution has not yet crystallised into a 
full-fledged norm of customary international law. Rather, in view of wide 
international support of people’s struggles for democracy and human rights 
implicating such fundamental areas of international law as recognition of states 
and governments and state legitimacy, the right to revolution can be fairly 
characterised as an emerging customary norm.  
It is also germane to note at this point that one should be warned against 
romanticising revolution as an alternative form of political participation, 
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however popular they are.770 The contemporary trend to uncritically define 
revolutions as legitimate (democratic) by simply looking at the number of 
people involved may seriously distort the picture, particularly if one takes into 
account the fact that million-man revolutions can be staged by opposing 
political factions where immediate economic gains rather than long-term 
democratic aspirations can play the principle role. Moreover, a fine line lies 
between the organised expression of the will of the people by means of a ballot 
and mob rule, or ‘streetocracy’, where the numbers of participating people is 
far less accurate. It follows that elections are the primary means by which the 
constitutive power of the people is expressed and should remain such. Only in 
the extremely rare cases when this mechanism of power transmission is 
defunct, can revolution be the only means to save democracy.
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7. Conclusion 
 
Since Thomas Franck’s landmark article on the right to democratic governance 
as an emerging right, the literature on democracy and its role in international 
law has truly flourished. This is understandable giving the fact that there is 
hardly any area of international law immune from the imperative to promote 
democratic institutions as a sine qua non of the effective functioning of 
national orders and the international legal system as a whole. This imperative 
is born of the increasing globalisation of the international society, emergence 
of global values and the attendant growing sensitivity of individual states to 
global developments affecting their national security and economic wellbeing. 
To ensure a smooth functioning of the new order marked by elevated 
interaction, interdependence and value reception, new measures are constantly 
adopted by the international community to keep pace with the needs of the 
time, one of these being democracy promotion. Because democracy is 
commonly treated as a key to peace, stability, economic development and 
effective implementation of human rights, it goes without saying that it plays 
a progressively discernible role in international law. The overwhelming 
literature on democracy largely acknowledges this fact by referring to ‘the 
emerging right to democratic governance’, ‘principle of democracy’, ‘principle 
of democratic teleology’, ‘customary obligation to conduct free and fair 
elections’ and even ‘das völkerrechtliche Demokratiegebot’ [international 
democracy obligation].1 Yet, such qualifiers fail to reflect the genuine role 
which democracy has assumed in international law and thus give a distorted 
picture of its legal standing. Moreover, the major works on democracy suffer 
from a lack of a clear methodological reflection on how the progressive 
democracy rhetoric is to be situated within the proper confines of the de lege 
lata legal discourse. 
This work has been developed to respond to these shortcomings and to 
reconceptualise the international law of democracy. To this end, the underlying 
theoretical paradigm for international law has been reconsidered to conclude 
that international law is no longer anchored on classical liberal ideas of state 
sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction, state consent, non-intervention and 
territorial integrity — core principles of legal positivist thinking. Instead, it 
increasingly evidences value receptiveness and intolerance towards states 
representing a threat to common interest. Because the manner in which a state 
is internally organised and the extent to which it protects human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of its citizens manifest either the acceptance or the 
disapproval of global values, only states constituted along liberal democratic 
lines and respecting their human rights obligations are perceived as full 
members of the international community. This new theoretical paradigm has 
been designated as new liberalism and is grounded on an idea that the over-
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inclusive orientation of international law, where democracies and all sort of 
autocracies are equal on the international arena, is being substituted by a 
system in which status of states is defined by their degree of acceptance of 
certain individual rights, including the so-called ‘right to democracy’. 
It is acknowledged that even though new liberalism as a value-based 
conception of international law provides for the needed normative flexibility 
to ground a coherent problem-solving practice, it nonetheless entails 
uncertainty as to the objective nature of values it propagates. Such uncertainty 
involves an unavoidably subjective judgment over the content of these values 
with a view to secure power and control, all too often by means of 
differentiation and subjugation — a practice reminiscent of the nineteenth-
century standard of civilisation. In this sense, the nineteenth-century division 
between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarian’ is now claimed to be reinvigorated in the 
politics of liberal anti-pluralism, whereby states failing to meet neoliberal 
criteria of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are excluded from the 
international community of liberal states as outlaws or pariahs. Although it is 
accepted that there are commonalities between the classical standard and the 
so-called new standard, mostly manifested in the existence of a hierarchy 
between full-right members of the international community and members with 
a less legitimate status, these are compensated by divergences modifying the 
essence of the new standard. Unlike the particularistic and exclusionary 
nineteenth-century standard, the twenty-first-century standard strives for 
universality and inclusion. It is not imposed upon the international community 
but is spawned by the dynamics of contemporary international and national 
systems in search for common denominator. It is further asserted that at no 
point of human history has the international system been immune from values. 
Thus, the standard of civilisation exists as long as the community of states 
interacts in one way or another. It may take more or less exclusive stance, 
assume more or less explicit shape, but at no time is it wholly absent. It is 
concluded that international law should not be artificially stripped of any 
language of civilisation, because this is what legal argument is about – to 
balance between conflicting value visions, but that the new standard, by 
whatever name it is called, is as inclusive as possible to secure legitimacy and 
efficiency of the contemporary international order. 
It has been further established that albeit there are multiple variations of 
new liberal thinking in international law, global constitutionalism represents 
the most sophisticated value-based conception when it comes to maintaining 
balance between law’s normative and positive dimensions. In this sense, 
although global constitutionalism is anchored on a normative idea of a more 
just and efficient world order, it is largely a positive doctrine concerned with 
capturing, mapping and explicating actual transformations taking place in 
international relations. It is therefore a theoretical framework which sees 
constitutionalism as a description and explanation of how international legal 
and political order is changing. Considering the broad variety of academic 
traditions on global constitutionalism, the understanding of global 
constitutionalism as a legal approach and methodological perspective situated 
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within the broader theoretical framework of new liberalism adopted in this 
thesis has been asserted to square around social constitutionalism – an 
academic construction used by Schwöbel to describe a dimension of global 
constitutionalism that views the international sphere as an order of coexistence, 
which is more commonly known under the label of ‘the international 
community school’. Within this paradigm, international legal system has 
undergone a transformation from a sovereignty-centred system (international 
society) to a value-oriented system (international community), which rests on 
three fundamental pillars: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It has 
been determined that not only do democratic credentials constitute the 
legitimacy base of states as members of the international community but also 
legitimacy of the international community rests on international constituency 
based upon domestic democratic participation. Apart from social 
constitutionalism as a leading theoretical paradigm within the variety of 
visions of global constitutionalism, it has been accepted that global 
constitutionalism is deeply intertwined with the domestic doctrine of political 
constitutionalism, characterised by the idea of legislative supremacy and the 
understanding of constitution as a continuous political process. On this 
account, because the international system lacks international constitution as a 
rigid framework of fundamental laws, international actors enjoy wide 
discretion as to how to go on political decisions but within ‘thin’ parameters 
set by global constitutional principles. 
In addition, it has been identified that the empirically solid evidence of 
constitutionalisation in international law is obfuscated by theoretical 
uncertainties lying at the core of the constitutional argument. One of these is 
the assertion that global constitutionalism accommodates both naturalist and 
positivist savours because, on the one hand, it constitutes a set of normative 
standards binding on states irrespective of their will and, on the other, it is 
grounded in the considerations of predictability, legal stability and legality – 
constructions traditionally found in legal positivism. However, such hybrid 
quality of global constitutionalism seems to be at loggerheads with the famous 
disclaimer of critical legal studies that international argument cannot be both 
normative (utopian) and concrete (apologist) because the closer to state 
practice an argument is, the less normative it becomes and vice versa. It has 
been suggested that constitutionalism combines both utopian and apologist 
concerns without tapping into either thereof. It is not utopian to the extent that 
it is based on the consent of states, at least implicitly, to incorporate certain 
global concerns, which individual states are not capable to address on their 
own, into the fabric of international law. Neither is it apologetic for whenever 
constitutionalist values are couched in a legally binding form, they are not easy 
to change by whim and whimsy of individual states. The balance between the 
two opposing poles is maintained by an agent-relative (minimalist) 
understanding of the notion of ‘objectivity’ as a central element of the law’s 
normativity. Thus, ‘objective values’ derive from deliberation based on 
idealised circumstances of complete knowledge and rationality, rather than 
being merely based on deliberation in actual circumstances, are consented to 
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by the community of states and are embedded in the architecture of the 
international legal order. 
Another theoretical difficulty animating the global constitutionalism 
discourse is its putative construction of international law as a narrative of 
progress. It has been acknowledged that because constitutionalisation of 
international law depicts the process of transition from a decentralised 
sovereignty-based system to a system with an elevated constitutional quality, 
it is automatically predicated on an idea of progress — the idea so much 
disfavoured by critical legal scholars. It is commonly accepted that the 
language of progress may give a hopelessly idealistic and simplistic depiction 
of the world, legitimise imperial politics and shift alternative narratives to the 
periphery. Yet, it is established that the narrative of progress is not only 
inevitable but also inalienable for any workable theory of international law 
seeking to provide for practical solutions to ever-emerging new legal problems. 
Global constitutionalism is grounded in progressivism. However, it has been 
shown that unlike mainstream scholarship, which attempts to conceal the 
progress narrative behind a veil of objective reasoning, constitutionalism puts 
the idea of progress at the very centre of its epistemology. Apart from 
transparency, legitimacy of such progressivism is enhanced by the latter’s 
positive character, that is there are empirically established signs of 
constitutionalisation as a progress, not an imperial projection of a certain 
desirable future. Ultimately, global constitutionalism as a discourse of progress 
has been shown to be founded on assumptions that minimise abuse and 
exclusion. First, softening of international law as a layer of global 
constitutionalisation implies that more states than ever before can now 
participate in the process of international law-making because it is easier and 
less costly. Second, the revision of the doctrine of custom implies that more 
credence is given to universal opinio juris that certain norm is desirable and/or 
needed, rather than to individual instances of state practice of the most 
powerful states who possess political authority and economic resources to 
make their actions count. Third, because constitutionalisation of international 
law implies a shift of emphasis from individual state consent to universal 
consensus as the basis of an international legal obligation, sources that more 
easily accommodate common interest, such as general principles of law, 
assume prominence. Because such principles derive from a large number and 
variety of domestic legal systems, obligations they impose are more universal 
than those established by (multilateral) treaty or custom. It has been concluded 
that global constitutionalism is a ‘law-in-context’ approach by virtue of its 
pedigree (political science), methodology (theoretical rather than empirical), 
objectives (assumes a certain progressive stance vis-à-vis international order 
rather than simply preserves the state of affairs) and ultimate audience (broader 
academic community). 
Before exploring anew legal foundations of democracy in the framework 
of global constitutionalism, it has been attempted to construct a novel 
definition of democracy. To this end, the thesis has sketched the main contours 
of the debate on the definition of democracy, which essentially revolves around 
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the discussions on theories and models of democracy. As to the former, 
political science distinguishes between three principal theories of democracy: 
classical theory, procedural theory and substantive theory. Whilst classical 
theory of democracy with its premium on government and individual rights is 
now rather a relic of the past, the debate is currently enduring between the 
adherents of procedural and substantive theories. Whereas procedural 
understanding equates democracy with the process of free, fair and periodic 
elections, substantive approach views democracy as an embodiment of a 
certain core of substantive values and practices, such as equality, 
empowerment and respect for human dignity. While the former is preoccupied 
with electoralism and can thus be easily hijacked by authoritarian regimes 
using elections as their legitimacy base, the latter lacks concrete conceptual 
frames to be workable. 
Such indeterminacy within democratic theory is exacerbated by an 
uncertainty in the debate on the models of democracy: one-party democracy, 
associated with broad public sphere and built on the principle of ‘government 
for the people’, and liberal democracy, characterised by the existence of a 
broad private sphere and grounded in the principle of ‘government by the 
people’. It has been established that even though it is commonly accepted that 
both models can undermine democracy if carried to extremes, it is liberal 
model which is recognised as the sole model compatible with international 
human rights standards. Yet, broad and at times contradictory theoretical 
underpinnings of the concept of liberal democracy, marked by the interplay of 
three broad intellectual traditions, such as liberalism, constitutionalism and 
democracy, as well as the emergence of alternative models of democracy using 
liberal model as a blueprint, hinder an emergence of a common definition of 
democracy even among adherents of the liberal model. 
It is further established that treatment of democracy in international law 
largely mirrors the uncertainties and challenges faced by political scientists, 
albeit the procedural liberal conception seems to considerably dominate 
international legal debate, largely due to its measurability. It revolves around 
the question of elections and their compatibility with international human 
rights law. Within this framework, the thesis identifies several ways in which 
international legal scholars approached the question of democracy. Firstly, the 
entitlement to democracy is derived from already established list of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, the most prominent being rights to elections 
and political participation, what has become to be known as the ‘democratic 
entitlement school’. Secondly, democracy is tied to the existing fabric of 
international law by virtue of the principle of (internal) self-determination, 
whereby the realisation of self-determination can only be conceived in a 
democratic system. A third way to derive democracy from international law is 
to suggest that states are now customarily obliged to be democratic in terms of 
practicing free and fair elections, without such an obligation taking the form 
of a human right or embodying the internal aspect of the principle of self-
determination. Lastly, democracy is argued to be neither a right nor a 
customary obligation to conduct elections but a mere teleological principle, 
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according to which states are obliged to gradually develop towards democracy 
and counter democratic regressions. The aforementioned approaches to 
democracy in international law are adjoined by less popular conceptions: an 
overtly optimistic one, enriching the definition of democracy with a set of 
substantive ingredients in line with substantive theory in political science, and 
an exceedingly pessimistic approach, resisting the international democratic 
parlance tout court. It is subsequently recognised that even though a procedural 
reading of the notion of democracy in international law is currently in the lead, 
it is criticised on many fronts, particularly because it ostensibly conceals and 
neglects the normative essence of democracy as a framework of empowerment 
and equality and thereby renders democracy toothless against manipulation by 
antidemocratic actors. Yet, viewing democracy through the prism of elections 
seems safer and more practical than delving into complex discussions of 
democracy’s normative elements, such as respect for human rights and the rule 
of law, whose empirical ascertainment and measurement are close to 
impossible. It is therefore claimed that because the conventional election-
centred conception of democracy is at loggerheads with the international law’s 
changing attitude toward the character of government regime and the role of 
individual in the international system and because the substantive definition is 
too generic to lay down precise limits for the concept of democracy, a novel 
approach is needed. 
The thesis has eventually developed a novel definition of democracy based 
on contemporary readings of the doctrines of liberalism and constitutionalism 
— two pillars of the global constitutionalism thesis. First, it has been 
postulated that liberal core of global constitutionalism derives from social-
welfare liberalism, which implies that apart from securing freedom from 
arbitrary authority (negative freedom), liberal democratic states should also 
ensure proper conditions for exercising negative rights (positive freedom). 
Secondly, constitutional dimension of global constitutionalism pins on the 
notion of legitimate constitution – a constitution encompassing certain 
procedural and substantive characteristics which secure its role as a bulwark 
against the arbitrary exercise of power. Within this conceptual setting, a limited 
substantive conception of democracy has been suggested, which reads as 
follows: democracy is a system of government established through the process 
of periodic, free, fair and genuine elections based on universal suffrage in 
multiparty setting guaranteeing continuous political participation (by means of 
vote and other democratic institutions, such as referendums and civil society 
organisations) on conditions of equality and non-discrimination as well as 
protection of a certain core of socio-economic rights and operating on the basis 
of a legitimate constitution founded on the principles of checks and balances, 
divisions of power and the rule of law. This definition encompasses five central 
elements: electoral, liberal-constitutional, participatory, deliberative and 
egalitarian. On this account, democracy originates in elections but does not end 
there as it represents a series of rights, both procedural and substantive, that 
are mutually reinforcing. Democracy is not a mere means to reach power but 
is an end in itself because it ensures the realisation of the fundamental 
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capabilities of all members of society on conditions of equality and non-
discrimination. The present definition, as runs the argument, does not solve all 
the complexities animating the concept of democracy. Yet, it overcomes major 
deficiencies of the previous definitions and conceptions of democracy and 
provides a flexible framework for accommodating local variations. 
The thesis proceeds to map legal roots of democracy in the framework of 
global constitutionalism. Against the backdrop of global constitutionalism’s 
overwhelmingly positive underpinnings, it is asserted that the twenty-first-
century international law exhibits strong empirical evidence of its 
constitutionalisation by acknowledging ‘non-consensual’ elements within 
international law as forming an integral part of international legal obligation. 
These non-consensual elements now transcend every domain of (general) 
international law concerned with the emergence and ascertainment of legal 
norms, including treaty interpretation, formation of custom, the soft law 
doctrine and general principles of law. It is firstly established that the textual 
approach to treaty interpretation, that is in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the treaty text, is not sufficient in the context of human rights 
treaties, whose primary objective is the protection of the basic rights of 
individual human beings, not the ascertainment of the drafters’ intent. It 
follows that the principal depositary of the right to democracy — article 25 
ICCPR — is to be interpreted teleologically and evolutively because such 
approach to interpretation is implied by the nature of human rights treaties, is 
in accordance with the VCLT and is supported by international and regional 
practices. As to teleological interpretation, it is posited that even though the 
notion of object and purpose, whose identification lies at the core of the 
teleological approach to interpretation, remains an enigma, it is a common 
practice to look at preambles of treaties, treaty’s overall text as well as 
subsequent state practice, including extraneous standards, as evidence of a 
treaty’s object and purpose. Because the object and purpose of the ICCPR is 
the promotion of human dignity, equality, self-realisation and political 
empowerment, these can only be secured in a democratic polity guaranteeing 
a genuine plurality of political choices. This conclusion is reinforced by 
subsequent state practice through the venues of international and regional 
bodies supporting pro-democracy reading of article 25 ICCPR, including by 
the universal endorsement of the standard of free and fair elections, as well as 
by the holistic interpretation of other Covenant provisions, whose objects and 
purposes not only do not contradict the object and purpose of article 25 read 
along democratic lines but also rely on the democratic system for their 
realisation. The thesis concludes that teleological interpretation of article 25 
ICCPR restricts the liberty of individual states to choose their form of 
government. This is applicable only to states parties to the Covenant, with 
signatories remaining unbound by the democratic requirement. 
It has been further claimed that teleological interpretation implies 
evolutive reading of treaty terms, that is treaty provisions are to be interpreted 
in the context of modern developments, such as state practice, and against the 
background of general international law of the day. Particularly a treaty’s 
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interpretation and application in view of its relationship with a wider normative 
system is an important precept of the evolutionary approach, what has become 
to be known as a theory of systemic integration. The thesis has established that 
the applicable general international law, constituting a broader normative 
environment affecting the interpretation of a treaty, is not only the law in force 
at the time the treaty was drafted but also at the time when the treaty is applied. 
Moreover, such general international law refers to all the existing sources of 
international law, including other treaties, custom, general principles and even 
soft law. It follows that regional human rights practices, such as a living 
instrument doctrine and the principle of commonly accepted standards, 
constitute a normative background against which the provisions of the ICCPR, 
including its article 25, are to be interpreted. Such interpretative practices, as 
the thesis has further submitted, are fully in accordance with the VCLT and 
represent the application of general international law’s principles of systemic 
integration and internal coherence in the human rights context. Therefore, 
reading the Covenant, including its article 25, as a ‘living instrument’ and in 
the light of modern ‘commonly accepted standards’, such as, for example, the 
widely endorsed concepts of ‘genuine elections’ and ‘free expression of the 
will of the electors’, inevitably implies liberal democratic form of government. 
It has been eventually concluded that the net outcome of teleological and 
evolutive interpretation of the ICCPR is an international obligation imposed 
upon states by article 25 to introduce and maintain democratic form of 
governance. 
Because the principle of systemic integration assumes that all sources of 
international law, including other treaties, custom, general principles and soft 
law instruments, must be taken into account in the interpretation of treaty 
provisions, this thesis submits that drawing support from other norms of 
international law in outlining and reinforcing legal underpinnings of the right 
to democracy is essential for the latter’s normative robustness and legitimacy. 
That said, the second non-consensual element forming theoretical and legal 
base for the democratic entitlement is an evolving doctrine of custom. It is first 
established that whereas traditionally conceptualised state practice, 
characterised by the creation and operation of election monitoring missions, 
maintenance of membership conditionality in the statutes of a number of 
international organisations, establishment of democratic conditionality in 
development policies, adherence to democratic standards in state creation and 
recognition practices as well as adoption of forcible measures against non-
democracies, seemingly lays down customary basis for the right to democracy, 
it is eventually recognised as falling short of being consistent and durable 
enough to result in the establishment of a customary norm of democracy.  
The modern approach to custom evolved from judicial and practical 
experience in response to the rigidity of the traditional ‘state practice plus 
opinio juris’ approach. It is argued that a customary norm can emerge even in 
the absence of general and consistent state practice as long as opinio juris, that 
is a belief that a norm is legally mandated, can be effectively determined from 
other sources of evidence, e.g. verbal statements, and is in accordance with 
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internationally recognised constitutional principles. Regardless of resonant 
critique prevising that the modern approach is deficient on theoretical and 
formalistic grounds, this thesis argues that the process of the modern custom 
formation is not only a conscious, egalitarian and deliberate process based on 
universal participation of all state parties irrespective of economic wealth and 
political power but is also legally sound and supported by international judicial 
practice. It is therefore established that states’ pro-democracy pronouncements 
on the international stage materialised in, inter alia, UNGA resolutions, 
resolutions of the former UN Human Rights Commission and its successor the 
Human Rights Council as well as general comments by the ICCPR Human 
Rights Committee, constitute a treasure house of international opinio juris 
regarding the legal standing and content of the democratic entitlement norm. 
Taken together, they provide a broad international consensus on the central 
procedural, institutional and substantive building blocks of democracy, such as 
the protection of the freedoms of association, assembly, expression, conscience 
and opinion, the right to political participation, the right to free and fair 
elections, respect for the rule of law, the separation of powers, the 
independence of the judiciary and political pluralism, based on full 
participation of all parties and ethnic groups. It is further asserted that the 
persistent objector rule cannot obliterate such international consensus because 
most states do not explicitly claim being non-democracies but instead 
defensively assert a special character of their democracies, which means that 
they fail to evidence their objection in a clear and consistent manner, and 
because by participating in the UN human rights regime states have already 
consented to the universality of human rights, including the right to democracy, 
and are thus estopped from raising objections. The thesis concludes that the 
right to democracy reflects customary international law. 
A third domain of international law affected by global 
constitutionalisation, which has a direct bearing on the legal standing of the 
democratic entitlement, is the doctrine of sources itself. It has been established 
that the classical doctrine of sources, embodied in article 38 of the ICJ Statute, 
cannot serve as a rigid framework of reference for all the materials and forms 
of state practice that constitute today’s avenues of law-creation and law-
ascertainment, because it is anachronistic, theoretically controversial, 
incoherent and unable to capture the diversity of modern law-making practices. 
The framework of global constitutionalism provides a theoretical base and 
empirical justification for a more attenuated vision of the doctrine. It has been 
thus submitted that whereas article 38 of the ICJ Statute retains its place as the 
epicentre of law-ascertainment, it is not exhaustive and serves as a focal point 
for the incorporation of other manifestations of normativity, such as soft law. 
Softening of international law, as the thesis has suggested, is a layer of 
global constitutionalisation because global constitutional principles find their 
most frequent and elaborate endorsement in non-binding instruments. As 
regards the right to democracy, non-binding instruments, such as non-treaty 
commitments by the international and regional organisations, provide for the 
most sophisticated account of democracy as a human right and a global value. 
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Particularly in Europe, Africa and the Americas, elaborated and deliberately 
norm creating non-treaty provisions on democracy reflect global 
understanding on constitutive elements of democracy going well beyond the 
procedural straitjacket. Whilst it has been eventually acknowledged that the 
right to democracy cannot be derived solely from non-treaty commitments, it 
has been nonetheless concluded that soft law instruments exert a strong impact 
on the conceptual scope of the democratic entitlement and constitute an 
essential stage of its legal evolution, not to mention the fact that soft law serves 
an important evidence of universal opinio juris and even state practice as well 
as constitutes the overall legal framework against which the treaty provisions 
on democracy are to be interpreted. 
Ultimately, the fourth foundational field of international law constituting 
both engine and object of global constitutionalisation is that of general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations. It has been conceded that a 
rare recourse to general principles as a full-standing legal source by the World 
Court and broader scholarly community is unjustified since akin to more 
conventional sources, such as treaty and custom, they are formal (they are 
explicitly mentioned in article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute as sources which the 
Court shall apply in dispute resolution) and consensual (they are anchored in a 
large number of domestic legal systems). It has been further asserted that by 
virtue of their elasticity and abstractedness, on the one hand, and solid legal 
base, on the other, general principles are the ultimate mechanism of law 
creation capable of easily accommodating universal values without watering 
down the considerations of legality. This involves important legal implications 
for the democratic entitlement thesis. Because equity has been acknowledged 
as the most relevant sub-category of general principles recognised by civilised 
nations in the context of the present research due to its overwhelming 
acceptance in national legal orders and wide application by the World Court, 
such a sub-range of equitable principles as good faith, estoppel, acquiesce and 
substance over form have been recognised as laying down equitable 
foundations for the right to democracy. Since the primary aim of such 
principles is to ensure that a particular norm is applied justly, they provide an 
important justificatory base for the democratic entitlement as a right to just and 
fair political participation based on considerations of human dignity, equality, 
liberty and empowerment. Moreover, akin to soft law, general principles 
constitute general international law to be accounted for when interpreting 
treaty provisions. It has been therefore concluded that the right to democratic 
governance is now an international legal norm. 
The democratic entitlement thesis has eventually been scrutinised in terms 
of its practical application to demonstrate that not only is it an academic 
construct, but it is actively enforced by the international community on the 
international and regional levels. It has been asserted that the most prominent 
feature of international and regional enforcement mechanisms is the collective 
response to unconstitutional changes of governments, such as military coups 
and executive coups, formalised through the adoption of international 
instruments containing so-called ‘democracy clauses’ – provisions envisaging 
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sanctions in response to democratic threats. The thesis has identified several 
systems for defending democracy by multilateral means: global system of the 
external defence of democracy and regional systems in Europe, the Americas, 
Africa and Asia. Global mechanism of the external response in defence of 
democracy has been said to derive from articles 30 UDHR and 5 ICCPR, 
prohibiting interpretation of the respective instruments in a way detrimental to 
any rights and freedoms set forth therein, as well as Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, establishing a collective security mechanism to deal with threats to 
international peace and security, with democracy overthrows amounting to 
such threats. The latter mechanism has been asserted to play a key role in terms 
of robustness and efficacy of response to recalcitrant behaviour, including 
attacks on democracy. While it has been acknowledged that the collective 
action system to defend democracy is limited to cases when attacks against the 
democratic order are defined by the SC as threats to international peace and 
security, the effectiveness of the global mechanism is to be evaluated more 
broadly than by a sheer number of authorised interventions. These may include 
responses in the form of verbal condemnations expressed on the international 
arena, which are equally important for breeding the culture of intolerance to 
undemocratic politics and aid in the creation of opinio juris within the broader 
process of customary law formation. 
At the European level, the system of external defence of democracy has 
been developed within the framework of three regional organisations: the CoE, 
the OSCE and the EU. The CoE’s democracy clause is enshrined in article 8 
of its Statute and the ECHR, whose articles 17 and 8-11 laid ground for the 
doctrine of ‘militant democracy’ as a tool to prevent nondemocratic actors 
from undermining democratic institutions. The OSCE laid down foundations 
for its own system of democracy protection in several key documents, such as 
the Copenhagen Document, the Charter of Paris, the Moscow Document and 
the Prague Document, which have had a significant impact on events in the 
region despite their non-treaty form. The EU, in its turn, codified the 
democracy clause in article 7 TEU, whose allegedly politicised nature is 
mitigated by the combined application of article 2 TEU, providing for values 
underpinning the EU, including democracy, and article 20 TFEU, 
incorporating EU citizenship rights, whose substance can be defined by 
reference to article 2 TEU values. Another EU’s democracy-defending 
mechanism has been claimed to reside in articles 258-260 TFEU enabling the 
infringement proceedings for non-compliance with European law, including 
general and persistent violations, which is viewed as a middle ground between 
the Article 7 TEU procedure and the conventional individual-based application 
of article 258 TFEU. It has been conceded that whereas the high degree of 
institutionalisation and cross-organisational interplay have generated greater 
levels of commitment and compliance with democratic norms in Europe, the 
enforcement of democratic clauses across the three forums is far from uniform, 
stretching from the weak systems of oversight and strong reliance on state will 
of the CoE and the OSCE to the developed institutional framework of 
monitoring and enforcement within the EU, which is nevertheless 
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geographically limited to 28 states and whose overwhelmingly political and 
economic agenda all too often clouds democratic commitments. 
The American collective system of defence of democracy, as the thesis has 
proceeded to opine, has been institutionalised through four important 
documents: the Santiago Commitment, Resolution 1080, the Protocol of 
Washington and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The most exemplary 
feature of these instruments is the explicit prohibition of an unconstitutional 
interruption of the democratic order. The IADC has been recognised as the 
most paradigmatic inter-American instrument for promoting and enforcing 
democratic practices in the states of Hemisphere since it targets not only 
traditional democratic reversals, such as military coups, but also more 
sophisticated ways of usurpation of constitutional processes, namely executive 
coups. Yet, the exploitation of the full potential of the American mechanism 
of democracy defence is still hindered by the leading role of the principle of 
non-intervention enshrined in the OAS Charter, which led some American 
scholars to designate their regional system of collective action as ‘intervention 
without intervening’. 
It is further established that the African region developed one of the most 
robust systems of the collective defence of democracy. Its key instruments, the 
2000 Lomé Declaration, the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU and the 2007 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Government incorporate the 
democracy clauses by prohibiting unconstitutional changes of government and 
envisaging a set of sanctions against coup-plotters, such as the suspension of 
the membership rights and the imposition of other punitive measures, including 
travel bans, visa restrictions and trade limitations. The thesis proceeds to 
submit that the African Democracy Charter contains so extensive provisions 
with respect to unconstitutional changes of government, up to the possibility 
of military intervention into a member state whose democratic order has been 
endangered by an unconstitutional usurpation, that the illegitimate usurpation 
of power in Africa is now to be considered a ‘crime against democracy’. This 
notwithstanding, it is noted that the African collective mechanism of defence 
against democratic disruptions suffers from a lack of a principled approach in 
its anti-coup policy, whereby various gradations of legitimacy of toppled 
regimes and as well as the extent of democratisation of incumbent regimes 
should attract a more balanced consideration. 
Ultimately, it is demonstrated that the vast region of Asia features the 
weakest commitment to democratic politics since most of the regional 
organisations in Asia have not adopted the democracy clause on the level of 
statutory law, with the politics of soft diplomacy, informality and discussion 
retaining a firm position. Yet, this thesis asserts that a gradual change from the 
policy of non-intervention to that of ‘constructive engagement’ with the issues 
relating to the internal regime of a state is traceable in the recent practice and 
statements by ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum and the Commonwealth. The 
three organisations did not only proclaim the validity of democratic principles 
in the Asian region but also showed their allegiance to democratic ideals in 
their practice of non-recognition of authoritarian regimes and sanctioning 
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recalcitrant governments by suspending their membership rights, albeit such 
practice remains largely ad hoc and confined to quite diplomacy and 
consensus. All in all, it is concluded that albeit the aforementioned mechanisms 
of external defence of democracy on the global scale and in regions vary 
significantly in scope, robustness and the extent of institutionalisation of the 
applied measures, stretching from the practice of stringent military defence of 
democracy in Africa to the Asian soft model of flexible engagement, they 
exemplify a remarkable consensus on one crucial point: once put in practice, 
the right to live in a democratically organised state shall not be abridged, and 
any attempts to do so will face international condemnation. 
Because the external mechanisms of collective action in defence of 
democracy leave much space for improvements in view of their politicisation, 
inconsistencies, selectivity and regional peculiarities, it has been further 
suggested that ascertaining the legal framework for internal response to 
democratic transgressions is an inalienable constitutive part of the enforcement 
dimension of the right to democracy. Thus, the enforcement aspect of the 
democratic entitlement thesis, and hence to a certain degree its conceptual 
soundness, have been amplified by the development and conceptualisation of 
the notion of the internal mechanism of democracy defence and enforcement, 
namely the right to revolution. It has been asserted that the bottom-up 
mechanism of democracy defence by means of revolution is an ultima ratio 
tool to restore democracy and an ultimate remedy to effectuate the right to 
democratic governance. This mode of remedy is particularly acute on the face 
of the international community’s inability to enforce international human 
rights. 
The thesis has consequently discussed revolution’s conceptual and 
philosophical foundations, whose detailed examination was considered to be 
specifically pertinent on the foot of revolution’s ambiguous legal status. As to 
the conceptual framework of revolution, it has been claimed that revolution 
should be understood as a political phenomenon concerned with a change in 
the location of sovereignty. It is characterised by four key elements: violence, 
mass mobilisation, rapidity and impact. On this account, a revolution is a mass 
uprising aimed at the unseating of the (repressive) ruling government along 
with the fundamental change of the institutional structure of the political 
system, typically pursued by violent means and in disobedience to the laws of 
the implicated state. It has been further asserted that even though the notion of 
revolution is increasingly becoming elastic and ‘transcendental’, because it 
also depicts modern struggles by ever-broader strata of actors emancipated by 
the progressive human rights rhetoric, who seek only a limited change in policy 
within their respective governments, it is to be distinguished from other modes 
of resistance, such as civil disobedience and coup d’état. 
It is subsequently submitted that apart from the established conceptual 
boundaries, the concept of revolution has deep intellectual roots transcending 
major legal traditions and geographical regions. It is asserted that the 
emergence and development of the right to revolution across the globe has a 
common feature, namely the idea that the right of resistance was coined as a 
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check against abusive state power. Its evaluative function of government 
performance was first based on certain external standard, such as God, nature 
and reason, and later on it was derived from the social underpinnings of the 
state itself, such as the social contract theory. The idea of revolution as a right 
remains alive up until today due to its codification in a wide array of 
constitutional documents across the globe. The thesis concludes that whereas 
the views of the world-renowned philosophers do not carry legal authority per 
se, as they used to do in the past, they provide an important evidence of the 
right to revolution’s global pedigree and acceptance on the level of ideas. 
This thesis eventually proceeds to discuss the complex legal status of the 
right to revolution. Albeit it is commonly posited that international law does 
not address the question of legal standing of revolution, the thesis illustrates 
that revolution has occasioned direct and long-term effects on the evolution 
and development of international law, the most pronounced of which is the 
establishment of the value code of international law through the promotion of 
such fundamental principles as human rights, self-determination, solidarity, 
equality and democratic legitimacy. Another way in which revolution enriched 
the architecture of international law is through the doctrine of revolutionary 
legality, according to which the legality of a revolutionary government is 
assessed through the prism of its efficacy. Yet, it is argued that much of what 
has been written on the topic so far is limited in context, nature and scope and 
the concept of revolution remains largely under-theorised. Moreover, the 
advancement of democracy as a human right and the corollary need to protect 
and restore it whenever it is in danger inevitably entails the investigation of the 
concept of revolution from a wholly new angle, that is as a last remedy against 
antidemocratic usurpers. Against this background, it is asserted that the legality 
of revolution (as a remedy) can be established on five grounds: revolution as a 
human right, revolution as a self-defence, revolution as a general principle of 
law, revolution as a legitimate belligerency and revolution as a legal remedy. 
However, it is subsequently established that none of the aforementioned 
justifications secures the lawfulness of revolution on the level of first-order 
legal rules. First, it is accepted that while the international human rights 
framework provides for intellectual foundations for the right to revolution, it 
does not expressly recognise the right, nor does the right in question fit neatly 
into the human rights theory. Second, the legal validity of the notion of 
revolution as a right to resist grave and sustainable human rights violations 
committed by an oppressive government can be defended within the 
framework of personal (as opposed to interstate) self-defence, which can be 
claimed to be itself both a general principle of law and a customary norm 
transcending such foundational areas of international law as international 
criminal law, the law of state responsibility and the law of the use of force. 
Yet, because the notion of personal self-defence lacks a clear legal ground in 
international law, the constellation built on this scheme is fragile and open to 
contestation. Third, the right to revolution can be characterised in and of itself 
as a general principle of law recognised by civilised nations by virtue of its 
entrenchment in the texts of world’s constitutions. However, it is eventually 
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admitted that since only the minority of constitutional provisions of domestic 
systems explicitly mention the right to resist by any means, with other 
constitutions merely implying the right or failing to acknowledge it at all, and 
there is no clear method of abstracting a general principle out of these 
provisions, not to mention the fact that such recognition would be at 
loggerheads with the fundamental precepts of constitutional thought, it is 
submitted that the right to revolution cannot be viewed as a general principle 
of law under this scheme. Fourth, another appropriate normative framework 
within which the legal base of the right to revolution can be established is IHL. 
It is posited that due to the evolving scope of the concept of self-determination, 
revolutionary struggles against oppression may amount to self-determination 
battles within the meaning of article 1 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions 
and can thus be equated to international armed conflicts, whose participants 
enjoy the highest degree of protection under IHL. Whilst it is consequently 
acknowledged that the provisions of humanitarian law on self-determination 
movements undoubtedly reinforce the international standing of revolutions as 
liberation struggles against oppressive regimes and thereby implicitly 
recognise their legitimacy, the relevance of the IHL framework for revolutions 
is rather meagre considering the fact that revolutions all too often either do not 
meet the threshold of a war or are deliberately characterised as such for the 
reasons of political convenience. Finally, it is asserted that the right to 
revolution as a remedy against human rights violations and government 
oppression springs from the principle ubi ius, ubi remedium – an equitable 
principle meaning that for every wrong committed there must be an adequate 
remedy. Even though the principle concerned was invoked by the PCIJ and the 
ICJ on numerous occasions and is hence recognised as being the most robust 
legal justification for the right to revolution, the content of the principle as well 
as precise modalities of its application are highly ambiguous, not to mention 
the fact that the World Court has never pronounced itself on the issue of the 
right to revolution as a remedy in its jurisprudence. Thus, it is concluded that 
the principle of ubi ius, ubi remedium does not secure the legality of the right 
to revolution on the level of first-tier legal norms. 
In view of the aforementioned, this thesis proceeds to opine that the five 
enlisted normative frameworks within which the right to revolution can be 
justified do not uphold the legality of the right to revolution as a first-order 
legal norm. Instead, each of them appeals to the right’s second-tier character, 
assuming that it is only to be activated in response to the violation of a first-
tier legal norm and only as a measure of last resort. It is hence concluded that 
the right to revolution is at best a right sui generis because it does not stand for 
any objective value akin to a conventional catalogue of human rights but 
serves, instead, a subsidiary role of an exceptional remedy to fill a gap when 
traditional channels of legal action are not available or their effectiveness is 
considerably compromised. 
Since the concept of a right sui generis has no clear doctrinal foundation, 
this thesis has proceeded to demystify this construction by reference to the 
formula of an ‘illegal but justifiable’ action as features in the post-Kosovo 
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practice of recognition of an action as illegal but legitimate if the latter adheres 
to a certain stratum of ethical constraints, mostly derived from the just war 
theory. The application of such formula to the notion of revolution with a view 
to clarifying the latter’s extraordinary sui generis status is effectuated through 
the prism of the substantive conception of legitimacy, which is, in its turn, used 
as a nexus between the morally-laden framework of the just war theory and the 
law proper. To this end, the thesis proceeds to examine the notion of legitimacy 
in international law. It is accepted that whereas legitimacy is traditionally 
equated to legality, that is what is legitimate is what law requires and vice versa 
(procedural legitimacy), the modern legal discourse increasingly views 
legitimacy as assuming a dichotomous relationship with legality by appealing 
to such extra-legal standards as justice, fairness, morality and human rights – 
what has become to be known as substantive legitimacy. The global 
endorsement of substantive conception of legitimacy is most illustratively 
evidenced by the post-Kosovo adoption of the ‘illegal but justifiable’ approach 
as a tool to fill the gap between what legality requires and what morality 
demands. Even though the formula was conceived in the context of 
humanitarian intervention, its extrapolation to the notion of the right of 
revolution is claimed to be justified by the close moral proximity between the 
doctrines of humanitarian intervention and revolution as well as the broad 
international practice of resort to legitimacy arguments in situations where 
blind following of the letter of law would lead to unjust results. It is concluded 
that the concept of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution provides for the most 
adequate normative framework for accommodating the legally indeterminate 
construction of revolution as a sui generis right. 
The thesis proceeds to submit that the concept of ‘illegal but justifiable’ 
revolution is tainted with uncertainties animating the qualifier ‘justifiable’. 
This is well reflected in the contemporary ‘terrorists v freedom fighters’ 
dilemma, whereby what one views as terrorism (unjustifiable violence) another 
can view as freedom-fighting (justifiable violence). This means that there 
exists an inherent conceptual permeability between the notions of terrorism 
and revolution. Thus, the notion of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution does not 
only introduce a novel framework within which one could reimagine such 
distinction but its conceptual integrity in fact depends on the possibility to draw 
a clear line between terrorist and revolutionary violence. Otherwise the concept 
is, as the argument runs, useless. Whenever the issue of violence enters legal 
debate and the appropriate setting of first-order legal norms is deficient or non-
existent, international practice shows that the recourse is typically made to the 
second-tier principles of the just war theory. The thesis thus sought to construct 
the notion of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution through a prism of the second-
order ethical rules originating in the JWT by counterpoising legitimate 
(freedom-fighting) and illegitimate non-state use of armed force (terrorism). 
The notion of terrorism as the most acute constraining factor within any debate 
on the permissibility of non-state violence is hence taken as a contrasting 
example to facilitate the understanding of strengths and possible limits of the 
application of the just war criteria to the concept of revolution. Moreover, since 
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in international law the legitimate recourse to force by non-state actors is most 
commonly associated with freedom-fighting (or national liberation, to use the 
terminology of international law), the link between this and revolution is 
revisited to assert that not only is revolution conceptually close to the notion 
of freedom-fighting, but also the revolutionary cause of defending democracy 
and human rights has come to enlarge the concept of freedom-fighting due to 
the evolving nature of the principle of self-determination, which underpins 
both revolutionary and national liberation struggles. In this sense, because 
apart from battles against colonial domination, alien occupation and racist 
regimes, the concept of freedom-fighting has broadened to include other self-
determination causes, including fights against systemic and systematic 
violations of human rights and government oppression, revolutionary struggles 
for democracy and human rights are claimed to constitute a modern variation 
of freedom-fighting. 
The applicability of the principled framework of ethical constraints 
derived from the JWT as a normative setting for the notion of ‘illegal but 
justifiable’ revolution is defended on the ground of wide international practice 
of recourse to the second-tier principles of the JWT in situations involving non-
state use of force, significant scholarly support, the fact that most of the JWT 
principles now constitute part of positive international law, both the laws of 
war and the laws of peace, and conceptual flexibility of the JWT rendering it 
responsive to modern types of conflicts waged by non-state actors as well as 
conflicts falling short of war. The thesis thus proceeds to delineate the notion 
of ‘illegal but justified’ revolution through a prism of the second-order rules 
originating in the JWT, such as legitimate cause, legitimate means, legitimate 
target and a set of legitimate conditions, including subsidiarity, legitimate 
authority and reasonable prospect of success. First, the legitimacy of cause is 
ascertained by reference to international legal principles of self-defence and 
self-determination, recognising the permissibility of non-state use of force in 
defence of human rights and democracy. Whenever non-state violence crosses 
the threshold of an armed conflict, IHL is an applicable framework, whereby 
the legitimacy of cause (achievement of national liberation as a means of the 
realisation of self-determination) is the ground for the full applicability of the 
laws of war. Second, the adherence to fundamental principles of IHL, such as 
proportionality, distinction and military necessity, in the time of war, and 
underlying principles of IHRL, such as proportionality, necessity, respect for 
non-derogable rights and peremptory norms, in the time of peace, signifies a 
priori legitimacy of means employed by non-state actors resorting to military 
force and thus distinguishes them from terrorists, provided that other criteria 
are met. Third, it is posited that whilst the goals of terrorists and freedom 
fighters may well be identical, they are distinguished from each other by the 
targets of their operations. In this sense, non-state violence against 
authoritarian states is more legitimate than against liberal democracies. 
Moreover, whereas terrorism primarily entails intentional targeting of civilians 
to produce shock and awe, revolutionaries only attack combatants or personnel 
and infrastructure that is directly responsible for the maintaining political 
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oppression. Finally, a set of legitimate conditions act as a sort of glue holding 
the three principal legitimacy criteria together. It is established that violence is 
more legitimate if applied as last resort, after all peaceful means to resolve the 
issue, including administrative, judicial and constitutional, have been 
exhausted (subsidiarity). Further, in order for non-state groups to be 
acknowledged as pursuing legitimate cause, they have to show that they 
represent the aspirations of the majority of population and act with their 
support (legitimate authority). Ultimately, it is pointed out that the requirement 
of reasonable prospect of success cannot serve as an effective criterion of 
legitimacy of political violence because force should be either overwhelming 
to secure the legitimate aims or should be avoided entirely, which does not 
reflect the realities of revolutionary struggles. Within this setting, it is 
concluded that revolution is ‘illegal but justifiable’ whenever it is undertaken 
in defence of human rights (legitimate cause), abides by the relevant norms of 
international law (legitimate means), targets representatives of oppressive 
regime (legitimate target), is exercised as a means of last resort (subsidiarity) 
and represents aspirations of the majority of population (legitimate authority). 
Albeit it is accepted that the aforementioned stratum of second-order ethical 
principles does not fully resolve the unusual sui generis status of the right to 
revolution and modalities of its exercise, it introduces additional avenues for 
debate over controversial conduct and provides a setting of more controlled 
criteria for the interpretation of first-tier legal rules with a view of adapting 
those to changing circumstances. It is concluded that to affirm exceptional 
legitimacy of political violence in furtherance of revolution is not only to 
generally recognise that the very existence of human rights plainly depends on 
the possibility of (violent) resistance in cases of their sustained and mass 
violations but also to accept the specific claim of this thesis, namely that 
revolution is an ultimate measure of democracy defence and thus constitutes 
the central element of the enforcement dimension of the democratic 
entitlement. 
The complex theoretical construct of ‘illegal but justifiable’ revolution as 
a means of democracy enforcement is subsequently proven to find support in 
state practice. International condoning and endorsement of such 
democratically inspired revolutions of the twentieth-firth century as the Arab 
Spring of 2010-12, including the most illustrative cases of Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria, and the Ukrainian Euromaidan revolution of 2013-14 exhibit 
strong evidence of international support of revolution as a measure of 
democracy promotion and democracy defence. As the thesis has demonstrated, 
the international community undertook a variety of actions in response to these 
pro-democracy upheavals: undemocratic governments have been designated as 
‘illegitimate’ with their leaders being called on to resign; sanctions have been 
introduced against governments refusing to cede to the demands of popular 
protests; the cause of anti-government resistance was internationally 
recognised as legitimate; rebel groups fighting for democracy were assisted by 
foreign states; the use of force by the protestors was not explicitly condemned 
by the international community; military force has been used against a 
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repressive government leading to a regime change and an instalment of a 
democratic government; and revolutionary governments have been recognised, 
albeit to different degree, by the international community despite the lack of 
all necessary credentials of political legitimacy. On the foot of the 
aforementioned instances of international practice, it has been argued that the 
international community implicitly accepted non-state violence in furtherance 
of revolution as a means to advance peoples’ democratic aspirations. 
The thesis further asserts that the above-enlisted instances of state practice 
coupled with the international endorsement of the democratic coups d’état in 
Algeria, Niger, Mauritania, Egypt and Thailand evidence the crystallisation of 
the right to revolution into a customary norm, albeit with a qualifier 
‘emerging’. Such peculiar standing of the right to revolution in customary 
international law is due to the fact that opinio juris underpinning state practice 
in support of revolution is somewhat deficient because it is grounded less on a 
sense of obligation that such practice is legally required and more on the moral 
concerns of unacceptability of state violence with respect to its subjects, not to 
mention the overall political background within which such international 
responses evolved and took shape. Even though it is established that the 
modern approach to the identification of the subjective element of custom is 
constantly progressing towards one accommodating fundamental ethical 
principles, which reflect state beliefs about the desirability of custom (rather 
than about its actual existence), and one based on assumption that the existence 
of opinio juris can also be derived from the principle of legitimate 
expectations, it is concluded that the customary status of the right to revolution 
cannot be effectively defended on the basis thereof. First, it is asserted that the 
right to revolution assumes uneasy relationship with fundamental ethical 
principles, such as the inherent value of human life. Second, the ascertainment 
of state beliefs with respect to the desirability of certain practice is even more 
problematic than with respect to the practice that is already required. Third, the 
principle of legitimate expectations has proven to be too vague and subjective 
to aid in the determination of opinio juris. 
Another complexity animating the qualification of the right to revolution 
as customary has been shown to relate to the lack of sufficient conceptual 
affinity between revolutions and democratic coups. Whereas both concepts 
feature a number of crucial points of convergence, of which the most 
significant one is the involvement of a large portion of the population, the 
concept of democratic military coup is more controversial due to its proneness 
to abuse. Consequently, the value of the cases where military coups staged in 
response to mass popular demands of greater democratisation met positive 
international reactions is only of a limited significance when it comes to the 
ascertainment of the customary nature of the right to revolution. On top of that, 
it is accepted that prevalent political concerns behind state reactions to both 
revolutions and democratic coups, combined with the fact that the above-
discussed cases of international support of anti-government force are rather 
exceptional, provide additional counterarguments against the right to 
revolution as a customary norm. It is concluded that the right to revolution has 
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not yet crystallised into a full-fledged norm of customary international law. 
Rather, in view of wide international support of people’s struggles for 
democracy and human rights implicating such fundamental areas of 
international law as recognition of states and governments and state legitimacy, 
the right to revolution can fairly be characterised as an emerging customary 
norm. 
All in all, this dissertation concludes that international law recognises the 
right to democracy and provides for the external and internal mechanisms of 
its defence and enforcement. For some this might sound as a revolutionary 
claim, but as Allott astutely observed, ‘[w]e are living in revolutionary times’.2 
These are times in which ‘[t]he internal and the external, the national and the 
international, are now completely flowing into each other’.3 This claim 
continues to be echoed today4 and constitutes the bedrock of the present work 
— the work that has taken a step forward to add shade and texture to the black 
and white discussions on democracy of the previous years.
                                               
2 Philip Allott, ‘Review Essay Symposium: Philip Allott’s Eunomia and The Health of Nations 
— Thinking Another World: “This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be”’ (2005) 16 
EJIL 255, 257. 
3 Philip Allott, ‘Roundtable — War, Force, and Revolution’ (2006) 100 ASIL Proc 261, 263. 
4 See Owen Taylor, ‘Reclaiming Revolution’ (2011) 22 FYBIL 259, 272; Jacqueline Rose, 
‘What More Could We Want of Ourselves!’ (2011) 33 London Rev of Books 5, 5. 
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